Improve security-crypto threadpool overflow handling #111369
Merged
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
gwbrown
added
>bug
:Security/Authentication
|
Pinging @elastic/es-security (Team:Security) |
|
Hi @gwbrown, I've created a changelog YAML for you. |
gwbrown
commented
Jul 26, 2024
| }, listener::onFailure)); | ||
| }, exception -> { | ||
| // Crypto threadpool queue is full, invalidate this cache entry and make sure nothing is going to wait on it | ||
| logger.warn( |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
I'm concerned that this might cause log spam, but I don't want to pull it all the way back to debug because I think it's good to be able to easily tell when this is happening.
gwbrown
commented
Jul 26, 2024
x-pack/plugin/security/src/main/java/org/elasticsearch/xpack/security/authc/ApiKeyService.java
Outdated
Show resolved
Hide resolved
DaveCTurner
reviewed
Jul 26, 2024
...plugin/security/src/test/java/org/elasticsearch/xpack/security/authc/ApiKeyServiceTests.java
Outdated
Show resolved
Hide resolved
DaveCTurner
reviewed
Jul 26, 2024
...plugin/security/src/test/java/org/elasticsearch/xpack/security/authc/ApiKeyServiceTests.java
Outdated
Show resolved
Hide resolved
albertzaharovits
approved these changes
Aug 2, 2024
jakelandis
approved these changes
Aug 2, 2024
gwbrown
added
the
auto-backport
gwbrown
added a commit
to gwbrown/elasticsearch
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 2, 2024
Prior to this PR, when the security-crypto threadpool queue overflows and rejects API key hashing submissions, a toxic value (specifically, a future which will never be completed) is added to the API key auth cache. This toxic cache value causes future authentication attempts with that API key to fail by timeout, because they will attempt to wait for the toxic future, until that value is invalidated and removed from the cache. Additionally, this will hold on to memory for each request that waits on the toxic future, even after the request has timed out. This PR adds a unit test to replicate this case, and adjusts the code which submits the key hashing task to the security-crypto threadpool to properly handle this point of failure by invalidating the cached future and notifying waiting handlers that the computation has failed.
💔 Backport failed
You can use sqren/backport to manually backport by running |
gwbrown
added a commit
to gwbrown/elasticsearch
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 2, 2024
Prior to this PR, when the security-crypto threadpool queue overflows and rejects API key hashing submissions, a toxic value (specifically, a future which will never be completed) is added to the API key auth cache. This toxic cache value causes future authentication attempts with that API key to fail by timeout, because they will attempt to wait for the toxic future, until that value is invalidated and removed from the cache. Additionally, this will hold on to memory for each request that waits on the toxic future, even after the request has timed out. This PR adds a unit test to replicate this case, and adjusts the code which submits the key hashing task to the security-crypto threadpool to properly handle this point of failure by invalidating the cached future and notifying waiting handlers that the computation has failed.
elasticsearchmachine
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 2, 2024
Prior to this PR, when the security-crypto threadpool queue overflows and rejects API key hashing submissions, a toxic value (specifically, a future which will never be completed) is added to the API key auth cache. This toxic cache value causes future authentication attempts with that API key to fail by timeout, because they will attempt to wait for the toxic future, until that value is invalidated and removed from the cache. Additionally, this will hold on to memory for each request that waits on the toxic future, even after the request has timed out. This PR adds a unit test to replicate this case, and adjusts the code which submits the key hashing task to the security-crypto threadpool to properly handle this point of failure by invalidating the cached future and notifying waiting handlers that the computation has failed.
gwbrown
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 5, 2024
Prior to this PR, when the security-crypto threadpool queue overflows and rejects API key hashing submissions, a toxic value (specifically, a future which will never be completed) is added to the API key auth cache. This toxic cache value causes future authentication attempts with that API key to fail by timeout, because they will attempt to wait for the toxic future, until that value is invalidated and removed from the cache. Additionally, this will hold on to memory for each request that waits on the toxic future, even after the request has timed out. This PR adds a unit test to replicate this case, and adjusts the code which submits the key hashing task to the security-crypto threadpool to properly handle this point of failure by invalidating the cached future and notifying waiting handlers that the computation has failed.
cbuescher
pushed a commit
to cbuescher/elasticsearch
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 4, 2024
Prior to this PR, when the security-crypto threadpool queue overflows and rejects API key hashing submissions, a toxic value (specifically, a future which will never be completed) is added to the API key auth cache. This toxic cache value causes future authentication attempts with that API key to fail by timeout, because they will attempt to wait for the toxic future, until that value is invalidated and removed from the cache. Additionally, this will hold on to memory for each request that waits on the toxic future, even after the request has timed out. This PR adds a unit test to replicate this case, and adjusts the code which submits the key hashing task to the security-crypto threadpool to properly handle this point of failure by invalidating the cached future and notifying waiting handlers that the computation has failed.
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Prior to this PR, when the security-crypto threadpool queue overflows and rejects API key hashing submissions, a toxic value (specifically, a future which will never be completed) is added to the API key auth cache. This toxic cache value causes future authentication attempts with that API key to fail by timeout, because they will attempt to wait for the toxic future, until that value is invalidated and removed from the cache. Additionally, this will hold on to memory for each request that waits on the toxic future, even after the request has timed out.
This PR adds a unit test to replicate this case, and adjusts the code which submits the key hashing task to the security-crypto threadpool to properly handle this point of failure by invalidating the cached future and notifying waiting handlers that the computation has failed.