Pull request #1

asj · 2015-10-07T06:23:27Z

Kindly consider to pull in these changes. These patch were individually submitted to the mailing list before. Thanks.

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

This will return EIO when __bread() fails to read SB, instead of EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

…INTK defined error handling logic behaves differently with or without CONFIG_PRINTK defined, since there are two copies of the same function which a bit of different logic One, when CONFIG_PRINTK is defined, code is __btrfs_std_error(..) { :: save_error_info(fs_info); if (sb->s_flags & MS_BORN) btrfs_handle_error(fs_info); } and two when CONFIG_PRINTK is not defined, the code is __btrfs_std_error(..) { :: if (sb->s_flags & MS_BORN) { save_error_info(fs_info); btrfs_handle_error(fs_info); } } I doubt if this was intentional ? and appear to have caused since we maintain two copies of the same function and they got diverged with commits. Now to decide which logic is correct reviewed changes as below, 533574c Commit added two copies of this function cf79ffb Commit made change to only one copy of the function and to the copy when CONFIG_PRINTK is defined. To fix this, instead of maintaining two copies of same function approach, maintain single function, and just put the extra portion of the code under CONFIG_PRINTK define. This patch just does that. And keeps code of with CONFIG_PRINTK defined. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

btrfs_error() and btrfs_std_error() does the same thing and calls _btrfs_std_error(), so consolidate them together. And the main motivation is that btrfs_error() is closely named with btrfs_err(), one handles error action the other is to log the error, so don't closely name them. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Suggested-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

…ot found Use btrfs specific error code BTRFS_ERROR_DEV_MISSING_NOT_FOUND instead of -ENOENT. Next this removes the logging when user specifies "missing" and we don't find it in the kernel device list. Logging are for system events not for user input errors. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

This uses a chunk of code from btrfs_read_dev_super() and creates a function called btrfs_read_dev_one_super() so that next patch can use it for scratch superblock. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [renamed bufhead to bh] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

This patch updates and renames btrfs_scratch_superblocks, (which is used by the replace device thread), with those fixes from the scratch superblock code section of btrfs_rm_device(). The fixes are: Scratch all copies of superblock Notify kobject that superblock has been changed Update time on the device So that btrfs_rm_device() can use the function btrfs_scratch_superblocks() instead of its own scratch code. And further replace deivce code which similarly releases device back to the system, will have the fixes from the btrfs device delete. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [renamed to btrfs_scratch_superblock] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

By general rule of thumb there shouldn't be any way that user land could trigger a kernel operation just by sending wrong arguments. Here do commit cleanups after user input has been verified. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Originally the message was not in a helper but ended up there. We should print error messages from callers instead. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [reworded subject and changelog] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [reworded subject and changelog] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

To avoid deadlock described in commit 084b6e7 ("btrfs: Fix a lockdep warning when running xfstest."), we should move kobj stuff out of dev_replace lock range. "It is because the btrfs_kobj_{add/rm}_device() will call memory allocation with GFP_KERNEL, which may flush fs page cache to free space, waiting for it self to do the commit, causing the deadlock. To solve the problem, move btrfs_kobj_{add/rm}_device() out of the dev_replace lock range, also involing split the btrfs_rm_dev_replace_srcdev() function into remove and free parts. Now only btrfs_rm_dev_replace_remove_srcdev() is called in dev_replace lock range, and kobj_{add/rm} and btrfs_rm_dev_replace_free_srcdev() are called out of the lock range." Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [added lockup description] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

This patch will log return value of add/del_qgroup_relation() and pass the err code of btrfs_run_qgroups to the btrfs_std_error(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

A part of code from btrfs_scan_one_device() is moved to a new function btrfs_read_disk_super(), so that former function looks cleaner and moves the code to ensure null terminating label to it as well. Further there is opportunity to merge various duplicate code on read disk super. Earlier attempt on this was highlighted that there was some issues for which there are multiple versions, however it was not clear what was issue. So until its worked out we can keep it in a separate function. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Optional Label may or may not be set, or it might be set at some time later. However while debugging to search through the kernel logs the scripts would need the logs to be consistent, so logs search key words shouldn't depend on the optional variables, instead fsid is better. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

From the issue diagnosable point of view, log if the device path is changed. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

looks like oversight, call brelse() when checksum fails. further down the code in the non error path we do call brelse() and so we don't see brelse() in the goto error.. paths. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

optimize check for stale device to only be checked when there is device added or changed. If there is no update to the device, there is no need to call btrfs_free_stale_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

This adds an enhancement to show the seed fsid and its devices on the btrfs sysfs. The way sprouting handles fs_devices: clone seed fs_devices and add to the fs_uuids mem copy seed fs_devices and assign to fs_devices->seed (move dev_list) evacuate seed fs_devices contents to hold sprout fs devices contents So to be inline with this fs_devices changes during seeding, represent seed fsid under the sprout fsid, this is achieved by using the kobject_move() The end result will be, /sys/fs/btrfs/sprout-fsid/seed/level-1-seed-fsid/seed/(if)level-2-seed-fsid Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

We need fsid kobject to hold pool attributes however its created only when fs is mounted. So, this patch changes the life cycle of the fsid and devices kobjects /sys/fs/btrfs/<fsid> and /sys/fs/btrfs/<fsid>/devices, from created and destroyed by mount and unmount event to created and destroyed by scanned and module-unload events respectively. However this does not alter life cycle of fs attributes as such. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

move a section of btrfs_rm_device() code to check for min number of the devices into the function __check_raid_min_devices() v2: commit update and title renamed from Btrfs: move check for min number of devices to a function Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

__check_raid_min_device() which was pealed from btrfs_rm_device() maintianed its original code to show the block move. This patch cleans up __check_raid_min_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

The patch renames btrfs_dev_replace_find_srcdev() to btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() and moves it to volumes.c. so that delete device can use it. v2: changed title from 'Btrfs: create rename btrfs_dev_replace_find_srcdev()' and commit update Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

btrfs_rm_device() has a section of the code which can be replaced btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

The operation of device replace and device delete follows same steps upto some depth with in btrfs kernel, however they don't share codes. This enhancement will help replace and delete to share codes. Btrfs: enhance check device_path in btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

With the previous patches now the btrfs_scratch_superblocks() is ready to be used in btrfs_rm_device() so use it. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

This introduces new ioctl BTRFS_IOC_RM_DEV_V2, which uses enhanced struct btrfs_ioctl_vol_args_v2 to carry devid as an user argument. The patch won't delete the old ioctl interface and remains backward compatible with user land progs. Test case/script: echo "0 $(blockdev --getsz /dev/sdf) linear /dev/sdf 0" | dmsetup create bad_disk mkfs.btrfs -f -d raid1 -m raid1 /dev/sdd /dev/sde /dev/mapper/bad_disk mount /dev/sdd /btrfs dmsetup suspend bad_disk echo "0 $(blockdev --getsz /dev/sdf) error /dev/sdf 0" | dmsetup load bad_disk dmsetup resume bad_disk echo "bad disk failed. now deleting/replacing" btrfs dev del 3 /btrfs echo $? btrfs fi show /btrfs umount /btrfs btrfs-show-super /dev/sdd | egrep num_device dmsetup remove bad_disk wipefs -a /dev/sdf Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Reported-by: Martin <[email protected]>

The VF's dynamic interrupt ctl "dyn_ctl_intrvl_s" is not initialized in idpf_vf_intr_reg_init(). This resulted in the following UBSAN error whenever a VF is created: [ 564.345655] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_txrx.c:3654:10 [ 564.345663] shift exponent 4294967295 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' [ 564.345671] CPU: 33 UID: 0 PID: 2458 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4+ #1 [ 564.345678] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50CYP2SBSTD/M50CYP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C6200.86B.0027.P10.2201070222 01/07/2022 [ 564.345683] Call Trace: [ 564.345688] <TASK> [ 564.345693] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xb0 [ 564.345708] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x16b/0x320 [ 564.345730] idpf_vport_intr_update_itr_ena_irq.cold+0x13/0x39 [idpf] [ 564.345755] ? __pfx_idpf_vport_intr_update_itr_ena_irq+0x10/0x10 [idpf] [ 564.345771] ? static_obj+0x95/0xd0 [ 564.345782] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x1a5/0x800 [ 564.345794] idpf_vport_intr_ena+0x5ef/0x9f0 [idpf] [ 564.345814] idpf_vport_open+0x2cc/0x1240 [idpf] [ 564.345837] idpf_open+0x6d/0xc0 [idpf] [ 564.345850] __dev_open+0x241/0x420 Fixes: d4d5587 ("idpf: initialize interrupts and enable vport") Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

Fix a kernel panic in the br_netfilter module when sending untagged traffic via a VxLAN device. This happens during the check for fragmentation in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit. It is dependent on: 1) the br_netfilter module being loaded; 2) net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables set to 1; 3) a bridge with a VxLAN (single-vxlan-device) netdevice as a bridge port; 4) untagged frames with size higher than the VxLAN MTU forwarded/flooded When forwarding the untagged packet to the VxLAN bridge port, before the netfilter hooks are called, br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel is called and changes the skb_dst to the tunnel dst. The tunnel_dst is a metadata type of dst, i.e., skb_valid_dst(skb) is false, and metadata->dst.dev is NULL. Then in the br_netfilter hooks, in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit, there's a check for frames that needs to be fragmented: frames with higher MTU than the VxLAN device end up calling br_nf_ip_fragment, which in turns call ip_skb_dst_mtu. The ip_dst_mtu tries to use the skb_dst(skb) as if it was a valid dst with valid dst->dev, thus the crash. This case was never supported in the first place, so drop the packet instead. PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) from 0.0.0.0 h1-eth0: 2000(2028) bytes of data. [ 176.291791] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000110 [ 176.292101] Mem abort info: [ 176.292184] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 176.292322] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 176.292530] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 176.292709] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 176.292862] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 176.293013] Data abort info: [ 176.293104] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 176.293488] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 176.293787] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 176.293995] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000043ef5000 [ 176.294166] [0000000000000110] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 176.294827] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 176.295252] Modules linked in: vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel veth br_netfilter bridge stp llc ipv6 crct10dif_ce [ 176.295923] CPU: 0 PID: 188 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-g5b3fbd61b9d1 #2 [ 176.296314] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 176.296535] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 176.296808] pc : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.297382] lr : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x2ac/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.297636] sp : ffff800080003630 [ 176.297743] x29: ffff800080003630 x28: 0000000000000008 x27: ffff6828c49ad9f8 [ 176.298093] x26: ffff6828c49ad000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000000003e8 [ 176.298430] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff6828c4960b40 x21: ffff6828c3b16d28 [ 176.298652] x20: ffff6828c3167048 x19: ffff6828c3b16d00 x18: 0000000000000014 [ 176.298926] x17: ffffb0476322f000 x16: ffffb7e164023730 x15: 0000000095744632 [ 176.299296] x14: ffff6828c3f1c880 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: ffffb7e137926a70 [ 176.299574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff6828c3f1c898 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 176.300049] x8 : ffff6828c49bf070 x7 : 0008460f18d5f20e x6 : f20e0100bebafeca [ 176.300302] x5 : ffff6828c7f918fe x4 : ffff6828c49bf070 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 176.300586] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff6828c3c7ad00 x0 : ffff6828c7f918f0 [ 176.300889] Call trace: [ 176.301123] br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.301411] br_nf_post_routing+0x2a8/0x3e4 [br_netfilter] [ 176.301703] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124 [ 176.302060] br_forward_finish+0xc8/0xe8 [bridge] [ 176.302371] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter] [ 176.302605] br_nf_forward_finish+0x118/0x22c [br_netfilter] [ 176.302824] br_nf_forward_ip.part.0+0x264/0x290 [br_netfilter] [ 176.303136] br_nf_forward+0x2b8/0x4e0 [br_netfilter] [ 176.303359] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124 [ 176.303803] __br_forward+0xc4/0x194 [bridge] [ 176.304013] br_flood+0xd4/0x168 [bridge] [ 176.304300] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1d4/0x5c4 [bridge] [ 176.304536] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter] [ 176.304978] br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x29c/0x494 [br_netfilter] [ 176.305188] br_nf_pre_routing+0x250/0x524 [br_netfilter] [ 176.305428] br_handle_frame+0x244/0x3cc [bridge] [ 176.305695] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x33c/0xecc [ 176.306080] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x40/0x8c [ 176.306197] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x64 [ 176.306369] process_backlog+0x80/0x124 [ 176.306540] __napi_poll+0x38/0x17c [ 176.306636] net_rx_action+0x124/0x26c [ 176.306758] __do_softirq+0x100/0x26c [ 176.307051] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c [ 176.307162] call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x4c [ 176.307289] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x2c [ 176.307396] do_softirq+0x54/0x6c [ 176.307485] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0x98 [ 176.307637] __dev_queue_xmit+0x22c/0xd28 [ 176.307775] neigh_resolve_output+0xf4/0x1a0 [ 176.308018] ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628 [ 176.308137] ip_do_fragment+0x5b4/0x658 [ 176.308279] ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x48/0xec [ 176.308420] __ip_finish_output+0xa4/0x254 [ 176.308593] ip_finish_output+0x34/0x130 [ 176.308814] ip_output+0x6c/0x108 [ 176.308929] ip_send_skb+0x50/0xf0 [ 176.309095] ip_push_pending_frames+0x30/0x54 [ 176.309254] raw_sendmsg+0x758/0xaec [ 176.309568] inet_sendmsg+0x44/0x70 [ 176.309667] __sys_sendto+0x110/0x178 [ 176.309758] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x38 [ 176.309918] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 [ 176.310211] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 [ 176.310353] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 176.310434] el0_svc+0x34/0xb4 [ 176.310551] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c [ 176.310690] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 176.311066] Code: f9402e61 79402aa2 927ff821 f9400023 (f9408860) [ 176.315743] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 176.316060] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 176.316371] Kernel Offset: 0x37e0e3000000 from 0xffff800080000000 [ 176.316564] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffff97d780000000 [ 176.316782] CPU features: 0x0,88000203,3c020000,0100421b [ 176.317210] Memory Limit: none [ 176.317527] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal Exception in interrupt ]---\ Fixes: 11538d0 ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths") Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andy Roulin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Andy Roulin says: ==================== netfilter: br_netfilter: fix panic with metadata_dst skb There's a kernel panic possible in the br_netfilter module when sending untagged traffic via a VxLAN device. Traceback is included below. This happens during the check for fragmentation in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit if the MTU on the VxLAN device is not big enough. It is dependent on: 1) the br_netfilter module being loaded; 2) net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables set to 1; 3) a bridge with a VxLAN (single-vxlan-device) netdevice as a bridge port; 4) untagged frames with size higher than the VxLAN MTU forwarded/flooded This case was never supported in the first place, so the first patch drops such packets. A regression selftest is added as part of the second patch. PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) from 0.0.0.0 h1-eth0: 2000(2028) bytes of data. [ 176.291791] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000110 [ 176.292101] Mem abort info: [ 176.292184] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 176.292322] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 176.292530] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 176.292709] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 176.292862] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 176.293013] Data abort info: [ 176.293104] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 176.293488] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 176.293787] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 176.293995] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000043ef5000 [ 176.294166] [0000000000000110] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 176.294827] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 176.295252] Modules linked in: vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel veth br_netfilter bridge stp llc ipv6 crct10dif_ce [ 176.295923] CPU: 0 PID: 188 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-g5b3fbd61b9d1 #2 [ 176.296314] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 176.296535] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 176.296808] pc : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.297382] lr : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x2ac/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.297636] sp : ffff800080003630 [ 176.297743] x29: ffff800080003630 x28: 0000000000000008 x27: ffff6828c49ad9f8 [ 176.298093] x26: ffff6828c49ad000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000000003e8 [ 176.298430] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff6828c4960b40 x21: ffff6828c3b16d28 [ 176.298652] x20: ffff6828c3167048 x19: ffff6828c3b16d00 x18: 0000000000000014 [ 176.298926] x17: ffffb0476322f000 x16: ffffb7e164023730 x15: 0000000095744632 [ 176.299296] x14: ffff6828c3f1c880 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: ffffb7e137926a70 [ 176.299574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff6828c3f1c898 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 176.300049] x8 : ffff6828c49bf070 x7 : 0008460f18d5f20e x6 : f20e0100bebafeca [ 176.300302] x5 : ffff6828c7f918fe x4 : ffff6828c49bf070 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 176.300586] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff6828c3c7ad00 x0 : ffff6828c7f918f0 [ 176.300889] Call trace: [ 176.301123] br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.301411] br_nf_post_routing+0x2a8/0x3e4 [br_netfilter] [ 176.301703] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124 [ 176.302060] br_forward_finish+0xc8/0xe8 [bridge] [ 176.302371] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter] [ 176.302605] br_nf_forward_finish+0x118/0x22c [br_netfilter] [ 176.302824] br_nf_forward_ip.part.0+0x264/0x290 [br_netfilter] [ 176.303136] br_nf_forward+0x2b8/0x4e0 [br_netfilter] [ 176.303359] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124 [ 176.303803] __br_forward+0xc4/0x194 [bridge] [ 176.304013] br_flood+0xd4/0x168 [bridge] [ 176.304300] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1d4/0x5c4 [bridge] [ 176.304536] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter] [ 176.304978] br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x29c/0x494 [br_netfilter] [ 176.305188] br_nf_pre_routing+0x250/0x524 [br_netfilter] [ 176.305428] br_handle_frame+0x244/0x3cc [bridge] [ 176.305695] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x33c/0xecc [ 176.306080] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x40/0x8c [ 176.306197] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x64 [ 176.306369] process_backlog+0x80/0x124 [ 176.306540] __napi_poll+0x38/0x17c [ 176.306636] net_rx_action+0x124/0x26c [ 176.306758] __do_softirq+0x100/0x26c [ 176.307051] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c [ 176.307162] call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x4c [ 176.307289] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x2c [ 176.307396] do_softirq+0x54/0x6c [ 176.307485] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0x98 [ 176.307637] __dev_queue_xmit+0x22c/0xd28 [ 176.307775] neigh_resolve_output+0xf4/0x1a0 [ 176.308018] ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628 [ 176.308137] ip_do_fragment+0x5b4/0x658 [ 176.308279] ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x48/0xec [ 176.308420] __ip_finish_output+0xa4/0x254 [ 176.308593] ip_finish_output+0x34/0x130 [ 176.308814] ip_output+0x6c/0x108 [ 176.308929] ip_send_skb+0x50/0xf0 [ 176.309095] ip_push_pending_frames+0x30/0x54 [ 176.309254] raw_sendmsg+0x758/0xaec [ 176.309568] inet_sendmsg+0x44/0x70 [ 176.309667] __sys_sendto+0x110/0x178 [ 176.309758] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x38 [ 176.309918] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 [ 176.310211] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 [ 176.310353] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 176.310434] el0_svc+0x34/0xb4 [ 176.310551] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c [ 176.310690] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 176.311066] Code: f9402e61 79402aa2 927ff821 f9400023 (f9408860) [ 176.315743] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 176.316060] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 176.316371] Kernel Offset: 0x37e0e3000000 from 0xffff800080000000 [ 176.316564] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffff97d780000000 [ 176.316782] CPU features: 0x0,88000203,3c020000,0100421b [ 176.317210] Memory Limit: none [ 176.317527] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal Exception in interrupt ]---\ ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

The kernel may crash when deleting a genetlink family if there are still listeners for that family: Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [c000000000c080bc] netlink_update_socket_mc+0x3c/0xc0 LR [c000000000c0f764] __netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0 Call Trace: __netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0 genl_unregister_family+0xd4/0x2d0 Change the unsafe loop on the list to a safe one, because inside the loop there is an element removal from this list. Fixes: b827357 ("genetlink: fix netns vs. netlink table locking (2)") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Anastasia Kovaleva <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Commit 004d250 ("igb: Fix igb_down hung on surprise removal") changed igb_io_error_detected() to ignore non-fatal pcie errors in order to avoid hung task that can happen when igb_down() is called multiple times. This caused an issue when processing transient non-fatal errors. igb_io_resume(), which is called after igb_io_error_detected(), assumes that device is brought down by igb_io_error_detected() if the interface is up. This resulted in panic with stacktrace below. [ T3256] igb 0000:09:00.0 haeth0: igb: haeth0 NIC Link is Down [ T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: Uncorrected (Non-Fatal) error received: 0000:09:00.0 [ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fatal), type=Transaction Layer, (Requester ID) [ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: device [8086:1537] error status/mask=00004000/00000000 [ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: [14] CmpltTO [ 200.105524,009][ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: AER: TLP Header: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast error_detected message [ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: Non-correctable non-fatal error reported. [ T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast mmio_enabled message [ T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast resume message [ T292] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ T292] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6539! [ T292] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ T292] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x37/0x40 [ T292] Call Trace: [ T292] <TASK> [ T292] ? die+0x33/0x90 [ T292] ? do_trap+0xdc/0x110 [ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40 [ T292] ? do_error_trap+0x70/0xb0 [ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40 [ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40 [ T292] ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 [ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40 [ T292] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40 [ T292] igb_up+0x41/0x150 [ T292] igb_io_resume+0x25/0x70 [ T292] report_resume+0x54/0x70 [ T292] ? report_frozen_detected+0x20/0x20 [ T292] pci_walk_bus+0x6c/0x90 [ T292] ? aer_print_port_info+0xa0/0xa0 [ T292] pcie_do_recovery+0x22f/0x380 [ T292] aer_process_err_devices+0x110/0x160 [ T292] aer_isr+0x1c1/0x1e0 [ T292] ? disable_irq_nosync+0x10/0x10 [ T292] irq_thread_fn+0x1a/0x60 [ T292] irq_thread+0xe3/0x1a0 [ T292] ? irq_set_affinity_notifier+0x120/0x120 [ T292] ? irq_affinity_notify+0x100/0x100 [ T292] kthread+0xe2/0x110 [ T292] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ T292] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ T292] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ T292] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ T292] </TASK> To fix this issue igb_io_resume() checks if the interface is running and the device is not down this means igb_io_error_detected() did not bring the device down and there is no need to bring it up. Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yuanyuan Zhong <[email protected]> Fixes: 004d250 ("igb: Fix igb_down hung on surprise removal") Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

Most qdiscs maintain their backlog using qdisc_pkt_len(skb) on the assumption it is invariant between the enqueue() and dequeue() handlers. Unfortunately syzbot can crash a host rather easily using a TBF + SFQ combination, with an STAB on SFQ [1] We can't support TCA_STAB on arbitrary level, this would require to maintain per-qdisc storage. [1] [ 88.796496] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 88.798611] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 88.799014] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 88.799506] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 88.799829] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 88.800569] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2053 Comm: b371744477 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-virtme #1117 [ 88.801107] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 88.801779] RIP: 0010:sfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:272 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:499) sch_sfq [ 88.802544] Code: 0f b7 50 12 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 00 48 89 d6 48 29 d0 48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 48 c1 e0 03 48 01 c2 66 83 7a 1a 00 7e c0 48 8b 3a <4c> 8b 07 4c 89 02 49 89 50 08 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c7 07 00 All code ======== 0: 0f b7 50 12 movzwl 0x12(%rax),%edx 4: 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 lea 0x0(,%rdx,8),%rax b: 00 c: 48 89 d6 mov %rdx,%rsi f: 48 29 d0 sub %rdx,%rax 12: 48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 mov 0x1c0(%rcx),%rdx 19: 48 c1 e0 03 shl $0x3,%rax 1d: 48 01 c2 add %rax,%rdx 20: 66 83 7a 1a 00 cmpw $0x0,0x1a(%rdx) 25: 7e c0 jle 0xffffffffffffffe7 27: 48 8b 3a mov (%rdx),%rdi 2a:* 4c 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%r8 <-- trapping instruction 2d: 4c 89 02 mov %r8,(%rdx) 30: 49 89 50 08 mov %rdx,0x8(%r8) 34: 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 movq $0x0,0x8(%rdi) 3b: 00 3c: 48 rex.W 3d: c7 .byte 0xc7 3e: 07 (bad) ... Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 4c 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%r8 3: 4c 89 02 mov %r8,(%rdx) 6: 49 89 50 08 mov %rdx,0x8(%r8) a: 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 movq $0x0,0x8(%rdi) 11: 00 12: 48 rex.W 13: c7 .byte 0xc7 14: 07 (bad) ... [ 88.803721] RSP: 0018:ffff9a1f892b7d58 EFLAGS: 00000206 [ 88.804032] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9a1f8420c800 RCX: ffff9a1f8420c800 [ 88.804560] RDX: ffff9a1f81bc1440 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 88.805056] RBP: ffffffffc04bb0e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000ff7f9a1f [ 88.805473] R10: 000000000001001b R11: 0000000000009a1f R12: 0000000000000140 [ 88.806194] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9a1f886df400 R15: ffff9a1f886df4ac [ 88.806734] FS: 00007f445601a740(0000) GS:ffff9a2e7fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 88.807225] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 88.807672] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000050cc46000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 88.808165] Call Trace: [ 88.808459] <TASK> [ 88.808710] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434) [ 88.809261] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:715) [ 88.809561] ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:87 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:147 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1489 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539) [ 88.809806] ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623) [ 88.810074] ? sfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:272 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:499) sch_sfq [ 88.810411] sfq_reset (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525) sch_sfq [ 88.810671] qdisc_reset (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2135 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2441 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3304 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3310 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036) [ 88.810950] tbf_reset (./include/linux/timekeeping.h:169 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:334) sch_tbf [ 88.811208] qdisc_reset (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2135 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2441 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3304 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3310 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036) [ 88.811484] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues (./include/linux/spinlock.h:396 ./include/net/sch_generic.h:768 net/core/dev.c:2958) [ 88.811870] __tun_detach (drivers/net/tun.c:590 drivers/net/tun.c:673) [ 88.812271] tun_chr_close (drivers/net/tun.c:702 drivers/net/tun.c:3517) [ 88.812505] __fput (fs/file_table.c:432 (discriminator 1)) [ 88.812735] task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:230) [ 88.813016] do_exit (kernel/exit.c:940) [ 88.813372] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:58 (discriminator 4)) [ 88.813639] ? handle_mm_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:97 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:155 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1022 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1045 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1052 mm/memory.c:5928 mm/memory.c:6088) [ 88.813867] do_group_exit (kernel/exit.c:1070) [ 88.814138] __x64_sys_exit_group (kernel/exit.c:1099) [ 88.814490] x64_sys_call (??:?) [ 88.814791] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1)) [ 88.815012] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) [ 88.815495] RIP: 0033:0x7f44560f1975 Fixes: 175f9c1 ("net_sched: Add size table for qdiscs") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Eric report a panic on IPPROTO_SMC, and give the facts that when INET_PROTOSW_ICSK was set, icsk->icsk_sync_mss must be set too. Bug: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000086000005 EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001195d1000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0800000109c46003, p4d=0800000109c46003, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 8037 Comm: syz.3.265 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-syzkaller-g5f5673607153 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : 0x0 lr : cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x2a8/0x3c0 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1910 sp : ffff80009b887a90 x29: ffff80009b887aa0 x28: ffff80008db94050 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 1fffe0001aa6f5b3 x25: dfff800000000000 x24: ffff0000db75da00 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff0000d8b78518 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff0000d537ad80 x19: ffff0000d8b78000 x18: 1fffe000366d79ee x17: ffff8000800614a8 x16: ffff800080569b84 x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 000000008b336894 x13: 00000000cd96feaa x12: 0000000000000003 x11: 0000000000040000 x10: 00000000000020a3 x9 : 1fffe0001b16f0f1 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000002 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000d8b78000 Call trace: 0x0 netlbl_sock_setattr+0x2e4/0x338 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1000 smack_netlbl_add+0xa4/0x154 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2593 smack_socket_post_create+0xa8/0x14c security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2973 security_socket_post_create+0x94/0xd4 security/security.c:4425 __sock_create+0x4c8/0x884 net/socket.c:1587 sock_create net/socket.c:1622 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1659 [inline] __sys_socket+0x134/0x340 net/socket.c:1706 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1720 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1718 [inline] __arm64_sys_socket+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1718 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? (????????) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This patch add a toy implementation that performs a simple return to prevent such panic. This is because MSS can be set in sock_create_kern or smc_setsockopt, similar to how it's done in AF_SMC. However, for AF_SMC, there is currently no way to synchronize MSS within __sys_connect_file. This toy implementation lays the groundwork for us to support such feature for IPPROTO_SMC in the future. Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server. Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference crash with the following syslog: [232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058 [232066.588586] Mem abort info: [232066.588701] ESR = 0x0000000096000007 [232066.588862] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [232066.589084] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [232066.589216] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [232066.589340] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault [232066.589559] Data abort info: [232066.589683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007 [232066.589842] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400 [232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000 [232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP [232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2 [232066.591052] vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs [232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1 [232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06 [232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70 [232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000 [232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001 [232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050 [232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000 [232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000 [232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6 [232066.600498] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000008 x9 : ffff8000054e5828 [232066.600784] x8 : 00000000ffffffbf x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000000a9eb14a [232066.601062] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff70ff8a14a800 x3 : 0000000000000058 [232066.601348] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 54dce46366daa6c6 x0 : 0000000000000000 [232066.601636] Call trace: [232066.601749] nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.601998] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x1b8/0x28c [nfsv4] [232066.602218] nfs4_state_manager+0x928/0x10f0 [nfsv4] [232066.602455] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x78/0x1b0 [nfsv4] [232066.602690] kthread+0x110/0x114 [232066.602830] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [232066.602985] Code: 1400000d f9403f20 f9402e61 91016003 (f9402c00) [232066.603284] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [232066.606936] Starting crashdump kernel... [232066.607146] Bye! Analysing the vmcore, we know that nfs4_copy_state listed by destination nfs_server->ss_copies was added by the field copies in handle_async_copy(), and we found a waiting copy process with the stack as: PID: 3511963 TASK: ffff710028b47e00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cp" #0 [ffff8001116ef740] __switch_to at ffff8000081b92f4 #1 [ffff8001116ef760] __schedule at ffff800008dd0650 #2 [ffff8001116ef7c0] schedule at ffff800008dd0a00 #3 [ffff8001116ef7e0] schedule_timeout at ffff800008dd6aa0 #4 [ffff8001116ef860] __wait_for_common at ffff800008dd166c #5 [ffff8001116ef8e0] wait_for_completion_interruptible at ffff800008dd1898 #6 [ffff8001116ef8f0] handle_async_copy at ffff8000055142f4 [nfsv4] #7 [ffff8001116ef970] _nfs42_proc_copy at ffff8000055147c8 [nfsv4] #8 [ffff8001116efa80] nfs42_proc_copy at ffff800005514cf0 [nfsv4] #9 [ffff8001116efc50] __nfs4_copy_file_range.constprop.0 at ffff8000054ed694 [nfsv4] The NULL-pointer dereference was due to nfs42_complete_copies() listed the nfs_server->ss_copies by the field ss_copies of nfs4_copy_state. So the nfs4_copy_state address ffff0100f98fa3f0 was offset by 0x10 and the data accessed through this pointer was also incorrect. Generally, the ordered list nfs4_state_owner->so_states indicate open(O_RDWR) or open(O_WRITE) states are reclaimed firstly by nfs4_reclaim_open_state(). When destination state reclaim is failed with NFS_STATE_RECOVERY_FAILED and copies are not deleted in nfs_server->ss_copies, the source state may be passed to the nfs42_complete_copies() process earlier, resulting in this crash scene finally. To solve this issue, we add a list_head nfs_server->ss_src_copies for a server-to-server copy specially. Fixes: 0e65a32 ("NFS: handle source server reboot") Signed-off-by: Yanjun Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>

When running `kmscube` with one or more performance monitors enabled via `GALLIUM_HUD`, the following kernel panic can occur: [ 55.008324] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000000052004a4 [ 55.008368] Mem abort info: [ 55.008377] ESR = 0x0000000096000005 [ 55.008387] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 55.008402] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 55.008412] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 55.008421] FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault [ 55.008434] Data abort info: [ 55.008442] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 55.008455] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 55.008467] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 55.008481] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001046c6000 [ 55.008497] [00000000052004a4] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 [ 55.008525] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 55.008542] Modules linked in: rfcomm [...] vc4 v3d snd_soc_hdmi_codec drm_display_helper gpu_sched drm_shmem_helper cec drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper i2c_brcmstb drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks snd_soc_core snd_compress snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer snd backlight [ 55.008799] CPU: 2 PID: 166 Comm: v3d_bin Tainted: G C 6.6.47+rpt-rpi-v8 #1 Debian 1:6.6.47-1+rpt1 [ 55.008824] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.5 (DT) [ 55.008838] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 55.008855] pc : __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x90/0x608 [ 55.008879] lr : __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x58/0x608 [ 55.008895] sp : ffffffc080673cf0 [ 55.008904] x29: ffffffc080673cf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff8106188a28 [ 55.008926] x26: ffffff8101e78040 x25: ffffff8101baa6c0 x24: ffffffd9d989f148 [ 55.008947] x23: ffffffda1c2a4008 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: ffffffc080673d38 [ 55.008968] x20: ffffff8101238000 x19: ffffff8104f83188 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 55.008988] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffffda1bd04d18 x15: 00000055bb08bc90 [ 55.009715] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffffda1bd4cbb0 [ 55.010433] x11: 00000000fa83b2da x10: 0000000000001a40 x9 : ffffffda1bd04d04 [ 55.011162] x8 : ffffff8102097b80 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 00000000030a5857 [ 55.011880] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 0300000005200470 x3 : 0300000005200470 [ 55.012598] x2 : ffffff8101238000 x1 : 0000000000000021 x0 : 0300000005200470 [ 55.013292] Call trace: [ 55.013959] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x90/0x608 [ 55.014646] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x1c/0x30 [ 55.015317] mutex_lock+0x50/0x68 [ 55.015961] v3d_perfmon_stop+0x40/0xe0 [v3d] [ 55.016627] v3d_bin_job_run+0x10c/0x2d8 [v3d] [ 55.017282] drm_sched_main+0x178/0x3f8 [gpu_sched] [ 55.017921] kthread+0x11c/0x128 [ 55.018554] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 55.019168] Code: f9400260 f1001c1f 54001ea9 927df000 (b9403401) [ 55.019776] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 55.020411] note: v3d_bin[166] exited with preempt_count 1 This issue arises because, upon closing the file descriptor (which happens when we interrupt `kmscube`), the active performance monitor is not stopped. Although all perfmons are destroyed in `v3d_perfmon_close_file()`, the active performance monitor's pointer (`v3d->active_perfmon`) is still retained. If `kmscube` is run again, the driver will attempt to stop the active performance monitor using the stale pointer in `v3d->active_perfmon`. However, this pointer is no longer valid because the previous process has already terminated, and all performance monitors associated with it have been destroyed and freed. To fix this, when the active performance monitor belongs to a given process, explicitly stop it before destroying and freeing it. Cc: [email protected] # v5.15+ Closes: raspberrypi/linux#6389 Fixes: 26a4dc2 ("drm/v3d: Expose performance counters to userspace") Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Juan A. Suarez <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]

After a CPU has set itself offline and before it eventually calls rcutree_report_cpu_dead(), there are still opportunities for callbacks to be enqueued, for example from a softirq. When that happens on NOCB, the rcuog wake-up is deferred through an IPI to an online CPU in order not to call into the scheduler and risk arming the RT-bandwidth after hrtimers have been migrated out and disabled. But performing a synchronized IPI from a softirq is buggy as reported in the following scenario: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 26 at kernel/smp.c:633 smp_call_function_single Modules linked in: rcutorture torture CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 26 Comm: migration/1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc1-00012-g9139f93209d1 #1 Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x320 <- __stop_cpus+0xd0/0x120 RIP: 0010:smp_call_function_single <IRQ> swake_up_one_online __call_rcu_nocb_wake __call_rcu_common ? rcu_torture_one_read call_timer_fn __run_timers run_timer_softirq handle_softirqs irq_exit_rcu ? tick_handle_periodic sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt </IRQ> Fix this with forcing deferred rcuog wake up through the NOCB timer when the CPU is offline. The actual wake up will happen from rcutree_report_cpu_dead(). Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/[email protected] Fixes: 9139f93 ("rcu/nocb: Fix RT throttling hrtimer armed from offline CPU") Reviewed-by: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <[email protected]>

Following OOPS is encountered while loading test_bpf module on powerpc 8xx: [ 218.835567] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xcb000000 [ 218.842473] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0017a80 [ 218.847451] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [ 218.852854] BE PAGE_SIZE=16K PREEMPT CMPC885 [ 218.857207] SAF3000 DIE NOTIFICATION [ 218.860713] Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) test_module [ 218.865867] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 527 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.11.0-s3k-dev-09856-g3de3d71ae2e6-dirty #1280 [ 218.875546] Hardware name: MIAE 8xx 0x500000 CMPC885 [ 218.880521] NIP: c0017a8 LR: beab859c CTR: 000101d4 [ 218.885584] REGS: cac2bc90 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.11.0-s3k-dev-09856-g3de3d71ae2e6-dirty) [ 218.894308] MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 55005555 XER: a0007100 [ 218.901290] DAR: cb000000 DSISR: c2000000 [ 218.901290] GPR00: 000185d1 cac2bd50 c21b9580 caf7c030 c3883fcc 00000008 cafffffc 00000000 [ 218.901290] GPR08: 00040000 18300000 20000000 00000004 99005555 100d815e ca669d08 00000369 [ 218.901290] GPR16: ca730000 00000000 ca2c004c 00000000 00000000 0000035d 00000311 00000369 [ 218.901290] GPR24: ca732240 00000001 00030ba3 c3800000 00000000 00185d48 caf7c000 ca2c004c [ 218.941087] NIP [c0017a8] memcpy+0x88/0xec [ 218.945277] LR [beab859c] test_bpf_init+0x22c/0x3c90 [test_bpf] [ 218.951476] Call Trace: [ 218.953916] [cac2bd50] [beab8570] test_bpf_init+0x200/0x3c90 [test_bpf] (unreliable) [ 218.962034] [cac2bde0] [c0004c04] do_one_initcall+0x4c/0x1fc [ 218.967706] [cac2be40] [c00a2ec4] do_init_module+0x68/0x360 [ 218.973292] [cac2be60] [c00a5194] init_module_from_file+0x8c/0xc0 [ 218.979401] [cac2bed0] [c00a5568] sys_finit_module+0x250/0x3f0 [ 218.985248] [cac2bf20] [c000e390] system_call_exception+0x8c/0x15c [ 218.991444] [cac2bf30] [c00120a8] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x28 This happens in the main loop of memcpy() ==> c0017a8: 7c 0b 37 ec dcbz r11,r6 c0017a84: 80 e4 00 04 lwz r7,4(r4) c0017a88: 81 04 00 08 lwz r8,8(r4) c0017a8c: 81 24 00 0c lwz r9,12(r4) c0017a90: 85 44 00 10 lwzu r10,16(r4) c0017a94: 90 e6 00 04 stw r7,4(r6) c0017a98: 91 06 00 08 stw r8,8(r6) c0017a9c: 91 26 00 0c stw r9,12(r6) c0017aa0: 95 46 00 10 stwu r10,16(r6) c0017aa4: 42 00 ff dc bdnz c0017a8 <memcpy+0x88> Commit ac9f97f ("powerpc/8xx: Inconditionally use task PGDIR in DTLB misses") relies on re-reading DAR register to know if an error is due to a missing copy of a PMD entry in task's PGDIR, allthough DAR was already read in the exception prolog and copied into thread struct. This is because is it done very early in the exception and there are not enough registers available to keep a pointer to thread struct. However, dcbz instruction is buggy and doesn't update DAR register on fault. That is detected and generates a call to FixupDAR workaround which updates DAR copy in thread struct but doesn't fix DAR register. Let's fix DAR in addition to the update of DAR copy in thread struct. Fixes: ac9f97f ("powerpc/8xx: Inconditionally use task PGDIR in DTLB misses") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://msgid.link/2b851399bd87e81c6ccb87ea3a7a6b32c7aa04d7.1728118396.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

The purpose of btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() shall be propagating an error of split bio to its original btrfs_bio, and tell the error to the upper layer. However, it's not working well on some cases. * Case 1. Immediate (or quick) end_bio with an error When btrfs sends btrfs_bio to mirrored devices, btrfs calls btrfs_bio_end_io() when all the mirroring bios are completed. If that btrfs_bio was split, it is from btrfs_clone_bioset and its end_io function is btrfs_orig_write_end_io. For this case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() accesses the orig_bbio's bio context to increase the error count. That works well in most cases. However, if the end_io is called enough fast, orig_bbio's (remaining part after split) bio context may not be properly set at that time. Since the bio context is set when the orig_bbio (the last btrfs_bio) is sent to devices, that might be too late for earlier split btrfs_bio's completion. That will result in NULL pointer dereference. That bug is easily reproducible by running btrfs/146 on zoned devices [1] and it shows the following trace. [1] You need raid-stripe-tree feature as it create "-d raid0 -m raid1" FS. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-BTRFS-ZNS+ torvalds#474 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-5) RIP: 0010:btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] BTRFS error (device dm-0): bdev /dev/mapper/error-test errs: wr 2, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 0, gen 0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000006f248 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888005a7f080 RCX: ffffc9000006f1dc RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff888005a7f080 RBP: ffff888011dfc540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff82e508e0 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff88800ddfbe58 R13: ffff888005a7f080 R14: ffff888005a7f158 R15: ffff888005a7f158 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000002e22006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26 ? page_fault_oops+0x13e/0x2b0 ? _printk+0x58/0x73 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5f/0x750 ? exc_page_fault+0x76/0x240 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] ? btrfs_log_dev_io_error+0x7f/0x90 [btrfs] btrfs_orig_write_end_io+0x51/0x90 [btrfs] dm_submit_bio+0x5c2/0xa50 [dm_mod] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? blk_try_enter_queue+0x90/0x1e0 __submit_bio+0xe0/0x130 ? ktime_get+0x10a/0x160 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x199/0x410 btrfs_submit_bio+0x7d/0x150 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x1a1/0x6d0 [btrfs] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 ? __folio_start_writeback+0x10/0x2c0 btrfs_submit_bbio+0x1c/0x40 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0x44/0x60 [btrfs] submit_extent_folio+0x13f/0x330 [btrfs] ? btrfs_set_range_writeback+0xa3/0xd0 [btrfs] extent_writepage_io+0x18b/0x360 [btrfs] extent_write_locked_range+0x17c/0x340 [btrfs] ? __pfx_end_bbio_data_write+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] run_delalloc_cow+0x71/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x176/0x500 [btrfs] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x119/0x260 [btrfs] writepage_delalloc+0x2ab/0x480 [btrfs] extent_write_cache_pages+0x236/0x7d0 [btrfs] btrfs_writepages+0x72/0x130 [btrfs] do_writepages+0xd4/0x240 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 __writeback_single_inode+0x5c/0x4c0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xb0 writeback_sb_inodes+0x22c/0x560 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0 wb_writeback+0x1d6/0x3f0 wb_workfn+0x334/0x520 process_one_work+0x1ee/0x570 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc6/0x130 worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xee/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: dm_mod btrfs blake2b_generic xor raid6_pq rapl CR2: 0000000000000020 * Case 2. Earlier completion of orig_bbio for mirrored btrfs_bios btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() assumes the end_io function for orig_bbio is called last among split bios. In that case, btrfs_orig_write_end_io() sets the bio->bi_status to BLK_STS_IOERR by seeing the bioc->error [2]. Otherwise, the increased orig_bio's bioc->error is not checked by anyone and return BLK_STS_OK to the upper layer. [2] Actually, this is not true. Because we only increases orig_bioc->errors by max_errors, the condition "atomic_read(&bioc->error) > bioc->max_errors" is still not met if only one split btrfs_bio fails. * Case 3. Later completion of orig_bbio for un-mirrored btrfs_bios In contrast to the above case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() is not working well if un-mirrored orig_bbio is completed last. It sets orig_bbio->bio.bi_status to the btrfs_bio's error. But, that is easily over-written by orig_bbio's completion status. If the status is BLK_STS_OK, the upper layer would not know the failure. * Solution Considering the above cases, we can only save the error status in the orig_bbio (remaining part after split) itself as it is always available. Also, the saved error status should be propagated when all the split btrfs_bios are finished (i.e, bbio->pending_ios == 0). This commit introduces "status" to btrfs_bbio and saves the first error of split bios to original btrfs_bio's "status" variable. When all the split bios are finished, the saved status is loaded into original btrfs_bio's status. With this commit, btrfs/146 on zoned devices does not hit the NULL pointer dereference anymore. Fixes: 852eee6 ("btrfs: allow btrfs_submit_bio to split bios") CC: [email protected] # 6.6+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

We can't take sb_lock while holding mark_lock, so split out replicas_entry_validate() and replicas_entry_sb_validate() - replicas_entry_validate() now uses the normal online device interface. 00039 ========= TEST set_option 00039 00039 WATCHDOG 30 00040 bcachefs (vdb): starting version 1.12: rebalance_work_acct_fix opts=errors=panic 00040 bcachefs (vdb): initializing new filesystem 00040 bcachefs (vdb): going read-write 00040 bcachefs (vdb): marking superblocks 00040 bcachefs (vdb): initializing freespace 00040 bcachefs (vdb): done initializing freespace 00040 bcachefs (vdb): reading snapshots table 00040 bcachefs (vdb): reading snapshots done 00040 bcachefs (vdb): done starting filesystem 00040 zstd 00041 bcachefs (vdb): shutting down 00041 bcachefs (vdb): going read-only 00041 bcachefs (vdb): finished waiting for writes to stop 00041 bcachefs (vdb): flushing journal and stopping allocators, journal seq 3 00041 bcachefs (vdb): flushing journal and stopping allocators complete, journal seq 11 00041 bcachefs (vdb): shutdown complete, journal seq 12 00041 bcachefs (vdb): marking filesystem clean 00041 bcachefs (vdb): shutdown complete 00041 Setting option on offline fs 00041 bch2_write_super(): fatal error : attempting to write superblock that wasn't version downgraded (1.12: (unknown version) > 1.10: disk_accounting_v3) 00041 fatal error - emergency read only 00041 bch2_write_super(): fatal error : attempting to write superblock that wasn't version downgraded (1.12: (unknown version) > 1.10: disk_accounting_v3) 00042 bcachefs (vdb): starting version 1.12: rebalance_work_acct_fix opts=errors=panic,compression=zstd 00042 bcachefs (vdb): recovering from clean shutdown, journal seq 12 00042 bcachefs (vdb): accounting_read... 00042 00042 ====================================================== 00042 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 00042 6.12.0-rc1-ktest-g805e938a8502 #6807 Not tainted 00042 ------------------------------------------------------ 00042 mount.bcachefs/665 is trying to acquire lock: 00045 ffffff80cc280908 (&c->sb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: bch2_replicas_entry_validate (fs/bcachefs/replicas.c:102) 00045 00045 but task is already holding lock: 00048 ffffff80cc284870 (&c->mark_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: bch2_accounting_read (fs/bcachefs/disk_accounting.c:670 (discriminator 1)) 00048 00048 which lock already depends on the new lock. 00048 00048 00048 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: 00048 00048 -> #1 (&c->mark_lock){++++}-{0:0}: 00049 percpu_down_write (kernel/locking/percpu-rwsem.c:232) 00052 bch2_sb_replicas_to_cpu_replicas (fs/bcachefs/replicas.c:583) 00055 bch2_sb_to_fs (fs/bcachefs/super-io.c:614) 00057 bch2_fs_open (fs/bcachefs/super.c:828 fs/bcachefs/super.c:2050) 00060 bch2_fs_get_tree (fs/bcachefs/fs.c:2067) 00062 vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1801) 00064 path_mount (fs/namespace.c:3507 fs/namespace.c:3834) 00066 __arm64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:3847 fs/namespace.c:4055 fs/namespace.c:4032 fs/namespace.c:4032) 00067 invoke_syscall.constprop.0 (arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h:61 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:54) 00068 do_el0_svc (include/linux/thread_info.h:127 (discriminator 2) arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:140 (discriminator 2) arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 (discriminator 2)) 00069 el0_svc (arch/arm64/include/asm/irqflags.h:82 arch/arm64/include/asm/irqflags.h:123 arch/arm64/include/asm/irqflags.h:136 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:165 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713) 00069 ========= FAILED TIMEOUT set_option in 30s Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>

This fixes an assertion pop in nocow_locking.c 00243 kernel BUG at fs/bcachefs/nocow_locking.c:41! 00243 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP 00243 Modules linked in: 00243 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) 00243 pstate: 60001005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) 00244 pc : bch2_bucket_nocow_unlock (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/nocow_locking.c:41) 00244 lr : bkey_nocow_lock (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/data_update.c:79) 00244 sp : ffffff80c82373b0 00244 x29: ffffff80c82373b0 x28: ffffff80e08958c0 x27: ffffff80e0880000 00244 x26: ffffff80c8237a98 x25: 00000000000000a0 x24: ffffff80c8237ab0 00244 x23: 00000000000000c0 x22: 0000000000000008 x21: 0000000000000000 00244 x20: ffffff80c8237a98 x19: 0000000000000018 x18: 0000000000000000 00244 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 000000000000003f x15: 0000000000000000 00244 x14: 0000000000000008 x13: 0000000000000018 x12: 0000000000000000 00244 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffff80e0880000 x9 : ffffffc0803ac1a4 00244 x8 : 0000000000000018 x7 : ffffff80c8237a88 x6 : ffffff80c8237ab0 00244 x5 : ffffff80e08988d0 x4 : 00000000ffffffff x3 : 0000000000000000 00244 x2 : 0000000000000004 x1 : 0003000000000d1e x0 : ffffff80e08988c0 00244 Call trace: 00244 bch2_bucket_nocow_unlock (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/nocow_locking.c:41) 00245 bch2_data_update_init (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/data_update.c:627 (discriminator 1)) 00245 promote_alloc.isra.0 (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/io_read.c:242 /home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/io_read.c:304) 00245 __bch2_read_extent (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/io_read.c:949) 00246 __bch2_read (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/io_read.c:1215) 00246 bch2_direct_IO_read (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/fs-io-direct.c:132) 00246 bch2_read_iter (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/bcachefs/fs-io-direct.c:201) 00247 aio_read.constprop.0 (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/aio.c:1602) 00247 io_submit_one.constprop.0 (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/aio.c:2003 /home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/aio.c:2052) 00248 __arm64_sys_io_submit (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/aio.c:2111 /home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/aio.c:2081 /home/testdashboard/linux-7/fs/aio.c:2081) 00248 invoke_syscall.constprop.0 (/home/testdashboard/linux-7/arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h:61 /home/testdashboard/linux-7/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:54) 00248 ========= FAILED TIMEOUT tiering_variable_buckets_replicas in 1200s Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>

The purpose of btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() shall be propagating an error of split bio to its original btrfs_bio, and tell the error to the upper layer. However, it's not working well on some cases. * Case 1. Immediate (or quick) end_bio with an error When btrfs sends btrfs_bio to mirrored devices, btrfs calls btrfs_bio_end_io() when all the mirroring bios are completed. If that btrfs_bio was split, it is from btrfs_clone_bioset and its end_io function is btrfs_orig_write_end_io. For this case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() accesses the orig_bbio's bio context to increase the error count. That works well in most cases. However, if the end_io is called enough fast, orig_bbio's (remaining part after split) bio context may not be properly set at that time. Since the bio context is set when the orig_bbio (the last btrfs_bio) is sent to devices, that might be too late for earlier split btrfs_bio's completion. That will result in NULL pointer dereference. That bug is easily reproducible by running btrfs/146 on zoned devices [1] and it shows the following trace. [1] You need raid-stripe-tree feature as it create "-d raid0 -m raid1" FS. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-BTRFS-ZNS+ torvalds#474 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-5) RIP: 0010:btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] BTRFS error (device dm-0): bdev /dev/mapper/error-test errs: wr 2, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 0, gen 0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000006f248 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888005a7f080 RCX: ffffc9000006f1dc RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff888005a7f080 RBP: ffff888011dfc540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff82e508e0 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff88800ddfbe58 R13: ffff888005a7f080 R14: ffff888005a7f158 R15: ffff888005a7f158 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000002e22006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26 ? page_fault_oops+0x13e/0x2b0 ? _printk+0x58/0x73 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5f/0x750 ? exc_page_fault+0x76/0x240 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] ? btrfs_log_dev_io_error+0x7f/0x90 [btrfs] btrfs_orig_write_end_io+0x51/0x90 [btrfs] dm_submit_bio+0x5c2/0xa50 [dm_mod] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? blk_try_enter_queue+0x90/0x1e0 __submit_bio+0xe0/0x130 ? ktime_get+0x10a/0x160 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x199/0x410 btrfs_submit_bio+0x7d/0x150 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x1a1/0x6d0 [btrfs] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 ? __folio_start_writeback+0x10/0x2c0 btrfs_submit_bbio+0x1c/0x40 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0x44/0x60 [btrfs] submit_extent_folio+0x13f/0x330 [btrfs] ? btrfs_set_range_writeback+0xa3/0xd0 [btrfs] extent_writepage_io+0x18b/0x360 [btrfs] extent_write_locked_range+0x17c/0x340 [btrfs] ? __pfx_end_bbio_data_write+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] run_delalloc_cow+0x71/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x176/0x500 [btrfs] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x119/0x260 [btrfs] writepage_delalloc+0x2ab/0x480 [btrfs] extent_write_cache_pages+0x236/0x7d0 [btrfs] btrfs_writepages+0x72/0x130 [btrfs] do_writepages+0xd4/0x240 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 __writeback_single_inode+0x5c/0x4c0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xb0 writeback_sb_inodes+0x22c/0x560 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0 wb_writeback+0x1d6/0x3f0 wb_workfn+0x334/0x520 process_one_work+0x1ee/0x570 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc6/0x130 worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xee/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: dm_mod btrfs blake2b_generic xor raid6_pq rapl CR2: 0000000000000020 * Case 2. Earlier completion of orig_bbio for mirrored btrfs_bios btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() assumes the end_io function for orig_bbio is called last among split bios. In that case, btrfs_orig_write_end_io() sets the bio->bi_status to BLK_STS_IOERR by seeing the bioc->error [2]. Otherwise, the increased orig_bio's bioc->error is not checked by anyone and return BLK_STS_OK to the upper layer. [2] Actually, this is not true. Because we only increases orig_bioc->errors by max_errors, the condition "atomic_read(&bioc->error) > bioc->max_errors" is still not met if only one split btrfs_bio fails. * Case 3. Later completion of orig_bbio for un-mirrored btrfs_bios In contrast to the above case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() is not working well if un-mirrored orig_bbio is completed last. It sets orig_bbio->bio.bi_status to the btrfs_bio's error. But, that is easily over-written by orig_bbio's completion status. If the status is BLK_STS_OK, the upper layer would not know the failure. * Solution Considering the above cases, we can only save the error status in the orig_bbio (remaining part after split) itself as it is always available. Also, the saved error status should be propagated when all the split btrfs_bios are finished (i.e, bbio->pending_ios == 0). This commit introduces "status" to btrfs_bbio and saves the first error of split bios to original btrfs_bio's "status" variable. When all the split bios are finished, the saved status is loaded into original btrfs_bio's status. With this commit, btrfs/146 on zoned devices does not hit the NULL pointer dereference anymore. Fixes: 852eee6 ("btrfs: allow btrfs_submit_bio to split bios") CC: [email protected] # 6.6+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

send_message() does not block in the MBOX implementation. This is because the mailbox layer has its own queue. However, this confuses the per xfer timeouts as they all start their timeout ticks in parallel. Consider a case where the xfer timeout is 30ms and a SCMI transaction takes 25ms: | 0ms: Message #0 is queued in mailbox layer and sent out, then sits | at scmi_wait_for_message_response() with a timeout of 30ms | 1ms: Message #1 is queued in mailbox layer but not sent out yet. | Since send_message() doesn't block, it also sits at | scmi_wait_for_message_response() with a timeout of 30ms | ... | 25ms: Message #0 is completed, txdone is called and message #1 is sent | 31ms: Message #1 times out since the count started at 1ms. Even though | it has only been inflight for 6ms. Fixes: 5c8a47a ("firmware: arm_scmi: Make scmi core independent of the transport type") Signed-off-by: Justin Chen <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cristian Marussi <[email protected]> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>

Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor364/5113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 but task is already holding lock: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(k-slock-AF_INET); lock(k-slock-AF_INET); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by syz-executor364/5113: #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x153/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1806 #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x11f/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1727 #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x5f/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470 #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x45f/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: local_lock_acquire include/linux/local_lock_internal.h:29 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x33b/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6104 #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0x230/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:232 #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5113 Comm: syz-executor364 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline] validate_chain+0x15d3/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855 __lock_acquire+0x137a/0x2040 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5142 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 mptcp_sk_clone_init+0x32/0x13c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3279 subflow_syn_recv_sock+0x931/0x1920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:874 tcp_check_req+0xfe4/0x1a20 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:853 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2267 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775 process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108 __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:908 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1763/0x3e90 net/core/dev.c:4450 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3105 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline] __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466 tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6542 [inline] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2c32/0x4570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6729 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline] __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3004 release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3558 mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x1ad/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1733 mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1812 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f04fb13a6b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 01 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd651f42d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f04fb13a6b9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffd651f4310 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000f4240 R13: 00007f04fb187449 R14: 00007ffd651f42f4 R15: 00007ffd651f4300 </TASK> As noted by Cong Wang, the splat is false positive, but the code path leading to the report is an unexpected one: a client is attempting an MPC handshake towards the in-kernel listener created by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint. Such connection will be never accepted; many of them can make the listener queue full and preventing the creation of MPJ subflow via such listener - its intended role. Explicitly detect this scenario at initial-syn time and drop the incoming MPC request. Fixes: 1729cf1 ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Martin KaFai Lau reported use-after-free [0] in reqsk_timer_handler(). """ We are seeing a use-after-free from a bpf prog attached to trace_tcp_retransmit_synack. The program passes the req->sk to the bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing kernel helper which does check for null before using it. """ The commit 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") added timer_pending() in reqsk_queue_unlink() not to call del_timer_sync() from reqsk_timer_handler(), but it introduced a small race window. Before the timer is called, expire_timers() calls detach_timer(timer, true) to clear timer->entry.pprev and marks it as not pending. If reqsk_queue_unlink() checks timer_pending() just after expire_timers() calls detach_timer(), TCP will miss del_timer_sync(); the reqsk timer will continue running and send multiple SYN+ACKs until it expires. The reported UAF could happen if req->sk is close()d earlier than the timer expiration, which is 63s by default. The scenario would be 1. inet_csk_complete_hashdance() calls inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(), but del_timer_sync() is missed 2. reqsk timer is executed and scheduled again 3. req->sk is accept()ed and reqsk_put() decrements rsk_refcnt, but reqsk timer still has another one, and inet_csk_accept() does not clear req->sk for non-TFO sockets 4. sk is close()d 5. reqsk timer is executed again, and BPF touches req->sk Let's not use timer_pending() by passing the caller context to __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(). Note that reqsk timer is pinned, so the issue does not happen in most use cases. [1] [0] BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 Use-after-free read at 0x00000000a891fb3a (in kfence-#1): bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 bpf_prog_5ea3e95db6da0438_tcp_retransmit_synack+0x1d20/0x1dda bpf_trace_run2+0x4c/0xc0 tcp_rtx_synack+0xf9/0x100 reqsk_timer_handler+0xda/0x3d0 run_timer_softirq+0x292/0x8a0 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 intel_idle_irq+0x5a/0xa0 cpuidle_enter_state+0x94/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb kfence-#1: 0x00000000a72cc7b6-0x00000000d97616d9, size=2376, cache=TCPv6 allocated by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.901592s: sk_prot_alloc+0x35/0x140 sk_clone_lock+0x1f/0x3f0 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x15/0x160 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x1f/0x410 tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock+0x1da/0x700 tcp_check_req+0x1fb/0x510 tcp_v6_rcv+0x98b/0x1420 ipv6_list_rcv+0x2258/0x26e0 napi_complete_done+0x5b1/0x2990 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x2ae/0x8d0 net_rx_action+0x13e/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 common_interrupt+0x80/0x90 asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb freed by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.927527s: rcu_core_si+0x4ff/0xf10 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb Fixes: 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [1] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

@flags

While running net selftests with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y I saw one lockdep splat [1]. genlmsg_mcast() uses for_each_net_rcu(), and must therefore hold RCU. Instead of letting all callers guard genlmsg_multicast_allns() with a rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() pair, do it in genlmsg_mcast(). This also means the @flags parameter is useless, we need to always use GFP_ATOMIC. [1] [10882.424136] ============================= [10882.424166] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [10882.424309] 6.12.0-rc2-virtme #1156 Not tainted [10882.424400] ----------------------------- [10882.424423] net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [10882.424469] other info that might help us debug this: [10882.424500] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [10882.424744] 2 locks held by ip/15677: [10882.424791] #0: ffffffffb6b491b0 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219) [10882.426334] #1: ffffffffb6b49248 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:61 net/netlink/genetlink.c:57 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209) [10882.426465] stack backtrace: [10882.426805] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 15677 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-virtme #1156 [10882.426919] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [10882.427046] Call Trace: [10882.427131] <TASK> [10882.427244] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [10882.427335] lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822) [10882.427387] genlmsg_multicast_allns (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 (discriminator 7) net/netlink/genetlink.c:1977 (discriminator 7)) [10882.427436] l2tp_tunnel_notify.constprop.0 (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:119) l2tp_netlink [10882.427683] l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:253) l2tp_netlink [10882.427748] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115) [10882.427834] genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210) [10882.427877] ? __pfx_l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:186) l2tp_netlink [10882.427927] ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1201) [10882.427959] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551) [10882.428069] genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1220) [10882.428095] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1332 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357) [10882.428140] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901) [10882.428210] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:729 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:744 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2607 (discriminator 1)) Fixes: 33f72e6 ("l2tp : multicast notification to the registered listeners") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: James Chapman <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Parkin <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Command bitmask have a dedicated bit for MANAGE_PAGES command, this bit isn't Initialize during command bitmask Initialization, only during MANAGE_PAGES. In addition, mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() is trying to trigger completion for MANAGE_PAGES command as well. Hence, in case health error occurred before any MANAGE_PAGES command have been invoke (for example, during mlx5_enable_hca()), mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() will try to trigger completion for MANAGE_PAGES command, which will result in null-ptr-deref error.[1] Fix it by Initialize command bitmask correctly. While at it, re-write the code for better understanding. [1] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core] Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000214 by task kworker/u96:2/12078 CPU: 10 PID: 12078 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2_for_upstream_debug_2024_04_07_19_01 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:08:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0 kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0 kasan_check_range+0xec/0x190 mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_flush+0x94/0x240 [mlx5_core] enter_error_state+0x6c/0xd0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xf3/0x480 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x787/0x1490 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0xda0/0xda0 ? assign_work+0x168/0x240 worker_thread+0x586/0xd30 ? rescuer_thread+0xae0/0xae0 kthread+0x2df/0x3b0 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Fixes: 9b98d39 ("net/mlx5: Start health poll at earlier stage of driver load") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

rxq contains a pointer to the device from where the redirect happened. Currently, the BPF program that was executed after a redirect via BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP* does not have it set. This is particularly bad since accessing ingress_ifindex, e.g. SEC("xdp") int prog(struct xdp_md *pkt) { return bpf_redirect_map(&dev_redirect_map, 0, 0); } SEC("xdp/devmap") int prog_after_redirect(struct xdp_md *pkt) { bpf_printk("ifindex %i", pkt->ingress_ifindex); return XDP_PASS; } depends on access to rxq, so a NULL pointer gets dereferenced: <1>[ 574.475170] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 <1>[ 574.475188] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode <1>[ 574.475194] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page <6>[ 574.475199] PGD 0 P4D 0 <4>[ 574.475207] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI <4>[ 574.475217] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-reduced-00859-g780801200300 torvalds#23 <4>[ 574.475226] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC13ANHi7/NUC13ANBi7, BIOS ANRPL357.0026.2023.0314.1458 03/14/2023 <4>[ 574.475231] Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work <4>[ 574.475247] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c <4>[ 574.475257] Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 80 00 00 00 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 55 48 89 e5 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8b 57 20 <48> 8b 52 00 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 48 bf f8 a6 d5 c4 5d a0 ff ff be 0b <4>[ 574.475263] RSP: 0018:ffffa62440280c98 EFLAGS: 00010206 <4>[ 574.475269] RAX: ffffa62440280cd8 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 <4>[ 574.475274] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa62440549048 RDI: ffffa62440280ce0 <4>[ 574.475278] RBP: ffffa62440280c98 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001 <4>[ 574.475281] R10: ffffa05dc8b98000 R11: ffffa05f577fca40 R12: ffffa05dcab24000 <4>[ 574.475285] R13: ffffa62440280ce0 R14: ffffa62440549048 R15: ffffa62440549000 <4>[ 574.475289] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa05f4f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 <4>[ 574.475294] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 <4>[ 574.475298] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000025522e000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 <4>[ 574.475303] PKRU: 55555554 <4>[ 574.475306] Call Trace: <4>[ 574.475313] <IRQ> <4>[ 574.475318] ? __die+0x23/0x70 <4>[ 574.475329] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c0 <4>[ 574.475339] ? skb_pp_cow_data+0x34c/0x490 <4>[ 574.475346] ? kmem_cache_free+0x257/0x280 <4>[ 574.475357] ? exc_page_fault+0x67/0x150 <4>[ 574.475368] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 <4>[ 574.475381] ? bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c <4>[ 574.475386] bq_xmit_all+0x158/0x420 <4>[ 574.475397] __dev_flush+0x30/0x90 <4>[ 574.475407] veth_poll+0x216/0x250 [veth] <4>[ 574.475421] __napi_poll+0x28/0x1c0 <4>[ 574.475430] net_rx_action+0x32d/0x3a0 <4>[ 574.475441] handle_softirqs+0xcb/0x2c0 <4>[ 574.475451] do_softirq+0x40/0x60 <4>[ 574.475458] </IRQ> <4>[ 574.475461] <TASK> <4>[ 574.475464] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x66/0x70 <4>[ 574.475471] __dev_queue_xmit+0x268/0xe40 <4>[ 574.475480] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x213/0x420 <4>[ 574.475491] ? alloc_skb_with_frags+0x4a/0x1d0 <4>[ 574.475502] ip6_finish_output2+0x2be/0x640 <4>[ 574.475512] ? nf_hook_slow+0x42/0xf0 <4>[ 574.475521] ip6_finish_output+0x194/0x300 <4>[ 574.475529] ? __pfx_ip6_finish_output+0x10/0x10 <4>[ 574.475538] mld_sendpack+0x17c/0x240 <4>[ 574.475548] mld_ifc_work+0x192/0x410 <4>[ 574.475557] process_one_work+0x15d/0x380 <4>[ 574.475566] worker_thread+0x29d/0x3a0 <4>[ 574.475573] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 <4>[ 574.475580] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 <4>[ 574.475587] kthread+0xcd/0x100 <4>[ 574.475597] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4>[ 574.475606] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 <4>[ 574.475615] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4>[ 574.475623] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 <4>[ 574.475635] </TASK> <4>[ 574.475637] Modules linked in: veth br_netfilter bridge stp llc iwlmvm x86_pkg_temp_thermal iwlwifi efivarfs nvme nvme_core <4>[ 574.475662] CR2: 0000000000000000 <4>[ 574.475668] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Therefore, provide it to the program by setting rxq properly. Fixes: cb261b5 ("bpf: Run devmap xdp_prog on flush instead of bulk enqueue") Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Kauer <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240911-devel-koalo-fix-ingress-ifindex-v4-1-5c643ae10258@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>

Robert Gill reported below #GP in 32-bit mode when dosemu software was executing vm86() system call: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 4 PID: 4610 Comm: dosemu.bin Not tainted 6.6.21-gentoo-x86 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1950/0H723K, BIOS 2.7.0 10/30/2010 EIP: restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: ff8affdc DS: 0000 ES: 0000 FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010046 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00c2101c CR3: 04b6d000 CR4: 000406d0 Call Trace: show_regs+0x70/0x78 die_addr+0x29/0x70 exc_general_protection+0x13c/0x348 exc_bounds+0x98/0x98 handle_exception+0x14d/0x14d exc_bounds+0x98/0x98 restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf exc_bounds+0x98/0x98 restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf This only happens in 32-bit mode when VERW based mitigations like MDS/RFDS are enabled. This is because segment registers with an arbitrary user value can result in #GP when executing VERW. Intel SDM vol. 2C documents the following behavior for VERW instruction: #GP(0) - If a memory operand effective address is outside the CS, DS, ES, FS, or GS segment limit. CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS macro executes VERW instruction before returning to user space. Use %cs selector to reference VERW operand. This ensures VERW will not #GP for an arbitrary user %ds. [ mingo: Fixed the SOB chain. ] Fixes: a0e2dab ("x86/entry_32: Add VERW just before userspace transition") Reported-by: Robert Gill <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <[email protected] Cc: [email protected] # 5.10+ Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218707 Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Brian Gerst <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

When trying to repeat the btf fields for array of nested struct, it doesn't check the remaining info_cnt. The following splat will be reported when the value of ret * nelems is greater than BTF_FIELDS_MAX: ------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../kernel/bpf/btf.c:3951:49 index 11 is out of range for type 'btf_field_info [11]' CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: test_progs ...... 6.11.0-rc4+ #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x40 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x6f/0x80 ? kallsyms_lookup_name+0x48/0xb0 btf_parse_fields+0x992/0xce0 map_create+0x591/0x770 __sys_bpf+0x229/0x2410 __x64_sys_bpf+0x1f/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x199/0x9f0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fea56f2cc5d ...... </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- Fix it by checking the remaining info_cnt in btf_repeat_fields() before repeating the btf fields. Fixes: 64e8ee8 ("bpf: look into the types of the fields of a struct type recursively.") Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

Hou Tao says: ==================== Check the remaining info_cnt before repeating btf fields From: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Hi, The patch set adds the missed check again info_cnt when flattening the array of nested struct. The problem was spotted when developing dynptr key support for hash map. Patch #1 adds the missed check and patch #2 adds three success test cases and one failure test case for the problem. Comments are always welcome. Change Log: v2: * patch #1: check info_cnt in btf_repeat_fields() * patch #2: use a hard-coded number instead of BTF_FIELDS_MAX, because BTF_FIELDS_MAX is not always available in vmlinux.h (e.g., for llvm 17/18) v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#t ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

When using encryption, either enforced by the server or when using 'seal' mount option, the client will squash all compound request buffers down for encryption into a single iov in smb2_set_next_command(). SMB2_ioctl_init() allocates a small buffer (448 bytes) to hold the SMB2_IOCTL request in the first iov, and if the user passes an input buffer that is greater than 328 bytes, smb2_set_next_command() will end up writing off the end of @rqst->iov[0].iov_base as shown below: mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ...,seal ln -s $(perl -e "print('a')for 1..1024") /mnt/link BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs] Write of size 4116 at addr ffff8881148fcab8 by task ln/859 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 859 Comm: ln Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ? smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs] print_report+0x156/0x4d9 ? smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x145/0x310 ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90 ? smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs] kasan_report+0xda/0x110 ? smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs] kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1f0 __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60 smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs] smb2_compound_op+0x238c/0x3840 [cifs] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 ? vfs_symlink+0x1a1/0x2c0 ? do_symlinkat+0x108/0x1c0 ? __pfx_smb2_compound_op+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? kmem_cache_free+0x118/0x3e0 ? cifs_get_writable_path+0xeb/0x1a0 [cifs] smb2_get_reparse_inode+0x423/0x540 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb2_get_reparse_inode+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 ? __kmalloc_noprof+0x37c/0x480 ? smb2_create_reparse_symlink+0x257/0x490 [cifs] ? smb2_create_reparse_symlink+0x38f/0x490 [cifs] smb2_create_reparse_symlink+0x38f/0x490 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb2_create_reparse_symlink+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? __build_path_from_dentry_optional_prefix+0x19d/0x2e0 [cifs] cifs_symlink+0x24f/0x960 [cifs] ? __pfx_make_vfsuid+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_cifs_symlink+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? make_vfsgid+0x6b/0xc0 ? generic_permission+0x96/0x2d0 vfs_symlink+0x1a1/0x2c0 do_symlinkat+0x108/0x1c0 ? __pfx_do_symlinkat+0x10/0x10 ? strncpy_from_user+0xaa/0x160 __x64_sys_symlinkat+0xb9/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f08d75c13bb Reported-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Fixes: e77fe73 ("cifs: we can not use small padding iovs together with encryption") Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>

We're seeing crashes from rq_qos_wake_function that look like this: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffafe180a40084 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10027c067 PMD 10115d067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-00013-geca631b8fe80 torvalds#11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1d/0x40 Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 9c 41 5c fa 65 ff 05 62 97 30 4c 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 0f b1 17 75 0a 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 89 c6 e8 2c 0b 00 RSP: 0018:ffffafe180580ca0 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffafe180a3f7a8 RCX: 0000000000000011 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffffafe180a40084 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000001e7240 R09: 0000000000000011 R10: 0000000000000028 R11: 0000000000000888 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffffafe180a40084 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9aaf1f280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffafe180a40084 CR3: 000000010e428002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> try_to_wake_up+0x5a/0x6a0 rq_qos_wake_function+0x71/0x80 __wake_up_common+0x75/0xa0 __wake_up+0x36/0x60 scale_up.part.0+0x50/0x110 wb_timer_fn+0x227/0x450 ... So rq_qos_wake_function() calls wake_up_process(data->task), which calls try_to_wake_up(), which faults in raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&p->pi_lock). p comes from data->task, and data comes from the waitqueue entry, which is stored on the waiter's stack in rq_qos_wait(). Analyzing the core dump with drgn, I found that the waiter had already woken up and moved on to a completely unrelated code path, clobbering what was previously data->task. Meanwhile, the waker was passing the clobbered garbage in data->task to wake_up_process(), leading to the crash. What's happening is that in between rq_qos_wake_function() deleting the waitqueue entry and calling wake_up_process(), rq_qos_wait() is finding that it already got a token and returning. The race looks like this: rq_qos_wait() rq_qos_wake_function() ============================================================== prepare_to_wait_exclusive() data->got_token = true; list_del_init(&curr->entry); if (data.got_token) break; finish_wait(&rqw->wait, &data.wq); ^- returns immediately because list_empty_careful(&wq_entry->entry) is true ... return, go do something else ... wake_up_process(data->task) (NO LONGER VALID!)-^ Normally, finish_wait() is supposed to synchronize against the waker. But, as noted above, it is returning immediately because the waitqueue entry has already been removed from the waitqueue. The bug is that rq_qos_wake_function() is accessing the waitqueue entry AFTER deleting it. Note that autoremove_wake_function() wakes the waiter and THEN deletes the waitqueue entry, which is the proper order. Fix it by swapping the order. We also need to use list_del_init_careful() to match the list_empty_careful() in finish_wait(). Fixes: 38cfb5a ("blk-wbt: improve waking of tasks") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d3bee2463a67b1ee597211823bf7ad3721c26e41.1729014591.git.osandov@fb.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

If bt_debugfs is not created successfully, which happens if either CONFIG_DEBUG_FS or CONFIG_DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL is unset, then iso_init() returns early and does not set iso_inited to true. This means that a subsequent call to iso_init() will result in duplicate calls to proto_register(), bt_sock_register(), etc. With CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED and CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION enabled, the duplicate call to proto_register() triggers this BUG(): list_add double add: new=ffffffffc0b280d0, prev=ffffffffbab56250, next=ffffffffc0b280d0. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 887 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 6.10.11-1-ao-desktop #1 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0 ... __list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0 proto_register+0x2b5/0x340 iso_init+0x23/0x150 [bluetooth] set_iso_socket_func+0x68/0x1b0 [bluetooth] kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x330 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x990/0x9e0 [bluetooth] __sock_sendmsg+0x7b/0x80 sock_write_iter+0x9a/0x110 do_iter_readv_writev+0x11d/0x220 vfs_writev+0x180/0x3e0 do_writev+0xca/0x100 ... This change removes the early return. The check for iso_debugfs being NULL was unnecessary, it is always NULL when iso_inited is false. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: ccf74f2 ("Bluetooth: Add BTPROTO_ISO socket type") Signed-off-by: Aaron Thompson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

If iso_init() has been called, iso_exit() must be called on module unload. Without that, the struct proto that iso_init() registered with proto_register() becomes invalid, which could cause unpredictable problems later. In my case, with CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED and CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION enabled, loading the module again usually triggers this BUG(): list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffffffffb5355fd0), but was 0000000000000068. (next=ffffffffc0a010d0). ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 4159 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.10.11-4+bt2-ao-desktop #1 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x61/0xa0 ... __list_add_valid_or_report+0x61/0xa0 proto_register+0x299/0x320 hci_sock_init+0x16/0xc0 [bluetooth] bt_init+0x68/0xd0 [bluetooth] __pfx_bt_init+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth] do_one_initcall+0x80/0x2f0 do_init_module+0x8b/0x230 __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x68/0x110 ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: ccf74f2 ("Bluetooth: Add BTPROTO_ISO socket type") Signed-off-by: Aaron Thompson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

The purpose of btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() shall be propagating an error of split bio to its original btrfs_bio, and tell the error to the upper layer. However, it's not working well on some cases. * Case 1. Immediate (or quick) end_bio with an error When btrfs sends btrfs_bio to mirrored devices, btrfs calls btrfs_bio_end_io() when all the mirroring bios are completed. If that btrfs_bio was split, it is from btrfs_clone_bioset and its end_io function is btrfs_orig_write_end_io. For this case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() accesses the orig_bbio's bio context to increase the error count. That works well in most cases. However, if the end_io is called enough fast, orig_bbio's (remaining part after split) bio context may not be properly set at that time. Since the bio context is set when the orig_bbio (the last btrfs_bio) is sent to devices, that might be too late for earlier split btrfs_bio's completion. That will result in NULL pointer dereference. That bug is easily reproducible by running btrfs/146 on zoned devices [1] and it shows the following trace. [1] You need raid-stripe-tree feature as it create "-d raid0 -m raid1" FS. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-BTRFS-ZNS+ torvalds#474 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-5) RIP: 0010:btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] BTRFS error (device dm-0): bdev /dev/mapper/error-test errs: wr 2, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 0, gen 0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000006f248 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888005a7f080 RCX: ffffc9000006f1dc RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff888005a7f080 RBP: ffff888011dfc540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff82e508e0 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff88800ddfbe58 R13: ffff888005a7f080 R14: ffff888005a7f158 R15: ffff888005a7f158 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000002e22006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26 ? page_fault_oops+0x13e/0x2b0 ? _printk+0x58/0x73 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5f/0x750 ? exc_page_fault+0x76/0x240 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] ? btrfs_log_dev_io_error+0x7f/0x90 [btrfs] btrfs_orig_write_end_io+0x51/0x90 [btrfs] dm_submit_bio+0x5c2/0xa50 [dm_mod] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? blk_try_enter_queue+0x90/0x1e0 __submit_bio+0xe0/0x130 ? ktime_get+0x10a/0x160 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x199/0x410 btrfs_submit_bio+0x7d/0x150 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x1a1/0x6d0 [btrfs] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 ? __folio_start_writeback+0x10/0x2c0 btrfs_submit_bbio+0x1c/0x40 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0x44/0x60 [btrfs] submit_extent_folio+0x13f/0x330 [btrfs] ? btrfs_set_range_writeback+0xa3/0xd0 [btrfs] extent_writepage_io+0x18b/0x360 [btrfs] extent_write_locked_range+0x17c/0x340 [btrfs] ? __pfx_end_bbio_data_write+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] run_delalloc_cow+0x71/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x176/0x500 [btrfs] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x119/0x260 [btrfs] writepage_delalloc+0x2ab/0x480 [btrfs] extent_write_cache_pages+0x236/0x7d0 [btrfs] btrfs_writepages+0x72/0x130 [btrfs] do_writepages+0xd4/0x240 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 __writeback_single_inode+0x5c/0x4c0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xb0 writeback_sb_inodes+0x22c/0x560 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0 wb_writeback+0x1d6/0x3f0 wb_workfn+0x334/0x520 process_one_work+0x1ee/0x570 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc6/0x130 worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xee/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: dm_mod btrfs blake2b_generic xor raid6_pq rapl CR2: 0000000000000020 * Case 2. Earlier completion of orig_bbio for mirrored btrfs_bios btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() assumes the end_io function for orig_bbio is called last among split bios. In that case, btrfs_orig_write_end_io() sets the bio->bi_status to BLK_STS_IOERR by seeing the bioc->error [2]. Otherwise, the increased orig_bio's bioc->error is not checked by anyone and return BLK_STS_OK to the upper layer. [2] Actually, this is not true. Because we only increases orig_bioc->errors by max_errors, the condition "atomic_read(&bioc->error) > bioc->max_errors" is still not met if only one split btrfs_bio fails. * Case 3. Later completion of orig_bbio for un-mirrored btrfs_bios In contrast to the above case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() is not working well if un-mirrored orig_bbio is completed last. It sets orig_bbio->bio.bi_status to the btrfs_bio's error. But, that is easily over-written by orig_bbio's completion status. If the status is BLK_STS_OK, the upper layer would not know the failure. * Solution Considering the above cases, we can only save the error status in the orig_bbio (remaining part after split) itself as it is always available. Also, the saved error status should be propagated when all the split btrfs_bios are finished (i.e, bbio->pending_ios == 0). This commit introduces "status" to btrfs_bbio and saves the first error of split bios to original btrfs_bio's "status" variable. When all the split bios are finished, the saved status is loaded into original btrfs_bio's status. With this commit, btrfs/146 on zoned devices does not hit the NULL pointer dereference anymore. Fixes: 852eee6 ("btrfs: allow btrfs_submit_bio to split bios") CC: [email protected] # 6.6+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

asj and others added 30 commits September 29, 2015 16:29

Btrfs: rename btrfs_sysfs_add_one to btrfs_sysfs_add_mounted

96f3136

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: rename btrfs_sysfs_remove_one to btrfs_sysfs_remove_mounted

6618a59

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: rename btrfs_kobj_add_device to btrfs_sysfs_add_device_link

e3bd697

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: rename btrfs_kobj_rm_device to btrfs_sysfs_rm_device_link

3257604

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: rename super_kobj to fsid_kobj

c1b7e47

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: SB read failure should return EIO for __bread failure

92fc03f

This will return EIO when __bread() fails to read SB, instead of EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: add helper for closing one device

f190aa4

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [reworded subject and changelog] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: pass the error code to the btrfs_std_error and log ret

0aee754

This patch will log return value of add/del_qgroup_relation() and pass the err code of btrfs_run_qgroups to the btrfs_std_error(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: device path change must be logged

defa97a

From the issue diagnosable point of view, log if the device path is changed. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: add missing brelse when superblock checksum fails

e6aea8e

looks like oversight, call brelse() when checksum fails. further down the code in the non error path we do call brelse() and so we don't see brelse() in the goto error.. paths. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: optimize check for stale device

0812a51

optimize check for stale device to only be checked when there is device added or changed. If there is no update to the device, there is no need to call btrfs_free_stale_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: clean up and optimize __check_raid_min_device()

3f7d4c2

__check_raid_min_device() which was pealed from btrfs_rm_device() maintianed its original code to show the block move. This patch cleans up __check_raid_min_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: make use of btrfs_find_device_by_user_input()

b737e10

btrfs_rm_device() has a section of the code which can be replaced btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: make use of btrfs_scratch_superblocks() in btrfs_rm_device()

cef4787

With the previous patches now the btrfs_scratch_superblocks() is ready to be used in btrfs_rm_device() so use it. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

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asj commented Oct 7, 2015

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asj commented Oct 7, 2015