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Fix remoteproc to work with the PRU GNU Binutils port #47

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@dinuxbg dinuxbg commented Oct 16, 2015

PRU IRAM addresses need to be masked before being handled to
remoteproc. This is due to PRU Binutils' lack of separate address
spaces for IRAM and DRAM.

Signed-off-by: Dimitar Dimitrov [email protected]

RobertCNelson and others added 30 commits October 16, 2015 12:24
This reverts commit ad78c91.

Signed-off-by: Robert Nelson <[email protected]>
This patch introduces regmap_get_max_register() function which would be
used by the infrastructures like nvmem framework built on top of
regmap.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
This patch introduces regmap_get_reg_stride() function which would
be used by the infrastructures like nvmem framework built on top of
regmap. Mostly this function would be used for sanity checks on inputs
within such infrastructure.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
The beaglebone family of boards contain two I2C busses enabled.
The first one with a baseboard identification EEPROM and a
cape I2C bus.

Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
Mark (and unmark) device nodes with the POPULATE flag as appropriate.
This is required to avoid multi probing when using I2C and device
overlays containing a mux.
This patch is also more careful with the release of the adapter device
which caused a deadlock with muxes, and does not break the build
on !OF since the node flag accessors are not defined then.

Signed-off-by: Pantelis Antoniou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
This patch adds just providers part of the framework just to enable easy
review.

Up until now, NVMEM drivers like eeprom were stored in drivers/misc,
where they all had to duplicate pretty much the same code to register
a sysfs file, allow in-kernel users to access the content of the devices
they were driving, etc.

This was also a problem as far as other in-kernel users were involved,
since the solutions used were pretty much different from on driver to
another, there was a rather big abstraction leak.

This introduction of this framework aims at solving this. It also
introduces DT representation for consumer devices to go get the data
they require (MAC Addresses, SoC/Revision ID, part numbers, and so on)
from the nvmems.

Having regmap interface to this framework would give much better
abstraction for nvmems on different buses.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]>
[Maxime Ripard: intial version of eeprom framework]
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]>
This patch adds just consumers part of the framework just to enable easy
review.

Up until now, nvmem drivers were stored in drivers/misc, where they all
had to duplicate pretty much the same code to register a sysfs file,
allow in-kernel users to access the content of the devices they were
driving, etc.

This was also a problem as far as other in-kernel users were involved,
since the solutions used were pretty much different from on driver to
another, there was a rather big abstraction leak.

This introduction of this framework aims at solving this. It also
introduces DT representation for consumer devices to go get the data they
require (MAC Addresses, SoC/Revision ID, part numbers, and so on) from
the nvmems.

Having regmap interface to this framework would give much better
abstraction for nvmems on different buses.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]>
[Maxime Ripard: intial version of the framework]
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]>
This patch adds read/write apis which are based on nvmem_device. It is
common that the drivers like omap cape manager or qcom cpr driver to
access bytes directly at particular offset in the eeprom and not from
nvmem cell info in DT. These driver would need to get access to the nvmem
directly, which is what these new APIS provide.

These wrapper apis would help such users to avoid code duplication in
there drivers and also avoid them reading a big eeprom blob and parsing
it internally in there driver.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]>
This patch adds bindings for simple nvmem framework which allows nvmem
consumers to talk to nvmem providers to get access to nvmem cell data.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]>
[Maxime Ripard: intial version of eeprom framework]
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch add basic how-to and api summary documentation for simple
NVMEM framework.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch adds QFPROM support driver which is used by other drivers
like thermal sensor and cpufreq.

On MSM parts there are some efuses (called qfprom) these fuses store
things like calibration data, speed bins.. etc. Drivers like cpufreq,
thermal sensors would read out this data for configuring the driver.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
This patch adds bindings for qfprom found in QCOM SOCs. QFPROM driver
is based on simple nvmem framework.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Now that we have the nvmem framework, we can consolidate the common
driver code. Move the driver to the framework, and hopefully, it will
fix the sysfs file creation race.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]>
[srinivas.kandagatla: Moved to regmap based EEPROM framework]
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
The patch adds support for the On Chip One Time Programmable Peripheral
(OCOTP) on the Vybrid platform.

Signed-off-by: Sanchayan Maity <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
This driver handles the i.MX On-Chip OTP Controller found in
i.MX6Q/D, i.MX6S/DL, i.MX6SL, and i.MX6SX SoCs. Currently it
just returns the values stored in the shadow registers.

Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
This patch brings read-only support for the On-Chip OTP cells
in the i.MX23 and i.MX28 processor. The driver implements the
new NVMEM provider API.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
There are some SoC specified values store in eFuse,
such as the cpu_leakage and cpu_version,
this driver can expose these values to /sys base on nvmem.

Signed-off-by: Caesar Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: ZhengShunQian <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
The position to read/write must be less than max
register size.

Signed-off-by: ZhengShunQian <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
It's pointless to test (cell->bit_offset || cell->bit_offset).
nvmem_shift_read_buffer_in_place() should be called when
(cell->bit_offset || cell->nbits).

Signed-off-by: Axel Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
A tmp buffer is allocated if cell->bit_offset || cell->nbits.
So the tmp buffer needs to be freed at the same condition to avoid leak.

Signed-off-by: Axel Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
The sunxi_sid driver doesn't check for kmalloc return status before
derefencing the returned pointer, which could lead to a NULL pointer
dereference if kmalloc failed. Check for its return code to make sure it
deosn't happen.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
As required by many providers like at24/at25/mxs-ocotp/qfprom and may be
other providers would want to allow root-only to read the nvmem content.
So making the defaults to be root-only access would address the request
and also provide flexibility to providers to specify there own permissions
on top of the root-only using the perm flag in nvmem_config.
Making this dynamic did cut down lot of static binary attributes in the
code.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch sets the actual size of binary file to the nvmem size.
Previously this was not possible as the core was using the static global
data structures for attributes.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
This patch adds perm variable to nvmem_config structure which will allow
providers to specify the permissions required for the sysfs binary file.
This permission is applied on top of root-only access permissions set by
the core.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
PRU IRAM addresses need to be masked before being handled to
remoteproc. This is due to PRU Binutils' lack of separate address
spaces for IRAM and DRAM.

Signed-off-by: Dimitar Dimitrov <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson added a commit to RobertCNelson/ti-linux-kernel-dev that referenced this pull request Oct 16, 2015
RobertCNelson added a commit to RobertCNelson/ti-linux-kernel-dev that referenced this pull request Oct 16, 2015
@RobertCNelson RobertCNelson force-pushed the 4.1 branch 2 times, most recently from 65459ca to 0bb26f4 Compare October 28, 2015 18:41
@RobertCNelson RobertCNelson force-pushed the 4.1 branch 3 times, most recently from 1cbe403 to 8da95c4 Compare November 6, 2015 00:32
@RobertCNelson RobertCNelson force-pushed the 4.1 branch 2 times, most recently from 23c11df to e8b1e4a Compare November 13, 2015 17:53
@RobertCNelson RobertCNelson force-pushed the 4.1 branch 3 times, most recently from f324678 to 8b1b5b4 Compare November 20, 2015 04:12
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Closing (all merged previously)

RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 1, 2016
[ Upstream commit 81e4396 ]

UBSAN reports the following warning from accessing path->path[-1]
in set_path_power():

[   16.078040] ================================================================================
[   16.078124] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c:3981:17
[   16.078198] index -1 is out of range for type 'hda_nid_t [10]'
[   16.078270] CPU: 2 PID: 1738 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-wt+ #47
[   16.078274] Hardware name: LENOVO 3443CTO/3443CTO, BIOS G6ET23WW (1.02 ) 08/14/2012
[   16.078278]  ffff8800cb246000 ffff8800cb3638b8 ffffffff815c4fe3 0000000000000032
[   16.078286]  ffff8800cb3638e0 ffffffffffffffff ffff8800cb3638d0 ffffffff8162443d
[   16.078294]  ffffffffa0894200 ffff8800cb363920 ffffffff81624af7 0000000000000292
[   16.078302] Call Trace:
[   16.078311]  [<ffffffff815c4fe3>] dump_stack+0x86/0xd3
[   16.078317]  [<ffffffff8162443d>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x40
[   16.078324]  [<ffffffff81624af7>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x67/0x70
[   16.078335]  [<ffffffffa087665f>] set_path_power+0x1bf/0x230 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078344]  [<ffffffffa087880d>] add_pin_power_ctls+0x8d/0xc0 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078352]  [<ffffffffa087f190>] ? pin_power_down_callback+0x20/0x20 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078360]  [<ffffffffa0878947>] add_all_pin_power_ctls+0x107/0x150 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078370]  [<ffffffffa08842b3>] snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config+0x2d73/0x49e0 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078376]  [<ffffffff81173360>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x1b0/0x2c0
[   16.078390]  [<ffffffffa089df27>] alc_parse_auto_config+0x147/0x310 [snd_hda_codec_realtek]
[   16.078402]  [<ffffffffa08a332a>] patch_alc269+0x23a/0x560 [snd_hda_codec_realtek]
[   16.078417]  [<ffffffffa0838644>] hda_codec_driver_probe+0xa4/0x1a0 [snd_hda_codec]
[   16.078424]  [<ffffffff817bbac1>] driver_probe_device+0x101/0x380
[   16.078430]  [<ffffffff817bbdf9>] __driver_attach+0xb9/0x100
[   16.078438]  [<ffffffff817bbd40>] ? driver_probe_device+0x380/0x380
[   16.078444]  [<ffffffff817b8d20>] bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xc0
[   16.078449]  [<ffffffff817bb087>] driver_attach+0x27/0x50
[   16.078454]  [<ffffffff817ba956>] bus_add_driver+0x166/0x2c0
[   16.078460]  [<ffffffffa0369000>] ? 0xffffffffa0369000
[   16.078465]  [<ffffffff817bd13d>] driver_register+0x7d/0x130
[   16.078477]  [<ffffffffa083816f>] __hda_codec_driver_register+0x6f/0x90 [snd_hda_codec]
[   16.078488]  [<ffffffffa036901e>] realtek_driver_init+0x1e/0x1000 [snd_hda_codec_realtek]
[   16.078493]  [<ffffffff8100215e>] do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1d0
[   16.078499]  [<ffffffff8119f54d>] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6d/0x80
[   16.078504]  [<ffffffff813701b1>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x391/0x560
[   16.078510]  [<ffffffff812bb314>] ? do_init_module+0x28/0x273
[   16.078515]  [<ffffffff812bb387>] do_init_module+0x9b/0x273
[   16.078522]  [<ffffffff811e3782>] load_module+0x20b2/0x3410
[   16.078527]  [<ffffffff811df140>] ? m_show+0x210/0x210
[   16.078533]  [<ffffffff813b2b26>] ? kernel_read+0x66/0xe0
[   16.078541]  [<ffffffff811e4cfa>] SYSC_finit_module+0xba/0xc0
[   16.078547]  [<ffffffff811e4d1e>] SyS_finit_module+0xe/0x10
[   16.078552]  [<ffffffff81a860fc>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbd
[   16.078556] ================================================================================

Fix by checking path->depth before use.

Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 1, 2016
commit 81e4396 upstream.

UBSAN reports the following warning from accessing path->path[-1]
in set_path_power():

[   16.078040] ================================================================================
[   16.078124] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c:3981:17
[   16.078198] index -1 is out of range for type 'hda_nid_t [10]'
[   16.078270] CPU: 2 PID: 1738 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-wt+ #47
[   16.078274] Hardware name: LENOVO 3443CTO/3443CTO, BIOS G6ET23WW (1.02 ) 08/14/2012
[   16.078278]  ffff8800cb246000 ffff8800cb3638b8 ffffffff815c4fe3 0000000000000032
[   16.078286]  ffff8800cb3638e0 ffffffffffffffff ffff8800cb3638d0 ffffffff8162443d
[   16.078294]  ffffffffa0894200 ffff8800cb363920 ffffffff81624af7 0000000000000292
[   16.078302] Call Trace:
[   16.078311]  [<ffffffff815c4fe3>] dump_stack+0x86/0xd3
[   16.078317]  [<ffffffff8162443d>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x40
[   16.078324]  [<ffffffff81624af7>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x67/0x70
[   16.078335]  [<ffffffffa087665f>] set_path_power+0x1bf/0x230 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078344]  [<ffffffffa087880d>] add_pin_power_ctls+0x8d/0xc0 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078352]  [<ffffffffa087f190>] ? pin_power_down_callback+0x20/0x20 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078360]  [<ffffffffa0878947>] add_all_pin_power_ctls+0x107/0x150 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078370]  [<ffffffffa08842b3>] snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config+0x2d73/0x49e0 [snd_hda_codec_generic]
[   16.078376]  [<ffffffff81173360>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x1b0/0x2c0
[   16.078390]  [<ffffffffa089df27>] alc_parse_auto_config+0x147/0x310 [snd_hda_codec_realtek]
[   16.078402]  [<ffffffffa08a332a>] patch_alc269+0x23a/0x560 [snd_hda_codec_realtek]
[   16.078417]  [<ffffffffa0838644>] hda_codec_driver_probe+0xa4/0x1a0 [snd_hda_codec]
[   16.078424]  [<ffffffff817bbac1>] driver_probe_device+0x101/0x380
[   16.078430]  [<ffffffff817bbdf9>] __driver_attach+0xb9/0x100
[   16.078438]  [<ffffffff817bbd40>] ? driver_probe_device+0x380/0x380
[   16.078444]  [<ffffffff817b8d20>] bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xc0
[   16.078449]  [<ffffffff817bb087>] driver_attach+0x27/0x50
[   16.078454]  [<ffffffff817ba956>] bus_add_driver+0x166/0x2c0
[   16.078460]  [<ffffffffa0369000>] ? 0xffffffffa0369000
[   16.078465]  [<ffffffff817bd13d>] driver_register+0x7d/0x130
[   16.078477]  [<ffffffffa083816f>] __hda_codec_driver_register+0x6f/0x90 [snd_hda_codec]
[   16.078488]  [<ffffffffa036901e>] realtek_driver_init+0x1e/0x1000 [snd_hda_codec_realtek]
[   16.078493]  [<ffffffff8100215e>] do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1d0
[   16.078499]  [<ffffffff8119f54d>] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6d/0x80
[   16.078504]  [<ffffffff813701b1>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x391/0x560
[   16.078510]  [<ffffffff812bb314>] ? do_init_module+0x28/0x273
[   16.078515]  [<ffffffff812bb387>] do_init_module+0x9b/0x273
[   16.078522]  [<ffffffff811e3782>] load_module+0x20b2/0x3410
[   16.078527]  [<ffffffff811df140>] ? m_show+0x210/0x210
[   16.078533]  [<ffffffff813b2b26>] ? kernel_read+0x66/0xe0
[   16.078541]  [<ffffffff811e4cfa>] SYSC_finit_module+0xba/0xc0
[   16.078547]  [<ffffffff811e4d1e>] SyS_finit_module+0xe/0x10
[   16.078552]  [<ffffffff81a860fc>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbd
[   16.078556] ================================================================================

Fix by checking path->depth before use.

Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 21, 2016
Reported by syzkaller:

    [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
    4.9.0-rc4+ #47 Not tainted
    -------------------------------
    ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:536 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 1 PID: 6679 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #47
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
     ffff880039e2f6d0 ffffffff81c2e46b ffff88003e3a5b40 0000000000000000
     0000000000000001 ffffffff83215600 ffff880039e2f700 ffffffff81334ea9
     ffffc9000730b000 0000000000000004 ffff88003c4f8420 ffff88003d3f8000
    Call Trace:
     [<     inline     >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
     [<ffffffff81c2e46b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
     [<ffffffff81334ea9>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x139/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4445
     [<     inline     >] __kvm_memslots include/linux/kvm_host.h:534
     [<     inline     >] kvm_memslots include/linux/kvm_host.h:541
     [<ffffffff8105d6ae>] kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init+0xa1e/0xce0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1941
     [<ffffffff8112685d>] kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr+0xed/0x140 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:2217

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Fixes: fda4e2e
Cc: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2016
commit 7301d6a upstream.

Reported by syzkaller:

    [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
    4.9.0-rc4+ #47 Not tainted
    -------------------------------
    ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:536 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 1 PID: 6679 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #47
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
     ffff880039e2f6d0 ffffffff81c2e46b ffff88003e3a5b40 0000000000000000
     0000000000000001 ffffffff83215600 ffff880039e2f700 ffffffff81334ea9
     ffffc9000730b000 0000000000000004 ffff88003c4f8420 ffff88003d3f8000
    Call Trace:
     [<     inline     >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
     [<ffffffff81c2e46b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
     [<ffffffff81334ea9>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x139/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4445
     [<     inline     >] __kvm_memslots include/linux/kvm_host.h:534
     [<     inline     >] kvm_memslots include/linux/kvm_host.h:541
     [<ffffffff8105d6ae>] kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init+0xa1e/0xce0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1941
     [<ffffffff8112685d>] kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr+0xed/0x140 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:2217

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Fixes: fda4e2e
Cc: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 8, 2017
commit 9d7f29c upstream.

calculate_min_delta() may incorrectly access a 4th element of buf2[]
which only has 3 elements. This may trigger undefined behaviour and has
been reported to cause strange crashes in start_kernel() sometime after
timer initialization when built with GCC 5.3, possibly due to
register/stack corruption:

sched_clock: 32 bits at 200MHz, resolution 5ns, wraps every 10737418237ns
CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffb0aa, epc == 8067daa8, ra == 8067da84
Oops[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.9.18 #51
task: 8065e3e0 task.stack: 80644000
$ 0   : 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000
$ 4   : 8065b4d0 00000000 805d0000 00000010
$ 8   : 00000010 80321400 fffff000 812de408
$12   : 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff
$16   : 00000002 ffffffff 80660000 806a666c
$20   : 806c0000 00000000 00000000 00000000
$24   : 00000000 00000010
$28   : 80644000 80645ed0 00000000 8067da84
Hi    : 00000000
Lo    : 00000000
epc   : 8067daa8 start_kernel+0x33c/0x500
ra    : 8067da84 start_kernel+0x318/0x500
Status: 11000402 KERNEL EXL
Cause : 4080040c (ExcCode 03)
BadVA : ffffb0aa
PrId  : 0501992c (MIPS 1004Kc)
Modules linked in:
Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo=80644000, task=8065e3e0, tls=00000000)
Call Trace:
[<8067daa8>] start_kernel+0x33c/0x500
Code: 24050240  0c0131f9  24849c64 <a200b0a8> 41606020  000000c0  0c1a45e6 00000000  0c1a5f44

UBSAN also detects the same issue:

================================================================
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in arch/mips/kernel/cevt-r4k.c:85:41
load of address 80647e4c with insufficient space
for an object of type 'unsigned int'
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.9.18 #47
Call Trace:
[<80028f70>] show_stack+0x88/0xa4
[<80312654>] dump_stack+0x84/0xc0
[<8034163c>] ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x50
[<803417d8>] __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch+0x160/0x168
[<8002dab0>] r4k_clockevent_init+0x544/0x764
[<80684d34>] time_init+0x18/0x90
[<8067fa5c>] start_kernel+0x2f0/0x500
=================================================================

buf2[] is intentionally only 3 elements so that the last element is the
median once 5 samples have been inserted, so explicitly prevent the
possibility of comparing against the 4th element rather than extending
the array.

Fixes: 1fa4055 ("MIPS: cevt-r4k: Dynamically calculate min_delta_ns")
Reported-by: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/15892/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 31, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ]

syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().

Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
 #0:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
 __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
crow-misia pushed a commit to crow-misia/linux that referenced this pull request May 16, 2019
[ Upstream commit 36096f2 ]

kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:47!
invalid opcode: 0000 [beagleboard#1
CPU: 0 PID: 12914 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G        W         5.1.0+ beagleboard#47
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x53/0x90
Code: 48 8b 32 48 39 fe 75 35 48 8b 50 08 48 39 f2 75 40 b8 01 00 00 00 5d c3 48
89 fe 48 89 c2 48 c7 c7 18 75 fe 82 e8 cb 34 78 ff <0f> 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 50 75 fe 82 e8 ba 34 78 ff 0f 0b 48 89 f2
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c2fe40 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffffffffa0184000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888237a17788 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffc90001c2fe40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc90001c2fe10 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90001c2fe50 R14: ffffffffa0184000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f3d83634540(0000) GS:ffff888237a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000555c350ea818 CR3: 0000000231677000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 unregister_pernet_operations+0x34/0x120
 unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30
 packet_exit+0x1c/0x369 [af_packet
 __x64_sys_delete_module+0x156/0x260
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x133/0x1b0
 ? do_syscall_64+0x12/0x1f0
 do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

When modprobe af_packet, register_pernet_subsys
fails and does a cleanup, ops->list is set to LIST_POISON1,
but the module init is considered to success, then while rmmod it,
BUG() is triggered in __list_del_entry_valid which is called from
unregister_pernet_subsys. This patch fix error handing path in
packet_init to avoid possilbe issue if some error occur.

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 9, 2020
[ Upstream commit a866759 ]

This reverts commit 64e62bd.

This commit ends up causing some lockdep splats due to trying to grab the
payload lock while holding the mgr's lock:

[   54.010099]
[   54.011765] ======================================================
[   54.018670] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   54.025577] 5.5.0-rc6-02274-g77381c23ee63 #47 Not tainted
[   54.031610] ------------------------------------------------------
[   54.038516] kworker/1:6/1040 is trying to acquire lock:
[   54.044354] ffff888272af3228 (&mgr->payload_lock){+.+.}, at:
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.054957]
[   54.054957] but task is already holding lock:
[   54.061473] ffff888272af3060 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}, at:
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x3c/0x2e4
[   54.071193]
[   54.071193] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[   54.071193]
[   54.080334]
[   54.080334] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   54.088697]
[   54.088697] -> #1 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}:
[   54.094440]        __mutex_lock+0xc3/0x498
[   54.099015]        drm_dp_mst_topology_get_port_validated+0x25/0x80
[   54.106018]        drm_dp_update_payload_part1+0xa2/0x2e2
[   54.112051]        intel_mst_pre_enable_dp+0x144/0x18f
[   54.117791]        intel_encoders_pre_enable+0x63/0x70
[   54.123532]        hsw_crtc_enable+0xa1/0x722
[   54.128396]        intel_update_crtc+0x50/0x194
[   54.133455]        skl_commit_modeset_enables+0x40c/0x540
[   54.139485]        intel_atomic_commit_tail+0x5f7/0x130d
[   54.145418]        intel_atomic_commit+0x2c8/0x2d8
[   54.150770]        drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x5a/0x70
[   54.156801]        drm_mode_setcrtc+0x2ab/0x833
[   54.161862]        drm_ioctl+0x2e5/0x424
[   54.166242]        vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x2f
[   54.170426]        do_vfs_ioctl+0x5fb/0x61e
[   54.175096]        ksys_ioctl+0x55/0x75
[   54.179377]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x1e
[   54.184146]        do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x6d
[   54.188721]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[   54.194946]
[   54.194946] -> #0 (&mgr->payload_lock){+.+.}:
[   54.201463]
[   54.201463] other info that might help us debug this:
[   54.201463]
[   54.210410]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   54.210410]
[   54.217025]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   54.222082]        ----                    ----
[   54.227138]   lock(&mgr->lock);
[   54.230643]                                lock(&mgr->payload_lock);
[   54.237742]                                lock(&mgr->lock);
[   54.244062]   lock(&mgr->payload_lock);
[   54.248346]
[   54.248346]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   54.248346]
[   54.254959] 7 locks held by kworker/1:6/1040:
[   54.259822]  #0: ffff888275c4f528 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.},
at: worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2
[   54.269451]  #1: ffffc9000119beb0
((work_completion)(&(&dev_priv->hotplug.hotplug_work)->work)){+.+.},
at: worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2
[   54.282768]  #2: ffff888272a403f0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.},
at: i915_hotplug_work_func+0x4b/0x2be
[   54.293368]  #3: ffffffff824fc6c0 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+},
at: i915_hotplug_work_func+0x17e/0x2be
[   54.304061]  #4: ffffc9000119bc58 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.},
at: drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x40/0xfd
[   54.314855]  #5: ffff888272a40470 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at:
drm_modeset_lock+0x74/0xe2
[   54.324385]  #6: ffff888272af3060 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}, at:
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x3c/0x2e4
[   54.334597]
[   54.334597] stack backtrace:
[   54.339464] CPU: 1 PID: 1040 Comm: kworker/1:6 Not tainted
5.5.0-rc6-02274-g77381c23ee63 #47
[   54.348893] Hardware name: Google Fizz/Fizz, BIOS
Google_Fizz.10139.39.0 01/04/2018
[   54.357451] Workqueue: events i915_hotplug_work_func
[   54.362995] Call Trace:
[   54.365724]  dump_stack+0x71/0x9c
[   54.369427]  check_noncircular+0x91/0xbc
[   54.373809]  ? __lock_acquire+0xc9e/0xf66
[   54.378286]  ? __lock_acquire+0xc9e/0xf66
[   54.382763]  ? lock_acquire+0x175/0x1ac
[   54.387048]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.393177]  ? __mutex_lock+0xc3/0x498
[   54.397362]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.403492]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.409620]  ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0x101
[   54.414390]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.420517]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.426645]  ? intel_digital_port_connected+0x34d/0x35c
[   54.432482]  ? intel_dp_detect+0x227/0x44e
[   54.437056]  ? ww_mutex_lock+0x49/0x9a
[   54.441242]  ? drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x75/0xfd
[   54.446789]  ? intel_encoder_hotplug+0x4b/0x97
[   54.451752]  ? intel_ddi_hotplug+0x61/0x2e0
[   54.456423]  ? mark_held_locks+0x53/0x68
[   54.460803]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3a/0x51
[   54.466347]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x187/0x1a4
[   54.471310]  ? drm_connector_list_iter_next+0x89/0x9a
[   54.476953]  ? i915_hotplug_work_func+0x206/0x2be
[   54.482208]  ? worker_thread+0x4d5/0x6e2
[   54.486587]  ? worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2
[   54.490966]  ? queue_work_on+0x64/0x64
[   54.495151]  ? kthread+0x1e9/0x1f1
[   54.498946]  ? queue_work_on+0x64/0x64
[   54.503130]  ? kthread_unpark+0x5e/0x5e
[   54.507413]  ? ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

The proper fix for this is probably cleanup the VCPI allocations when we're
enabling the topology, or on the first payload allocation. For now though,
let's just revert.

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>
Fixes: 64e62bd ("drm/dp_mst: Remove VCPI while disabling topology mgr")
Cc: Sean Paul <[email protected]>
Cc: Wayne Lin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2020
[ Upstream commit 32f6865 ]

Running the eBPF test_verifier leads to random errors looking like this:

[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage, while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

commit 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] differently. Track the
beginning of instruction and account for the extra instruction while
calculating the arm instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 12, 2022
[ Upstream commit ffb76a8 ]

Hi,

When testing install and uninstall of ipmi_si.ko and ipmi_msghandler.ko,
the system crashed.

The log as follows:
[  141.087026] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc09b3a5a
[  141.087241] PGD 8fe4c0d067 P4D 8fe4c0d067 PUD 8fe4c0f067 PMD 103ad89067 PTE 0
[  141.087464] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  141.087580] CPU: 67 PID: 668 Comm: kworker/67:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0.x86_64 #47
[  141.088009] Workqueue: events 0xffffffffc09b3a40
[  141.088009] RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc09b3a5a
[  141.088009] Code: Bad RIP value.
[  141.088009] RSP: 0018:ffffb9094e2c3e88 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  141.088009] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9abfdb1f04a0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  141.088009] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
[  141.088009] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff9abfffee3cb8 R09: 00000000000002e1
[  141.088009] R10: ffffb9094cb73d90 R11: 00000000000f4240 R12: ffff9abfffee8700
[  141.088009] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9abfdb1f04a0 R15: ffff9abfdb1f04a8
[  141.088009] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9abfffec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  141.088009] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  141.088009] CR2: ffffffffc09b3a30 CR3: 0000008fe4c0a001 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[  141.088009] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  141.088009] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  141.088009] PKRU: 55555554
[  141.088009] Call Trace:
[  141.088009]  ? process_one_work+0x195/0x390
[  141.088009]  ? worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[  141.088009]  ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[  141.088009]  ? kthread+0x10d/0x130
[  141.088009]  ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[  141.088009]  ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc0b28a5a
[  200.223240] PGD 97fe00d067 P4D 97fe00d067 PUD 97fe00f067 PMD a580cbf067 PTE 0
[  200.223464] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  200.223579] CPU: 63 PID: 664 Comm: kworker/63:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0.x86_64 #46
[  200.224008] Workqueue: events 0xffffffffc0b28a40
[  200.224008] RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc0b28a5a
[  200.224008] Code: Bad RIP value.
[  200.224008] RSP: 0018:ffffbf3c8e2a3e88 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  200.224008] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa0799ad6bca0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  200.224008] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
[  200.224008] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff9fe43fde3cb8 R09: 00000000000000d5
[  200.224008] R10: ffffbf3c8cb53d90 R11: 00000000000f4240 R12: ffff9fe43fde8700
[  200.224008] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffa0799ad6bca0 R15: ffffa0799ad6bca8
[  200.224008] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9fe43fdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  200.224008] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  200.224008] CR2: ffffffffc0b28a30 CR3: 00000097fe00a002 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[  200.224008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  200.224008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  200.224008] PKRU: 55555554
[  200.224008] Call Trace:
[  200.224008]  ? process_one_work+0x195/0x390
[  200.224008]  ? worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[  200.224008]  ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[  200.224008]  ? kthread+0x10d/0x130
[  200.224008]  ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[  200.224008]  ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[  200.224008] kernel fault(0x1) notification starting on CPU 63
[  200.224008] kernel fault(0x1) notification finished on CPU 63
[  200.224008] CR2: ffffffffc0b28a5a
[  200.224008] ---[ end trace c82a412d93f57412 ]---

The reason is as follows:
T1: rmmod ipmi_si.
    ->ipmi_unregister_smi()
        -> ipmi_bmc_unregister()
            -> __ipmi_bmc_unregister()
                -> kref_put(&bmc->usecount, cleanup_bmc_device);
                    -> schedule_work(&bmc->remove_work);

T2: rmmod ipmi_msghandler.
    ipmi_msghander module uninstalled, and the module space
    will be freed.

T3: bmc->remove_work doing cleanup the bmc resource.
    -> cleanup_bmc_work()
        -> platform_device_unregister(&bmc->pdev);
            -> platform_device_del(pdev);
                -> device_del(&pdev->dev);
                    -> kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_REMOVE);
                        -> kobject_uevent_env()
                            -> dev_uevent()
                                -> if (dev->type && dev->type->name)

   'dev->type'(bmc_device_type) pointer space has freed when uninstall
    ipmi_msghander module, 'dev->type->name' cause the system crash.

drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:
2820 static const struct device_type bmc_device_type = {
2821         .groups         = bmc_dev_attr_groups,
2822 };

Steps to reproduce:
Add a time delay in cleanup_bmc_work() function,
and uninstall ipmi_si and ipmi_msghandler module.

2910 static void cleanup_bmc_work(struct work_struct *work)
2911 {
2912         struct bmc_device *bmc = container_of(work, struct bmc_device,
2913                                               remove_work);
2914         int id = bmc->pdev.id; /* Unregister overwrites id */
2915
2916         msleep(3000);   <---
2917         platform_device_unregister(&bmc->pdev);
2918         ida_simple_remove(&ipmi_bmc_ida, id);
2919 }

Use 'remove_work_wq' instead of 'system_wq' to solve this issues.

Fixes: b2cfd8a ("ipmi: Rework device id and guid handling to catch changing BMCs")
Signed-off-by: Wu Bo <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
RobertCNelson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 36a8738 ]

The test_tag test triggers an unhandled page fault:

  # ./test_tag
  [  130.640218] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80001b898004, era == 9000000003137f7c, ra == 9000000003139e70
  [  130.640501] Oops[#3]:
  [  130.640553] CPU: 0 PID: 1326 Comm: test_tag Tainted: G      D    O       6.7.0-rc4-loong-devel-gb62ab1a397cf #47 61985c1d94084daa2432f771daa45b56b10d8d2a
  [  130.640764] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
  [  130.640874] pc 9000000003137f7c ra 9000000003139e70 tp 9000000104cb4000 sp 9000000104cb7a40
  [  130.641001] a0 ffff80001b894000 a1 ffff80001b897ff8 a2 000000006ba210be a3 0000000000000000
  [  130.641128] a4 000000006ba210be a5 00000000000000f1 a6 00000000000000b3 a7 0000000000000000
  [  130.641256] t0 0000000000000000 t1 00000000000007f6 t2 0000000000000000 t3 9000000004091b70
  [  130.641387] t4 000000006ba210be t5 0000000000000004 t6 fffffffffffffff0 t7 90000000040913e0
  [  130.641512] t8 0000000000000005 u0 0000000000000dc0 s9 0000000000000009 s0 9000000104cb7ae0
  [  130.641641] s1 00000000000007f6 s2 0000000000000009 s3 0000000000000095 s4 0000000000000000
  [  130.641771] s5 ffff80001b894000 s6 ffff80001b897fb0 s7 9000000004090c50 s8 0000000000000000
  [  130.641900]    ra: 9000000003139e70 build_body+0x1fcc/0x4988
  [  130.642007]   ERA: 9000000003137f7c build_body+0xd8/0x4988
  [  130.642112]  CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
  [  130.642261]  PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
  [  130.642353]  EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE)
  [  130.642458]  ECFG: 00071c1c (LIE=2-4,10-12 VS=7)
  [  130.642554] ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0)
  [  130.642658]  BADV: ffff80001b898004
  [  130.642719]  PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000)
  [  130.642815] Modules linked in: [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(O)]
  [  130.642924] Process test_tag (pid: 1326, threadinfo=00000000f7f4015f, task=000000006499f9fd)
  [  130.643062] Stack : 0000000000000000 9000000003380724 0000000000000000 0000000104cb7be8
  [  130.643213]         0000000000000000 25af8d9b6e600558 9000000106250ea0 9000000104cb7ae0
  [  130.643378]         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000104cb7be8 90000000049f6000
  [  130.643538]         0000000000000090 9000000106250ea0 ffff80001b894000 ffff80001b894000
  [  130.643685]         00007ffffb917790 900000000313ca94 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  [  130.643831]         ffff80001b894000 0000000000000ff7 0000000000000000 9000000100468000
  [  130.643983]         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000040 25af8d9b6e600558
  [  130.644131]         0000000000000bb7 ffff80001b894048 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  [  130.644276]         9000000104cb7be8 90000000049f6000 0000000000000090 9000000104cb7bdc
  [  130.644423]         ffff80001b894000 0000000000000000 00007ffffb917790 90000000032acfb0
  [  130.644572]         ...
  [  130.644629] Call Trace:
  [  130.644641] [<9000000003137f7c>] build_body+0xd8/0x4988
  [  130.644785] [<900000000313ca94>] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x228/0x4ec
  [  130.644891] [<90000000032acfb0>] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x158/0x1b0
  [  130.645003] [<90000000032b3504>] bpf_prog_load+0x760/0xb44
  [  130.645089] [<90000000032b6744>] __sys_bpf+0xbb8/0x2588
  [  130.645175] [<90000000032b8388>] sys_bpf+0x20/0x2c
  [  130.645259] [<9000000003f6ab38>] do_syscall+0x7c/0x94
  [  130.645369] [<9000000003121c5c>] handle_syscall+0xbc/0x158
  [  130.645507]
  [  130.645539] Code: 380839f6  380831f9  28412bae <24000ca6> 004081ad  0014cb50  004083e8  02bff34c  58008e91
  [  130.645729]
  [  130.646418] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

On my machine, which has CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_16KB=y, the test failed at
loading a BPF prog with 2039 instructions:

  prog = (struct bpf_prog *)ffff80001b894000
  insn = (struct bpf_insn *)(prog->insnsi)ffff80001b894048
  insn + 2039 = (struct bpf_insn *)ffff80001b898000 <- end of the page

In the build_insn() function, we are trying to access next instruction
unconditionally, i.e. `(insn + 1)->imm`. The address lies in the next
page and can be not owned by the current process, thus an page fault is
inevitable and then segfault.

So, let's access next instruction only under `dst = imm64` context.

With this fix, we have:

  # ./test_tag
  test_tag: OK (40945 tests)

Fixes: bbfddb9 ("LoongArch: BPF: Avoid declare variables in switch-case")
Tested-by: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hengqi Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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