Update 4.1 Kernel to 4.1.6 #41
Closed
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This reverts commit 956b200.
Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>
This patch introduces regmap_get_max_register() function which would be used by the infrastructures like nvmem framework built on top of regmap. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
This patch introduces regmap_get_reg_stride() function which would be used by the infrastructures like nvmem framework built on top of regmap. Mostly this function would be used for sanity checks on inputs within such infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
The beaglebone family of boards contain two I2C busses enabled. The first one with a baseboard identification EEPROM and a cape I2C bus. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
Mark (and unmark) device nodes with the POPULATE flag as appropriate. This is required to avoid multi probing when using I2C and device overlays containing a mux. This patch is also more careful with the release of the adapter device which caused a deadlock with muxes, and does not break the build on !OF since the node flag accessors are not defined then. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
This patch adds just providers part of the framework just to enable easy review. Up until now, NVMEM drivers like eeprom were stored in drivers/misc, where they all had to duplicate pretty much the same code to register a sysfs file, allow in-kernel users to access the content of the devices they were driving, etc. This was also a problem as far as other in-kernel users were involved, since the solutions used were pretty much different from on driver to another, there was a rather big abstraction leak. This introduction of this framework aims at solving this. It also introduces DT representation for consumer devices to go get the data they require (MAC Addresses, SoC/Revision ID, part numbers, and so on) from the nvmems. Having regmap interface to this framework would give much better abstraction for nvmems on different buses. Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]> [Maxime Ripard: intial version of eeprom framework] Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch adds just consumers part of the framework just to enable easy review. Up until now, nvmem drivers were stored in drivers/misc, where they all had to duplicate pretty much the same code to register a sysfs file, allow in-kernel users to access the content of the devices they were driving, etc. This was also a problem as far as other in-kernel users were involved, since the solutions used were pretty much different from on driver to another, there was a rather big abstraction leak. This introduction of this framework aims at solving this. It also introduces DT representation for consumer devices to go get the data they require (MAC Addresses, SoC/Revision ID, part numbers, and so on) from the nvmems. Having regmap interface to this framework would give much better abstraction for nvmems on different buses. Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]> [Maxime Ripard: intial version of the framework] Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch adds read/write apis which are based on nvmem_device. It is common that the drivers like omap cape manager or qcom cpr driver to access bytes directly at particular offset in the eeprom and not from nvmem cell info in DT. These driver would need to get access to the nvmem directly, which is what these new APIS provide. These wrapper apis would help such users to avoid code duplication in there drivers and also avoid them reading a big eeprom blob and parsing it internally in there driver. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch adds bindings for simple nvmem framework which allows nvmem consumers to talk to nvmem providers to get access to nvmem cell data. Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]> [Maxime Ripard: intial version of eeprom framework] Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch add basic how-to and api summary documentation for simple NVMEM framework. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch adds QFPROM support driver which is used by other drivers like thermal sensor and cpufreq. On MSM parts there are some efuses (called qfprom) these fuses store things like calibration data, speed bins.. etc. Drivers like cpufreq, thermal sensors would read out this data for configuring the driver. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch adds bindings for qfprom found in QCOM SOCs. QFPROM driver is based on simple nvmem framework. Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Now that we have the nvmem framework, we can consolidate the common driver code. Move the driver to the framework, and hopefully, it will fix the sysfs file creation race. Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]> [srinivas.kandagatla: Moved to regmap based EEPROM framework] Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
ConfigFS lacked binary attributes up until now. This patch introduces support for binary attributes in a somewhat similar manner of sysfs binary attributes albeit with changes that fit the configfs usage model. Problems that configfs binary attributes fix are everything that requires a binary blob as part of the configuration of a resource, such as bitstream loading for FPGAs, DTBs for dynamically created devices etc. Look at Documentation/filesystems/configfs/configfs.txt for internals and howto use them. Changes since V3: * Rebase against 4.0-rc Changes since V2: * Spelling checkpatch fixes. Changes since V1: * Uses vmalloc instead of kmalloc. * Renamed bin_attribute members. * Implemented maximum limit of attribute. * Cosmetic, whitespace & checkpatch fixes. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
Add a runtime interface to using configfs for generic device tree overlay usage. With it its possible to use device tree overlays without having to use a per-platform overlay manager. Please see Documentation/devicetree/configfs-overlays.txt for more info. Changes since v4: - Loading fix for multiple overlays as found out by Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Changes since v3: - Fixed compilation on SPARC & Xtensa Changes since v2: - Removed ifdef CONFIG_OF_OVERLAY (since for now it's required) - Created a documentation entry - Slight rewording in Kconfig Changes since v1: - of_resolve() -> of_resolve_phandles(). Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
Removing any omap device always resulted in a crash; turns out BUS_NOTIFY_DEL_DEVICE is not the last notifier event sent in the course of removing the device, the correct event is BUS_NOTIFY_UNBOUND_DRIVER, which still is not the right place to perform the cleanup. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
Having an omap serial device without a serial aliases doesn't work. For now fallback to using the hwmod instance. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
When using DT the driver devm_kalloc's platform data and assigns them directly to the pdev->dev.platform variable. This is wrong since device de-registration expects the data to be kmalloc'ed instead, resulting in a crash. Fix by copying the platform data to a kmalloc buffer. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
90% of the usage of device node's full_name is printing it out
in a kernel message. Preparing for the eventual delayed allocation
introduce a custom printk format specifier that is both more
compact and more pleasant to the eye.
For instance typical use is:
pr_info("Frobbing node %s\n", node->full_name);
Which can be written now as:
pr_info("Frobbing node %pO\n", node);
More fine-grained control of formatting includes printing the name,
flag, path-spec name, reference count and others, explained in the
documentation entry.
Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
We are going to need the overlays to appear on sysfs with runtime global properties (like master enable) so turn them into kobjects. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
A throw once master enable switch to protect against any further overlay applications if the administrator desires so. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
The two default overlay attributes are: * A targets sysfs attribute listing the targets of the installed overlay. The targets list the path on the kernel's device tree where each overlay fragment is applied to * A per overlay can_remove sysfs attribute that reports whether the overlay can be removed or not due to another overlapping overlay. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
Documentation ABI entry for overlays sysfs entries. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
I have encountered the same issue(s) on A6A boards. I couldn't find a patch, so I wrote this patch to update the device tree in the davinci_mdio driver in the 3.15.1 tree, it seems to correct it. I would welcome any input on a different approach. https://groups.google.com/d/msg/beagleboard/9mctrG26Mc8/SRlnumt0LoMJ v4.1-rcX: added hack around CONFIG_OF_OVERLAY v4.2-rc3+: added if (of_machine_is_compatible("ti,am335x-bone")) so we do not break dual ethernet am335x devices Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>
Increase the size of the buffer that is created in the fbdev emulation helpers. And fill in the var structure with the amount that was allocated. Signed-off-by: Darren Etheridge <[email protected]>
Add a vsync callback registration API that is identical to what was done for da8xx-fb.c. Need to find if there is a better way using the DRM infrastructure from kernel space. Either that or change the userspace window manager stuff in the gpu libraries to make use of the DRM provided syncronization mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Darren Etheridge <[email protected]>
Use pdata_quirks to provide platform data to the sgx driver. The data that is provided includes: 1) Function pointers for the driver to use to reset the h/w block. 2) The reset name that matches with what is used in hwmod. Signed-off-by: Darren Etheridge <[email protected]>
Add the node into the am33xx.dtsi file for the SGX GPU that is found in some variants of the SoC. Signed-off-by: Darren Etheridge <[email protected]>
When compiling a kernel without CONFIG_MULTI_CACHE enabled the dma access functions end up not being exported. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>
4.1 TI Delta: RobertCNelson/ti-linux-kernel@beca8d6...7e9c903 Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>
USB & LEDs not working
Merged old 3.8 device tree usb settings to 4.1 tree; currently not working
…e 1 (old device tree)
|
Erroneous pull request, my apologies |
RobertCNelson
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 2, 2016
The kernel WARNs and then crashes today if wm8994_device_init() fails after calling devm_regulator_bulk_get(). That happens because there are multiple devices involved here and the order in which managed resources are freed isn't correct. The regulators are added as children of wm8994->dev. Whereas, devm_regulator_bulk_get() receives wm8994->dev as the device, though it gets the same regulators which were added as children of wm8994->dev earlier. During failures, the children are removed first and the core eventually calls regulator_unregister() for them. As regulator_put() was never done for them (opposite of devm_regulator_bulk_get()), the kernel WARNs at WARN_ON(rdev->open_count); And eventually it crashes from debugfs_remove_recursive(). --------x------------------x---------------- wm8994 3-001a: Device is not a WM8994, ID is 0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at /mnt/ssd/all/work/repos/devel/linux/drivers/regulator/core.c:4072 regulator_unregister+0xc8/0xd0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc6-00154-g54fe84cbd50b #41 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) [<c010e24c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010af38>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c010af38>] (show_stack) from [<c032a1c4>] (dump_stack+0x88/0x9c) [<c032a1c4>] (dump_stack) from [<c011a98c>] (__warn+0xe8/0x100) [<c011a98c>] (__warn) from [<c011aa54>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x20/0x28) [<c011aa54>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<c0384a0c>] (regulator_unregister+0xc8/0xd0) [<c0384a0c>] (regulator_unregister) from [<c0406434>] (release_nodes+0x16c/0x1dc) [<c0406434>] (release_nodes) from [<c04039c4>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0x110) [<c04039c4>] (__device_release_driver) from [<c0403a64>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) [<c0403a64>] (device_release_driver) from [<c0402b24>] (bus_remove_device+0xd8/0x104) [<c0402b24>] (bus_remove_device) from [<c03ffcd8>] (device_del+0x10c/0x218) [<c03ffcd8>] (device_del) from [<c0404e4c>] (platform_device_del+0x1c/0x88) [<c0404e4c>] (platform_device_del) from [<c0404ec4>] (platform_device_unregister+0xc/0x20) [<c0404ec4>] (platform_device_unregister) from [<c0428bc0>] (mfd_remove_devices_fn+0x5c/0x64) [<c0428bc0>] (mfd_remove_devices_fn) from [<c03ff9d8>] (device_for_each_child_reverse+0x4c/0x78) [<c03ff9d8>] (device_for_each_child_reverse) from [<c04288c4>] (mfd_remove_devices+0x20/0x30) [<c04288c4>] (mfd_remove_devices) from [<c042758c>] (wm8994_device_init+0x2ac/0x7f0) [<c042758c>] (wm8994_device_init) from [<c04f14a8>] (i2c_device_probe+0x178/0x1fc) [<c04f14a8>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c04036fc>] (driver_probe_device+0x214/0x2c0) [<c04036fc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach+0xac/0xb0) [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0x9c) [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver+0x1a0/0x218) [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c040406c>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf8) [<c040406c>] (driver_register) from [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver+0x34/0x84) [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall+0x40/0x170) [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x15c/0x1fc) [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x114) [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init) from [<c0107978>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) ---[ end trace 0919d3d0bc998260 ]--- [snip..] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000078 pgd = c0004000 [00000078] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.8.0-rc6-00154-g54fe84cbd50b #41 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) task: ee874000 task.stack: ee878000 PC is at down_write+0x14/0x54 LR is at debugfs_remove_recursive+0x30/0x150 [snip..] [<c06e489c>] (down_write) from [<c02e9954>] (debugfs_remove_recursive+0x30/0x150) [<c02e9954>] (debugfs_remove_recursive) from [<c0382b78>] (_regulator_put+0x24/0xac) [<c0382b78>] (_regulator_put) from [<c0382c1c>] (regulator_put+0x1c/0x2c) [<c0382c1c>] (regulator_put) from [<c0406434>] (release_nodes+0x16c/0x1dc) [<c0406434>] (release_nodes) from [<c04035d4>] (driver_probe_device+0xec/0x2c0) [<c04035d4>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach+0xac/0xb0) [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0x9c) [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver+0x1a0/0x218) [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c040406c>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf8) [<c040406c>] (driver_register) from [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver+0x34/0x84) [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall+0x40/0x170) [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x15c/0x1fc) [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x114) [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init) from [<c0107978>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) Code: e1a04000 f590f000 e3a03001 e34f3fff (e1902f9f) ---[ end trace 0919d3d0bc998262 ]--- --------x------------------x---------------- Fix the kernel warnings and crashes by using regulator_bulk_get() instead of devm_regulator_bulk_get() and explicitly freeing the supplies in exit paths. Tested on Exynos 5250, dual core ARM A15 machine. Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> Acked-by: Charles Keepax <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 12, 2016
Since commit: 4bcc595 ("printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines") printk() requires KERN_CONT to continue log messages. Lots of printk() in lockdep.c and print_ip_sym() don't have it. As the result lockdep reports are completely messed up. Add missing KERN_CONT and inline print_ip_sym() where necessary. Example of a messed up report: 0-rc5+ #41 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- syz-executor0/5036 is trying to acquire lock: ( rtnl_mutex ){+.+.+.} , at: [<ffffffff86b3d6ac>] rtnl_lock+0x1c/0x20 but task is already holding lock: ( &net->packet.sklist_lock ){+.+...} , at: [<ffffffff873541a6>] packet_diag_dump+0x1a6/0x1920 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 ( &net->packet.sklist_lock +.+...} ... Without this patch all scripts that parse kernel bug reports are broken. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 9, 2017
[ Upstream commit 2423496 ] The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 8, 2017
[ Upstream commit 2423496 ] The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 31, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
crow-misia
pushed a commit
to crow-misia/linux
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 21, 2018
commit 74e3512 upstream. Fix double-free that happens when thermal zone setup fails, see KASAN log below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in __hwmon_device_register+0x5dc/0xa7c CPU: 0 PID: 132 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G B 4.19.0-rc8-next-20181016-00042-gb52cd80401e9-dirty beagleboard#41 Hardware name: NVIDIA Tegra SoC (Flattened Device Tree) Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func Backtrace: [<c0110540>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c0110944>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c0110924>] (show_stack) from [<c105cb08>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xb0) [<c105ca6c>] (dump_stack) from [<c02fdaec>] (print_address_description+0x68/0x250) [<c02fda84>] (print_address_description) from [<c02fd4ac>] (kasan_report_invalid_free+0x68/0x88) [<c02fd444>] (kasan_report_invalid_free) from [<c02fc85c>] (__kasan_slab_free+0x1f4/0x200) [<c02fc668>] (__kasan_slab_free) from [<c02fd0c0>] (kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x18) [<c02fd0ac>] (kasan_slab_free) from [<c02f9c6c>] (kfree+0x90/0x294) [<c02f9bdc>] (kfree) from [<c0b41bbc>] (__hwmon_device_register+0x5dc/0xa7c) [<c0b415e0>] (__hwmon_device_register) from [<c0b421e8>] (hwmon_device_register_with_info+0xa0/0xa8) [<c0b42148>] (hwmon_device_register_with_info) from [<c0b42324>] (devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info+0x74/0xb4) [<c0b422b0>] (devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info) from [<c0b4481c>] (lm90_probe+0x414/0x578) [<c0b44408>] (lm90_probe) from [<c0aeeff4>] (i2c_device_probe+0x35c/0x384) [<c0aeec98>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c08776cc>] (really_probe+0x290/0x3e4) [<c087743c>] (really_probe) from [<c0877a2c>] (driver_probe_device+0x80/0x1c4) [<c08779ac>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0877da8>] (__device_attach_driver+0x104/0x11c) [<c0877ca4>] (__device_attach_driver) from [<c0874dd8>] (bus_for_each_drv+0xa4/0xc8) [<c0874d34>] (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c08773b0>] (__device_attach+0xf0/0x15c) [<c08772c0>] (__device_attach) from [<c0877e24>] (device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x20) [<c0877e08>] (device_initial_probe) from [<c08762f4>] (bus_probe_device+0xdc/0xec) [<c0876218>] (bus_probe_device) from [<c0876a08>] (deferred_probe_work_func+0xa8/0xd4) [<c0876960>] (deferred_probe_work_func) from [<c01527c4>] (process_one_work+0x3dc/0x96c) [<c01523e8>] (process_one_work) from [<c01541e0>] (worker_thread+0x4ec/0x8bc) [<c0153cf4>] (worker_thread) from [<c015b238>] (kthread+0x230/0x240) [<c015b008>] (kthread) from [<c01010bc>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38) Exception stack(0xcf743fb0 to 0xcf743ff8) 3fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 Allocated by task 132: kasan_kmalloc.part.1+0x58/0xf4 kasan_kmalloc+0x90/0xa4 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x90/0x2a0 __hwmon_device_register+0xbc/0xa7c hwmon_device_register_with_info+0xa0/0xa8 devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info+0x74/0xb4 lm90_probe+0x414/0x578 i2c_device_probe+0x35c/0x384 really_probe+0x290/0x3e4 driver_probe_device+0x80/0x1c4 __device_attach_driver+0x104/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0xa4/0xc8 __device_attach+0xf0/0x15c device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x20 bus_probe_device+0xdc/0xec deferred_probe_work_func+0xa8/0xd4 process_one_work+0x3dc/0x96c worker_thread+0x4ec/0x8bc kthread+0x230/0x240 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38 (null) Freed by task 132: __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x200 kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x18 kfree+0x90/0x294 hwmon_dev_release+0x1c/0x20 device_release+0x4c/0xe8 kobject_put+0xac/0x11c device_unregister+0x2c/0x30 __hwmon_device_register+0xa58/0xa7c hwmon_device_register_with_info+0xa0/0xa8 devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info+0x74/0xb4 lm90_probe+0x414/0x578 i2c_device_probe+0x35c/0x384 really_probe+0x290/0x3e4 driver_probe_device+0x80/0x1c4 __device_attach_driver+0x104/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0xa4/0xc8 __device_attach+0xf0/0x15c device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x20 bus_probe_device+0xdc/0xec deferred_probe_work_func+0xa8/0xd4 process_one_work+0x3dc/0x96c worker_thread+0x4ec/0x8bc kthread+0x230/0x240 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38 (null) Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.15+ Fixes: 47c332d ("hwmon: Deal with errors from the thermal subsystem") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
crow-misia
pushed a commit
to crow-misia/linux
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 16, 2019
[ Upstream commit 8e1da73 ] Add napi_disable routine in gro_cells_destroy since starting from commit c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") gro_cell_poll and gro_cells_destroy can run concurrently on napi_skbs list producing a kernel Oops if the tunnel interface is removed while gro_cell_poll is running. The following Oops has been triggered removing a vxlan device while the interface is receiving traffic [ 5628.948853] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 [ 5628.949981] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 5628.950308] Oops: 0002 [beagleboard#1] SMP PTI [ 5628.950748] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ beagleboard#41 [ 5628.952940] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.955615] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.956250] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.957102] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.957940] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.958803] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.959661] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.960682] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.961616] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.962359] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.963188] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.964034] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.964871] Call Trace: [ 5628.965179] net_rx_action+0xf0/0x380 [ 5628.965637] __do_softirq+0xc7/0x431 [ 5628.966510] run_ksoftirqd+0x24/0x30 [ 5628.966957] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc5/0x160 [ 5628.967436] kthread+0x113/0x130 [ 5628.968283] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 5628.968721] Modules linked in: [ 5628.969099] CR2: 0000000000000008 [ 5628.969510] ---[ end trace 9d9dedc7181661fe ]--- [ 5628.970073] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.972965] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.973611] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.974504] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.975462] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.976413] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.977375] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.978296] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.979327] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.980044] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.980929] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.981736] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.982409] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 5628.983307] Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 25, 2019
[ Upstream commit 8e1da73 ] Add napi_disable routine in gro_cells_destroy since starting from commit c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") gro_cell_poll and gro_cells_destroy can run concurrently on napi_skbs list producing a kernel Oops if the tunnel interface is removed while gro_cell_poll is running. The following Oops has been triggered removing a vxlan device while the interface is receiving traffic [ 5628.948853] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 [ 5628.949981] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 5628.950308] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [ 5628.950748] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #41 [ 5628.952940] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.955615] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.956250] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.957102] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.957940] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.958803] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.959661] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.960682] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.961616] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.962359] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.963188] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.964034] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.964871] Call Trace: [ 5628.965179] net_rx_action+0xf0/0x380 [ 5628.965637] __do_softirq+0xc7/0x431 [ 5628.966510] run_ksoftirqd+0x24/0x30 [ 5628.966957] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc5/0x160 [ 5628.967436] kthread+0x113/0x130 [ 5628.968283] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 5628.968721] Modules linked in: [ 5628.969099] CR2: 0000000000000008 [ 5628.969510] ---[ end trace 9d9dedc7181661fe ]--- [ 5628.970073] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.972965] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.973611] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.974504] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.975462] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.976413] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.977375] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.978296] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.979327] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.980044] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.980929] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.981736] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.982409] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 5628.983307] Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 25, 2019
[ Upstream commit 60034d3 ] There is a potential deadlock in rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch() whereby rxrpc_put_peer() is called with the peer_hash_lock held, but if it reduces the peer's refcount to 0, rxrpc_put_peer() calls __rxrpc_put_peer() - which the tries to take the already held lock. Fix this by providing a version of rxrpc_put_peer() that can be called in situations where the lock is already held. The bug may produce the following lockdep report: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.2.0-next-20190718 #41 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/0:3/21678 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock_bh /./include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: __rxrpc_put_peer /net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:415 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: rxrpc_put_peer+0x2d3/0x6a0 /net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:435 but task is already holding lock: 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock_bh /./include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch /net/rxrpc/peer_event.c:378 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x6b3/0xd02 /net/rxrpc/peer_event.c:430 Fixes: 330bdcf ("rxrpc: Fix the keepalive generator [ver #2]") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 25, 2020
[ Upstream commit a2ec905 ] Fix kernel oops observed when an ext adv data is larger than 31 bytes. This can be reproduced by setting up an advertiser with advertisement larger than 31 bytes. The issue is not sensitive to the advertisement content. In particular, this was reproduced with an advertisement of 229 bytes filled with 'A'. See stack trace below. This is fixed by not catching ext_adv as legacy adv are only cached to be able to concatenate a scanable adv with its scan response before sending it up through mgmt. With ext_adv, this is no longer necessary. general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 205 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-37-generic #41-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 7590/0CF6RR, BIOS 1.7.0 05/11/2020 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth] RIP: 0010:hci_bdaddr_list_lookup+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth] Code: ff ff e9 26 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8b 07 48 89 e5 48 39 c7 75 0a eb 24 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 1c 44 8b 06 <44> 39 40 10 75 ef 44 0f b7 4e 04 66 44 39 48 14 75 e3 38 50 16 75 RSP: 0018:ffffbc6a40493c70 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 4141414141414141 RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9903e76c100f RDI: ffff9904289d4b28 RBP: ffffbc6a40493c70 R08: 0000000093570362 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9904344eae38 R12: ffff9904289d4000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffa3 R15: ffff9903e76c100f FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff990434580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007feed125a000 CR3: 00000001b860a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Call Trace: process_adv_report+0x12e/0x560 [bluetooth] hci_le_meta_evt+0x7b2/0xba0 [bluetooth] hci_event_packet+0x1c29/0x2a90 [bluetooth] hci_rx_work+0x19b/0x360 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x400 kthread+0x104/0x140 Fixes: c215e93 ("Bluetooth: Process extended ADV report event") Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <[email protected]> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Reported-by: Balakrishna Godavarthi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alain Michaud <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sonny Sasaka <[email protected]> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
No description provided.