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Else there may be magic numbers in /sys/kernel/debug/block/*/state. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Make blk_ksm_destroy() use the kvfree_sensitive() function (which was introduced in v5.8-rc1) instead of open-coding it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
So that the target task will exit the wait_event_interruptible-like loop and call task_work_run() asap. The patch turns "bool notify" into 0,TWA_RESUME,TWA_SIGNAL enum, the new TWA_SIGNAL flag implies signal_wake_up(). However, it needs to avoid the race with recalc_sigpending(), so the patch also adds the new JOBCTL_TASK_WORK bit included in JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK. TODO: once this patch is merged we need to change all current users of task_work_add(notify = true) to use TWA_RESUME. Cc: [email protected] # v5.7 Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Since 5.7, we've been using task_work to trigger async running of requests in the context of the original task. This generally works great, but there's a case where if the task is currently blocked in the kernel waiting on a condition to become true, it won't process task_work. Even though the task is woken, it just checks whatever condition it's waiting on, and goes back to sleep if it's still false. This is a problem if that very condition only becomes true when that task_work is run. An example of that is the task registering an eventfd with io_uring, and it's now blocked waiting on an eventfd read. That read could depend on a completion event, and that completion event won't get trigged until task_work has been run. Use the TWA_SIGNAL notification for task_work, so that we ensure that the task always runs the work when queued. Cc: [email protected] # v5.7 Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Else there will be memory leak if alloc_disk() fails. Fixes: 6a27b65 ("block: virtio-blk: support multi virt queues per virtio-blk device") Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe: "One fix in here, for a regression in 5.7 where a task is waiting in the kernel for a condition, but that condition won't become true until task_work is run. And the task_work can't be run exactly because the task is waiting in the kernel, so we'll never make any progress. One example of that is registering an eventfd and queueing io_uring work, and then the task goes and waits in eventfd read with the expectation that it'll get woken (and read an event) when the io_uring request completes. The io_uring request is finished through task_work, which won't get run while the task is looping in eventfd read" * tag 'io_uring-5.8-2020-07-01' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: io_uring: use signal based task_work running task_work: teach task_work_add() to do signal_wake_up()
Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe: - Use kvfree_sensitive() for the block keyslot free (Eric) - Sync blk-mq debugfs flags (Hou) - Memory leak fix in virtio-blk error path (Hou) * tag 'block-5.8-2020-07-01' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: virtio-blk: free vblk-vqs in error path of virtblk_probe() block/keyslot-manager: use kvfree_sensitive() blk-mq-debugfs: update blk_queue_flag_name[] accordingly for new flags
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GFP_KERNEL flag specifies a normal kernel allocation in which executing in process context without any locks and can sleep. mmio_diff takes sometime to finish all the diff compare and it has locks, continue using GFP_KERNEL will output below trace if LOCKDEP enabled. Use GFP_ATOMIC instead. V2: Rebase. ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.7.0-rc2 #400 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- is trying to acquire: ffffffffb47bea20 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x0/0x30 and this task is already holding: ffff88845b85cc90 (&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0xcf/0x2e0 which would create a new lock dependency: (&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2} -> (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at: lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x40 shadow_context_status_change+0xfe/0x2f0 notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0xa0 __atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xf0 execlists_schedule_out+0x42a/0x820 process_csb+0xe7/0x3e0 execlists_submission_tasklet+0x5c/0x1d0 tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0xeb/0x260 __do_softirq+0x11d/0x56f irq_exit+0xf6/0x100 do_IRQ+0x7f/0x160 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x2a cpuidle_enter_state+0xcd/0x5b0 cpuidle_enter+0x37/0x60 do_idle+0x337/0x3f0 cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20 start_kernel+0x58b/0x5c5 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at: ... lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30 kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x2e/0x290 alloc_worker+0x2b/0xb0 init_rescuer.part.0+0x17/0xe0 workqueue_init+0x293/0x3bb kernel_init_freeable+0x149/0x325 kernel_init+0x8/0x116 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); local_irq_disable(); lock(&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock); lock(fs_reclaim); <Interrupt> lock(&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by cat/1439: #0: ffff888444a23698 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read+0x49/0x680 #1: ffff88845b858068 (&gvt->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0xc7/0x2e0 #2: ffff88845b85cc90 (&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0xcf/0x2e0 the dependencies between SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock and the holding lock: -> (&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2} ops: 31 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x2f/0x40 vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0xcf/0x2e0 seq_read+0x242/0x680 full_proxy_read+0x95/0xc0 vfs_read+0xc2/0x1b0 ksys_read+0xc4/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x63/0x290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 IN-SOFTIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x40 shadow_context_status_change+0xfe/0x2f0 notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0xa0 __atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xf0 execlists_schedule_out+0x42a/0x820 process_csb+0xe7/0x3e0 execlists_submission_tasklet+0x5c/0x1d0 tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0xeb/0x260 __do_softirq+0x11d/0x56f irq_exit+0xf6/0x100 do_IRQ+0x7f/0x160 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x2a cpuidle_enter_state+0xcd/0x5b0 cpuidle_enter+0x37/0x60 do_idle+0x337/0x3f0 cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20 start_kernel+0x58b/0x5c5 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x40 shadow_context_status_change+0xfe/0x2f0 notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0xa0 __atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xf0 execlists_schedule_in+0x2c8/0x690 __execlists_submission_tasklet+0x1303/0x1930 execlists_submit_request+0x1e7/0x230 submit_notify+0x105/0x2a4 __i915_sw_fence_complete+0xaa/0x380 __engine_park+0x313/0x5a0 ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x3e/0x90 intel_gt_resume+0x41e/0x440 intel_gt_init+0x283/0xbc0 i915_gem_init+0x197/0x240 i915_driver_probe+0xc2d/0x12e0 i915_pci_probe+0xa2/0x1e0 local_pci_probe+0x6f/0xb0 pci_device_probe+0x171/0x230 really_probe+0x17a/0x380 driver_probe_device+0x70/0xf0 device_driver_attach+0x82/0x90 __driver_attach+0x60/0x100 bus_for_each_dev+0xe4/0x140 bus_add_driver+0x257/0x2a0 driver_register+0xd3/0x150 i915_init+0x6d/0x80 do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x3a0 kernel_init_freeable+0x2b4/0x325 kernel_init+0x8/0x116 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 } __key.77812+0x0/0x40 ... acquired at: lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2e/0x260 mmio_diff_handler+0xc0/0x150 intel_gvt_for_each_tracked_mmio+0x7b/0x140 vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0x111/0x2e0 seq_read+0x242/0x680 full_proxy_read+0x95/0xc0 vfs_read+0xc2/0x1b0 ksys_read+0xc4/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x63/0x290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 the dependencies between the lock to be acquired and SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: -> (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0} ops: 1999031 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30 kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x2e/0x290 alloc_worker+0x2b/0xb0 init_rescuer.part.0+0x17/0xe0 workqueue_init+0x293/0x3bb kernel_init_freeable+0x149/0x325 kernel_init+0x8/0x116 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30 kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x2e/0x290 alloc_worker+0x2b/0xb0 init_rescuer.part.0+0x17/0xe0 workqueue_init+0x293/0x3bb kernel_init_freeable+0x149/0x325 kernel_init+0x8/0x116 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30 kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x2e/0x290 alloc_worker+0x2b/0xb0 init_rescuer.part.0+0x17/0xe0 workqueue_init+0x293/0x3bb kernel_init_freeable+0x149/0x325 kernel_init+0x8/0x116 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 } __fs_reclaim_map+0x0/0x60 ... acquired at: lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2e/0x260 mmio_diff_handler+0xc0/0x150 intel_gvt_for_each_tracked_mmio+0x7b/0x140 vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0x111/0x2e0 seq_read+0x242/0x680 full_proxy_read+0x95/0xc0 vfs_read+0xc2/0x1b0 ksys_read+0xc4/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x63/0x290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 stack backtrace: CPU: 5 PID: 1439 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.7.0-rc2 #400 Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7BEH/NUC8BEB, BIOS BECFL357.86A.0056.2018.1128.1717 11/28/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x97/0xe0 check_irq_usage.cold+0x428/0x434 ? check_usage_forwards+0x2c0/0x2c0 ? class_equal+0x11/0x20 ? __bfs+0xd2/0x2d0 ? in_any_class_list+0xa0/0xa0 ? check_path+0x22/0x40 ? check_noncircular+0x150/0x2b0 ? print_circular_bug.isra.0+0x1b0/0x1b0 ? mark_lock+0x13d/0xc50 ? __lock_acquire+0x1e32/0x39b0 __lock_acquire+0x1e32/0x39b0 ? timerqueue_add+0xc1/0x130 ? register_lock_class+0xa60/0xa60 ? mark_lock+0x13d/0xc50 lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0 ? __zone_pcp_update+0x80/0x80 ? check_flags.part.0+0x210/0x210 ? mark_held_locks+0x65/0x90 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x40 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x190/0x290 ? fwtable_read32+0x163/0x480 ? mmio_diff_handler+0xc0/0x150 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30 ? __zone_pcp_update+0x80/0x80 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2e/0x260 mmio_diff_handler+0xc0/0x150 ? vgpu_mmio_diff_open+0x30/0x30 intel_gvt_for_each_tracked_mmio+0x7b/0x140 vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0x111/0x2e0 ? mmio_diff_handler+0x150/0x150 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa0/0xb0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xc0/0xc0 ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x33/0x40 ? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 seq_read+0x242/0x680 ? debugfs_locked_down.isra.0+0x70/0x70 full_proxy_read+0x95/0xc0 vfs_read+0xc2/0x1b0 ksys_read+0xc4/0x160 ? kernel_write+0xb0/0xb0 ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x63/0x290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x7ffbe3e6efb2 Code: c0 e9 c2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d ca cb 0a 00 e8 f5 19 02 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffd021c08a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007ffbe3e6efb2 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007ffbe34cd000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffbe34cd000 R08: 00007ffbe34cc010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000562b6f0a11f0 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ Acked-by: Zhenyu Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Colin Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <[email protected]> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
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…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into kvm-master KVM/arm fixes for 5.8, take #2 - Make sure a vcpu becoming non-resident doesn't race against the doorbell delivery - Only advertise pvtime if accounting is enabled - Return the correct error code if reset fails with SVE - Make sure that pseudo-NMI functions are annotated as __always_inline
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Jakub Sitnicki says: ==================== This patch set prepares ground for link-based multi-prog attachment for future netns attach types, with BPF_SK_LOOKUP attach type in mind [0]. Two changes are needed in order to attach and run a series of BPF programs: 1) an bpf_prog_array of programs to run (patch #2), and 2) a list of attached links to keep track of attachments (patch #3). Nothing changes for BPF flow_dissector. Just as before only one program can be attached to netns. In v3 I've simplified patch #2 that introduces bpf_prog_array to take advantage of the fact that it will hold at most one program for now. In particular, I'm no longer using bpf_prog_array_copy. It turned out to be less suitable for link operations than I thought as it fails to append the same BPF program. bpf_prog_array_replace_item is also gone, because we know we always want to replace the first element in prog_array. Naturally the code that handles bpf_prog_array will need change once more when there is a program type that allows multi-prog attachment. But I feel it will be better to do it gradually and present it together with tests that actually exercise multi-prog code paths. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ v2 -> v3: - Don't check if run_array is null in link update callback. (Martin) - Allow updating the link with the same BPF program. (Andrii) - Add patch #4 with a test for the above case. - Kill bpf_prog_array_replace_item. Access the run_array directly. - Switch from bpf_prog_array_copy() to bpf_prog_array_alloc(1, ...). - Replace rcu_deref_protected & RCU_INIT_POINTER with rcu_replace_pointer. - Drop Andrii's Ack from patch #2. Code changed. v1 -> v2: - Show with a (void) cast that bpf_prog_array_replace_item() return value is ignored on purpose. (Andrii) - Explain why bpf-cgroup cannot replace programs in bpf_prog_array based on bpf_prog pointer comparison in patch #2 description. (Andrii) ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Jul 11, 2020
Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Various fixes Fix two issues found by syzkaller. Patch #1 removes inappropriate usage of WARN_ON() following memory allocation failure. Constantly triggered when syzkaller injects faults. Patch #2 fixes a use-after-free that can be triggered by 'devlink dev info' following a failed devlink reload. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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In BRM_status_show(), if the condition "!ioc->is_warpdrive" tested on entry to the function is true, a "goto out" is called. This results in unlocking ioc->pci_access_mutex without this mutex lock being taken. This generates the following splat: [ 1148.539883] mpt3sas_cm2: BRM_status_show: BRM attribute is only for warpdrive [ 1148.547184] [ 1148.548708] ===================================== [ 1148.553501] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! [ 1148.558277] 5.8.0-rc3+ #827 Not tainted [ 1148.562183] ------------------------------------- [ 1148.566959] cat/5008 is trying to release lock (&ioc->pci_access_mutex) at: [ 1148.574035] [<ffffffffc070b7a3>] BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas] [ 1148.580574] but there are no more locks to release! [ 1148.585524] [ 1148.585524] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1148.599624] 3 locks held by cat/5008: [ 1148.607085] #0: ffff92aea3e392c0 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read+0x34/0x480 [ 1148.618509] #1: ffff922ef14c4888 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x2a/0xb0 [ 1148.630729] #2: ffff92aedb5d7310 (kn->active#224){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x32/0xb0 [ 1148.643347] [ 1148.643347] stack backtrace: [ 1148.655259] CPU: 73 PID: 5008 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3+ #827 [ 1148.665309] Hardware name: HGST H4060-S/S2600STB, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [ 1148.678394] Call Trace: [ 1148.684750] dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 [ 1148.691802] lock_release.cold+0x45/0x4a [ 1148.699451] __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x270 [ 1148.707675] BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas] [ 1148.716092] dev_attr_show+0x19/0x40 [ 1148.723664] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x87/0x100 [ 1148.731193] seq_read+0xbc/0x480 [ 1148.737882] vfs_read+0xa0/0x160 [ 1148.744514] ksys_read+0x58/0xd0 [ 1148.751129] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 [ 1148.757941] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1148.766240] RIP: 0033:0x7f1230566542 [ 1148.772957] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 1148.779206] RSP: 002b:00007ffeac1bcac8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.790063] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f1230566542 [ 1148.800284] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f1223460000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1148.810474] RBP: 00007f1223460000 R08: 00007f122345f010 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.820641] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.830728] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 Fix this by returning immediately instead of jumping to the out label. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Sreekanth Reddy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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Jul 14, 2020
In pci_disable_sriov(), i.e., # echo 0 > /sys/class/net/enp11s0f1np1/device/sriov_numvfs iommu_release_device iommu_group_remove_device arm_smmu_domain_free kfree(smmu_domain) Later, iommu_release_device arm_smmu_release_device arm_smmu_detach_dev spin_lock_irqsave(&smmu_domain->devices_lock, would trigger an use-after-free. Fixed it by call arm_smmu_release_device() first before iommu_group_remove_device(). BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3458/0x4440 __lock_acquire at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4250 Read of size 8 at addr ffff0089df1a6f68 by task bash/3356 CPU: 5 PID: 3356 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3-next-20200630 #2 Hardware name: HPE Apollo 70 /C01_APACHE_MB , BIOS L50_5.13_1.11 06/18/2019 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x398 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0x140/0x1b8 print_address_description.isra.12+0x54/0x4a8 kasan_report+0x134/0x1b8 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x2c/0x50 __lock_acquire+0x3458/0x4440 lock_acquire+0x204/0xf10 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xf8/0x180 arm_smmu_detach_dev+0xd8/0x4a0 arm_smmu_detach_dev at drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c:2776 arm_smmu_release_device+0xb4/0x1c8 arm_smmu_disable_pasid at drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c:2754 (inlined by) arm_smmu_release_device at drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c:3000 iommu_release_device+0xc0/0x178 iommu_release_device at drivers/iommu/iommu.c:302 iommu_bus_notifier+0x118/0x160 notifier_call_chain+0xa4/0x128 __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xa8 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x20 device_del+0x618/0xa00 pci_remove_bus_device+0x108/0x2d8 pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x1c/0x28 pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0x228/0x368 sriov_disable+0x8c/0x348 pci_disable_sriov+0x5c/0x70 mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0xd8/0x260 [mlx5_core] sriov_numvfs_store+0x240/0x318 dev_attr_store+0x38/0x68 sysfs_kf_write+0xdc/0x128 kernfs_fop_write+0x23c/0x448 __vfs_write+0x54/0xe8 vfs_write+0x124/0x3f0 ksys_write+0xe8/0x1b8 __arm64_sys_write+0x68/0x98 do_el0_svc+0x124/0x220 el0_sync_handler+0x260/0x408 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 Allocated by task 3356: save_stack+0x24/0x50 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.13+0xc4/0xe0 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1ec/0x318 arm_smmu_domain_alloc+0x54/0x148 iommu_group_alloc_default_domain+0xc0/0x440 iommu_probe_device+0x1c0/0x308 iort_iommu_configure+0x434/0x518 acpi_dma_configure+0xf0/0x128 pci_dma_configure+0x114/0x160 really_probe+0x124/0x6d8 driver_probe_device+0xc4/0x180 __device_attach_driver+0x184/0x1e8 bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x1a0 __device_attach+0x19c/0x2a8 device_attach+0x10/0x18 pci_bus_add_device+0x70/0xf8 pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x7b4/0xb40 sriov_enable+0x5c8/0xc30 pci_enable_sriov+0x64/0x80 mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0x58/0x260 [mlx5_core] sriov_numvfs_store+0x1c0/0x318 dev_attr_store+0x38/0x68 sysfs_kf_write+0xdc/0x128 kernfs_fop_write+0x23c/0x448 __vfs_write+0x54/0xe8 vfs_write+0x124/0x3f0 ksys_write+0xe8/0x1b8 __arm64_sys_write+0x68/0x98 do_el0_svc+0x124/0x220 el0_sync_handler+0x260/0x408 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 Freed by task 3356: save_stack+0x24/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x198 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x110/0x298 kfree+0x128/0x668 arm_smmu_domain_free+0xf4/0x1a0 iommu_group_release+0xec/0x160 kobject_put+0xf4/0x238 kobject_del+0x110/0x190 kobject_put+0x1e4/0x238 iommu_group_remove_device+0x394/0x938 iommu_release_device+0x9c/0x178 iommu_release_device at drivers/iommu/iommu.c:300 iommu_bus_notifier+0x118/0x160 notifier_call_chain+0xa4/0x128 __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xa8 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x20 device_del+0x618/0xa00 pci_remove_bus_device+0x108/0x2d8 pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x1c/0x28 pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0x228/0x368 sriov_disable+0x8c/0x348 pci_disable_sriov+0x5c/0x70 mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0xd8/0x260 [mlx5_core] sriov_numvfs_store+0x240/0x318 dev_attr_store+0x38/0x68 sysfs_kf_write+0xdc/0x128 kernfs_fop_write+0x23c/0x448 __vfs_write+0x54/0xe8 vfs_write+0x124/0x3f0 ksys_write+0xe8/0x1b8 __arm64_sys_write+0x68/0x98 do_el0_svc+0x124/0x220 el0_sync_handler+0x260/0x408 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0089df1a6e00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 360 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff0089df1a6e00, ffff0089df1a7000) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffffe02257c680 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff0089df1a1400 flags: 0x7ffff800000200(slab) raw: 007ffff800000200 ffffffe02246b8c8 ffffffe02257ff88 ffff000000320680 raw: ffff0089df1a1400 00000000002a000e 00000001ffffffff ffff0089df1a5001 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page->mem_cgroup:ffff0089df1a5001 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff0089df1a6e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff0089df1a6e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff0089df1a6f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff0089df1a6f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff0089df1a7000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: a6a4c7e ("iommu: Add probe_device() and release_device() call-backs") Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
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Jul 16, 2020
devm_gpiod_get_index() doesn't return NULL but -ENOENT when the requested GPIO doesn't exist, leading to the following messages: [ 2.742468] gpiod_direction_input: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.748147] can't set direction for gpio #2: -2 [ 2.753081] gpiod_direction_input: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.758724] can't set direction for gpio #3: -2 [ 2.763666] gpiod_direction_output: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.769394] can't set direction for gpio #4: -2 [ 2.774341] gpiod_direction_input: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.779981] can't set direction for gpio #5: -2 [ 2.784545] ff000a20.serial: ttyCPM1 at MMIO 0xfff00a20 (irq = 39, base_baud = 8250000) is a CPM UART Use devm_gpiod_get_index_optional() instead. At the same time, handle the error case and properly exit with an error. Fixes: 97cbaf2 ("tty: serial: cpm_uart: Convert to use GPIO descriptors") Cc: [email protected] Cc: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/694a25fdce548c5ee8b060ef6a4b02746b8f25c0.1591986307.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Jul 31, 2020
This patch fixes a race condition that causes a use-after-free during amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail. This can occur when 2 non-blocking commits are requested and the second one finishes before the first. Essentially, this bug occurs when the following sequence of events happens: 1. Non-blocking commit #1 is requested w/ a new dm_state #1 and is deferred to the workqueue. 2. Non-blocking commit #2 is requested w/ a new dm_state #2 and is deferred to the workqueue. 3. Commit #2 starts before commit #1, dm_state #1 is used in the commit_tail and commit #2 completes, freeing dm_state #1. 4. Commit #1 starts after commit #2 completes, uses the freed dm_state 1 and dereferences a freelist pointer while setting the context. Since this bug has only been spotted with fast commits, this patch fixes the bug by clearing the dm_state instead of using the old dc_state for fast updates. In addition, since dm_state is only used for its dc_state and amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail will retain the dc_state if none is found, removing the dm_state should not have any consequences in fast updates. This use-after-free bug has existed for a while now, but only caused a noticeable issue starting from 5.7-rc1 due to 3202fa6 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object") moving the freelist pointer from dm_state->base (which was unused) to dm_state->context (which is dereferenced). Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207383 Fixes: bd200d1 ("drm/amd/display: Don't replace the dc_state for fast updates") Reported-by: Duncan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mazin Rezk <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected]
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Aug 2, 2020
Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw fixes This patch set contains various fixes for mlxsw. Patches #1-#2 fix two trap related issues introduced in previous cycle. Patches #3-#5 fix rare use-after-frees discovered by syzkaller. After over a week of fuzzing with the fixes, the bugs did not reproduce. Patch #6 from Amit fixes an issue in the ethtool selftest that was recently discovered after running the test on a new platform that supports only 1Gbps and 10Gbps speeds. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Aug 2, 2020
I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Aug 3, 2020
Dave hit this splat during testing btrfs/078: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc6-default+ #1191 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/75 is trying to acquire lock: ffffa040e9d04ff8 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8b0c8040 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x25/0x30 __kmalloc_track_caller+0x49/0x330 kstrdup+0x2e/0x60 __kernfs_new_node.constprop.0+0x44/0x250 kernfs_new_node+0x25/0x50 kernfs_create_link+0x34/0xa0 sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x5e/0xd0 btrfs_sysfs_add_devices_dir+0x65/0x100 [btrfs] btrfs_init_new_device+0x44c/0x12b0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0xc3c/0x25c0 [btrfs] ksys_ioctl+0x68/0xa0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x137/0x3e0 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0xb44/0xfb0 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x9b/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xc1/0x350 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x143/0x7a0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x15f/0x310 [btrfs] push_leaf_right+0x150/0x240 [btrfs] split_leaf+0x3cd/0x6d0 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xd14/0xf70 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x64/0xc0 [btrfs] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xb2/0x840 [btrfs] btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x10e/0x1d0 [btrfs] btrfs_work_helper+0x2f9/0x650 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x22c/0x600 worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 kthread+0x137/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0x98/0xa20 validate_chain+0xa8c/0x2a00 __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] btrfs_evict_inode+0x3bf/0x560 [btrfs] evict+0xd6/0x1c0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x54/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x121/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x175/0x420 shrink_slab+0xb1/0x2e0 shrink_node+0x192/0x600 balance_pgdat+0x31f/0x750 kswapd+0x206/0x510 kthread+0x137/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> &fs_info->chunk_mutex --> fs_reclaim Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/75: #0: ffffffff8b0c8040 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 #1: ffffffff8b0b50b8 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x54/0x2e0 #2: ffffa040e057c0e8 (&type->s_umount_key#26){++++}-{3:3}, at: trylock_super+0x16/0x50 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 75 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6-default+ #1191 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x16f/0x190 check_prev_add+0x98/0xa20 validate_chain+0xa8c/0x2a00 __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] ? __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 ? btrfs_evict_inode+0x138/0x560 [btrfs] ? btrfs_evict_inode+0x2fe/0x560 [btrfs] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] btrfs_evict_inode+0x3bf/0x560 [btrfs] evict+0xd6/0x1c0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x54/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x121/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x175/0x420 shrink_slab+0xb1/0x2e0 shrink_node+0x192/0x600 balance_pgdat+0x31f/0x750 kswapd+0x206/0x510 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x50 ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 ? balance_pgdat+0x750/0x750 kthread+0x137/0x150 ? kthread_stop+0x2a0/0x2a0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This is because we're holding the chunk_mutex while adding this device and adding its sysfs entries. We actually hold different locks in different places when calling this function, the dev_replace semaphore for instance in dev replace, so instead of moving this call around simply wrap it's operations in NOFS. CC: [email protected] # 4.14+ Reported-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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Aug 3, 2020
There's long existed a lockdep splat because we open our bdev's under the ->device_list_mutex at mount time, which acquires the bd_mutex. Usually this goes unnoticed, but if you do loopback devices at all suddenly the bd_mutex comes with a whole host of other dependencies, which results in the splat when you mount a btrfs file system. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-journal/509 is trying to acquire lock: ffff970831f84db0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}: __sb_start_write+0x13e/0x220 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #5 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __might_fault+0x60/0x80 _copy_from_user+0x20/0xb0 get_sg_io_hdr+0x9a/0xb0 scsi_cmd_ioctl+0x1ea/0x2f0 cdrom_ioctl+0x3c/0x12b4 sr_block_ioctl+0xa4/0xd0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 ksys_ioctl+0x82/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #4 (&cd->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 sr_block_open+0xa2/0x180 __blkdev_get+0xdd/0x550 blkdev_get+0x38/0x150 do_dentry_open+0x16b/0x3e0 path_openat+0x3c9/0xa00 do_filp_open+0x75/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x8a/0x140 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 __blkdev_get+0x6a/0x550 blkdev_get+0x85/0x150 blkdev_get_by_path+0x2c/0x70 btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] open_fs_devices+0x88/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_open_devices+0x92/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root+0x250/0x490 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x119/0x380 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x8c6/0xca0 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x36/0x420 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x91/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4e6/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x48e/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> sb_pagefaults Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2); lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by systemd-journal/509: #0: ffff97083bdec8b8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_user_addr_fault+0x12e/0x4b0 #1: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] #2: ffff97083144d6a8 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x3f8/0x500 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 509 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc8 check_noncircular+0x134/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x7fa3972fdbfe Code: Bad RIP value. Fix this by not holding the ->device_list_mutex at this point. The device_list_mutex exists to protect us from modifying the device list while the file system is running. However it can also be modified by doing a scan on a device. But this action is specifically protected by the uuid_mutex, which we are holding here. We cannot race with opening at this point because we have the ->s_mount lock held during the mount. Not having the ->device_list_mutex here is perfectly safe as we're not going to change the devices at this point. CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> [ add some comments ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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We are currently getting this lockdep splat in btrfs/161: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ mount/678048 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9b769f15b6e0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9b76abdb08d0 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x6a/0x800 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x8b/0x8f0 btrfs_init_new_device+0x2d2/0x1240 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x2d20 [btrfs] ksys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 __mutex_lock+0x8b/0x8f0 clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x330/0x800 [btrfs] open_ctree+0xb7c/0x18ce [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xfa [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x7de/0xb30 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by mount/678048: #0: ffff9b75ff5fb0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#63/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380 #1: ffffffffc0c2fbc8 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x54/0x800 [btrfs] #2: ffff9b76abdb08d0 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x6a/0x800 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 678048 Comm: mount Tainted: G E 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./890FX Deluxe5, BIOS P1.40 05/03/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xd0 check_noncircular+0x162/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0x8b/0x8f0 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20 ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x14/0x40 ? __module_address+0x28/0xf0 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] ? static_obj+0x4f/0x60 ? lockdep_init_map_waits+0x43/0x200 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x330/0x800 [btrfs] open_ctree+0xb7c/0x18ce [btrfs] ? super_setup_bdi_name+0x79/0xd0 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xfa [btrfs] ? vfs_parse_fs_string+0x84/0xb0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 ? kfree+0x2b5/0x310 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] ? cred_has_capability+0x7c/0x120 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 ? legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x7de/0xb30 ? memdup_user+0x4e/0x90 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is because btrfs_read_chunk_tree() can come upon DEV_EXTENT's and then read the device, which takes the device_list_mutex. The device_list_mutex needs to be taken before the chunk_mutex, so this is a problem. We only really need the chunk mutex around adding the chunk, so move the mutex around read_one_chunk. An argument could be made that we don't even need the chunk_mutex here as it's during mount, and we are protected by various other locks. However we already have special rules for ->device_list_mutex, and I'd rather not have another special case for ->chunk_mutex. CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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When running with -o enospc_debug you can get the following splat if one of the dump_space_info's trip ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Tainted: G OE ------------------------------------------------------ dd/563090 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9e7dbf4f1e18 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3c/0x3c0 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0x7ef/0x13b0 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x9b/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xc1/0x340 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x122/0x530 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x106/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x55/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&space_info->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_block_rsv_release+0x1a6/0x3f0 [btrfs] btrfs_inode_rsv_release+0x4f/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent+0x155/0x480 [btrfs] clear_state_bit+0x81/0x1a0 [btrfs] __clear_extent_bit+0x25c/0x5d0 [btrfs] clear_extent_bit+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x2b7/0x3c0 [btrfs] truncate_cleanup_page+0x47/0xe0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x238/0x840 truncate_pagecache+0x44/0x60 btrfs_setattr+0x202/0x5e0 [btrfs] notify_change+0x33b/0x490 do_truncate+0x76/0xd0 path_openat+0x687/0xa10 do_filp_open+0x91/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x215/0x2d0 do_sys_open+0x44/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&tree->lock#2){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 find_first_extent_bit+0x32/0x150 [btrfs] write_pinned_extent_entries.isra.0+0xc5/0x100 [btrfs] __btrfs_write_out_cache+0x172/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_write_out_cache+0x7a/0xf0 [btrfs] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x286/0x3b0 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x245/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0xf9/0x2f5 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctl->tree_lock --> &space_info->lock --> &cache->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cache->lock); lock(&space_info->lock); lock(&cache->lock); lock(&ctl->tree_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by dd/563090: #0: ffff9e7e21d18448 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x195/0x200 #1: ffff9e7dd0410ed8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#19){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_file_write_iter+0x86/0x610 [btrfs] #2: ffff9e7e21d18638 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40b/0x5b0 [btrfs] #3: ffff9e7e1f05d688 (&cur_trans->cache_write_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x158/0x4f0 [btrfs] #4: ffff9e7e2284ddb8 (&space_info->groups_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0x69/0x120 [btrfs] #5: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 563090 Comm: dd Tainted: G OE 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./890FX Deluxe5, BIOS P1.40 05/03/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xd0 check_noncircular+0x162/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 ? wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x30/0x40 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] ? btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data+0x1d/0x60 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] ? start_transaction+0xe0/0x5b0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xa8/0xd0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is because we're holding the block_group->lock while trying to dump the free space cache. However we don't need this lock, we just need it to read the values for the printk, so move the free space cache dumping outside of the block group lock. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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Like syscall entry all architectures have similar and pointlessly different code to handle pending work before returning from a syscall to user space. 1) One-time syscall exit work: - rseq syscall exit - audit - syscall tracing - tracehook (single stepping) 2) Preparatory work - Exit to user mode loop (common TIF handling). - Architecture specific one time work arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() - Address limit and lockdep checks 3) Final transition (lockdep, tracing, context tracking, RCU). Invokes arch_exit_to_user_mode() to handle e.g. speculation mitigations Provide a generic version based on the x86 code which has all the RCU and instrumentation protections right. Provide a variant for interrupt return to user mode as well which shares the above #2 and #3 work items. After syscall_exit_to_user_mode() and irqentry_exit_to_user_mode() the architecture code just has to return to user space. The code after returning from these functions must not be instrumented. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Aug 5, 2020
The following deadlock was captured. The first process is holding 'kernfs_mutex' and hung by io. The io was staging in 'r1conf.pending_bio_list' of raid1 device, this pending bio list would be flushed by second process 'md127_raid1', but it was hung by 'kernfs_mutex'. Using sysfs_notify_dirent_safe() to replace sysfs_notify() can fix it. There were other sysfs_notify() invoked from io path, removed all of them. PID: 40430 TASK: ffff8ee9c8c65c40 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "probe_file" #0 [ffffb87c4df37260] __schedule at ffffffff9a8678ec #1 [ffffb87c4df372f8] schedule at ffffffff9a867f06 #2 [ffffb87c4df37310] io_schedule at ffffffff9a0c73e6 #3 [ffffb87c4df37328] __dta___xfs_iunpin_wait_3443 at ffffffffc03a4057 [xfs] #4 [ffffb87c4df373a0] xfs_iunpin_wait at ffffffffc03a6c79 [xfs] #5 [ffffb87c4df373b0] __dta_xfs_reclaim_inode_3357 at ffffffffc039a46c [xfs] #6 [ffffb87c4df37400] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag at ffffffffc039a8b6 [xfs] #7 [ffffb87c4df37590] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr at ffffffffc039bb33 [xfs] #8 [ffffb87c4df375b0] xfs_fs_free_cached_objects at ffffffffc03af0e9 [xfs] #9 [ffffb87c4df375c0] super_cache_scan at ffffffff9a287ec7 #10 [ffffb87c4df37618] shrink_slab at ffffffff9a1efd93 #11 [ffffb87c4df37700] shrink_node at ffffffff9a1f5968 #12 [ffffb87c4df37788] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff9a1f5ea2 #13 [ffffb87c4df377f0] try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff9a1f6445 #14 [ffffb87c4df37880] try_charge at ffffffff9a26cc5f #15 [ffffb87c4df37920] memcg_kmem_charge_memcg at ffffffff9a270f6a #16 [ffffb87c4df37958] new_slab at ffffffff9a251430 #17 [ffffb87c4df379c0] ___slab_alloc at ffffffff9a251c85 #18 [ffffb87c4df37a80] __slab_alloc at ffffffff9a25635d #19 [ffffb87c4df37ac0] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff9a251f89 #20 [ffffb87c4df37b00] alloc_inode at ffffffff9a2a2b10 #21 [ffffb87c4df37b20] iget_locked at ffffffff9a2a4854 #22 [ffffb87c4df37b60] kernfs_get_inode at ffffffff9a311377 #23 [ffffb87c4df37b80] kernfs_iop_lookup at ffffffff9a311e2b #24 [ffffb87c4df37ba8] lookup_slow at ffffffff9a290118 #25 [ffffb87c4df37c10] walk_component at ffffffff9a291e83 #26 [ffffb87c4df37c78] path_lookupat at ffffffff9a293619 #27 [ffffb87c4df37cd8] filename_lookup at ffffffff9a2953af #28 [ffffb87c4df37de8] user_path_at_empty at ffffffff9a295566 #29 [ffffb87c4df37e10] vfs_statx at ffffffff9a289787 #30 [ffffb87c4df37e70] SYSC_newlstat at ffffffff9a289d5d #31 [ffffb87c4df37f18] sys_newlstat at ffffffff9a28a60e #32 [ffffb87c4df37f28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9a003949 #33 [ffffb87c4df37f50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff9aa001ad RIP: 00007f617a5f2905 RSP: 00007f607334f838 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6064044b20 RCX: 00007f617a5f2905 RDX: 00007f6064044b20 RSI: 00007f6064044b20 RDI: 00007f6064005890 RBP: 00007f6064044aa0 R8: 0000000000000030 R9: 000000000000011c R10: 0000000000000013 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f606417e6d0 R13: 00007f6064044aa0 R14: 00007f6064044b10 R15: 00000000ffffffff ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000006 CS: 0033 SS: 002b PID: 927 TASK: ffff8f15ac5dbd80 CPU: 42 COMMAND: "md127_raid1" #0 [ffffb87c4df07b28] __schedule at ffffffff9a8678ec #1 [ffffb87c4df07bc0] schedule at ffffffff9a867f06 #2 [ffffb87c4df07bd8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff9a86825e #3 [ffffb87c4df07be8] __mutex_lock at ffffffff9a869bcc #4 [ffffb87c4df07ca0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9a86a013 #5 [ffffb87c4df07cb0] mutex_lock at ffffffff9a86a04f #6 [ffffb87c4df07cc8] kernfs_find_and_get_ns at ffffffff9a311d83 #7 [ffffb87c4df07cf0] sysfs_notify at ffffffff9a314b3a #8 [ffffb87c4df07d18] md_update_sb at ffffffff9a688696 #9 [ffffb87c4df07d98] md_update_sb at ffffffff9a6886d5 #10 [ffffb87c4df07da8] md_check_recovery at ffffffff9a68ad9c #11 [ffffb87c4df07dd0] raid1d at ffffffffc01f0375 [raid1] #12 [ffffb87c4df07ea0] md_thread at ffffffff9a680348 #13 [ffffb87c4df07f08] kthread at ffffffff9a0b8005 #14 [ffffb87c4df07f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff9aa00344 Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
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Aug 7, 2020
The SADC component in JZ47xx SoCs provides support for touchscreen operations (pen position and pen down pressure) in single-ended and differential modes. The touchscreen component of SADC takes a significant time to stabilize after first receiving the clock and a delay of 50ms has been empirically proven to be a safe value before data sampling can begin. Of the known hardware to use this controller, GCW Zero and Anbernic RG-350 utilize the touchscreen mode by having their joystick(s) attached to the X/Y positive/negative input pins. JZ4770 and later SoCs introduce a low-level command feature. With it, up to 32 commands can be programmed, each one corresponding to a sampling job. It allows to change the low-voltage reference, the high-voltage reference, have them connected to VCC, GND, or one of the X-/X+ or Y-/Y+ pins. This patch introduces support for 6 stream-capable channels: - channel #0 samples X+/GND - channel #1 samples Y+/GND - channel #2 samples X-/GND - channel #3 samples Y-/GND - channel #4 samples X+/X- - channel #5 samples Y+/Y- Being able to sample X-/GND and Y-/GND is useful on some devices, where one joystick is connected to the X+/Y+ pins, and a second joystick is connected to the X-/Y- pins. All the boards which probe this driver have the interrupt provided from Device Tree, with no need to handle a case where the IRQ was not provided. Co-developed-by: Paul Cercueil <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Artur Rojek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
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Aug 11, 2020
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208565 PID: 257 TASK: ecdd0000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "init" #0 [<c0b420ec>] (__schedule) from [<c0b423c8>] #1 [<c0b423c8>] (schedule) from [<c0b459d4>] #2 [<c0b459d4>] (rwsem_down_read_failed) from [<c0b44fa0>] #3 [<c0b44fa0>] (down_read) from [<c044233c>] #4 [<c044233c>] (f2fs_truncate_blocks) from [<c0442890>] #5 [<c0442890>] (f2fs_truncate) from [<c044d408>] #6 [<c044d408>] (f2fs_evict_inode) from [<c030be18>] #7 [<c030be18>] (evict) from [<c030a558>] #8 [<c030a558>] (iput) from [<c047c600>] #9 [<c047c600>] (f2fs_sync_node_pages) from [<c0465414>] #10 [<c0465414>] (f2fs_write_checkpoint) from [<c04575f4>] #11 [<c04575f4>] (f2fs_sync_fs) from [<c0441918>] #12 [<c0441918>] (f2fs_do_sync_file) from [<c0441098>] #13 [<c0441098>] (f2fs_sync_file) from [<c0323fa0>] #14 [<c0323fa0>] (vfs_fsync_range) from [<c0324294>] #15 [<c0324294>] (do_fsync) from [<c0324014>] #16 [<c0324014>] (sys_fsync) from [<c0108bc0>] This can be caused by flush_dirty_inode() in f2fs_sync_node_pages() where iput() requires f2fs_lock_op() again resulting in livelock. Reported-by: Zhiguo Niu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
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Aug 11, 2020
… set We received an error report that perf-record caused 'Segmentation fault' on a newly system (e.g. on the new installed ubuntu). (gdb) backtrace #0 __read_once_size (size=4, res=<synthetic pointer>, p=0x14) at /root/0-jinyao/acme/tools/include/linux/compiler.h:139 #1 atomic_read (v=0x14) at /root/0-jinyao/acme/tools/include/asm/../../arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:28 #2 refcount_read (r=0x14) at /root/0-jinyao/acme/tools/include/linux/refcount.h:65 #3 perf_mmap__read_init (map=map@entry=0x0) at mmap.c:177 #4 0x0000561ce5c0de39 in perf_evlist__poll_thread (arg=0x561ce68584d0) at util/sideband_evlist.c:62 #5 0x00007fad78491609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #6 0x00007fad7823c103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 The root cause is, evlist__add_bpf_sb_event() just returns 0 if HAVE_LIBBPF_SUPPORT is not defined (inline function path). So it will not create a valid evsel for side-band event. But perf-record still creates BPF side band thread to process the side-band event, then the error happpens. We can reproduce this issue by removing the libelf-dev. e.g. 1. apt-get remove libelf-dev 2. perf record -a -- sleep 1 root@test:~# ./perf record -a -- sleep 1 perf: Segmentation fault Obtained 6 stack frames. ./perf(+0x28eee8) [0x5562d6ef6ee8] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x46210) [0x7fbfdc65f210] ./perf(+0x342e74) [0x5562d6faae74] ./perf(+0x257e39) [0x5562d6ebfe39] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(+0x9609) [0x7fbfdc990609] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(clone+0x43) [0x7fbfdc73b103] Segmentation fault (core dumped) To fix this issue, 1. We either install the missing libraries to let HAVE_LIBBPF_SUPPORT be defined. e.g. apt-get install libelf-dev and install other related libraries. 2. Use this patch to skip the side-band event setup if HAVE_LIBBPF_SUPPORT is not set. Committer notes: The side band thread is not used just with BPF, it is also used with --switch-output-event, so narrow the ifdef to the BPF specific part. Fixes: 23cbb41 ("perf record: Move side band evlist setup to separate routine") Signed-off-by: Jin Yao <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Jin Yao <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Aug 14, 2020
Yonghong Song says: ==================== Andrii raised a concern that current uapi for bpf iterator map element is a little restrictive and not suitable for future potential complex customization. This is a valid suggestion, considering people may indeed add more complex custimization to the iterator, e.g., cgroup_id + user_id, etc. for task or task_file. Another example might be map_id plus additional control so that the bpf iterator may bail out a bucket earlier if a bucket has too many elements which may hold lock too long and impact other parts of systems. Patch #1 modified uapi with kernel changes. Patch #2 adjusted libbpf api accordingly. Changelogs: v3 -> v4: . add a forward declaration of bpf_iter_link_info in tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h in case that libbpf is built against not-latest uapi bpf.h. . target the patch set to "bpf" instead of "bpf-next" v2 -> v3: . undo "not reject iter_info.map.map_fd == 0" from v1. In the future map_fd may become optional, so let us use map_fd == 0 indicating the map_fd is not set by user space. . add link_info_len to bpf_iter_attach_opts to ensure always correct link_info_len from user. Otherwise, libbpf may deduce incorrect link_info_len if it uses different uapi header than the user app. v1 -> v2: . ensure link_create target_fd/flags == 0 since they are not used. (Andrii) . if either of iter_info ptr == 0 or iter_info_len == 0, but not both, return error to user space. (Andrii) . do not reject iter_info.map.map_fd == 0, go ahead to use it trying to get a map reference since the map_fd is required for map_elem iterator. . use bpf_iter_link_info in bpf_iter_attach_opts instead of map_fd. this way, user space is responsible to set up bpf_iter_link_info and libbpf just passes the data to the kernel, simplifying libbpf design. (Andrii) ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Aug 15, 2020
Freeing chip on error may lead to an Oops at the next time the system goes to resume. Fix this by removing all snd_echo_free() calls on error. Fixes: 47b5d02 ("ALSA: Echoaudio - Add suspend support #2") Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
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Aug 10, 2024
linkwatch_event() grabs possibly very contended RTNL mutex. system_wq is not suitable for such work. Inspired by many noisy syzbot reports. 3 locks held by kworker/0:7/5266: #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3206 [inline] #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x90a/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312 #1: ffffc90003f6fd00 ((linkwatch_work).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3207 [inline] , at: process_scheduled_works+0x945/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312 #2: ffffffff8fa6f208 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: linkwatch_event+0xe/0x60 net/core/link_watch.c:276 Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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When l2tp tunnels use a socket provided by userspace, we can hit lockdep splats like the below when data is transmitted through another (unrelated) userspace socket which then gets routed over l2tp. This issue was previously discussed here: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ The solution is to have lockdep treat socket locks of l2tp tunnel sockets separately than those of standard INET sockets. To do so, use a different lockdep subclass where lock nesting is possible. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.10.0+ #34 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- iperf3/771 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8881027601d8 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(slock-AF_INET/1); lock(slock-AF_INET/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 10 locks held by iperf3/771: #0: ffff888102650258 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendmsg+0x1a/0x40 #1: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0 #2: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130 #3: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0 #4: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf9/0x260 #5: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10 #6: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0 #7: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130 #8: ffffffff822ac1e0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0xcc/0x1450 #9: ffff888101f33258 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock#2){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x513/0x1450 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 771 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 6.10.0+ #34 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0 dump_stack+0xc/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x135d/0x2600 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2a0 ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 ? __skb_checksum+0xa3/0x540 _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x35/0x50 ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x3c/0xc0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11e/0x420 sch_direct_xmit+0xc3/0x640 __dev_queue_xmit+0x61c/0x1450 ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130 ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ip_output+0x99/0x120 __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0 ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890 __tcp_send_ack+0x1b8/0x340 tcp_send_ack+0x23/0x30 __tcp_ack_snd_check+0xa8/0x530 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 tcp_rcv_established+0x412/0xd70 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x299/0x420 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1991/0x1e10 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x50/0x220 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x158/0x260 ip_local_deliver+0xc8/0xe0 ip_rcv+0xe5/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xce/0xe0 ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0 __netif_receive_skb+0x34/0xd0 ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0 process_backlog+0x2cb/0x9f0 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x61/0x280 net_rx_action+0x332/0x670 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 handle_softirqs+0xda/0x480 ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450 do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xc8/0xe0 ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450 __dev_queue_xmit+0xa48/0x1450 ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130 ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ip_output+0x99/0x120 __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0 ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890 tcp_write_xmit+0x766/0x2fb0 ? __entry_text_end+0x102ba9/0x102bad ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __might_fault+0x74/0xc0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x190 tcp_push+0x117/0x310 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x14c1/0x1740 tcp_sendmsg+0x28/0x40 inet_sendmsg+0x5d/0x90 sock_write_iter+0x242/0x2b0 vfs_write+0x68d/0x800 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ksys_write+0xc8/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x3d/0x50 x64_sys_call+0xfaf/0x1f50 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f4d143af992 Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> e9 01 cc ff ff 41 54 b8 02 00 00 0 RSP: 002b:00007ffd65032058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f4d143af992 RDX: 0000000000000025 RSI: 00007f4d143f3bcc RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f4d143f2b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4d143f3bcc R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd650323f0 </TASK> Fixes: 0b2c597 ("l2tp: close all race conditions in l2tp_tunnel_register()") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4 CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Chapman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Currently the dma debugging code can end up indirectly calling printk under the radix_lock. This happens when a radix tree node allocation fails. This is a problem because the printk code, when used together with netconsole, can end up inside the dma debugging code while trying to transmit a message over netcons. This creates the possibility of either a circular deadlock on the same CPU, with that CPU trying to grab the radix_lock twice, or an ABBA deadlock between different CPUs, where one CPU grabs the console lock first and then waits for the radix_lock, while the other CPU is holding the radix_lock and is waiting for the console lock. The trace captured by lockdep is of the ABBA variant. -> #2 (&dma_entry_hash[i].lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5a/0x90 debug_dma_map_page+0x79/0x180 dma_map_page_attrs+0x1d2/0x2f0 bnxt_start_xmit+0x8c6/0x1540 netpoll_start_xmit+0x13f/0x180 netpoll_send_skb+0x20d/0x320 netpoll_send_udp+0x453/0x4a0 write_ext_msg+0x1b9/0x460 console_flush_all+0x2ff/0x5a0 console_unlock+0x55/0x180 vprintk_emit+0x2e3/0x3c0 devkmsg_emit+0x5a/0x80 devkmsg_write+0xfd/0x180 do_iter_readv_writev+0x164/0x1b0 vfs_writev+0xf9/0x2b0 do_writev+0x6d/0x110 do_syscall_64+0x80/0x150 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #0 (console_owner){-.-.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x15d1/0x31a0 lock_acquire+0xe8/0x290 console_flush_all+0x2ea/0x5a0 console_unlock+0x55/0x180 vprintk_emit+0x2e3/0x3c0 _printk+0x59/0x80 warn_alloc+0x122/0x1b0 __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1101/0x1120 __alloc_pages+0x1eb/0x2c0 alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x150 new_slab+0x2dc/0x4e0 ___slab_alloc+0xdcb/0x1390 kmem_cache_alloc+0x23d/0x360 radix_tree_node_alloc+0x3c/0xf0 radix_tree_insert+0xf5/0x230 add_dma_entry+0xe9/0x360 dma_map_page_attrs+0x1d2/0x2f0 __bnxt_alloc_rx_frag+0x147/0x180 bnxt_alloc_rx_data+0x79/0x160 bnxt_rx_skb+0x29/0xc0 bnxt_rx_pkt+0xe22/0x1570 __bnxt_poll_work+0x101/0x390 bnxt_poll+0x7e/0x320 __napi_poll+0x29/0x160 net_rx_action+0x1e0/0x3e0 handle_softirqs+0x190/0x510 run_ksoftirqd+0x4e/0x90 smpboot_thread_fn+0x1a8/0x270 kthread+0x102/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 This bug is more likely than it seems, because when one CPU has run out of memory, chances are the other has too. The good news is, this bug is hidden behind the CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG, so not many users are likely to trigger it. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Reported-by: Konstantin Ovsepian <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
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…on array The out-of-bounds access is reported by UBSAN: [ 0.000000] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../arch/riscv/kernel/vendor_extensions.c:41:66 [ 0.000000] index -1 is out of range for type 'riscv_isavendorinfo [32]' [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2ubuntu-defconfig #2 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 0.000000] Call Trace: [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff94e078ba>] dump_backtrace+0x32/0x40 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff95c83c1a>] show_stack+0x38/0x44 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff95c94614>] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x9c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff95c94658>] dump_stack+0x18/0x20 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff95c8bbb2>] ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x46 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff95485a82>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x94/0x9c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff94e09442>] __riscv_isa_vendor_extension_available+0x90/0x92 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff94e043b6>] riscv_cpufeature_patch_func+0xc4/0x148 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff94e035f8>] _apply_alternatives+0x42/0x50 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff95e04196>] apply_boot_alternatives+0x3c/0x100 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff95e05b52>] setup_arch+0x85a/0x8bc [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff95e00ca0>] start_kernel+0xa4/0xfb6 The dereferencing using cpu should actually not happen, so remove it. Fixes: 23c996f ("riscv: Extend cpufeature.c to detect vendor extensions") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
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Lockdep reported a warning in Linux version 6.6: [ 414.344659] ================================ [ 414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ 414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted [ 414.346221] -------------------------------- [ 414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ 414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: [ 414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ 414.351751] lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.352218] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60 [ 414.352769] __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60 [ 414.353289] sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0 [ 414.353829] sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270 [ 414.354338] blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170 [ 414.354807] __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0 [ 414.355335] blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0 [ 414.355847] __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30 [ 414.356367] scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830 [ 414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ 414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted [ 414.346221] -------------------------------- [ 414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ 414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: [ 414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ 414.351751] lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.352218] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60 [ 414.352769] __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60 [ 414.353289] sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0 [ 414.353829] sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270 [ 414.354338] blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170 [ 414.354807] __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0 [ 414.355335] blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0 [ 414.355847] __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30 [ 414.356367] scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830 [ 414.356863] scsi_io_completion+0x177/0x1610 [ 414.357379] scsi_complete+0x12f/0x260 [ 414.357856] blk_complete_reqs+0xba/0xf0 [ 414.358338] __do_softirq+0x1b0/0x7a2 [ 414.358796] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0 [ 414.359262] sysvec_call_function_single+0xaf/0xc0 [ 414.359828] asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x1a/0x20 [ 414.360426] default_idle+0x1e/0x30 [ 414.360873] default_idle_call+0x9b/0x1f0 [ 414.361390] do_idle+0x2d2/0x3e0 [ 414.361819] cpu_startup_entry+0x55/0x60 [ 414.362314] start_secondary+0x235/0x2b0 [ 414.362809] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b [ 414.363413] irq event stamp: 428794 [ 414.363825] hardirqs last enabled at (428793): [<ffffffff816bfd1c>] ktime_get+0x1dc/0x200 [ 414.364694] hardirqs last disabled at (428794): [<ffffffff85470177>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x47/0x50 [ 414.365629] softirqs last enabled at (428444): [<ffffffff85474780>] __do_softirq+0x540/0x7a2 [ 414.366522] softirqs last disabled at (428419): [<ffffffff813f65ab>] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0 [ 414.367425] other info that might help us debug this: [ 414.368194] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 414.368900] CPU0 [ 414.369225] ---- [ 414.369548] lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait); [ 414.370000] <Interrupt> [ 414.370342] lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait); [ 414.370802] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 414.371569] 5 locks held by kworker/u10:3/1152: [ 414.372088] #0: ffff88810130e938 ((wq_completion)writeback){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x357/0x13f0 [ 414.373180] #1: ffff88810201fdb8 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x3a3/0x13f0 [ 414.374384] #2: ffffffff86ffbdc0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00 [ 414.375342] #3: ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.376377] #4: ffff888106205a08 (&hctx->dispatch_wait_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1337/0x1ee0 [ 414.378607] stack backtrace: [ 414.379177] CPU: 0 PID: 1152 Comm: kworker/u10:3 Not tainted 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 [ 414.380032] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 414.381177] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0) [ 414.381805] Call Trace: [ 414.382136] <TASK> [ 414.382429] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [ 414.382884] mark_lock_irq+0xb3b/0x1260 [ 414.383367] ? __pfx_mark_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 414.383889] ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0 [ 414.384373] ? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10 [ 414.384903] ? graph_lock+0xcf/0x410 [ 414.385350] ? save_trace+0x3d/0xc70 [ 414.385808] mark_lock.part.20+0x56d/0xa90 [ 414.386317] mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110 [ 414.386791] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 414.387320] lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.387901] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 [ 414.388422] trace_hardirqs_on+0x58/0x100 [ 414.388917] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 [ 414.389422] __blk_mq_tag_busy+0x1d6/0x2a0 [ 414.389920] __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x761/0x9f0 [ 414.390899] blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1780/0x1ee0 [ 414.391473] ? __pfx_blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x10/0x10 [ 414.392070] ? sbitmap_get+0x2b8/0x450 [ 414.392533] ? __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x210/0x9f0 [ 414.393095] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xd99/0x1690 [ 414.393730] ? elv_attempt_insert_merge+0x1b1/0x420 [ 414.394302] ? __pfx___blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x10/0x10 [ 414.394970] ? lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.395456] ? blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00 [ 414.395986] ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 414.396499] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x109/0x190 [ 414.397100] blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x66e/0xa00 [ 414.397616] blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x614/0x2030 [ 414.398244] ? __pfx_blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x10/0x10 [ 414.398897] ? writeback_sb_inodes+0x241/0xcc0 [ 414.399429] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x65/0x80 [ 414.399957] __blk_flush_plug+0x2f1/0x530 [ 414.400458] ? __pfx___blk_flush_plug+0x10/0x10 [ 414.400999] blk_finish_plug+0x59/0xa0 [ 414.401467] wb_writeback+0x7cc/0x920 [ 414.401935] ? __pfx_wb_writeback+0x10/0x10 [ 414.402442] ? mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110 [ 414.402931] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 414.403462] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.404062] wb_workfn+0x2b3/0xcf0 [ 414.404500] ? __pfx_wb_workfn+0x10/0x10 [ 414.404989] process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 [ 414.405546] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 414.406139] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x101/0x2a0 [ 414.406641] ? assign_work+0x19b/0x240 [ 414.407106] ? lock_is_held_type+0x9d/0x110 [ 414.407604] worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 [ 414.408075] ? __kthread_parkme+0x62/0x210 [ 414.408572] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.409168] ? __kthread_parkme+0x13c/0x210 [ 414.409678] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.410191] kthread+0x33c/0x440 [ 414.410602] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.411068] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 414.411526] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.411993] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 414.412489] </TASK> When interrupt is turned on while a lock holding by spin_lock_irq it throws a warning because of potential deadlock. blk_mq_prep_dispatch_rq blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_alloc_driver_tag blk_mq_tag_busy -> tag is already busy // failed to get driver tag blk_mq_mark_tag_wait spin_lock_irq(&wq->lock) -> lock A (&sbq->ws[i].wait) __add_wait_queue(wq, wait) -> wait queue active blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_tag_busy -> 1) tag must be idle, which means there can't be inflight IO spin_lock_irq(&tags->lock) -> lock B (hctx->tags) spin_unlock_irq(&tags->lock) -> unlock B, turn on interrupt accidentally -> 2) context must be preempt by IO interrupt to trigger deadlock. As shown above, the deadlock is not possible in theory, but the warning still need to be fixed. Fix it by using spin_lock_irqsave to get lockB instead of spin_lock_irq. Fixes: 4f1731d ("blk-mq: fix potential io hang by wrong 'wake_batch'") Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
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Prevent the call trace below from happening, by not allowing IPsec creation over a slave, if master device doesn't support IPsec. WARNING: CPU: 44 PID: 16136 at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:240 down_read+0x75/0x94 Modules linked in: esp4_offload esp4 act_mirred act_vlan cls_flower sch_ingress mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mst_pciconf(OE) nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache netfs xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 rfkill cuse fuse rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_umad ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ipmi_ssif intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common amd64_edac edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mlx5_ib ghash_clmulni_intel sha1_ssse3 dell_smbios ib_uverbs aesni_intel crypto_simd dcdbas wmi_bmof dell_wmi_descriptor cryptd pcspkr ib_core acpi_ipmi sp5100_tco ccp i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ptdma k10temp ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_cpufreq ext4 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod t10_pi sg mgag200 drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mlx5_core sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cec ahci libahci mlxfw drm pci_hyperv_intf libata tg3 sha256_ssse3 tls megaraid_sas i2c_algo_bit psample wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: mst_pci] CPU: 44 PID: 16136 Comm: kworker/44:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: GOE 5.15.0-20240509.el8uek.uek7_u3_update_v6.6_ipsec_bf.x86_64 #2 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7525/074H08, BIOS 2.0.3 01/15/2021 Workqueue: events xfrm_state_gc_task RIP: 0010:down_read+0x75/0x94 Code: 00 48 8b 45 08 65 48 8b 14 25 80 fc 01 00 83 e0 02 48 09 d0 48 83 c8 01 48 89 45 08 5d 31 c0 89 c2 89 c6 89 c7 e9 cb 88 3b 00 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 08 a8 01 74 b2 a8 02 75 ae 48 89 c2 48 83 ca 02 f0 RSP: 0018:ffffb26387773da8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa08b658af900 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff886bc5e1366f2f RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffa08b658af940 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0a9bfb31540 R13: ffffa0a9bfb37900 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa0a9bfb37905 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0a9bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055a45ed814e8 CR3: 000000109038a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2f9 ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2f9 ? mlx5_devcom_for_each_peer_begin+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core] ? down_read+0x75/0x94 ? __warn+0x80/0x113 ? down_read+0x75/0x94 ? report_bug+0xa4/0x11d ? handle_bug+0x35/0x8b ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x75 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x1b ? down_read+0x75/0x94 ? down_read+0xe/0x94 mlx5_devcom_for_each_peer_begin+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core] mlx5_ipsec_fs_roce_tx_destroy+0xb1/0x130 [mlx5_core] tx_destroy+0x1b/0xc0 [mlx5_core] tx_ft_put+0x53/0xc0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_xfrm_free_state+0x45/0x90 [mlx5_core] ___xfrm_state_destroy+0x10f/0x1a2 xfrm_state_gc_task+0x81/0xa9 process_one_work+0x1f1/0x3c6 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e4 ? process_one_work.cold+0x46/0x3c kthread+0x127/0x144 ? set_kthread_struct+0x60/0x52 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x2d </TASK> ---[ end trace 5ef7896144d398e1 ]--- Fixes: dfbd229 ("net/mlx5: Configure IPsec steering for egress RoCEv2 MPV traffic") Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 disable BH when collecting stats via hardware offload to ensure concurrent updates from packet path do not result in losing stats. From Sebastian Andrzej Siewior. Patch #2 uses write seqcount to reset counters serialize against reader. Also from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior. Patch #3 ensures vlan header is in place before accessing its fields, according to KMSAN splat triggered by syzbot. * tag 'nf-24-08-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: flowtable: validate vlan header netfilter: nft_counter: Synchronize nft_counter_reset() against reader. netfilter: nft_counter: Disable BH in nft_counter_offload_stats(). ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into for-next/fixes KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.11, round #2 - Don't drop references on LPIs that weren't visited by the vgic-debug iterator - Cure lock ordering issue when unregistering vgic redistributors - Fix for misaligned stage-2 mappings when VMs are backed by hugetlb pages - Treat SGI registers as UNDEFINED if a VM hasn't been configured for GICv3 * tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.11-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm: KVM: arm64: Make ICC_*SGI*_EL1 undef in the absence of a vGICv3 KVM: arm64: Ensure canonical IPA is hugepage-aligned when handling fault KVM: arm64: vgic: Don't hold config_lock while unregistering redistributors KVM: arm64: vgic-debug: Don't put unmarked LPIs KVM: arm64: vgic: Hold config_lock while tearing down a CPU interface KVM: selftests: arm64: Correct feature test for S1PIE in get-reg-list KVM: arm64: Tidying up PAuth code in KVM KVM: arm64: vgic-debug: Exit the iterator properly w/o LPI KVM: arm64: Enforce dependency on an ARMv8.4-aware toolchain docs: KVM: Fix register ID of SPSR_FIQ KVM: arm64: vgic: fix unexpected unlock sparse warnings KVM: arm64: fix kdoc warnings in W=1 builds KVM: arm64: fix override-init warnings in W=1 builds KVM: arm64: free kvm->arch.nested_mmus with kvfree()
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 sets on NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO for UDP packets less than 4 bytes payload from netdev/egress by subtracting skb_network_offset() when validating IPv4 packet length, otherwise 'meta l4proto udp' never matches. Patch #2 subtracts skb_network_offset() when validating IPv6 packet length for netdev/egress. netfilter pull request 24-08-28 * tag 'nf-24-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables_ipv6: consider network offset in netdev/egress validation netfilter: nf_tables: restore IP sanity checks for netdev/egress ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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Currently, netif_queue_set_napi() is called from ice_vsi_rebuild() that is not rtnl-locked when called from the reset. This creates the need to take the rtnl_lock just for a single function and complicates the synchronization with .ndo_bpf. At the same time, there no actual need to fill napi-to-queue information at this exact point. Fill napi-to-queue information when opening the VSI and clear it when the VSI is being closed. Those routines are already rtnl-locked. Also, rewrite napi-to-queue assignment in a way that prevents inclusion of XDP queues, as this leads to out-of-bounds writes, such as one below. [ +0.000004] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in netif_queue_set_napi+0x1c2/0x1e0 [ +0.000012] Write of size 8 at addr ffff889881727c80 by task bash/7047 [ +0.000006] CPU: 24 PID: 7047 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #2 [ +0.000004] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021 [ +0.000003] Call Trace: [ +0.000003] <TASK> [ +0.000002] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 [ +0.000007] print_report+0xce/0x630 [ +0.000007] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000007] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1c9/0x2c0 [ +0.000005] ? netif_queue_set_napi+0x1c2/0x1e0 [ +0.000003] kasan_report+0xe9/0x120 [ +0.000004] ? netif_queue_set_napi+0x1c2/0x1e0 [ +0.000004] netif_queue_set_napi+0x1c2/0x1e0 [ +0.000005] ice_vsi_close+0x161/0x670 [ice] [ +0.000114] ice_dis_vsi+0x22f/0x270 [ice] [ +0.000095] ice_pf_dis_all_vsi.constprop.0+0xae/0x1c0 [ice] [ +0.000086] ice_prepare_for_reset+0x299/0x750 [ice] [ +0.000087] pci_dev_save_and_disable+0x82/0xd0 [ +0.000006] pci_reset_function+0x12d/0x230 [ +0.000004] reset_store+0xa0/0x100 [ +0.000006] ? __pfx_reset_store+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000002] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000004] ? __check_object_size+0x4c1/0x640 [ +0.000007] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x30b/0x4a0 [ +0.000006] vfs_write+0x5d6/0xdf0 [ +0.000005] ? fd_install+0x180/0x350 [ +0.000005] ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0xA10 [ +0.000004] ? do_fcntl+0x52c/0xcd0 [ +0.000004] ? kasan_save_track+0x13/0x60 [ +0.000003] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60 [ +0.000006] ksys_write+0xfa/0x1d0 [ +0.000003] ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000002] ? __x64_sys_fcntl+0x121/0x180 [ +0.000004] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x87/0xe0 [ +0.000005] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x170 [ +0.000007] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x87/0xe0 [ +0.000004] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000003] ? file_close_fd_locked+0x167/0x230 [ +0.000005] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7d/0x220 [ +0.000005] ? do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x170 [ +0.000004] ? do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x170 [ +0.000003] ? do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x170 [ +0.000003] ? fput+0x1a/0x2c0 [ +0.000004] ? filp_close+0x19/0x30 [ +0.000004] ? do_dup2+0x25a/0x4c0 [ +0.000004] ? __x64_sys_dup2+0x6e/0x2e0 [ +0.000002] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7d/0x220 [ +0.000004] ? do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x170 [ +0.000003] ? __count_memcg_events+0x113/0x380 [ +0.000005] ? handle_mm_fault+0x136/0x820 [ +0.000005] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x444/0xa80 [ +0.000004] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ +0.000004] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ +0.000002] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ +0.000005] RIP: 0033:0x7f2033593154 Fixes: 080b0c8 ("ice: Fix ASSERT_RTNL() warning during certain scenarios") Fixes: 91fdbce ("ice: Add support in the driver for associating queue with napi") Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Amritha Nambiar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: George Kuruvinakunnel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
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Chi Zhiling reported: We found a null pointer accessing in tracefs[1], the reason is that the variable 'ei_child' is set to LIST_POISON1, that means the list was removed in eventfs_remove_rec. so when access the ei_child->is_freed, the panic triggered. by the way, the following script can reproduce this panic loop1 (){ while true do echo "p:kp submit_bio" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events echo "" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events done } loop2 (){ while true do tree /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/ done } loop1 & loop2 [1]: [ 1147.959632][T17331] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000150 [ 1147.968239][T17331] Mem abort info: [ 1147.971739][T17331] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 1147.976172][T17331] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1147.982171][T17331] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1147.985906][T17331] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1147.989734][T17331] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 1147.995292][T17331] Data abort info: [ 1147.998858][T17331] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 1148.005023][T17331] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 1148.010759][T17331] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 1148.016752][T17331] [dead000000000150] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 1148.024571][T17331] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 1148.030825][T17331] Modules linked in: team_mode_loadbalance team nlmon act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress bonding tls macvlan dummy ib_core bridge stp llc veth amdgpu amdxcp mfd_core gpu_sched drm_exec drm_buddy radeon crct10dif_ce video drm_suballoc_helper ghash_ce drm_ttm_helper sha2_ce ttm sha256_arm64 i2c_algo_bit sha1_ce sbsa_gwdt cp210x drm_display_helper cec sr_mod cdrom drm_kms_helper binfmt_misc sg loop fuse drm dm_mod nfnetlink ip_tables autofs4 [last unloaded: tls] [ 1148.072808][T17331] CPU: 3 PID: 17331 Comm: ls Tainted: G W ------- ---- 6.6.43 #2 [ 1148.081751][T17331] Source Version: 21b3b386e948bedd29369af66f3e98ab01b1c650 [ 1148.088783][T17331] Hardware name: Greatwall GW-001M1A-FTF/GW-001M1A-FTF, BIOS KunLun BIOS V4.0 07/16/2020 [ 1148.098419][T17331] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 1148.106060][T17331] pc : eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398 [ 1148.111017][T17331] lr : eventfs_iterate+0x2fc/0x398 [ 1148.115969][T17331] sp : ffff80008d56bbd0 [ 1148.119964][T17331] x29: ffff80008d56bbf0 x28: ffff001ff5be2600 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.127781][T17331] x26: ffff001ff52ca4e0 x25: 0000000000009977 x24: dead000000000100 [ 1148.135598][T17331] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 000000000000000b x21: ffff800082645f10 [ 1148.143415][T17331] x20: ffff001fddf87c70 x19: ffff80008d56bc90 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.151231][T17331] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff001ff52ca4e0 [ 1148.159048][T17331] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.166864][T17331] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffff8000804391d0 [ 1148.174680][T17331] x8 : 0000000180000000 x7 : 0000000000000018 x6 : 0000aaab04b92862 [ 1148.182498][T17331] x5 : 0000aaab04b92862 x4 : 0000000080000000 x3 : 0000000000000068 [ 1148.190314][T17331] x2 : 000000000000000f x1 : 0000000000007ea8 x0 : 0000000000000001 [ 1148.198131][T17331] Call trace: [ 1148.201259][T17331] eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398 [ 1148.205864][T17331] iterate_dir+0x98/0x188 [ 1148.210036][T17331] __arm64_sys_getdents64+0x78/0x160 [ 1148.215161][T17331] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108 [ 1148.219593][T17331] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0 [ 1148.224977][T17331] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [ 1148.228974][T17331] el0_svc+0x40/0x168 [ 1148.232798][T17331] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 [ 1148.237836][T17331] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 [ 1148.242182][T17331] Code: 54ffff6c f9400676 910006d6 f900067 (b9405300) [ 1148.248955][T17331] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The issue is that list_del() is used on an SRCU protected list variable before the synchronization occurs. This can poison the list pointers while there is a reader iterating the list. This is simply fixed by using list_del_rcu() that is specifically made for this purpose. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: 43aa6f9 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts") Reported-by: Chi Zhiling <[email protected]> Tested-by: Chi Zhiling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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If smb2_compound_op() is called with a valid @CFILE and returned -EINVAL, we need to call cifs_get_writable_path() before retrying it as the reference of @CFILE was already dropped by previous call. This fixes the following KASAN splat when running fstests generic/013 against Windows Server 2022: CIFS: Attempting to mount //w22-fs0/scratch run fstests generic/013 at 2024-09-02 19:48:59 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88811f1a3730 by task kworker/3:2/176 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 176 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Workqueue: cifsoplockd cifs_oplock_break [cifs] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200 print_report+0x156/0x4d9 ? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x145/0x300 ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90 ? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 ? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200 detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200 timer_delete+0x96/0xe0 ? __pfx_timer_delete+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 try_to_grab_pending+0x46/0x3b0 __cancel_work+0x89/0x1b0 ? __pfx___cancel_work+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 cifs_close_deferred_file+0x110/0x2c0 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_close_deferred_file+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 cifs_oplock_break+0x4c1/0xa50 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_oplock_break+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_is_held_type+0x85/0xf0 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 process_one_work+0x4c6/0x9f0 ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquired+0x220/0x550 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0x100 worker_thread+0x2e4/0x570 ? __kthread_parkme+0xd1/0xf0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x17f/0x1c0 ? kthread+0xda/0x1c0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1118: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 cifs_new_fileinfo+0xc8/0x9d0 [cifs] cifs_atomic_open+0x467/0x770 [cifs] lookup_open.isra.0+0x665/0x8b0 path_openat+0x4c3/0x1380 do_filp_open+0x167/0x270 do_sys_openat2+0x129/0x160 __x64_sys_creat+0xad/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 83: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 poison_slab_object+0xe9/0x160 __kasan_slab_free+0x32/0x50 kfree+0xf2/0x300 process_one_work+0x4c6/0x9f0 worker_thread+0x2e4/0x570 kthread+0x17f/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xad/0xc0 insert_work+0x29/0xe0 __queue_work+0x5ea/0x760 queue_work_on+0x6d/0x90 _cifsFileInfo_put+0x3f6/0x770 [cifs] smb2_compound_op+0x911/0x3940 [cifs] smb2_set_path_size+0x228/0x270 [cifs] cifs_set_file_size+0x197/0x460 [cifs] cifs_setattr+0xd9c/0x14b0 [cifs] notify_change+0x4e3/0x740 do_truncate+0xfa/0x180 vfs_truncate+0x195/0x200 __x64_sys_truncate+0x109/0x150 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 71f15c9 ("smb: client: retry compound request without reusing lease") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]> Cc: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
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…nux/kernel/git/ukleinek/linux Pull pwm fix from Uwe Kleine-König: "Fix an off-by-one in the stm32 driver. Hardware engineers tend to start counting at 1 while the software guys usually start with 0. This isn't so nice because that results in drivers where pwm device #2 needs to use the hardware registers with index 3. This was noticed by Fabrice Gasnier. A small patch fixing that mismatch is the only change included here" * tag 'pwm/for-6.11-rc7-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ukleinek/linux: pwm: stm32: Use the right CCxNP bit in stm32_pwm_enable()
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following batch contains two fixes from Florian Westphal: Patch #1 fixes a sk refcount leak in nft_socket on mismatch. Patch #2 fixes cgroupsv2 matching from containers due to incorrect level in subtree. netfilter pull request 24-09-12 * tag 'nf-24-09-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nft_socket: make cgroupsv2 matching work with namespaces netfilter: nft_socket: fix sk refcount leaks ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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I have done a lot of analysis for these type of devices and collaborated quite a bit with Nick Weihs (author of the first patch submitted for this including adding samsung_helper.c). More information can be found in the issue on Github [1] including additional rationale and testing. The existing implementation includes a large number of equalizer coef values that are not necessary to actually init and enable the speaker amps, as well as create a somewhat worse sound profile. Users have reported "muffled" or "muddy" sound; more information about this including my analysis of the differences can be found in the linked Github issue. This patch refactors the "v2" version of ALC298_FIXUP_SAMSUNG_AMP to a much simpler implementation which removes the new samsung_helper.c, reuses more of the existing patch_realtek.c, and sends significantly fewer unnecessary coef values (including removing all of these EQ-specific coef values). A pcm_playback_hook is used to dynamically enable and disable the speaker amps only when there will be audio playback; this is to match the behavior of how the driver for these devices is working in Windows, and is suspected but not yet tested or confirmed to help with power consumption. Support for models with 2 speaker amps vs 4 speaker amps is controlled by a specific quirk name for both types. A new int num_speaker_amps has been added to alc_spec so that the hooks can know how many speaker amps to enable or disable. This design was chosen to limit the number of places that subsystem ids will need to be maintained: like this, they can be maintained only once in the quirk table and there will not be another separate list of subsystem ids to maintain elsewhere in the code. Also updated the quirk name from ALC298_FIXUP_SAMSUNG_AMP2 to ALC298_FIXUP_SAMSUNG_AMP_V2_.. as this is not a quirk for "Amp #2" on ALC298 but is instead a different version of how to handle it. More devices have been added (see Github issue for testing confirmation), as well as a small cleanup to existing names. [1]: thesofproject#4055 (comment) Signed-off-by: Joshua Grisham <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
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Add nested locking with I_MUTEX_XATTR subclass to avoid lockdep warning while handling xattr inode on file open syscall at ext4_xattr_inode_iget. Backtrace EXT4-fs (loop0): Ignoring removed oldalloc option ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor543/2794 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline] ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566 down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564 ext4_update_i_disksize fs/ext4/ext4.h:3267 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_write fs/ext4/xattr.c:1390 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create fs/ext4/xattr.c:1538 [inline] ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x331a/0x3d80 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1662 ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x124/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2228 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0xc27/0x14e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2385 ext4_xattr_set+0x219/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498 ext4_xattr_user_set+0xc9/0xf0 fs/ext4/xattr_user.c:40 __vfs_setxattr+0x404/0x450 fs/xattr.c:177 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11d/0x4f0 fs/xattr.c:208 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1f9/0x210 fs/xattr.c:266 vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x2c0 fs/xattr.c:283 setxattr+0x1db/0x3e0 fs/xattr.c:548 path_setxattr+0x15a/0x240 fs/xattr.c:567 __do_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:582 [inline] __se_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:578 [inline] __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc5/0xe0 fs/xattr.c:578 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb -> #0 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline] validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729 __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955 lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566 down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425 ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485 ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline] ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline] ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898 ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline] __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018 ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562 notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435 do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline] do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline] path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425 do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline] __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline] __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline] __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3); lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1); lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3); lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by syz-executor543/2794: #0: ffff888026fbc448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x4a/0x2a0 fs/namespace.c:365 #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline] #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_truncate+0x1cf/0x2c0 fs/open.c:62 #2: ffff8880215e3310 (&ei->i_mmap_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0xec4/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5519 #3: ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_write_trylock_xattr fs/ext4/xattr.h:162 [inline] #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5938 [inline] #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4fb/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 2794 Comm: syz-executor543 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x177/0x211 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_circular_bug+0x146/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2002 check_noncircular+0x2cc/0x390 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2123 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline] validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729 __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955 lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566 down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425 ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485 ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline] ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline] ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898 ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline] __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018 ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562 notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435 do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline] do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline] path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425 do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline] __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline] __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline] __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb RIP: 0033:0x7f0cde4ea229 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 21 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd81d1c978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0030656c69662f30 RCX: 00007f0cde4ea229 RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 00000000000a0a00 RDI: 00000000200001c0 RBP: 2f30656c69662f2e R08: 0000000000208000 R09: 0000000000208000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd81d1c9c0 R13: 00007ffd81d1ca00 R14: 0000000000080000 R15: 0000000000000003 EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea:2730: inode #13: comm syz-executor543: corrupted in-inode xattr Signed-off-by: Wojciech Gładysz <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
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The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used. So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in the hist entry can be garbage. So it shouldn't access it unconditionally. I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles. $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true $ sudo perf report -s cgroup Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48 48 return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso; (gdb) bt #0 0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48 #1 0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344 #2 0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385 #3 0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:644 #4 0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0, block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761 #5 0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779 #6 0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015 #7 0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0) at util/hist.c:1260 #8 0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334 #9 0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232 #10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271 #11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354 #12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132 #13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245 #14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324 #15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342 #16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60) at util/session.c:780 #17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406 As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a value. This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same. I only checked the 'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same). Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps") Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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…ptions Patch series "mm: split PTE/PMD PT table Kconfig cleanups+clarifications". This series is a follow up to the fixes: "[PATCH v1 0/2] mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb vs. core-mm PT locking" When working on the fixes, I wondered why 8xx is fine (-> never uses split PT locks) and how PT locking even works properly with PMD page table sharing (-> always requires split PMD PT locks). Let's improve the split PT lock detection, make hugetlb properly depend on it and make 8xx bail out if it would ever get enabled by accident. As an alternative to patch #3 we could extend the Kconfig SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS option from patch #2 -- but enforcing it closer to the code that actually implements it feels a bit nicer for documentation purposes, and there is no need to actually disable it because it should always be disabled (!SMP). Did a bunch of cross-compilations to make sure that split PTE/PMD PT locks are still getting used where we would expect them. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] This patch (of 3): Let's clean that up a bit and prepare for depending on CONFIG_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCKS in other Kconfig options. More cleanups would be reasonable (like the arch-specific "depends on" for CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS), but we'll leave that for another day. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Qi Zheng <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <[email protected]> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]> Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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commit 823430c ("memory tier: consolidate the initialization of memory tiers") introduces a locking change that use guard(mutex) to instead of mutex_lock/unlock() for memory_tier_lock. It unexpectedly expanded the locked region to include the hotplug_memory_notifier(), as a result, it triggers an locking dependency detected of ABBA deadlock. Exclude hotplug_memory_notifier() from the locked region to fixing it. The deadlock scenario is that when a memory online event occurs, the execution of memory notifier will access the read lock of the memory_chain.rwsem, then the reigistration of the memory notifier in memory_tier_init() acquires the write lock of the memory_chain.rwsem while holding memory_tier_lock. Then the memory online event continues to invoke the memory hotplug callback registered by memory_tier_init(). Since this callback tries to acquire the memory_tier_lock, a deadlock occurs. In fact, this deadlock can't happen because memory_tier_init() always executes before memory online events happen due to the subsys_initcall() has an higher priority than module_init(). [ 133.491106] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 133.493656] 6.11.0-rc2+ #146 Tainted: G O N [ 133.504290] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 133.515194] (udev-worker)/1133 is trying to acquire lock: [ 133.525715] ffffffff87044e28 (memory_tier_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0 [ 133.536449] [ 133.536449] but task is already holding lock: [ 133.549847] ffffffff875d3310 ((memory_chain).rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0xb0 [ 133.556781] [ 133.556781] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 133.556781] [ 133.569957] [ 133.569957] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 133.577618] [ 133.577618] -> #1 ((memory_chain).rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 133.584997] down_write+0x97/0x210 [ 133.588647] blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x71/0xd0 [ 133.592537] register_memory_notifier+0x26/0x30 [ 133.596314] memory_tier_init+0x187/0x300 [ 133.599864] do_one_initcall+0x117/0x5d0 [ 133.603399] kernel_init_freeable+0xab0/0xeb0 [ 133.606986] kernel_init+0x28/0x2f0 [ 133.610312] ret_from_fork+0x59/0x90 [ 133.613652] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 133.617012] [ 133.617012] -> #0 (memory_tier_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 133.623390] __lock_acquire+0x2efd/0x5c60 [ 133.626730] lock_acquire+0x1ce/0x580 [ 133.629757] __mutex_lock+0x15c/0x1490 [ 133.632731] mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 [ 133.635717] memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0 [ 133.638748] notifier_call_chain+0xbf/0x370 [ 133.641647] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x76/0xb0 [ 133.644636] memory_notify+0x2e/0x40 [ 133.647427] online_pages+0x597/0x720 [ 133.650246] memory_subsys_online+0x4f6/0x7f0 [ 133.653107] device_online+0x141/0x1d0 [ 133.655831] online_memory_block+0x4d/0x60 [ 133.658616] walk_memory_blocks+0xc0/0x120 [ 133.661419] add_memory_resource+0x51d/0x6c0 [ 133.664202] add_memory_driver_managed+0xf5/0x180 [ 133.667060] dev_dax_kmem_probe+0x7f7/0xb40 [kmem] [ 133.669949] dax_bus_probe+0x147/0x230 [ 133.672687] really_probe+0x27f/0xac0 [ 133.675463] __driver_probe_device+0x1f3/0x460 [ 133.678493] driver_probe_device+0x56/0x1b0 [ 133.681366] __driver_attach+0x277/0x570 [ 133.684149] bus_for_each_dev+0x145/0x1e0 [ 133.686937] driver_attach+0x49/0x60 [ 133.689673] bus_add_driver+0x2f3/0x6b0 [ 133.692421] driver_register+0x170/0x4b0 [ 133.695118] __dax_driver_register+0x141/0x1b0 [ 133.697910] dax_kmem_init+0x54/0xff0 [kmem] [ 133.700794] do_one_initcall+0x117/0x5d0 [ 133.703455] do_init_module+0x277/0x750 [ 133.706054] load_module+0x5d1d/0x74f0 [ 133.708602] init_module_from_file+0x12c/0x1a0 [ 133.711234] idempotent_init_module+0x3f1/0x690 [ 133.713937] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x10e/0x1a0 [ 133.716492] x64_sys_call+0x184d/0x20d0 [ 133.719053] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 [ 133.721537] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 133.724239] [ 133.724239] other info that might help us debug this: [ 133.724239] [ 133.730832] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 133.730832] [ 133.735298] CPU0 CPU1 [ 133.737759] ---- ---- [ 133.740165] rlock((memory_chain).rwsem); [ 133.742623] lock(memory_tier_lock); [ 133.745357] lock((memory_chain).rwsem); [ 133.748141] lock(memory_tier_lock); [ 133.750489] [ 133.750489] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 133.750489] [ 133.756742] 6 locks held by (udev-worker)/1133: [ 133.759179] #0: ffff888207be6158 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x26c/0x570 [ 133.762299] #1: ffffffff875b5868 (device_hotplug_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_device_hotplug+0x20/0x30 [ 133.765565] #2: ffff88820cf6a108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_online+0x2f/0x1d0 [ 133.768978] #3: ffffffff86d08ff0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x17/0x30 [ 133.772312] #4: ffffffff8702dfb0 (mem_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x23/0x30 [ 133.775544] #5: ffffffff875d3310 ((memory_chain).rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0xb0 [ 133.779113] [ 133.779113] stack backtrace: [ 133.783728] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1133 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G O N 6.11.0-rc2+ #146 [ 133.787220] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [N]=TEST [ 133.789948] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 133.793291] Call Trace: [ 133.795826] <TASK> [ 133.798284] dump_stack_lvl+0xea/0x150 [ 133.801025] dump_stack+0x19/0x20 [ 133.803609] print_circular_bug+0x477/0x740 [ 133.806341] check_noncircular+0x2f4/0x3e0 [ 133.809056] ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10 [ 133.811866] ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 133.814670] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8+0x1c/0x30 [ 133.817610] __lock_acquire+0x2efd/0x5c60 [ 133.820339] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 133.823128] ? __dax_driver_register+0x141/0x1b0 [ 133.825926] ? do_one_initcall+0x117/0x5d0 [ 133.828648] lock_acquire+0x1ce/0x580 [ 133.831349] ? memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0 [ 133.834293] ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 133.837134] __mutex_lock+0x15c/0x1490 [ 133.839829] ? memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0 [ 133.842753] ? memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0 [ 133.845602] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x21/0x30 [ 133.848438] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 133.851200] ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 133.853935] ? global_dirty_limits+0xc0/0x160 [ 133.856699] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0 [ 133.859564] mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 [ 133.862251] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 [ 133.864964] memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0 [ 133.867752] notifier_call_chain+0xbf/0x370 [ 133.870550] ? writeback_set_ratelimit+0xe8/0x160 [ 133.873372] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x76/0xb0 [ 133.876311] memory_notify+0x2e/0x40 [ 133.879013] online_pages+0x597/0x720 [ 133.881686] ? irqentry_exit+0x3e/0xa0 [ 133.884397] ? __pfx_online_pages+0x10/0x10 [ 133.887244] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8+0x1c/0x30 [ 133.890299] ? mhp_init_memmap_on_memory+0x7a/0x1c0 [ 133.893203] memory_subsys_online+0x4f6/0x7f0 [ 133.896099] ? __pfx_memory_subsys_online+0x10/0x10 [ 133.899039] ? xa_load+0x16d/0x2e0 [ 133.901667] ? __pfx_xa_load+0x10/0x10 [ 133.904366] ? __pfx_memory_subsys_online+0x10/0x10 [ 133.907218] device_online+0x141/0x1d0 [ 133.909845] online_memory_block+0x4d/0x60 [ 133.912494] walk_memory_blocks+0xc0/0x120 [ 133.915104] ? __pfx_online_memory_block+0x10/0x10 [ 133.917776] add_memory_resource+0x51d/0x6c0 [ 133.920404] ? __pfx_add_memory_resource+0x10/0x10 [ 133.923104] ? _raw_write_unlock+0x31/0x60 [ 133.925781] ? register_memory_resource+0x119/0x180 [ 133.928450] add_memory_driver_managed+0xf5/0x180 [ 133.931036] dev_dax_kmem_probe+0x7f7/0xb40 [kmem] [ 133.933665] ? __pfx_dev_dax_kmem_probe+0x10/0x10 [kmem] [ 133.936332] ? __pfx___up_read+0x10/0x10 [ 133.938878] dax_bus_probe+0x147/0x230 [ 133.941332] ? __pfx_dax_bus_probe+0x10/0x10 [ 133.943954] really_probe+0x27f/0xac0 [ 133.946387] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1+0x1e/0x30 [ 133.949106] __driver_probe_device+0x1f3/0x460 [ 133.951704] ? parse_option_str+0x149/0x190 [ 133.954241] driver_probe_device+0x56/0x1b0 [ 133.956749] __driver_attach+0x277/0x570 [ 133.959228] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [ 133.961776] bus_for_each_dev+0x145/0x1e0 [ 133.964367] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10 [ 133.967019] ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 [ 133.969543] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x31/0x60 [ 133.972132] driver_attach+0x49/0x60 [ 133.974536] bus_add_driver+0x2f3/0x6b0 [ 133.977044] driver_register+0x170/0x4b0 [ 133.979480] __dax_driver_register+0x141/0x1b0 [ 133.982126] ? __pfx_dax_kmem_init+0x10/0x10 [kmem] [ 133.984724] dax_kmem_init+0x54/0xff0 [kmem] [ 133.987284] ? __pfx_dax_kmem_init+0x10/0x10 [kmem] [ 133.989965] do_one_initcall+0x117/0x5d0 [ 133.992506] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 [ 133.995185] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xa0 [ 133.997748] ? kasan_poison+0x3e/0x60 [ 134.000288] ? kasan_unpoison+0x2c/0x60 [ 134.002762] ? kasan_poison+0x3e/0x60 [ 134.005202] ? __asan_register_globals+0x62/0x80 [ 134.007753] ? __pfx_dax_kmem_init+0x10/0x10 [kmem] [ 134.010439] do_init_module+0x277/0x750 [ 134.012953] load_module+0x5d1d/0x74f0 [ 134.015406] ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10 [ 134.017887] ? __pfx_ima_post_read_file+0x10/0x10 [ 134.020470] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8+0x1c/0x30 [ 134.023127] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x1a/0x20 [ 134.025767] ? security_kernel_post_read_file+0xa2/0xd0 [ 134.028429] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x1a/0x20 [ 134.031162] ? kernel_read_file+0x503/0x820 [ 134.033645] ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10 [ 134.036232] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 134.038766] init_module_from_file+0x12c/0x1a0 [ 134.041291] ? init_module_from_file+0x12c/0x1a0 [ 134.043936] ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10 [ 134.046516] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x21/0x30 [ 134.049091] ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 [ 134.051551] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x60/0x210 [ 134.054077] idempotent_init_module+0x3f1/0x690 [ 134.056643] ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10 [ 134.059318] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x1a/0x20 [ 134.061995] ? __fget_light+0x17d/0x210 [ 134.064428] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x10e/0x1a0 [ 134.066976] x64_sys_call+0x184d/0x20d0 [ 134.069405] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 [ 134.071926] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [[email protected]: add mutex_lock/unlock() pair back] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 823430c ("memory tier: consolidate the initialization of memory tiers") Signed-off-by: Yanfei Xu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Cc: Ho-Ren (Jack) Chuang <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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Patch series "zram: introduce custom comp backends API", v7. This series introduces support for run-time compression algorithms tuning, so users, for instance, can adjust compression/acceleration levels and provide pre-trained compression/decompression dictionaries which certain algorithms support. At this point we stop supporting (old/deprecated) comp API. We may add new acomp API support in the future, but before that zram needs to undergo some major rework (we are not ready for async compression). Some benchmarks for reference (look at column #2) *** init zstd /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750659072 504622188 514355200 0 514355200 1 0 34204 34204 *** init zstd dict=/home/ss/zstd-dict-amd64 /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750650880 465908890 475398144 0 475398144 1 0 34185 34185 *** init zstd level=8 dict=/home/ss/zstd-dict-amd64 /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750654976 430803319 439873536 0 439873536 1 0 34185 34185 *** init lz4 /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750646784 664266564 677060608 0 677060608 1 0 34288 34288 *** init lz4 dict=/home/ss/lz4-dict-amd64 /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750650880 619990300 632102912 0 632102912 1 0 34278 34278 *** init lz4hc /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750630400 609023822 621232128 0 621232128 1 0 34288 34288 *** init lz4hc dict=/home/ss/lz4-dict-amd64 /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750659072 505133172 515231744 0 515231744 1 0 34278 34278 Recompress init zram zstd (prio=0), zstd level=5 (prio 1), zstd with dict (prio 2) *** zstd /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750982656 504630584 514269184 0 514269184 1 0 34204 34204 *** idle recompress priority=1 (zstd level=5) /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750982656 488645601 525438976 0 514269184 1 0 34204 34204 *** idle recompress priority=2 (zstd dict) /sys/block/zram0/mm_stat 1750982656 460869640 517914624 0 514269184 1 0 34185 34204 This patch (of 24): We need to export a number of API functions that enable advanced zstd usage - C/D dictionaries, dictionaries sharing between contexts, etc. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Cc: Nick Terrell <[email protected]> Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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Hou Tao says: ==================== The tiny patch set aims to fix two problems found during the development of supporting dynptr key in hash table. Patch #1 fixes the missed btf_record_free() when map creation fails and patch #2 fixes the missed kfree() when there is no special field in the passed btf. ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Case #1: SQLite App GC Thread Kworker Shrinker - f2fs_ioc_start_atomic_write - f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write - f2fs_commit_atomic_write - filemap_write_and_wait_range : write atomic_file's data to cow_inode echo 3 > drop_caches to drop atomic_file's cache. - f2fs_gc - gc_data_segment - move_data_page - set_page_dirty - writepages - f2fs_do_write_data_page : overwrite atomic_file's data to cow_inode - f2fs_down_write(&fi->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE]) - __f2fs_commit_atomic_write - f2fs_up_write(&fi->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE]) Case #2: SQLite App GC Thread Kworker - f2fs_ioc_start_atomic_write - __writeback_single_inode - do_writepages - f2fs_write_cache_pages - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page : write atomic_file's data to cow_inode - f2fs_gc - gc_data_segment - move_data_page - set_page_dirty - writepages - f2fs_do_write_data_page : overwrite atomic_file's data to cow_inode - f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write In above cases racing in between atomic_write and GC, previous data in atomic_file may be overwrited to cow_file, result in data corruption. This patch introduces PAGE_PRIVATE_ATOMIC_WRITE bit flag in page.private, and use it to indicate that there is last dirty data in atomic file, and the data should be writebacked into cow_file, if the flag is not tagged in page, we should never write data across files. Fixes: 3db1de0 ("f2fs: change the current atomic write way") Cc: Daeho Jeong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net v2: with kdoc fixes per Paolo Abeni. The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 and #2 handle an esoteric scenario: Given two tasks sending UDP packets to one another, two packets of the same flow in each direction handled by different CPUs that result in two conntrack objects in NEW state, where reply packet loses race. Then, patch #3 adds a testcase for this scenario. Series from Florian Westphal. 1) NAT engine can falsely detect a port collision if it happens to pick up a reply packet as NEW rather than ESTABLISHED. Add extra code to detect this and suppress port reallocation in this case. 2) To complete the clash resolution in the reply direction, extend conntrack logic to detect clashing conntrack in the reply direction to existing entry. 3) Adds a test case. Then, an assorted list of fixes follow: 4) Add a selftest for tproxy, from Antonio Ojea. 5) Guard ctnetlink_*_size() functions under #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_GLUE_CT) || defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS) From Andy Shevchenko. 6) Use -m socket --transparent in iptables tproxy documentation. From XIE Zhibang. 7) Call kfree_rcu() when releasing flowtable hooks to address race with netlink dump path, from Phil Sutter. 8) Fix compilation warning in nf_reject with CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER=n. From Simon Horman. 9) Guard ctnetlink_label_size() under CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS which is its only user, to address a compilation warning. From Simon Horman. 10) Use rcu-protected list iteration over basechain hooks from netlink dump path. 11) Fix memcg for nf_tables, use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT is not complete. 12) Remove old nfqueue conntrack clash resolution. Instead trying to use same destination address consistently which requires double DNAT, use the existing clash resolution which allows clashing packets go through with different destination. Antonio Ojea originally reported an issue from the postrouting chain, I proposed a fix: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/ZuwSwAqKgCB2a51-@calendula/T/ which he reported it did not work for him. 13) Adds a selftest for patch 12. 14) Fixes ipvs.sh selftest. netfilter pull request 24-09-26 * tag 'nf-24-09-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: selftests: netfilter: Avoid hanging ipvs.sh kselftest: add test for nfqueue induced conntrack race netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: remove old clash resolution logic netfilter: nf_tables: missing objects with no memcg accounting netfilter: nf_tables: use rcu chain hook list iterator from netlink dump path netfilter: ctnetlink: compile ctnetlink_label_size with CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS netfilter: nf_reject: Fix build warning when CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER=n netfilter: nf_tables: Keep deleted flowtable hooks until after RCU docs: tproxy: ignore non-transparent sockets in iptables netfilter: ctnetlink: Guard possible unused functions selftests: netfilter: nft_tproxy.sh: add tcp tests selftests: netfilter: add reverse-clash resolution test case netfilter: conntrack: add clash resolution for reverse collisions netfilter: nf_nat: don't try nat source port reallocation for reverse dir clash ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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The following calculation used in coalesced_mmio_has_room() to check whether the ring buffer is full is wrong and results in premature exits if the start of the valid entries is in the first half of the ring buffer. avail = (ring->first - last - 1) % KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX; if (avail == 0) /* full */ Because negative values are handled using two's complement, and KVM computes the result as an unsigned value, the above will get a false positive if "first < last" and the ring is half-full. The above might have worked as expected in python for example: >>> (-86) % 170 84 However it doesn't work the same way in C. printf("avail: %d\n", (-86) % 170); printf("avail: %u\n", (-86) % 170); printf("avail: %u\n", (-86u) % 170u); Using gcc-11 these print: avail: -86 avail: 4294967210 avail: 0 For illustration purposes, given a 4-bit integer and a ring size of 0xA (unsigned), 0xA == 0x1010 == -6, and thus (-6u % 0xA) == 0. Fix the calculation and allow all but one entries in the buffer to be used as originally intended. Note, KVM's behavior is self-healing to some extent, as KVM will allow the entire buffer to be used if ring->first is beyond the halfway point. In other words, in the unlikely scenario that a use case benefits from being able to coalesce more than 86 entries at once, KVM will still provide such behavior, sometimes. Note #2, the % operator in C is not the modulo operator but the remainder operator. Modulo and remainder operators differ with respect to negative values. But, the relevant values in KVM are all unsigned, so it's a moot point in this case anyway. Note #3, this is almost a pure revert of the buggy commit, plus a READ_ONCE() to provide additional safety. Thue buggy commit justified the change with "it paves the way for making this function lockless", but it's not at all clear what was intended, nor is there any evidence that the buggy code was somehow safer. (a) the fields in question were already accessed locklessly, from the perspective that they could be modified by userspace at any time, and (b) the lock guarding the ring itself was changed, but never dropped, i.e. whatever lockless scheme (SRCU?) was planned never landed. Fixes: 105f8d4 ("KVM: Calculate available entries in coalesced mmio ring") Signed-off-by: Ilias Stamatis <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [sean: rework changelog to clarify behavior, call out weirdness of buggy commit] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
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Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations. Translating the below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the fairness of r/w semaphores). CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 1 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 2 lock(&vcpu->mutex); 3 lock(&kvm->srcu); 4 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 5 lock(kvm_lock); 6 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 7 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 8 sync(&kvm->srcu); Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(): cpuhp_cpufreq_online() | -> cpufreq_online() | -> cpufreq_gov_performance_limits() | -> __cpufreq_driver_target() | -> __target_index() | -> cpufreq_freq_transition_begin() | -> cpufreq_notify_transition() | -> ... __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier() But, actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the combination of dependencies and timings involved. E.g. the cpufreq notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual. The most robust solution to the general cpu_hotplug_lock issue is likely to switch vm_list to be an RCU-protected list, e.g. so that x86's cpufreq notifier doesn't to take kvm_lock. For now, settle for fixing the most blatant deadlock, as switching to an RCU-protected list is a much more involved change, but add a comment in locking.rst to call out that care needs to be taken when walking holding kvm_lock and walking vm_list. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S O ------------------------------------------------------ tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock: ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] but task is already holding lock: ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0 static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30 kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm] kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm] vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel] __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}: __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0 synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30 kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm] __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30 lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260 __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] param_attr_store+0x93/0x100 module_attr_store+0x22/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x28d/0x380 ksys_write+0x70/0xe0 __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Cc: Chao Gao <[email protected]> Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock") Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Farrah Chen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server. Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference crash with the following syslog: [232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058 [232066.588586] Mem abort info: [232066.588701] ESR = 0x0000000096000007 [232066.588862] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [232066.589084] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [232066.589216] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [232066.589340] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault [232066.589559] Data abort info: [232066.589683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007 [232066.589842] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400 [232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000 [232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP [232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2 [232066.591052] vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs [232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1 [232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06 [232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70 [232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000 [232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001 [232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050 [232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000 [232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000 [232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6 [232066.600498] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000008 x9 : ffff8000054e5828 [232066.600784] x8 : 00000000ffffffbf x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000000a9eb14a [232066.601062] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff70ff8a14a800 x3 : 0000000000000058 [232066.601348] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 54dce46366daa6c6 x0 : 0000000000000000 [232066.601636] Call trace: [232066.601749] nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.601998] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x1b8/0x28c [nfsv4] [232066.602218] nfs4_state_manager+0x928/0x10f0 [nfsv4] [232066.602455] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x78/0x1b0 [nfsv4] [232066.602690] kthread+0x110/0x114 [232066.602830] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [232066.602985] Code: 1400000d f9403f20 f9402e61 91016003 (f9402c00) [232066.603284] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [232066.606936] Starting crashdump kernel... [232066.607146] Bye! Analysing the vmcore, we know that nfs4_copy_state listed by destination nfs_server->ss_copies was added by the field copies in handle_async_copy(), and we found a waiting copy process with the stack as: PID: 3511963 TASK: ffff710028b47e00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cp" #0 [ffff8001116ef740] __switch_to at ffff8000081b92f4 #1 [ffff8001116ef760] __schedule at ffff800008dd0650 #2 [ffff8001116ef7c0] schedule at ffff800008dd0a00 #3 [ffff8001116ef7e0] schedule_timeout at ffff800008dd6aa0 #4 [ffff8001116ef860] __wait_for_common at ffff800008dd166c #5 [ffff8001116ef8e0] wait_for_completion_interruptible at ffff800008dd1898 #6 [ffff8001116ef8f0] handle_async_copy at ffff8000055142f4 [nfsv4] #7 [ffff8001116ef970] _nfs42_proc_copy at ffff8000055147c8 [nfsv4] #8 [ffff8001116efa80] nfs42_proc_copy at ffff800005514cf0 [nfsv4] #9 [ffff8001116efc50] __nfs4_copy_file_range.constprop.0 at ffff8000054ed694 [nfsv4] The NULL-pointer dereference was due to nfs42_complete_copies() listed the nfs_server->ss_copies by the field ss_copies of nfs4_copy_state. So the nfs4_copy_state address ffff0100f98fa3f0 was offset by 0x10 and the data accessed through this pointer was also incorrect. Generally, the ordered list nfs4_state_owner->so_states indicate open(O_RDWR) or open(O_WRITE) states are reclaimed firstly by nfs4_reclaim_open_state(). When destination state reclaim is failed with NFS_STATE_RECOVERY_FAILED and copies are not deleted in nfs_server->ss_copies, the source state may be passed to the nfs42_complete_copies() process earlier, resulting in this crash scene finally. To solve this issue, we add a list_head nfs_server->ss_src_copies for a server-to-server copy specially. Fixes: 0e65a32 ("NFS: handle source server reboot") Signed-off-by: Yanjun Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
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Fix a kernel panic in the br_netfilter module when sending untagged traffic via a VxLAN device. This happens during the check for fragmentation in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit. It is dependent on: 1) the br_netfilter module being loaded; 2) net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables set to 1; 3) a bridge with a VxLAN (single-vxlan-device) netdevice as a bridge port; 4) untagged frames with size higher than the VxLAN MTU forwarded/flooded When forwarding the untagged packet to the VxLAN bridge port, before the netfilter hooks are called, br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel is called and changes the skb_dst to the tunnel dst. The tunnel_dst is a metadata type of dst, i.e., skb_valid_dst(skb) is false, and metadata->dst.dev is NULL. Then in the br_netfilter hooks, in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit, there's a check for frames that needs to be fragmented: frames with higher MTU than the VxLAN device end up calling br_nf_ip_fragment, which in turns call ip_skb_dst_mtu. The ip_dst_mtu tries to use the skb_dst(skb) as if it was a valid dst with valid dst->dev, thus the crash. This case was never supported in the first place, so drop the packet instead. PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) from 0.0.0.0 h1-eth0: 2000(2028) bytes of data. [ 176.291791] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000110 [ 176.292101] Mem abort info: [ 176.292184] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 176.292322] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 176.292530] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 176.292709] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 176.292862] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 176.293013] Data abort info: [ 176.293104] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 176.293488] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 176.293787] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 176.293995] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000043ef5000 [ 176.294166] [0000000000000110] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 176.294827] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 176.295252] Modules linked in: vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel veth br_netfilter bridge stp llc ipv6 crct10dif_ce [ 176.295923] CPU: 0 PID: 188 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-g5b3fbd61b9d1 #2 [ 176.296314] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 176.296535] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 176.296808] pc : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.297382] lr : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x2ac/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.297636] sp : ffff800080003630 [ 176.297743] x29: ffff800080003630 x28: 0000000000000008 x27: ffff6828c49ad9f8 [ 176.298093] x26: ffff6828c49ad000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000000003e8 [ 176.298430] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff6828c4960b40 x21: ffff6828c3b16d28 [ 176.298652] x20: ffff6828c3167048 x19: ffff6828c3b16d00 x18: 0000000000000014 [ 176.298926] x17: ffffb0476322f000 x16: ffffb7e164023730 x15: 0000000095744632 [ 176.299296] x14: ffff6828c3f1c880 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: ffffb7e137926a70 [ 176.299574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff6828c3f1c898 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 176.300049] x8 : ffff6828c49bf070 x7 : 0008460f18d5f20e x6 : f20e0100bebafeca [ 176.300302] x5 : ffff6828c7f918fe x4 : ffff6828c49bf070 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 176.300586] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff6828c3c7ad00 x0 : ffff6828c7f918f0 [ 176.300889] Call trace: [ 176.301123] br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.301411] br_nf_post_routing+0x2a8/0x3e4 [br_netfilter] [ 176.301703] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124 [ 176.302060] br_forward_finish+0xc8/0xe8 [bridge] [ 176.302371] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter] [ 176.302605] br_nf_forward_finish+0x118/0x22c [br_netfilter] [ 176.302824] br_nf_forward_ip.part.0+0x264/0x290 [br_netfilter] [ 176.303136] br_nf_forward+0x2b8/0x4e0 [br_netfilter] [ 176.303359] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124 [ 176.303803] __br_forward+0xc4/0x194 [bridge] [ 176.304013] br_flood+0xd4/0x168 [bridge] [ 176.304300] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1d4/0x5c4 [bridge] [ 176.304536] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter] [ 176.304978] br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x29c/0x494 [br_netfilter] [ 176.305188] br_nf_pre_routing+0x250/0x524 [br_netfilter] [ 176.305428] br_handle_frame+0x244/0x3cc [bridge] [ 176.305695] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x33c/0xecc [ 176.306080] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x40/0x8c [ 176.306197] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x64 [ 176.306369] process_backlog+0x80/0x124 [ 176.306540] __napi_poll+0x38/0x17c [ 176.306636] net_rx_action+0x124/0x26c [ 176.306758] __do_softirq+0x100/0x26c [ 176.307051] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c [ 176.307162] call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x4c [ 176.307289] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x2c [ 176.307396] do_softirq+0x54/0x6c [ 176.307485] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0x98 [ 176.307637] __dev_queue_xmit+0x22c/0xd28 [ 176.307775] neigh_resolve_output+0xf4/0x1a0 [ 176.308018] ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628 [ 176.308137] ip_do_fragment+0x5b4/0x658 [ 176.308279] ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x48/0xec [ 176.308420] __ip_finish_output+0xa4/0x254 [ 176.308593] ip_finish_output+0x34/0x130 [ 176.308814] ip_output+0x6c/0x108 [ 176.308929] ip_send_skb+0x50/0xf0 [ 176.309095] ip_push_pending_frames+0x30/0x54 [ 176.309254] raw_sendmsg+0x758/0xaec [ 176.309568] inet_sendmsg+0x44/0x70 [ 176.309667] __sys_sendto+0x110/0x178 [ 176.309758] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x38 [ 176.309918] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 [ 176.310211] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 [ 176.310353] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 176.310434] el0_svc+0x34/0xb4 [ 176.310551] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c [ 176.310690] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 176.311066] Code: f9402e61 79402aa2 927ff821 f9400023 (f9408860) [ 176.315743] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 176.316060] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 176.316371] Kernel Offset: 0x37e0e3000000 from 0xffff800080000000 [ 176.316564] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffff97d780000000 [ 176.316782] CPU features: 0x0,88000203,3c020000,0100421b [ 176.317210] Memory Limit: none [ 176.317527] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal Exception in interrupt ]---\ Fixes: 11538d0 ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths") Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andy Roulin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Oct 13, 2024
Andy Roulin says: ==================== netfilter: br_netfilter: fix panic with metadata_dst skb There's a kernel panic possible in the br_netfilter module when sending untagged traffic via a VxLAN device. Traceback is included below. This happens during the check for fragmentation in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit if the MTU on the VxLAN device is not big enough. It is dependent on: 1) the br_netfilter module being loaded; 2) net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables set to 1; 3) a bridge with a VxLAN (single-vxlan-device) netdevice as a bridge port; 4) untagged frames with size higher than the VxLAN MTU forwarded/flooded This case was never supported in the first place, so the first patch drops such packets. A regression selftest is added as part of the second patch. PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) from 0.0.0.0 h1-eth0: 2000(2028) bytes of data. [ 176.291791] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000110 [ 176.292101] Mem abort info: [ 176.292184] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 176.292322] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 176.292530] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 176.292709] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 176.292862] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 176.293013] Data abort info: [ 176.293104] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 176.293488] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 176.293787] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 176.293995] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000043ef5000 [ 176.294166] [0000000000000110] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 176.294827] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 176.295252] Modules linked in: vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel veth br_netfilter bridge stp llc ipv6 crct10dif_ce [ 176.295923] CPU: 0 PID: 188 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-g5b3fbd61b9d1 #2 [ 176.296314] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 176.296535] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 176.296808] pc : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.297382] lr : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x2ac/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.297636] sp : ffff800080003630 [ 176.297743] x29: ffff800080003630 x28: 0000000000000008 x27: ffff6828c49ad9f8 [ 176.298093] x26: ffff6828c49ad000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000000003e8 [ 176.298430] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff6828c4960b40 x21: ffff6828c3b16d28 [ 176.298652] x20: ffff6828c3167048 x19: ffff6828c3b16d00 x18: 0000000000000014 [ 176.298926] x17: ffffb0476322f000 x16: ffffb7e164023730 x15: 0000000095744632 [ 176.299296] x14: ffff6828c3f1c880 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: ffffb7e137926a70 [ 176.299574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff6828c3f1c898 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 176.300049] x8 : ffff6828c49bf070 x7 : 0008460f18d5f20e x6 : f20e0100bebafeca [ 176.300302] x5 : ffff6828c7f918fe x4 : ffff6828c49bf070 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 176.300586] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff6828c3c7ad00 x0 : ffff6828c7f918f0 [ 176.300889] Call trace: [ 176.301123] br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter] [ 176.301411] br_nf_post_routing+0x2a8/0x3e4 [br_netfilter] [ 176.301703] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124 [ 176.302060] br_forward_finish+0xc8/0xe8 [bridge] [ 176.302371] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter] [ 176.302605] br_nf_forward_finish+0x118/0x22c [br_netfilter] [ 176.302824] br_nf_forward_ip.part.0+0x264/0x290 [br_netfilter] [ 176.303136] br_nf_forward+0x2b8/0x4e0 [br_netfilter] [ 176.303359] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124 [ 176.303803] __br_forward+0xc4/0x194 [bridge] [ 176.304013] br_flood+0xd4/0x168 [bridge] [ 176.304300] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1d4/0x5c4 [bridge] [ 176.304536] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter] [ 176.304978] br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x29c/0x494 [br_netfilter] [ 176.305188] br_nf_pre_routing+0x250/0x524 [br_netfilter] [ 176.305428] br_handle_frame+0x244/0x3cc [bridge] [ 176.305695] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x33c/0xecc [ 176.306080] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x40/0x8c [ 176.306197] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x64 [ 176.306369] process_backlog+0x80/0x124 [ 176.306540] __napi_poll+0x38/0x17c [ 176.306636] net_rx_action+0x124/0x26c [ 176.306758] __do_softirq+0x100/0x26c [ 176.307051] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c [ 176.307162] call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x4c [ 176.307289] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x2c [ 176.307396] do_softirq+0x54/0x6c [ 176.307485] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0x98 [ 176.307637] __dev_queue_xmit+0x22c/0xd28 [ 176.307775] neigh_resolve_output+0xf4/0x1a0 [ 176.308018] ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628 [ 176.308137] ip_do_fragment+0x5b4/0x658 [ 176.308279] ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x48/0xec [ 176.308420] __ip_finish_output+0xa4/0x254 [ 176.308593] ip_finish_output+0x34/0x130 [ 176.308814] ip_output+0x6c/0x108 [ 176.308929] ip_send_skb+0x50/0xf0 [ 176.309095] ip_push_pending_frames+0x30/0x54 [ 176.309254] raw_sendmsg+0x758/0xaec [ 176.309568] inet_sendmsg+0x44/0x70 [ 176.309667] __sys_sendto+0x110/0x178 [ 176.309758] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x38 [ 176.309918] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 [ 176.310211] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 [ 176.310353] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 176.310434] el0_svc+0x34/0xb4 [ 176.310551] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c [ 176.310690] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 176.311066] Code: f9402e61 79402aa2 927ff821 f9400023 (f9408860) [ 176.315743] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 176.316060] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 176.316371] Kernel Offset: 0x37e0e3000000 from 0xffff800080000000 [ 176.316564] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffff97d780000000 [ 176.316782] CPU features: 0x0,88000203,3c020000,0100421b [ 176.317210] Memory Limit: none [ 176.317527] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal Exception in interrupt ]---\ ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Oct 18, 2024
Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor364/5113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 but task is already holding lock: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(k-slock-AF_INET); lock(k-slock-AF_INET); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by syz-executor364/5113: #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x153/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1806 #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x11f/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1727 #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x5f/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470 #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x45f/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: local_lock_acquire include/linux/local_lock_internal.h:29 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x33b/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6104 #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0x230/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:232 #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5113 Comm: syz-executor364 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline] validate_chain+0x15d3/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855 __lock_acquire+0x137a/0x2040 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5142 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 mptcp_sk_clone_init+0x32/0x13c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3279 subflow_syn_recv_sock+0x931/0x1920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:874 tcp_check_req+0xfe4/0x1a20 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:853 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2267 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775 process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108 __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:908 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1763/0x3e90 net/core/dev.c:4450 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3105 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline] __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466 tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6542 [inline] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2c32/0x4570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6729 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline] __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3004 release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3558 mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x1ad/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1733 mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1812 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f04fb13a6b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 01 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd651f42d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f04fb13a6b9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffd651f4310 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000f4240 R13: 00007f04fb187449 R14: 00007ffd651f42f4 R15: 00007ffd651f4300 </TASK> As noted by Cong Wang, the splat is false positive, but the code path leading to the report is an unexpected one: a client is attempting an MPC handshake towards the in-kernel listener created by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint. Such connection will be never accepted; many of them can make the listener queue full and preventing the creation of MPJ subflow via such listener - its intended role. Explicitly detect this scenario at initial-syn time and drop the incoming MPC request. Fixes: 1729cf1 ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Hou Tao says: ==================== Check the remaining info_cnt before repeating btf fields From: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Hi, The patch set adds the missed check again info_cnt when flattening the array of nested struct. The problem was spotted when developing dynptr key support for hash map. Patch #1 adds the missed check and patch #2 adds three success test cases and one failure test case for the problem. Comments are always welcome. Change Log: v2: * patch #1: check info_cnt in btf_repeat_fields() * patch #2: use a hard-coded number instead of BTF_FIELDS_MAX, because BTF_FIELDS_MAX is not always available in vmlinux.h (e.g., for llvm 17/18) v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#t ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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