Patch missing for musb_cppi41.c in 3.14 branch #18

chdh · 2015-01-11T23:29:08Z

The patch "usb: musb: Ensure that cppi41 timer gets armed on premature DMA TX irq" is missing for musb_cppi41.c in the 3.14 branch, while newer and older patches have been applied.

RobertCNelson · 2015-01-12T14:43:00Z

It might just be a miss merge:

Pinging Dan: http://git.ti.com/gitweb/?p=ti-linux-kernel/ti-linux-kernel.git;a=commitdiff;h=d34a808ddba13e47ecebaee0aaf668841e667aef

Regards,

Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>

commit a5dcb73 upstream. when sock_create_kern(..., a) returns an error, 'a' might not be a valid pointer, so it shouldn't be dereferenced to read a->sk->sk_sndbuf and and a->sk->sk_rcvbuf; not doing that caused the following crash: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4254 Comm: syzkaller919713 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #18 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:smc_create+0x14e/0x300 net/smc/af_smc.c:1410 RSP: 0018:ffff8801b06afbc8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801b63457c0 RCX: ffffffff85a3e746 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: ffff8801b06afbf0 R08: 00000000000007c0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8801b6345c08 R14: 00000000ffffffe9 R15: ffffffff8695ced0 FS: 0000000001afb880(0000) GS:ffff8801db200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000040 CR3: 00000001b0721004 CR4: 00000000001606f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __sock_create+0x4d4/0x850 net/socket.c:1285 sock_create net/socket.c:1325 [inline] SYSC_socketpair net/socket.c:1409 [inline] SyS_socketpair+0x1c0/0x6f0 net/socket.c:1366 do_syscall_64+0x282/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x26/0x9b RIP: 0033:0x4404b9 RSP: 002b:00007fff44ab6908 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000035 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000004404b9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 000000000000002b RBP: 00007fff44ab6910 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 00007fff44003031 R10: 0000000020000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 b3 01 00 00 4c 8b a3 48 04 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 20 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 82 01 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 20 48 b8 00 00 00 00 RIP: smc_create+0x14e/0x300 net/smc/af_smc.c:1410 RSP: ffff8801b06afbc8 Fixes: cd6851f smc: remote memory buffers (RMBs) Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

tcp_write_queue_purge clears all the SKBs in the write queue but does not reset the sk_send_head. As a result, we can have a NULL pointer dereference anywhere that we use tcp_send_head instead of the tcp_write_queue_tail. For example, after a27fd7a (tcp: purge write queue upon RST), we can purge the write queue on RST. Prior to 75c119a (tcp: implement rb-tree based retransmit queue), tcp_push will only check tcp_send_head and then accesses tcp_write_queue_tail to send the actual SKB. As a result, it will dereference a NULL pointer. This has been reported twice for 4.14 where we don't have 75c119a: By Timofey Titovets: [ 422.081094] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038 [ 422.081254] IP: tcp_push+0x42/0x110 [ 422.081314] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 422.081364] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI By Yongjian Xu: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038 IP: tcp_push+0x48/0x120 PGD 80000007ff77b067 P4D 80000007ff77b067 PUD 7fd989067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#18] SMP PTI Modules linked in: tcp_diag inet_diag tcp_bbr sch_fq iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr ixgbe mdio i2c_i801 lpc_ich joydev input_leds shpchp e1000e igb dca ptp pps_core hwmon mei_me mei ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler sg ses scsi_transport_sas enclosure ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas wmi ast ttm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax CPU: 6 PID: 14156 Comm: [ET_NET 6] Tainted: G D 4.14.26-1.el6.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: LENOVO ThinkServer RD440 /ThinkServer RD440, BIOS A0TS80A 09/22/2014 task: ffff8807d78d8140 task.stack: ffffc9000e944000 RIP: 0010:tcp_push+0x48/0x120 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e947a88 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000005b4 RBX: ffff880f7cce9c00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000040 RDI: ffff8807d00f5000 RBP: ffffc9000e947aa8 R08: 0000000000001c84 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8807d00f5158 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8807d00f5000 R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 00000000000256d4 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f5916de9700(0000) GS:ffff88107fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 00000007f8226004 CR4: 00000000001606e0 Call Trace: tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x33d/0xe50 tcp_sendmsg+0x37/0x60 inet_sendmsg+0x39/0xc0 sock_sendmsg+0x49/0x60 sock_write_iter+0xb6/0x100 do_iter_readv_writev+0xec/0x130 ? rw_verify_area+0x49/0xb0 do_iter_write+0x97/0xd0 vfs_writev+0x7e/0xe0 ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x80/0xa0 ? __fget_light+0x2c/0x70 ? __do_page_fault+0x1e7/0x530 do_writev+0x60/0xf0 ? inet_shutdown+0xac/0x110 SyS_writev+0x10/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140 ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x8b/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x3135ce0c57 RSP: 002b:00007f5916de4b00 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000003135ce0c57 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f5916de4b90 RDI: 000000000000606f RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f5916de8c38 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00000000000464cc R13: 00007f5916de8c30 R14: 00007f58d8bef080 R15: 0000000000000002 Code: 48 8b 97 60 01 00 00 4c 8d 97 58 01 00 00 41 b9 00 00 00 00 41 89 f3 4c 39 d2 49 0f 44 d1 41 81 e3 00 80 00 00 0f 85 b0 00 00 00 <80> 4a 38 08 44 8b 8f 74 06 00 00 44 89 8f 7c 06 00 00 83 e6 01 RIP: tcp_push+0x48/0x120 RSP: ffffc9000e947a88 CR2: 0000000000000038 ---[ end trace 8d545c2e93515549 ]--- Fixes: a27fd7a (tcp: purge write queue upon RST) Reported-by: Timofey Titovets <[email protected]> Reported-by: Yongjian Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]> Tested-by: Yongjian Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2bbea6e ] when mounting an ISO filesystem sometimes (very rarely) the system hangs because of a race condition between two tasks. PID: 6766 TASK: ffff88007b2a6dd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "mount" #0 [ffff880078447ae0] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 #1 [ffff880078447b48] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8168ed49 #2 [ffff880078447b58] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8168c995 #3 [ffff880078447bb8] mutex_lock at ffffffff8168bdef #4 [ffff880078447bd0] sr_block_ioctl at ffffffffa00b6818 [sr_mod] #5 [ffff880078447c10] blkdev_ioctl at ffffffff812fea50 #6 [ffff880078447c70] ioctl_by_bdev at ffffffff8123a8b3 #7 [ffff880078447c90] isofs_fill_super at ffffffffa04fb1e1 [isofs] #8 [ffff880078447da8] mount_bdev at ffffffff81202570 #9 [ffff880078447e18] isofs_mount at ffffffffa04f9828 [isofs] #10 [ffff880078447e28] mount_fs at ffffffff81202d09 #11 [ffff880078447e70] vfs_kern_mount at ffffffff8121ea8f #12 [ffff880078447ea8] do_mount at ffffffff81220fee #13 [ffff880078447f28] sys_mount at ffffffff812218d6 #14 [ffff880078447f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007fd9ea914e9a RSP: 00007ffd5d9bf648 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000000a5 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: 00007fd9ec2bc210 RSI: 00007fd9ec2bc290 RDI: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000c0ed0001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007fd9ec2bc040 R13: 00007fd9eb6b2380 R14: 00007fd9ec2bc210 R15: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task was trying to mount the cdrom. It allocated and configured a super_block struct and owned the write-lock for the super_block->s_umount rwsem. While exclusively owning the s_umount lock, it called sr_block_ioctl and waited to acquire the global sr_mutex lock. PID: 6785 TASK: ffff880078720fb0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "systemd-udevd" #0 [ffff880078417898] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 #1 [ffff880078417900] schedule at ffffffff8168dc59 #2 [ffff880078417910] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff8168f605 #3 [ffff880078417980] call_rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff81328838 #4 [ffff8800784179d0] down_read at ffffffff8168cde0 #5 [ffff8800784179e8] get_super at ffffffff81201cc7 #6 [ffff880078417a10] __invalidate_device at ffffffff8123a8de #7 [ffff880078417a40] flush_disk at ffffffff8123a94b #8 [ffff880078417a88] check_disk_change at ffffffff8123ab50 #9 [ffff880078417ab0] cdrom_open at ffffffffa00a29e1 [cdrom] #10 [ffff880078417b68] sr_block_open at ffffffffa00b6f9b [sr_mod] #11 [ffff880078417b98] __blkdev_get at ffffffff8123ba86 #12 [ffff880078417bf0] blkdev_get at ffffffff8123bd65 #13 [ffff880078417c78] blkdev_open at ffffffff8123bf9b #14 [ffff880078417c90] do_dentry_open at ffffffff811fc7f7 #15 [ffff880078417cd8] vfs_open at ffffffff811fc9cf #16 [ffff880078417d00] do_last at ffffffff8120d53d #17 [ffff880078417db0] path_openat at ffffffff8120e6b2 #18 [ffff880078417e48] do_filp_open at ffffffff8121082b #19 [ffff880078417f18] do_sys_open at ffffffff811fdd33 #20 [ffff880078417f70] sys_open at ffffffff811fde4e #21 [ffff880078417f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007f29438b0c20 RSP: 00007ffc76624b78 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00007f2944a5fa70 RSI: 00000000000a0800 RDI: 00007f2944a5fa70 RBP: 00007f2944a5f540 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000020 R10: 00007f2943614c40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffff811fde4e R13: ffff880078417f78 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 00007f2944a4b010 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task tried to open the cdrom device, the sr_block_open function acquired the global sr_mutex lock. The call to check_disk_change() then saw an event flag indicating a possible media change and tried to flush any cached data for the device. As part of the flush, it tried to acquire the super_block->s_umount lock associated with the cdrom device. This was the same super_block as created and locked by the previous task. The first task acquires the s_umount lock and then the sr_mutex_lock; the second task acquires the sr_mutex_lock and then the s_umount lock. This patch fixes the issue by moving check_disk_change() out of cdrom_open() and let the caller take care of it. Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 373c83a ] Using built-in in kernel image without a firmware in filesystem or in the kernel image can lead to a kernel NULL pointer deference. Watchdog need to be stopped in brcmf_sdio_remove The system is going down NOW! [ 1348.110759] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000002f8 Sent SIGTERM to all processes [ 1348.121412] Mem abort info: [ 1348.126962] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 1348.130023] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1348.135948] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1348.138997] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1348.142154] Data abort info: [ 1348.145045] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 1348.148884] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 1348.151861] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = (____ptrval____) [ 1348.158475] [00000000000002f8] pgd=0000000000000000 [ 1348.163364] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1348.168927] Modules linked in: ipv6 [ 1348.172421] CPU: 3 PID: 1421 Comm: brcmf_wdog/mmc0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5-next-20180517 #18 [ 1348.180757] Hardware name: Amarula A64-Relic (DT) [ 1348.185455] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO) [ 1348.190251] pc : brcmf_sdiod_freezer_count+0x0/0x20 [ 1348.195124] lr : brcmf_sdio_watchdog_thread+0x64/0x290 [ 1348.200253] sp : ffff00000b85be30 [ 1348.203561] x29: ffff00000b85be30 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 1348.208868] x27: ffff00000b6cb918 x26: ffff80003b990638 [ 1348.214176] x25: ffff0000087b1a20 x24: ffff80003b94f800 [ 1348.219483] x23: ffff000008e620c8 x22: ffff000008f0b660 [ 1348.224790] x21: ffff000008c6a858 x20: 00000000fffffe00 [ 1348.230097] x19: ffff80003b94f800 x18: 0000000000000001 [ 1348.235404] x17: 0000ffffab2e8a74 x16: ffff0000080d7de8 [ 1348.240711] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000400 [ 1348.246018] x13: 0000000000000400 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 1348.251324] x11: 00000000000002c4 x10: 0000000000000a10 [ 1348.256631] x9 : ffff00000b85bc40 x8 : ffff80003be11870 [ 1348.261937] x7 : ffff80003dfc7308 x6 : 000000078ff08b55 [ 1348.267243] x5 : 00000139e1058400 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 1348.272550] x3 : dead000000000100 x2 : 958f2788d6618100 [ 1348.277856] x1 : 00000000fffffe00 x0 : 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Michael Trimarchi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit a5ba1d9 upstream. We have reports of the following crash: PID: 7 TASK: ffff88085c6d61c0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u25:0" #0 [ffff88085c6db710] machine_kexec at ffffffff81046239 #1 [ffff88085c6db760] crash_kexec at ffffffff810fc248 #2 [ffff88085c6db830] oops_end at ffffffff81008ae7 #3 [ffff88085c6db860] no_context at ffffffff81050b8f #4 [ffff88085c6db8b0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050d75 #5 [ffff88085c6db900] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050e83 #6 [ffff88085c6db910] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8105132e #7 [ffff88085c6db9b0] do_page_fault at ffffffff8105152c #8 [ffff88085c6db9c0] page_fault at ffffffff81a3f122 [exception RIP: uart_put_char+149] RIP: ffffffff814b67b5 RSP: ffff88085c6dba78 RFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000000292 RBX: ffffffff827c5120 RCX: 0000000000000081 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000005f RDI: ffffffff827c5120 RBP: ffff88085c6dba98 R8: 000000000000012c R9: ffffffff822ea320 R10: ffff88085fe4db04 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff881059f9c000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000005f R15: 0000000000000fba ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88085c6dbaa0] tty_put_char at ffffffff81497544 #10 [ffff88085c6dbac0] do_output_char at ffffffff8149c91c #11 [ffff88085c6dbae0] __process_echoes at ffffffff8149cb8b #12 [ffff88085c6dbb30] commit_echoes at ffffffff8149cdc2 #13 [ffff88085c6dbb60] n_tty_receive_buf_fast at ffffffff8149e49b #14 [ffff88085c6dbbc0] __receive_buf at ffffffff8149ef5a #15 [ffff88085c6dbc20] n_tty_receive_buf_common at ffffffff8149f016 #16 [ffff88085c6dbca0] n_tty_receive_buf2 at ffffffff8149f194 #17 [ffff88085c6dbcb0] flush_to_ldisc at ffffffff814a238a #18 [ffff88085c6dbd50] process_one_work at ffffffff81090be2 #19 [ffff88085c6dbe20] worker_thread at ffffffff81091b4d #20 [ffff88085c6dbeb0] kthread at ffffffff81096384 #21 [ffff88085c6dbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81a3d69f after slogging through some dissasembly: ffffffff814b6720 <uart_put_char>: ffffffff814b6720: 55 push %rbp ffffffff814b6721: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff814b6724: 48 83 ec 20 sub $0x20,%rsp ffffffff814b6728: 48 89 1c 24 mov %rbx,(%rsp) ffffffff814b672c: 4c 89 64 24 08 mov %r12,0x8(%rsp) ffffffff814b6731: 4c 89 6c 24 10 mov %r13,0x10(%rsp) ffffffff814b6736: 4c 89 74 24 18 mov %r14,0x18(%rsp) ffffffff814b673b: e8 b0 8e 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3f5f0 <mcount> ffffffff814b6740: 4c 8b a7 88 02 00 00 mov 0x288(%rdi),%r12 ffffffff814b6747: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d ffffffff814b674a: 41 89 f6 mov %esi,%r14d ffffffff814b674d: 49 83 bc 24 70 01 00 cmpq $0x0,0x170(%r12) ffffffff814b6754: 00 00 ffffffff814b6756: 49 8b 9c 24 80 01 00 mov 0x180(%r12),%rbx ffffffff814b675d: 00 ffffffff814b675e: 74 2f je ffffffff814b678f <uart_put_char+0x6f> ffffffff814b6760: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b6763: e8 a8 67 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cf10 <_raw_spin_lock_irqsave> ffffffff814b6768: 41 8b 8c 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%ecx ffffffff814b676f: 00 ffffffff814b6770: 89 ca mov %ecx,%edx ffffffff814b6772: f7 d2 not %edx ffffffff814b6774: 41 03 94 24 7c 01 00 add 0x17c(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b677b: 00 ffffffff814b677c: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b6782: 75 23 jne ffffffff814b67a7 <uart_put_char+0x87> ffffffff814b6784: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi ffffffff814b6787: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b678a: e8 e1 64 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cc70 <_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore> ffffffff814b678f: 44 89 e8 mov %r13d,%eax ffffffff814b6792: 48 8b 1c 24 mov (%rsp),%rbx ffffffff814b6796: 4c 8b 64 24 08 mov 0x8(%rsp),%r12 ffffffff814b679b: 4c 8b 6c 24 10 mov 0x10(%rsp),%r13 ffffffff814b67a0: 4c 8b 74 24 18 mov 0x18(%rsp),%r14 ffffffff814b67a5: c9 leaveq ffffffff814b67a6: c3 retq ffffffff814b67a7: 49 8b 94 24 70 01 00 mov 0x170(%r12),%rdx ffffffff814b67ae: 00 ffffffff814b67af: 48 63 c9 movslq %ecx,%rcx ffffffff814b67b2: 41 b5 01 mov $0x1,%r13b ffffffff814b67b5: 44 88 34 0a mov %r14b,(%rdx,%rcx,1) ffffffff814b67b9: 41 8b 94 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b67c0: 00 ffffffff814b67c1: 83 c2 01 add $0x1,%edx ffffffff814b67c4: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b67ca: 41 89 94 24 78 01 00 mov %edx,0x178(%r12) ffffffff814b67d1: 00 ffffffff814b67d2: eb b0 jmp ffffffff814b6784 <uart_put_char+0x64> ffffffff814b67d4: 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 data32 data32 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) ffffffff814b67db: 00 00 00 00 00 for our build, this is crashing at: circ->buf[circ->head] = c; Looking in uart_port_startup(), it seems that circ->buf (state->xmit.buf) protected by the "per-port mutex", which based on uart_port_check() is state->port.mutex. Indeed, the lock acquired in uart_put_char() is uport->lock, i.e. not the same lock. Anyway, since the lock is not acquired, if uart_shutdown() is called, the last chunk of that function may release state->xmit.buf before its assigned to null, and cause the race above. To fix it, let's lock uport->lock when allocating/deallocating state->xmit.buf in addition to the per-port mutex. v2: switch to locking uport->lock on allocation/deallocation instead of locking the per-port mutex in uart_put_char. Note that since uport->lock is a spin lock, we have to switch the allocation to GFP_ATOMIC. v3: move the allocation outside the lock, so we can switch back to GFP_KERNEL Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 373c83a ] Using built-in in kernel image without a firmware in filesystem or in the kernel image can lead to a kernel NULL pointer deference. Watchdog need to be stopped in brcmf_sdio_remove The system is going down NOW! [ 1348.110759] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000002f8 Sent SIGTERM to all processes [ 1348.121412] Mem abort info: [ 1348.126962] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 1348.130023] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1348.135948] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1348.138997] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1348.142154] Data abort info: [ 1348.145045] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 1348.148884] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 1348.151861] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = (____ptrval____) [ 1348.158475] [00000000000002f8] pgd=0000000000000000 [ 1348.163364] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1348.168927] Modules linked in: ipv6 [ 1348.172421] CPU: 3 PID: 1421 Comm: brcmf_wdog/mmc0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5-next-20180517 #18 [ 1348.180757] Hardware name: Amarula A64-Relic (DT) [ 1348.185455] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO) [ 1348.190251] pc : brcmf_sdiod_freezer_count+0x0/0x20 [ 1348.195124] lr : brcmf_sdio_watchdog_thread+0x64/0x290 [ 1348.200253] sp : ffff00000b85be30 [ 1348.203561] x29: ffff00000b85be30 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 1348.208868] x27: ffff00000b6cb918 x26: ffff80003b990638 [ 1348.214176] x25: ffff0000087b1a20 x24: ffff80003b94f800 [ 1348.219483] x23: ffff000008e620c8 x22: ffff000008f0b660 [ 1348.224790] x21: ffff000008c6a858 x20: 00000000fffffe00 [ 1348.230097] x19: ffff80003b94f800 x18: 0000000000000001 [ 1348.235404] x17: 0000ffffab2e8a74 x16: ffff0000080d7de8 [ 1348.240711] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000400 [ 1348.246018] x13: 0000000000000400 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 1348.251324] x11: 00000000000002c4 x10: 0000000000000a10 [ 1348.256631] x9 : ffff00000b85bc40 x8 : ffff80003be11870 [ 1348.261937] x7 : ffff80003dfc7308 x6 : 000000078ff08b55 [ 1348.267243] x5 : 00000139e1058400 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 1348.272550] x3 : dead000000000100 x2 : 958f2788d6618100 [ 1348.277856] x1 : 00000000fffffe00 x0 : 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Michael Trimarchi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit a5ba1d9 upstream. We have reports of the following crash: PID: 7 TASK: ffff88085c6d61c0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u25:0" #0 [ffff88085c6db710] machine_kexec at ffffffff81046239 #1 [ffff88085c6db760] crash_kexec at ffffffff810fc248 #2 [ffff88085c6db830] oops_end at ffffffff81008ae7 #3 [ffff88085c6db860] no_context at ffffffff81050b8f #4 [ffff88085c6db8b0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050d75 #5 [ffff88085c6db900] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050e83 #6 [ffff88085c6db910] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8105132e #7 [ffff88085c6db9b0] do_page_fault at ffffffff8105152c #8 [ffff88085c6db9c0] page_fault at ffffffff81a3f122 [exception RIP: uart_put_char+149] RIP: ffffffff814b67b5 RSP: ffff88085c6dba78 RFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000000292 RBX: ffffffff827c5120 RCX: 0000000000000081 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000005f RDI: ffffffff827c5120 RBP: ffff88085c6dba98 R8: 000000000000012c R9: ffffffff822ea320 R10: ffff88085fe4db04 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff881059f9c000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000005f R15: 0000000000000fba ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88085c6dbaa0] tty_put_char at ffffffff81497544 #10 [ffff88085c6dbac0] do_output_char at ffffffff8149c91c #11 [ffff88085c6dbae0] __process_echoes at ffffffff8149cb8b #12 [ffff88085c6dbb30] commit_echoes at ffffffff8149cdc2 #13 [ffff88085c6dbb60] n_tty_receive_buf_fast at ffffffff8149e49b #14 [ffff88085c6dbbc0] __receive_buf at ffffffff8149ef5a #15 [ffff88085c6dbc20] n_tty_receive_buf_common at ffffffff8149f016 #16 [ffff88085c6dbca0] n_tty_receive_buf2 at ffffffff8149f194 #17 [ffff88085c6dbcb0] flush_to_ldisc at ffffffff814a238a #18 [ffff88085c6dbd50] process_one_work at ffffffff81090be2 #19 [ffff88085c6dbe20] worker_thread at ffffffff81091b4d #20 [ffff88085c6dbeb0] kthread at ffffffff81096384 #21 [ffff88085c6dbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81a3d69f after slogging through some dissasembly: ffffffff814b6720 <uart_put_char>: ffffffff814b6720: 55 push %rbp ffffffff814b6721: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff814b6724: 48 83 ec 20 sub $0x20,%rsp ffffffff814b6728: 48 89 1c 24 mov %rbx,(%rsp) ffffffff814b672c: 4c 89 64 24 08 mov %r12,0x8(%rsp) ffffffff814b6731: 4c 89 6c 24 10 mov %r13,0x10(%rsp) ffffffff814b6736: 4c 89 74 24 18 mov %r14,0x18(%rsp) ffffffff814b673b: e8 b0 8e 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3f5f0 <mcount> ffffffff814b6740: 4c 8b a7 88 02 00 00 mov 0x288(%rdi),%r12 ffffffff814b6747: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d ffffffff814b674a: 41 89 f6 mov %esi,%r14d ffffffff814b674d: 49 83 bc 24 70 01 00 cmpq $0x0,0x170(%r12) ffffffff814b6754: 00 00 ffffffff814b6756: 49 8b 9c 24 80 01 00 mov 0x180(%r12),%rbx ffffffff814b675d: 00 ffffffff814b675e: 74 2f je ffffffff814b678f <uart_put_char+0x6f> ffffffff814b6760: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b6763: e8 a8 67 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cf10 <_raw_spin_lock_irqsave> ffffffff814b6768: 41 8b 8c 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%ecx ffffffff814b676f: 00 ffffffff814b6770: 89 ca mov %ecx,%edx ffffffff814b6772: f7 d2 not %edx ffffffff814b6774: 41 03 94 24 7c 01 00 add 0x17c(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b677b: 00 ffffffff814b677c: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b6782: 75 23 jne ffffffff814b67a7 <uart_put_char+0x87> ffffffff814b6784: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi ffffffff814b6787: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b678a: e8 e1 64 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cc70 <_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore> ffffffff814b678f: 44 89 e8 mov %r13d,%eax ffffffff814b6792: 48 8b 1c 24 mov (%rsp),%rbx ffffffff814b6796: 4c 8b 64 24 08 mov 0x8(%rsp),%r12 ffffffff814b679b: 4c 8b 6c 24 10 mov 0x10(%rsp),%r13 ffffffff814b67a0: 4c 8b 74 24 18 mov 0x18(%rsp),%r14 ffffffff814b67a5: c9 leaveq ffffffff814b67a6: c3 retq ffffffff814b67a7: 49 8b 94 24 70 01 00 mov 0x170(%r12),%rdx ffffffff814b67ae: 00 ffffffff814b67af: 48 63 c9 movslq %ecx,%rcx ffffffff814b67b2: 41 b5 01 mov $0x1,%r13b ffffffff814b67b5: 44 88 34 0a mov %r14b,(%rdx,%rcx,1) ffffffff814b67b9: 41 8b 94 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b67c0: 00 ffffffff814b67c1: 83 c2 01 add $0x1,%edx ffffffff814b67c4: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b67ca: 41 89 94 24 78 01 00 mov %edx,0x178(%r12) ffffffff814b67d1: 00 ffffffff814b67d2: eb b0 jmp ffffffff814b6784 <uart_put_char+0x64> ffffffff814b67d4: 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 data32 data32 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) ffffffff814b67db: 00 00 00 00 00 for our build, this is crashing at: circ->buf[circ->head] = c; Looking in uart_port_startup(), it seems that circ->buf (state->xmit.buf) protected by the "per-port mutex", which based on uart_port_check() is state->port.mutex. Indeed, the lock acquired in uart_put_char() is uport->lock, i.e. not the same lock. Anyway, since the lock is not acquired, if uart_shutdown() is called, the last chunk of that function may release state->xmit.buf before its assigned to null, and cause the race above. To fix it, let's lock uport->lock when allocating/deallocating state->xmit.buf in addition to the per-port mutex. v2: switch to locking uport->lock on allocation/deallocation instead of locking the per-port mutex in uart_put_char. Note that since uport->lock is a spin lock, we have to switch the allocation to GFP_ATOMIC. v3: move the allocation outside the lock, so we can switch back to GFP_KERNEL Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 17e2e7d upstream. While playing with gigantic hugepages and memory_hotplug, I triggered the following #PF when "cat memoryX/removable": BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [beagleboard#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 1481 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 4.20.0-rc6-mm1-1-default+ beagleboard#18 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:has_unmovable_pages+0x154/0x210 Call Trace: is_mem_section_removable+0x7d/0x100 removable_show+0x90/0xb0 dev_attr_show+0x1c/0x50 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xca/0x1b0 seq_read+0x133/0x380 __vfs_read+0x26/0x180 vfs_read+0x89/0x140 ksys_read+0x42/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The reason is we do not pass the Head to page_hstate(), and so, the call to compound_order() in page_hstate() returns 0, so we end up checking all hstates's size to match PAGE_SIZE. Obviously, we do not find any hstate matching that size, and we return NULL. Then, we dereference that NULL pointer in hugepage_migration_supported() and we got the #PF from above. Fix that by getting the head page before calling page_hstate(). Also, since gigantic pages span several pageblocks, re-adjust the logic for skipping pages. While are it, we can also get rid of the round_up(). [[email protected]: remove round_up(), adjust skip pages logic per Michal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…mory [ Upstream commit a6ecfb1 ] When halting a guest, QEMU flushes the virtual ITS caches, which amounts to writing to the various tables that the guest has allocated. When doing this, we fail to take the srcu lock, and the kernel shouts loudly if running a lockdep kernel: [ 69.680416] ============================= [ 69.680819] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 69.681526] 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty beagleboard#18 Not tainted [ 69.682096] ----------------------------- [ 69.682501] ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:605 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 69.683225] [ 69.683225] other info that might help us debug this: [ 69.683225] [ 69.683975] [ 69.683975] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 69.684598] 6 locks held by qemu-system-aar/4097: [ 69.685059] #0: 0000000034196013 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x244/0x3a0 [ 69.686087] beagleboard#1: 00000000f2ed935e (&its->its_lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x250/0x3a0 [ 69.686919] beagleboard#2: 000000005e71ea54 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.687698] beagleboard#3: 00000000c17e548d (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.688475] beagleboard#4: 00000000ba386017 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.689978] beagleboard#5: 00000000c2c3c335 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.690729] [ 69.690729] stack backtrace: [ 69.691151] CPU: 2 PID: 4097 Comm: qemu-system-aar Not tainted 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty beagleboard#18 [ 69.691984] Hardware name: rockchip evb_rk3399/evb_rk3399, BIOS 2019.04-rc3-00124-g2feec69fb1 03/15/2019 [ 69.692831] Call trace: [ 69.694072] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xcc/0x110 [ 69.694490] gfn_to_memslot+0x174/0x190 [ 69.694853] kvm_write_guest+0x50/0xb0 [ 69.695209] vgic_its_save_tables_v0+0x248/0x330 [ 69.695639] vgic_its_set_attr+0x298/0x3a0 [ 69.696024] kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x9c/0xd8 [ 69.696424] kvm_device_ioctl+0x8c/0xf8 [ 69.696788] do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x960 [ 69.697128] ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0 [ 69.697445] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38 [ 69.697817] el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138 [ 69.698173] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 [ 69.698528] el0_svc+0x8/0xc The fix is to obviously take the srcu lock, just like we do on the read side of things since bf30824. One wonders why this wasn't fixed at the same time, but hey... Fixes: bf30824 ("KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock") Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 68f2515 ] The lcdc device is missing the dma_coherent_mask definition causing the following warning on da850-evm: da8xx_lcdc da8xx_lcdc.0: found Sharp_LK043T1DG01 panel ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:247 dma_alloc_attrs+0xc8/0x110 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3-00077-g16d72dd4891f #18 Hardware name: DaVinci DA850/OMAP-L138/AM18x EVM [<c000fce8>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c000d900>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c000d900>] (show_stack) from [<c001a4f8>] (__warn+0xec/0x114) [<c001a4f8>] (__warn) from [<c001a634>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x3c/0x48) [<c001a634>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<c0065860>] (dma_alloc_attrs+0xc8/0x110) [<c0065860>] (dma_alloc_attrs) from [<c02820f8>] (fb_probe+0x228/0x5a8) [<c02820f8>] (fb_probe) from [<c02d3e9c>] (platform_drv_probe+0x48/0x9c) [<c02d3e9c>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c02d221c>] (really_probe+0x1d8/0x2d4) [<c02d221c>] (really_probe) from [<c02d2474>] (driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x168) [<c02d2474>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c02d2728>] (device_driver_attach+0x58/0x60) [<c02d2728>] (device_driver_attach) from [<c02d27b0>] (__driver_attach+0x80/0xbc) [<c02d27b0>] (__driver_attach) from [<c02d047c>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x64/0xb4) [<c02d047c>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c02d1590>] (bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x1d8) [<c02d1590>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c02d301c>] (driver_register+0x78/0x10c) [<c02d301c>] (driver_register) from [<c000a5c0>] (do_one_initcall+0x48/0x1bc) [<c000a5c0>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c05cae6c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x10c/0x1d8) [<c05cae6c>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c048a000>] (kernel_init+0x8/0xf4) [<c048a000>] (kernel_init) from [<c00090e0>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x34) Exception stack(0xc6837fb0 to 0xc6837ff8) 7fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 7fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 7fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 ---[ end trace 8a8073511be81dd2 ]--- Add a 32-bit mask to the platform device's definition. Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sekhar Nori <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 55b40db ] Commit aca5139 ("netns: Fix arbitrary net_device-s corruptions on net_ns stop.") introduced a possibility to hit a BUG in case device is returning back to init_net and two following conditions are met: 1) dev->ifindex value is used in a name of another "dev%d" device in init_net. 2) dev->name is used by another device in init_net. Under real life circumstances this is hard to get. Therefore this has been present happily for over 10 years. To reproduce: $ ip a 1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000 link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00 inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 ::1/128 scope host valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever 2: dummy0: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000 link/ether 86:89:3f:86:61:29 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 3: enp0s2: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000 link/ether 52:54:00:12:34:56 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff $ ip netns add ns1 $ ip -n ns1 link add dummy1ns1 type dummy $ ip -n ns1 link add dummy2ns1 type dummy $ ip link set enp0s2 netns ns1 $ ip -n ns1 link set enp0s2 name dummy0 [ 100.858894] virtio_net virtio0 dummy0: renamed from enp0s2 $ ip link add dev4 type dummy $ ip -n ns1 a 1: lo: <LOOPBACK> mtu 65536 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000 link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00 2: dummy1ns1: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000 link/ether 16:63:4c:38:3e:ff brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 3: dummy2ns1: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000 link/ether aa:9e:86:dd:6b:5d brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 4: dummy0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000 link/ether 52:54:00:12:34:56 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff $ ip a 1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000 link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00 inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 ::1/128 scope host valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever 2: dummy0: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000 link/ether 86:89:3f:86:61:29 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 4: dev4: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000 link/ether 5a:e1:4a:b6:ec:f8 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff $ ip netns del ns1 [ 158.717795] default_device_exit: failed to move dummy0 to init_net: -17 [ 158.719316] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 158.720591] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:9824! [ 158.722260] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 158.723728] CPU: 0 PID: 56 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc1+ #18 [ 158.725422] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-2.fc30 04/01/2014 [ 158.727508] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 158.728915] RIP: 0010:default_device_exit.cold+0x1d/0x1f [ 158.730683] Code: 84 e8 18 c9 3e fe 0f 0b e9 70 90 ff ff e8 36 e4 52 fe 89 d9 4c 89 e2 48 c7 c6 80 d6 25 84 48 c7 c7 20 c0 25 84 e8 f4 c8 3e [ 158.736854] RSP: 0018:ffff8880347e7b90 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 158.738752] RAX: 000000000000003b RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 158.741369] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8128013d RDI: ffffed10068fcf64 [ 158.743418] RBP: ffff888033550170 R08: 000000000000003b R09: fffffbfff0b94b9c [ 158.745626] R10: fffffbfff0b94b9b R11: ffffffff85ca5cdf R12: ffff888032f28000 [ 158.748405] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8880335501b8 R15: 1ffff110068fcf72 [ 158.750638] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888036000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 158.752944] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 158.755245] CR2: 00007fe8b45d21d0 CR3: 00000000340b4005 CR4: 0000000000360ef0 [ 158.757654] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 158.760012] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 158.762758] Call Trace: [ 158.763882] ? dev_change_net_namespace+0xbb0/0xbb0 [ 158.766148] ? devlink_nl_cmd_set_doit+0x520/0x520 [ 158.768034] ? dev_change_net_namespace+0xbb0/0xbb0 [ 158.769870] ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xa8/0x150 [ 158.771544] cleanup_net+0x446/0x8f0 [ 158.772945] ? unregister_pernet_operations+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 158.775294] process_one_work+0xa1a/0x1740 [ 158.776896] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x310/0x310 [ 158.779143] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11b/0x280 [ 158.780848] worker_thread+0x9e/0x1060 [ 158.782500] ? process_one_work+0x1740/0x1740 [ 158.784454] kthread+0x31b/0x420 [ 158.786082] ? __kthread_create_on_node+0x3f0/0x3f0 [ 158.788286] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 158.789871] ---[ end trace defd6c657c71f936 ]--- [ 158.792273] RIP: 0010:default_device_exit.cold+0x1d/0x1f [ 158.795478] Code: 84 e8 18 c9 3e fe 0f 0b e9 70 90 ff ff e8 36 e4 52 fe 89 d9 4c 89 e2 48 c7 c6 80 d6 25 84 48 c7 c7 20 c0 25 84 e8 f4 c8 3e [ 158.804854] RSP: 0018:ffff8880347e7b90 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 158.807865] RAX: 000000000000003b RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 158.811794] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8128013d RDI: ffffed10068fcf64 [ 158.816652] RBP: ffff888033550170 R08: 000000000000003b R09: fffffbfff0b94b9c [ 158.820930] R10: fffffbfff0b94b9b R11: ffffffff85ca5cdf R12: ffff888032f28000 [ 158.825113] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8880335501b8 R15: 1ffff110068fcf72 [ 158.829899] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888036000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 158.834923] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 158.838164] CR2: 00007fe8b45d21d0 CR3: 00000000340b4005 CR4: 0000000000360ef0 [ 158.841917] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 158.845149] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fix this by checking if a device with the same name exists in init_net and fallback to original code - dev%d to allocate name - in case it does. This was found using syzkaller. Fixes: aca5139 ("netns: Fix arbitrary net_device-s corruptions on net_ns stop.") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit d0a255e upstream. A deadlock with this stacktrace was observed. The loop thread does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, it calls into dm-bufio shrinker and the shrinker depends on I/O completion in the dm-bufio subsystem. In order to fix the deadlock (and other similar ones), we set the flag PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO at loop thread entry. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 PID: 14127 TASK: ffff881455749c00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "loop1" #0 [ffff88272f5af228] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff88272f5af280] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff88272f5af2a0] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8173fd5e #3 [ffff88272f5af2b0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff81741fb5 #4 [ffff88272f5af330] mutex_lock at ffffffff81742133 #5 [ffff88272f5af350] dm_bufio_shrink_count at ffffffffa03865f9 [dm_bufio] #6 [ffff88272f5af380] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a86bd #7 [ffff88272f5af470] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #8 [ffff88272f5af500] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adb34 #9 [ffff88272f5af590] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adef8 #10 [ffff88272f5af610] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff811a09c3 #11 [ffff88272f5af710] alloc_pages_current at ffffffff811e8b71 #12 [ffff88272f5af760] new_slab at ffffffff811f4523 #13 [ffff88272f5af7b0] __slab_alloc at ffffffff8173a1b5 #14 [ffff88272f5af880] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff811f484b #15 [ffff88272f5af8d0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff812535b3 #16 [ffff88272f5afb00] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff81255dc3 #17 [ffff88272f5afb30] xfs_vm_direct_IO at ffffffffa01fe3fc [xfs] #18 [ffff88272f5afb90] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81198994 #19 [ffff88272f5afc50] __dta_xfs_file_read_iter_2398 at ffffffffa020c970 [xfs] #20 [ffff88272f5afcc0] lo_rw_aio at ffffffffa0377042 [loop] #21 [ffff88272f5afd70] loop_queue_work at ffffffffa0377c3b [loop] #22 [ffff88272f5afe60] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff810a8a0c #23 [ffff88272f5afec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #24 [ffff88272f5aff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1bc7896 ] When experimenting with bpf_send_signal() helper in our production environment (5.2 based), we experienced a deadlock in NMI mode: #5 [ffffc9002219f770] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8110be24 #6 [ffffc9002219f770] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff81a43012 #7 [ffffc9002219f780] try_to_wake_up at ffffffff810e7ecd #8 [ffffc9002219f7e0] signal_wake_up_state at ffffffff810c7b55 #9 [ffffc9002219f7f0] __send_signal at ffffffff810c8602 #10 [ffffc9002219f830] do_send_sig_info at ffffffff810ca31a #11 [ffffc9002219f868] bpf_send_signal at ffffffff8119d227 #12 [ffffc9002219f988] bpf_overflow_handler at ffffffff811d4140 #13 [ffffc9002219f9e0] __perf_event_overflow at ffffffff811d68cf #14 [ffffc9002219fa10] perf_swevent_overflow at ffffffff811d6a09 #15 [ffffc9002219fa38] ___perf_sw_event at ffffffff811e0f47 #16 [ffffc9002219fc30] __schedule at ffffffff81a3e04d #17 [ffffc9002219fc90] schedule at ffffffff81a3e219 #18 [ffffc9002219fca0] futex_wait_queue_me at ffffffff8113d1b9 #19 [ffffc9002219fcd8] futex_wait at ffffffff8113e529 #20 [ffffc9002219fdf0] do_futex at ffffffff8113ffbc #21 [ffffc9002219fec0] __x64_sys_futex at ffffffff81140d1c #22 [ffffc9002219ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002602 #23 [ffffc9002219ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81c00068 The above call stack is actually very similar to an issue reported by Commit eac9153 ("bpf/stackmap: Fix deadlock with rq_lock in bpf_get_stack()") by Song Liu. The only difference is bpf_send_signal() helper instead of bpf_get_stack() helper. The above deadlock is triggered with a perf_sw_event. Similar to Commit eac9153, the below almost identical reproducer used tracepoint point sched/sched_switch so the issue can be easily caught. /* stress_test.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #define THREAD_COUNT 1000 char *filename; void *worker(void *p) { void *ptr; int fd; char *pptr; fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return NULL; while (1) { struct timespec ts = {0, 1000 + rand() % 2000}; ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096 * 64, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); usleep(1); if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) { printf("failed to mmap\n"); break; } munmap(ptr, 4096 * 64); usleep(1); pptr = malloc(1); usleep(1); pptr[0] = 1; usleep(1); free(pptr); usleep(1); nanosleep(&ts, NULL); } close(fd); return NULL; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { void *ptr; int i; pthread_t threads[THREAD_COUNT]; if (argc < 2) return 0; filename = argv[1]; for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) { if (pthread_create(threads + i, NULL, worker, NULL)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error creating thread\n"); return 0; } } for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) pthread_join(threads[i], NULL); return 0; } and the following command: 1. run `stress_test /bin/ls` in one windown 2. hack bcc trace.py with the following change: # --- a/tools/trace.py # +++ b/tools/trace.py @@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(%s); __data.tgid = __tgid; __data.pid = __pid; bpf_get_current_comm(&__data.comm, sizeof(__data.comm)); + bpf_send_signal(10); %s %s %s.perf_submit(%s, &__data, sizeof(__data)); 3. in a different window run ./trace.py -p $(pidof stress_test) t:sched:sched_switch The deadlock can be reproduced in our production system. Similar to Song's fix, the fix is to delay sending signal if irqs is disabled to avoid deadlocks involving with rq_lock. With this change, my above stress-test in our production system won't cause deadlock any more. I also implemented a scale-down version of reproducer in the selftest (a subsequent commit). With latest bpf-next, it complains for the following potential deadlock. [ 32.832450] -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}: [ 32.833100] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80 [ 32.833696] task_rq_lock+0x2c/0xa0 [ 32.834182] task_sched_runtime+0x59/0xd0 [ 32.834721] thread_group_cputime+0x250/0x270 [ 32.835304] thread_group_cputime_adjusted+0x2e/0x70 [ 32.835959] do_task_stat+0x8a7/0xb80 [ 32.836461] proc_single_show+0x51/0xb0 ... [ 32.839512] -> #0 (&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock){....}: [ 32.840275] __lock_acquire+0x1358/0x1a20 [ 32.840826] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x1d0 [ 32.841309] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80 [ 32.841916] __lock_task_sighand+0x79/0x160 [ 32.842465] do_send_sig_info+0x35/0x90 [ 32.842977] bpf_send_signal+0xa/0x10 [ 32.843464] bpf_prog_bc13ed9e4d3163e3_send_signal_tp_sched+0x465/0x1000 [ 32.844301] trace_call_bpf+0x115/0x270 [ 32.844809] perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x4a/0xc0 [ 32.845411] perf_trace_sched_switch+0x10f/0x180 [ 32.846014] __schedule+0x45d/0x880 [ 32.846483] schedule+0x5f/0xd0 ... [ 32.853148] Chain exists of: [ 32.853148] &(&sighand->siglock)->rlock --> &p->pi_lock --> &rq->lock [ 32.853148] [ 32.854451] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 32.854451] [ 32.855173] CPU0 CPU1 [ 32.855745] ---- ---- [ 32.856278] lock(&rq->lock); [ 32.856671] lock(&p->pi_lock); [ 32.857332] lock(&rq->lock); [ 32.857999] lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock); Deadlock happens on CPU0 when it tries to acquire &sighand->siglock but it has been held by CPU1 and CPU1 tries to grab &rq->lock and cannot get it. This is not exactly the callstack in our production environment, but sympotom is similar and both locks are using spin_lock_irqsave() to acquire the lock, and both involves rq_lock. The fix to delay sending signal when irq is disabled also fixed this issue. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b12eea5 ] The evsel->unit borrows a pointer of pmu event or alias instead of owns a string. But tool event (duration_time) passes a result of strdup() caused a leak. It was found by ASAN during metric test: Direct leak of 210 byte(s) in 70 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe366fca0b5 in strdup (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x920b5) #1 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in add_event_tool util/parse-events.c:414 #2 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in parse_events_add_tool util/parse-events.c:1414 #3 0x559fbbd8474d in parse_events_parse util/parse-events.y:439 #4 0x559fbbcc95da in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:2096 #5 0x559fbbcc95da in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2141 #6 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:406 #7 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:393 #8 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_cpu tests/pmu-events.c:415 #9 0x559fbbc28555 in test_parsing tests/pmu-events.c:498 #10 0x559fbbc0109b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410 #11 0x559fbbc0109b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440 #12 0x559fbbc03e69 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:695 #13 0x559fbbc03e69 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807 #14 0x559fbbc691f4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312 #15 0x559fbbb071a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364 #16 0x559fbbb071a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408 #17 0x559fbbb071a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538 #18 0x7fe366b68cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 Fixes: f0fbb11 ("perf stat: Implement duration_time as a proper event") Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 4d14c5c upstream Calling btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc from btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata can result in flushing delalloc while holding a transaction and delayed node locks. This is deadlock prone. In the past multiple commits: * ae5e070 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're already holding a transaction") * 6f23277 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already hold the handle") Tried to solve various aspects of this but this was always a whack-a-mole game. Unfortunately those 2 fixes don't solve a deadlock scenario involving btrfs_delayed_node::mutex. Namely, one thread can call btrfs_dirty_inode as a result of reading a file and modifying its atime: PID: 6963 TASK: ffff8c7f3f94c000 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "test" #0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d #1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff #2 schedule_timeout at ffffffffa52a1bdd #3 wait_for_completion at ffffffffa529eeea <-- sleeps with delayed node mutex held #4 start_delalloc_inodes at ffffffffc0380db5 #5 btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot at ffffffffc0393836 #6 try_flush_qgroup at ffffffffc03f04b2 #7 __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta at ffffffffc03f5bb6 <-- tries to reserve space and starts delalloc inodes. #8 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e31aa <-- acquires delayed node mutex #9 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 #10 btrfs_dirty_inode at ffffffffc038627b <-- TRANSACTIION OPENED #11 touch_atime at ffffffffa4cf0000 #12 generic_file_read_iter at ffffffffa4c1f123 #13 new_sync_read at ffffffffa4ccdc8a #14 vfs_read at ffffffffa4cd0849 #15 ksys_read at ffffffffa4cd0bd1 #16 do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa4a052eb #17 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa540008c This will cause an asynchronous work to flush the delalloc inodes to happen which can try to acquire the same delayed_node mutex: PID: 455 TASK: ffff8c8085fa4000 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kworker/u16:30" #0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d #1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff #2 schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa529e80a #3 __mutex_lock at ffffffffa529fdcb <-- goes to sleep, never wakes up. #4 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e3143 <-- tries to acquire the mutex #5 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 <-- this is the same inode that pid 6963 is holding #6 cow_file_range_inline.constprop.78 at ffffffffc0386be7 #7 cow_file_range at ffffffffc03879c1 #8 btrfs_run_delalloc_range at ffffffffc038894c #9 writepage_delalloc at ffffffffc03a3c8f #10 __extent_writepage at ffffffffc03a4c01 #11 extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffffc03a500b #12 extent_writepages at ffffffffc03a6de2 #13 do_writepages at ffffffffa4c277eb #14 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffffa4c1e5bb #15 btrfs_run_delalloc_work at ffffffffc0380987 <-- starts running delayed nodes #16 normal_work_helper at ffffffffc03b706c #17 process_one_work at ffffffffa4aba4e4 #18 worker_thread at ffffffffa4aba6fd #19 kthread at ffffffffa4ac0a3d #20 ret_from_fork at ffffffffa54001ff To fully address those cases the complete fix is to never issue any flushing while holding the transaction or the delayed node lock. This patch achieves it by calling qgroup_reserve_meta directly which will either succeed without flushing or will fail and return -EDQUOT. In the latter case that return value is going to be propagated to btrfs_dirty_inode which will fallback to start a new transaction. That's fine as the majority of time we expect the inode will have BTRFS_DELAYED_NODE_INODE_DIRTY flag set which will result in directly copying the in-memory state. Fixes: c53e965 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT") CC: [email protected] # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 41d5854 upstream. I got several memory leak reports from Asan with a simple command. It was because VDSO is not released due to the refcount. Like in __dsos_addnew_id(), it should put the refcount after adding to the list. $ perf record true [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.030 MB perf.data (10 samples) ] ================================================================= ==692599==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 439 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fea52341037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559bce4aa8ee in dso__new_id util/dso.c:1256 #2 0x559bce59245a in __machine__addnew_vdso util/vdso.c:132 #3 0x559bce59245a in machine__findnew_vdso util/vdso.c:347 #4 0x559bce50826c in map__new util/map.c:175 #5 0x559bce503c92 in machine__process_mmap2_event util/machine.c:1787 #6 0x559bce512f6b in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1481 #7 0x559bce515107 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1551 #8 0x559bce51d4d2 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #9 0x559bce51d4d2 in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #10 0x559bce519bea in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2268 #11 0x559bce519bea in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2297 #12 0x559bce2e7a52 in process_buildids /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1017 #13 0x559bce2e7a52 in record__finish_output /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1234 #14 0x559bce2ed4f6 in __cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2026 #15 0x559bce2ed4f6 in cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2858 #16 0x559bce422db4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313 #17 0x559bce2acac8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365 #18 0x559bce2acac8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409 #19 0x559bce2acac8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539 #20 0x7fea51e76d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 Indirect leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fea52341037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559bce520907 in nsinfo__copy util/namespaces.c:169 #2 0x559bce50821b in map__new util/map.c:168 #3 0x559bce503c92 in machine__process_mmap2_event util/machine.c:1787 #4 0x559bce512f6b in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1481 #5 0x559bce515107 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1551 #6 0x559bce51d4d2 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #7 0x559bce51d4d2 in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #8 0x559bce519bea in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2268 #9 0x559bce519bea in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2297 #10 0x559bce2e7a52 in process_buildids /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1017 #11 0x559bce2e7a52 in record__finish_output /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1234 #12 0x559bce2ed4f6 in __cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2026 #13 0x559bce2ed4f6 in cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2858 #14 0x559bce422db4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313 #15 0x559bce2acac8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365 #16 0x559bce2acac8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409 #17 0x559bce2acac8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539 #18 0x7fea51e76d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 471 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 57f0ff0 upstream. It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the following segmentation fault: # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle terminates with: #0 0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489 #3 hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564 #4 0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657 #5 0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0, sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288 #6 0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38) at util/hist.c:1056 #7 iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056 #8 0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0) at util/hist.c:1231 #9 0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:842 #10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202 #11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244 #12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323 #13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114 #17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6 If you look at the frame #2, the code is: 488 if (he->srcline) { 489 he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline); 490 if (he->srcline == NULL) 491 goto err_rawdata; 492 } If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish), it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem. Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed. Committer notes: Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line 2189 in add_callchain_ip(): 2181 if (al.sym != NULL) { 2182 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent && 2183 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex)) 2184 *parent = al.sym; 2185 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al && 2186 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) { 2187 /* Treat this symbol as the root, 2188 forgetting its callees. */ 2189 *root_al = al; 2190 callchain_cursor_reset(cursor); 2191 } 2192 } And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be copied to the root_al, so then, back to: 1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al, 1212 int max_stack_depth, void *arg) 1213 { 1214 int err, err2; 1215 struct map *alm = NULL; 1216 1217 if (al) 1218 alm = map__get(al->map); 1219 1220 err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent, 1221 iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth); 1222 if (err) { 1223 map__put(alm); 1224 return err; 1225 } 1226 1227 err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al); 1228 if (err) 1229 goto out; 1230 1231 err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); 1232 if (err) 1233 goto out; 1234 That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then: iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above sequence to the cset and apply, thanks! Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]> CC: Milian Wolff <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries") Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Juri Lelli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4224cfd ] When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bf0cd60 ] AV/C deferred transaction was supported at a commit 00a7bb8 ("ALSA: firewire-lib: Add support for deferred transaction") while 'deferrable' flag can be uninitialized for non-control/notify AV/C transactions. UBSAN reports it: kernel: ================================================================================ kernel: UBSAN: invalid-load in /build/linux-aa0B4d/linux-5.15.0/sound/firewire/fcp.c:363:9 kernel: load of value 158 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' kernel: CPU: 3 PID: 182227 Comm: irq/35-firewire Tainted: P OE 5.15.0-18-generic #18-Ubuntu kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. AX370-Gaming 5/AX370-Gaming 5, BIOS F42b 08/01/2019 kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <IRQ> kernel: show_stack+0x52/0x58 kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x5f kernel: dump_stack+0x10/0x12 kernel: ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45 kernel: __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value.cold+0x44/0x49 kernel: fcp_response.part.0.cold+0x1a/0x2b [snd_firewire_lib] kernel: fcp_response+0x28/0x30 [snd_firewire_lib] kernel: fw_core_handle_request+0x230/0x3d0 [firewire_core] kernel: handle_ar_packet+0x1d9/0x200 [firewire_ohci] kernel: ? handle_ar_packet+0x1d9/0x200 [firewire_ohci] kernel: ? transmit_complete_callback+0x9f/0x120 [firewire_core] kernel: ar_context_tasklet+0xa8/0x2e0 [firewire_ohci] kernel: tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0xea/0xf0 kernel: tasklet_action+0x22/0x30 kernel: __do_softirq+0xd9/0x2e3 kernel: ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.0+0xf0/0xf0 kernel: do_softirq+0x75/0xa0 kernel: </IRQ> kernel: <TASK> kernel: __local_bh_enable_ip+0x50/0x60 kernel: irq_forced_thread_fn+0x7e/0x90 kernel: irq_thread+0xba/0x190 kernel: ? irq_thread_fn+0x60/0x60 kernel: kthread+0x11e/0x140 kernel: ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xf0/0xf0 kernel: ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 kernel: ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 kernel: </TASK> kernel: ================================================================================ This commit fixes the bug. The bug has no disadvantage for the non- control/notify AV/C transactions since the flag has an effect for AV/C response with INTERIM (0x0f) status which is not used for the transactions in AV/C general specification. Fixes: 00a7bb8 ("ALSA: firewire-lib: Add support for deferred transaction") Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 577298e ] Even if it is only a false-positive since skip_buf0/skip_buf1 are only used in mt76_dma_tx_cleanup_idx routine, initialize skip_unmap in mt76_dma_rx_fill in order to fix the following UBSAN report: [ 13.924906] UBSAN: invalid-load in linux-5.15.0/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/dma.c:162:13 [ 13.924909] load of value 225 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' [ 13.924912] CPU: 9 PID: 672 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.15.0-18-generic #18-Ubuntu [ 13.924914] Hardware name: LENOVO 21A0000CMX/21A0000CMX, BIOS R1MET43W (1.13 ) 11/05/2021 [ 13.924915] Call Trace: [ 13.924917] <TASK> [ 13.924920] show_stack+0x52/0x58 [ 13.924925] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x5f [ 13.924931] dump_stack+0x10/0x12 [ 13.924932] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45 [ 13.924934] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value.cold+0x44/0x49 [ 13.924935] ? __iommu_dma_map+0x84/0xf0 [ 13.924939] mt76_dma_add_buf.constprop.0.cold+0x23/0x85 [mt76] [ 13.924949] mt76_dma_rx_fill.isra.0+0x102/0x1f0 [mt76] [ 13.924954] mt76_dma_init+0xc9/0x150 [mt76] [ 13.924959] ? mt7921_dma_enable+0x110/0x110 [mt7921e] [ 13.924966] mt7921_dma_init+0x1e3/0x260 [mt7921e] [ 13.924970] mt7921_register_device+0x29d/0x510 [mt7921e] [ 13.924975] mt7921_pci_probe.part.0+0x17f/0x1b0 [mt7921e] [ 13.924980] mt7921_pci_probe+0x43/0x60 [mt7921e] [ 13.924984] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x90 [ 13.924987] pci_device_probe+0x115/0x1f0 [ 13.924989] really_probe+0x21e/0x420 [ 13.924992] __driver_probe_device+0x115/0x190 [ 13.924994] driver_probe_device+0x23/0xc0 [ 13.924996] __driver_attach+0xbd/0x1d0 [ 13.924998] ? __device_attach_driver+0x110/0x110 [ 13.924999] bus_for_each_dev+0x7e/0xc0 [ 13.925001] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [ 13.925003] bus_add_driver+0x135/0x200 [ 13.925005] driver_register+0x95/0xf0 [ 13.925008] ? 0xffffffffc0766000 [ 13.925010] __pci_register_driver+0x68/0x70 [ 13.925011] mt7921_pci_driver_init+0x23/0x1000 [mt7921e] [ 13.925015] do_one_initcall+0x48/0x1d0 [ 13.925019] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x19e/0x2e0 [ 13.925022] do_init_module+0x62/0x280 [ 13.925025] load_module+0xac9/0xbb0 [ 13.925027] __do_sys_finit_module+0xbf/0x120 [ 13.925029] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x18/0x20 [ 13.925030] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [ 13.925033] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 13.925034] ? sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x78/0xe0 [ 13.925036] ? asm_sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0xa/0x20 [ 13.925039] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 13.925040] RIP: 0033:0x7fbf2b90f94d [ 13.925045] RSP: 002b:00007ffe2ec7e5d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 13.925047] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000056106b0634e0 RCX: 00007fbf2b90f94d [ 13.925048] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fbf2baa3441 RDI: 0000000000000013 [ 13.925049] RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 13.925050] R10: 0000000000000013 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fbf2baa3441 [ 13.925051] R13: 000056106b062620 R14: 000056106b0610c0 R15: 000056106b0640d0 [ 13.925053] </TASK> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 2a4a62a upstream. syscall_stub_data() expects the data_count parameter to be the number of longs, not bytes. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0 Read of size 128 at addr 000000006411f6f0 by task swapper/1 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0+ #18 Call Trace: show_stack.cold+0x166/0x2a7 __dump_stack+0x3a/0x43 dump_stack_lvl+0x1f/0x27 print_report.cold+0xdb/0xf81 kasan_report+0x119/0x1f0 kasan_check_range+0x3a3/0x440 memcpy+0x52/0x140 syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0 write_ldt_entry+0xac/0x190 init_new_ldt+0x515/0x960 init_new_context+0x2c4/0x4d0 mm_init.constprop.0+0x5ed/0x760 mm_alloc+0x118/0x170 0x60033f48 do_one_initcall+0x1d7/0x860 0x60003e7b kernel_init+0x6e/0x3d4 new_thread_handler+0x1e7/0x2c0 The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/1 and is located at offset 64 in frame: init_new_ldt+0x0/0x960 This frame has 2 objects: [32, 40) 'addr' [64, 80) 'desc' ================================================================== Fixes: 858259c ("uml: maintain own LDT entries") Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5dd7caf ] In __unregister_kprobe_top(), if the currently unregistered probe has post_handler but other child probes of the aggrprobe do not have post_handler, the post_handler of the aggrprobe is cleared. If this is a ftrace-based probe, there is a problem. In later calls to disarm_kprobe(), we will use kprobe_ftrace_ops because post_handler is NULL. But we're armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This triggers a WARN in __disarm_kprobe_ftrace() and may even cause use-after-free: Failed to disarm kprobe-ftrace at kernel_clone+0x0/0x3c0 (error -2) WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 137 at kernel/kprobes.c:1135 __disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.21+0xcf/0xe0 Modules linked in: testKprobe_007(-) CPU: 5 PID: 137 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-dirty #18 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> __disable_kprobe+0xcd/0xe0 __unregister_kprobe_top+0x12/0x150 ? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30 unregister_kprobes.part.23+0x31/0xa0 unregister_kprobe+0x32/0x40 __x64_sys_delete_module+0x15e/0x260 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2cd/0x6b0 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [...] For the kprobe-on-ftrace case, we keep the post_handler setting to identify this aggrprobe armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This way we can disarm it correctly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Fixes: 0bc11ed ("kprobes: Allow kprobes coexist with livepatch") Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <[email protected]> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 beagleboard#1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d beagleboard#2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 beagleboard#3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b beagleboard#4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb beagleboard#5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 beagleboard#6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 beagleboard#7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] beagleboard#8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 beagleboard#9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 beagleboard#10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 beagleboard#11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 beagleboard#12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde beagleboard#13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b beagleboard#14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 beagleboard#15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a beagleboard#16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 beagleboard#17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca beagleboard#18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6702a9 ] syzkaller reported use-after-free with the stack trace like below [1]: [ 38.960489][ C3] ================================================================== [ 38.963216][ C3] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.964950][ C3] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888048e03450 by task swapper/3/0 [ 38.966363][ C3] [ 38.967053][ C3] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.0.0-09039-ga6afa4199d3d-dirty beagleboard#18 [ 38.968464][ C3] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014 [ 38.969959][ C3] Call Trace: [ 38.970841][ C3] <IRQ> [ 38.971663][ C3] dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174 [ 38.972620][ C3] print_report.cold+0x2c3/0x752 [ 38.973626][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.974644][ C3] kasan_report+0xb1/0x1d0 [ 38.975720][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.976831][ C3] ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.978412][ C3] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x353/0x5b0 [ 38.979755][ C3] usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x385/0x430 [ 38.981266][ C3] dummy_timer+0x140c/0x34e0 [ 38.982925][ C3] ? notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x1e0 [ 38.984761][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.986242][ C3] ? lock_release+0x51c/0x790 [ 38.987323][ C3] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x70 [ 38.988483][ C3] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130 [ 38.989621][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 38.990777][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.991919][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.993138][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.994890][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.996266][ C3] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x16f/0x230 [ 38.997670][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.999116][ C3] call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6a0 [ 39.000668][ C3] ? add_timer_on+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.002137][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.003809][ C3] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0x226/0x2a0 [ 39.005509][ C3] __run_timers.part.0+0x69a/0xac0 [ 39.007025][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 39.008716][ C3] ? call_timer_fn+0x6a0/0x6a0 [ 39.010254][ C3] ? cpuacct_percpu_seq_show+0x10/0x10 [ 39.011795][ C3] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [ 39.013277][ C3] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x2b0 [ 39.014724][ C3] run_timer_softirq+0xb6/0x1d0 [ 39.016196][ C3] __do_softirq+0x1d2/0x9be [ 39.017616][ C3] __irq_exit_rcu+0xeb/0x190 [ 39.019004][ C3] irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 [ 39.020361][ C3] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8f/0xb0 [ 39.021965][ C3] </IRQ> [ 39.023237][ C3] <TASK> In ar5523_probe(), ar5523_host_available() calls ar5523_cmd() as below (there are other functions which finally call ar5523_cmd()): ar5523_probe() -> ar5523_host_available() -> ar5523_cmd_read() -> ar5523_cmd() If ar5523_cmd() timed out, then ar5523_host_available() failed and ar5523_probe() freed the device structure. So, ar5523_cmd_tx_cb() might touch the freed structure. This patch fixes this issue by canceling in-flight tx cmd if submitted urb timed out. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=9e12b2d54300842b71bdd18b54971385ff0d0d3a [1] Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 031af50 ] The inline assembly for arm64's cmpxchg_double*() implementations use a +Q constraint to hazard against other accesses to the memory location being exchanged. However, the pointer passed to the constraint is a pointer to unsigned long, and thus the hazard only applies to the first 8 bytes of the location. GCC can take advantage of this, assuming that other portions of the location are unchanged, leading to a number of potential problems. This is similar to what we fixed back in commit: fee960b ("arm64: xchg: hazard against entire exchange variable") ... but we forgot to adjust cmpxchg_double*() similarly at the same time. The same problem applies, as demonstrated with the following test: | struct big { | u64 lo, hi; | } __aligned(128); | | unsigned long foo(struct big *b) | { | u64 hi_old, hi_new; | | hi_old = b->hi; | cmpxchg_double_local(&b->lo, &b->hi, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78); | hi_new = b->hi; | | return hi_old ^ hi_new; | } ... which GCC 12.1.0 compiles as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: d503233f paciasp | 4: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | 8: 1400000e b 40 <foo+0x40> | c: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // beagleboard#18 | 10: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // beagleboard#52 | 14: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 18: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 1c: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // beagleboard#86 | 20: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // beagleboard#120 | 24: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 28: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 2c: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 30: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 34: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 38: d50323bf autiasp | 3c: d65f03c0 ret | 40: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // beagleboard#18 | 44: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // beagleboard#52 | 48: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // beagleboard#86 | 4c: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // beagleboard#120 | 50: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 54: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 58: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 5c: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 60: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 64: b5000066 cbnz x6, 70 <foo+0x70> | 68: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 6c: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 54 <foo+0x54> | 70: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 74: d50323bf autiasp | 78: d65f03c0 ret Notice that at the lines with "BANG" comments, GCC has assumed that the higher 8 bytes are unchanged by the cmpxchg_double() call, and that `hi_old ^ hi_new` can be reduced to a constant zero, for both LSE and LL/SC versions of cmpxchg_double(). This patch fixes the issue by passing a pointer to __uint128_t into the +Q constraint, ensuring that the compiler hazards against the entire 16 bytes being modified. With this change, GCC 12.1.0 compiles the above test as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: f9400407 ldr x7, [x0, beagleboard#8] | 4: d503233f paciasp | 8: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | c: 1400000f b 48 <foo+0x48> | 10: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // beagleboard#18 | 14: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // beagleboard#52 | 18: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 1c: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 20: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // beagleboard#86 | 24: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // beagleboard#120 | 28: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 2c: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 30: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 34: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 38: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, beagleboard#8] | 3c: d50323bf autiasp | 40: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 44: d65f03c0 ret | 48: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // beagleboard#18 | 4c: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // beagleboard#52 | 50: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // beagleboard#86 | 54: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // beagleboard#120 | 58: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 5c: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 60: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 64: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 68: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 6c: b5000066 cbnz x6, 78 <foo+0x78> | 70: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 74: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 5c <foo+0x5c> | 78: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, beagleboard#8] | 7c: d50323bf autiasp | 80: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 84: d65f03c0 ret ... sampling the high 8 bytes before and after the cmpxchg, and performing an EOR, as we'd expect. For backporting, I've tested this atop linux-4.9.y with GCC 5.5.0. Note that linux-4.9.y is oldest currently supported stable release, and mandates GCC 5.1+. Unfortunately I couldn't get a GCC 5.1 binary to run on my machines due to library incompatibilities. I've also used a standalone test to check that we can use a __uint128_t pointer in a +Q constraint at least as far back as GCC 4.8.5 and LLVM 3.9.1. Fixes: 5284e1b ("arm64: xchg: Implement cmpxchg_double") Fixes: e9a4b79 ("arm64: cmpxchg_dbl: patch in lse instructions when supported by the CPU") Reported-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y6DEfQXymYVgL3oJ@boqun-archlinux/ Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Steve Capper <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

During the migration of Soundwire runtime stream allocation from the Qualcomm Soundwire controller to SoC's soundcard drivers the sdm845 soundcard was forgotten. At this point any playback attempt or audio daemon startup, for instance on sdm845-db845c (Qualcomm RB3 board), will result in stream pointer NULL dereference: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000101ecf000 [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: ... CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1198 Comm: aplay Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-qcomlt-arm64-00059-g9d78f315a362-dirty #18 Hardware name: Thundercomm Dragonboard 845c (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus] lr : sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus] sp : ffff80008a2035c0 x29: ffff80008a2035c0 x28: ffff80008a203978 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 00000000000000c0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff1676025f4800 x23: ffff167600ff1cb8 x22: ffff167600ff1c98 x21: 0000000000000003 x20: ffff167607316000 x19: ffff167604e64e80 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffcec265074160 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff167600ff1cec x5 : ffffcec22cfa2010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000003 x2 : ffff167613f836c0 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff16761feb60b8 Call trace: sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus] wsa881x_hw_params+0x68/0x80 [snd_soc_wsa881x] snd_soc_dai_hw_params+0x3c/0xa4 __soc_pcm_hw_params+0x230/0x660 dpcm_be_dai_hw_params+0x1d0/0x3f8 dpcm_fe_dai_hw_params+0x98/0x268 snd_pcm_hw_params+0x124/0x460 snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x998/0x16e8 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x34/0x58 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0xf8 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x34/0xe0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: aa0403fb f9418400 9100e000 9400102f (f8420f22) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 0000000000006108 <sdw_stream_add_slave>: 6108: d503233f paciasp 610c: a9b97bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-112]! 6110: 910003fd mov x29, sp 6114: a90153f3 stp x19, x20, [sp, #16] 6118: a9025bf5 stp x21, x22, [sp, #32] 611c: aa0103f6 mov x22, x1 6120: 2a0303f5 mov w21, w3 6124: a90363f7 stp x23, x24, [sp, #48] 6128: aa0003f8 mov x24, x0 612c: aa0203f7 mov x23, x2 6130: a9046bf9 stp x25, x26, [sp, #64] 6134: aa0403f9 mov x25, x4 <-- x4 copied to x25 6138: a90573fb stp x27, x28, [sp, #80] 613c: aa0403fb mov x27, x4 6140: f9418400 ldr x0, [x0, #776] 6144: 9100e000 add x0, x0, #0x38 6148: 94000000 bl 0 <mutex_lock> 614c: f8420f22 ldr x2, [x25, #32]! <-- offset 0x44 ^^^ This is 0x6108 + offset 0x44 from the beginning of sdw_stream_add_slave() where data abort happens. wsa881x_hw_params() is called with stream = NULL and passes it further in register x4 (5th argument) to sdw_stream_add_slave() without any checks. Value from x4 is copied to x25 and finally it aborts on trying to load a value from address in x25 plus offset 32 (in dec) which corresponds to master_list member in struct sdw_stream_runtime: struct sdw_stream_runtime { const char * name; /* 0 8 */ struct sdw_stream_params params; /* 8 12 */ enum sdw_stream_state state; /* 20 4 */ enum sdw_stream_type type; /* 24 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ here-> struct list_head master_list; /* 32 16 */ int m_rt_count; /* 48 4 */ /* size: 56, cachelines: 1, members: 6 */ /* sum members: 48, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* padding: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 56 bytes */ Fix this by adding required calls to qcom_snd_sdw_startup() and sdw_release_stream() to startup and shutdown routines which restores the previous correct behaviour when ->set_stream() method is called to set a valid stream runtime pointer on playback startup. Reproduced and then fix was tested on db845c RB3 board. Reported-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 15c7fab ("ASoC: qcom: Move Soundwire runtime stream alloc to soundcards") Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Cc: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexey Klimov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Steev Klimaszewski <[email protected]> # Lenovo Yoga C630 Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>

Uprobe needs to fetch args into a percpu buffer, and then copy to ring buffer to avoid non-atomic context problem. Sometimes user-space strings, arrays can be very large, but the size of percpu buffer is only page size. And store_trace_args() won't check whether these data exceeds a single page or not, caused out-of-bounds memory access. It could be reproduced by following steps: 1. build kernel with CONFIG_KASAN enabled 2. save follow program as test.c ``` \#include <stdio.h> \#include <stdlib.h> \#include <string.h> // If string length large than MAX_STRING_SIZE, the fetch_store_strlen() // will return 0, cause __get_data_size() return shorter size, and // store_trace_args() will not trigger out-of-bounds access. // So make string length less than 4096. \#define STRLEN 4093 void generate_string(char *str, int n) { int i; for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { char c = i % 26 + 'a'; str[i] = c; } str[n-1] = '\0'; } void print_string(char *str) { printf("%s\n", str); } int main() { char tmp[STRLEN]; generate_string(tmp, STRLEN); print_string(tmp); return 0; } ``` 3. compile program `gcc -o test test.c` 4. get the offset of `print_string()` ``` objdump -t test | grep -w print_string 0000000000401199 g F .text 000000000000001b print_string ``` 5. configure uprobe with offset 0x1199 ``` off=0x1199 cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/ echo "p /root/test:${off} arg1=+0(%di):ustring arg2=\$comm arg3=+0(%di):ustring" > uprobe_events echo 1 > events/uprobes/enable echo 1 > tracing_on ``` 6. run `test`, and kasan will report error. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88812311c004 by task test/499CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 499 Comm: test Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #18 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.16.0-4.al8 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310 kasan_report+0x10f/0x120 ? strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0 strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0 ? rmqueue.constprop.0+0x70d/0x2ad0 process_fetch_insn+0xb26/0x1470 ? __pfx_process_fetch_insn+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pte_offset_map+0x1f/0x2d0 ? unwind_next_frame+0xc5f/0x1f80 ? arch_stack_walk+0x68/0xf0 ? is_bpf_text_address+0x23/0x30 ? kernel_text_address.part.0+0xbb/0xd0 ? __kernel_text_address+0x66/0xb0 ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0xa0 ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10 ? arch_stack_walk+0xa2/0xf0 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8b/0xf0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? depot_alloc_stack+0x4c/0x1f0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xe/0x30 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x35d/0x4f0 ? kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x50 ? kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 ? mutex_lock+0x91/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 prepare_uprobe_buffer.part.0+0x2cd/0x500 uprobe_dispatcher+0x2c3/0x6a0 ? __pfx_uprobe_dispatcher+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4d/0x90 handler_chain+0xdd/0x3e0 handle_swbp+0x26e/0x3d0 ? __pfx_handle_swbp+0x10/0x10 ? uprobe_pre_sstep_notifier+0x151/0x1b0 irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xe2/0x1b0 asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40 RIP: 0033:0x401199 Code: 01 c2 0f b6 45 fb 88 02 83 45 fc 01 8b 45 fc 3b 45 e4 7c b7 8b 45 e4 48 98 48 8d 50 ff 48 8b 45 e8 48 01 d0 ce RSP: 002b:00007ffdf00576a8 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 00007ffdf00576b0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000ff2 RDX: 0000000000000ffc RSI: 0000000000000ffd RDI: 00007ffdf00576b0 RBP: 00007ffdf00586b0 R08: 00007feb2f9c0d20 R09: 00007feb2f9c0d20 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000401040 R13: 00007ffdf0058780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> This commit enforces the buffer's maxlen less than a page-size to avoid store_trace_args() out-of-memory access. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Fixes: dcad1a2 ("tracing/uprobes: Fetch args before reserving a ring buffer") Signed-off-by: Qiao Ma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>

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musb: add fix for beagleboard/linux#18

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musb: add fix for beagleboard/linux#18

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musb_cppi41: fix mismerge: #18

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Patch missing for musb_cppi41.c in 3.14 branch #18

Patch missing for musb_cppi41.c in 3.14 branch #18

chdh commented Jan 11, 2015

RobertCNelson commented Jan 12, 2015

Patch missing for musb_cppi41.c in 3.14 branch #18

Patch missing for musb_cppi41.c in 3.14 branch #18

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chdh commented Jan 11, 2015

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