4.9 1.0.x imx stable merge #22

agners · 2018-01-24T14:58:01Z

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[ Upstream commit 2c42225 ] We only allow runtime updates of expectation policies for timeout and maximum number of expectations, otherwise reject the update. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Acked-by: Liping Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f83bf8d ] We have memory leaks of nf_conntrack_helper & expect_policy. Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cd37a29 ] For some unknown reasons, in some cases, FLPD cache invalidation doesn't work properly with SYSMMU v5 controllers found in Exynos5433 SoCs. This can be observed by a firmware crash during initialization phase of MFC video decoder available in the mentioned SoCs when IOMMU support is enabled. To workaround this issue perform a full TLB/FLPD invalidation in case of replacing any first level page descriptors in case of SYSMMU v5. Fixes: 740a01e ("iommu/exynos: Add support for v5 SYSMMU") CC: [email protected] # v4.10+ Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andrzej Hajda <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b20cb60 ] revert commit a59e6d8 ("r8152: correct the rx early size") and fix the rx early size as (rx buffer size - rx packet size - rx desc size - alignment) / 4 Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 557d054 ] Until now, tipc_nametbl_unsubscribe() is called at subscriptions reference count cleanup. Usually the subscriptions cleanup is called at subscription timeout or at subscription cancel or at subscriber delete. We have ignored the possibility of this being called from other locations, which causes deadlock as we try to grab the tn->nametbl_lock while holding it already. CPU1: CPU2: ---------- ---------------- tipc_nametbl_publish spin_lock_bh(&tn->nametbl_lock) tipc_nametbl_insert_publ tipc_nameseq_insert_publ tipc_subscrp_report_overlap tipc_subscrp_get tipc_subscrp_send_event tipc_close_conn tipc_subscrb_release_cb tipc_subscrb_delete tipc_subscrp_put tipc_subscrp_put tipc_subscrp_kref_release tipc_nametbl_unsubscribe spin_lock_bh(&tn->nametbl_lock) <<grab nametbl_lock again>> CPU1: CPU2: ---------- ---------------- tipc_nametbl_stop spin_lock_bh(&tn->nametbl_lock) tipc_purge_publications tipc_nameseq_remove_publ tipc_subscrp_report_overlap tipc_subscrp_get tipc_subscrp_send_event tipc_close_conn tipc_subscrb_release_cb tipc_subscrb_delete tipc_subscrp_put tipc_subscrp_put tipc_subscrp_kref_release tipc_nametbl_unsubscribe spin_lock_bh(&tn->nametbl_lock) <<grab nametbl_lock again>> In this commit, we advance the calling of tipc_nametbl_unsubscribe() from the refcount cleanup to the intended callers. Fixes: d094c4d ("tipc: add subscription refcount to avoid invalid delete") Reported-by: John Thompson <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ec4fbd6 ] Dmitry reported a lockdep splat [1] (false positive) that we can fix by releasing the spinlock before calling icmp_send() from ip_expire() This is a false positive because sending an ICMP message can not possibly re-enter the IP frag engine. [1] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.10.0+ Freescale#29 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- modprobe/12392 is trying to acquire lock: (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 but task is already holding lock: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] ip_expire+0x51/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:201 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> Freescale#1 (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}: validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] ip_defrag+0x3a2/0x4130 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:669 ip_check_defrag+0x4e3/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:713 packet_rcv_fanout+0x282/0x800 net/packet/af_packet.c:1459 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1834 [inline] dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x294/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:1890 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:2903 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xab0 net/core/dev.c:2923 sch_direct_xmit+0x31f/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:182 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_resolve_output+0x6b9/0xb10 net/core/neighbour.c:1308 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:478 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x8b8/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_do_fragment+0x1d93/0x2720 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:672 ip_fragment.constprop.54+0x145/0x200 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:545 ip_finish_output+0x82d/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:314 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 raw_sendmsg+0x26de/0x3a00 net/ipv4/raw.c:655 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:761 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a3/0x9f0 net/socket.c:1985 __sys_sendmmsg+0x25c/0x750 net/socket.c:2075 SYSC_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2106 [inline] SyS_sendmmsg+0x35/0x60 net/socket.c:2101 do_syscall_64+0x2e8/0x930 arch/x86/entry/common.c:281 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a -> #0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1830 [inline] check_prevs_add+0xa8f/0x19f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1940 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:468 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:476 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xf6c/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_finish_output+0xa29/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 icmp_push_reply+0x372/0x4d0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:394 icmp_send+0x156c/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:754 ip_expire+0x40e/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:239 call_timer_fn+0x241/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1268 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307 [inline] __run_timers+0x960/0xcf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1601 run_timer_softirq+0x21/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1614 __do_softirq+0x31f/0xbe7 kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:962 apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:707 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline] atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline] rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs kernel/rcu/tree.c:350 [inline] __rcu_is_watching kernel/rcu/tree.c:1133 [inline] rcu_is_watching+0x83/0x110 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1147 rcu_read_lock_held+0x87/0xc0 kernel/rcu/update.c:293 radix_tree_deref_slot include/linux/radix-tree.h:238 [inline] filemap_map_pages+0x6d4/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2335 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3231 [inline] do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3265 [inline] do_fault+0xbd5/0x2080 mm/memory.c:3370 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:3600 [inline] __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x2cb0 mm/memory.c:3714 handle_mm_fault+0x1e2/0x480 mm/memory.c:3751 __do_page_fault+0x4f6/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1397 do_page_fault+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1460 page_fault+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1011 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&q->lock)->rlock); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); lock(&(&q->lock)->rlock); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 10 locks held by modprobe/12392: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff81329758>] __do_page_fault+0x2b8/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1336 Freescale#1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8188cab6>] filemap_map_pages+0x1e6/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2324 Freescale#2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] Freescale#2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] pte_alloc_one_map mm/memory.c:2944 [inline] Freescale#2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] alloc_set_pte+0x13b8/0x1b90 mm/memory.c:3072 Freescale#3: (((&q->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81627e72>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:175 [inline] Freescale#3: (((&q->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81627e72>] call_timer_fn+0x1c2/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1258 Freescale#4: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] Freescale#4: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] ip_expire+0x51/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:201 Freescale#5: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8389a633>] ip_expire+0x1b3/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:216 Freescale#6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:309 [inline] Freescale#6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] icmp_xmit_lock net/ipv4/icmp.c:219 [inline] Freescale#6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] icmp_send+0x803/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:681 Freescale#7: (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<ffffffff838ab9a1>] ip_finish_output2+0x2c1/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:198 Freescale#8: (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<ffffffff836d1dee>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x23e/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3324 Freescale#9: (dev->qdisc_running_key ?: &qdisc_running_key){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff836d3a27>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 12392 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.10.0+ Freescale#29 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_circular_bug+0x307/0x3b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1204 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1830 [inline] check_prevs_add+0xa8f/0x19f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1940 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:468 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:476 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xf6c/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_finish_output+0xa29/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 icmp_push_reply+0x372/0x4d0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:394 icmp_send+0x156c/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:754 ip_expire+0x40e/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:239 call_timer_fn+0x241/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1268 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307 [inline] __run_timers+0x960/0xcf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1601 run_timer_softirq+0x21/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1614 __do_softirq+0x31f/0xbe7 kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:962 apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:707 RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline] RIP: 0010:atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs kernel/rcu/tree.c:350 [inline] RIP: 0010:__rcu_is_watching kernel/rcu/tree.c:1133 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcu_is_watching+0x83/0x110 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1147 RSP: 0000:ffff8801c391f120 EFLAGS: 00000a03 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801c391f148 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055edd4374000 RDI: ffff8801dbe1ae0c RBP: ffff8801c391f1a0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 1ffff10038723e25 R13: ffff8801dbe1ae00 R14: ffff8801c391f680 R15: dffffc0000000000 </IRQ> rcu_read_lock_held+0x87/0xc0 kernel/rcu/update.c:293 radix_tree_deref_slot include/linux/radix-tree.h:238 [inline] filemap_map_pages+0x6d4/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2335 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3231 [inline] do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3265 [inline] do_fault+0xbd5/0x2080 mm/memory.c:3370 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:3600 [inline] __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x2cb0 mm/memory.c:3714 handle_mm_fault+0x1e2/0x480 mm/memory.c:3751 __do_page_fault+0x4f6/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1397 do_page_fault+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1460 page_fault+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1011 RIP: 0033:0x7f83172f2786 RSP: 002b:00007fffe859ae80 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 000055edd4373040 RBX: 00007f83175111c8 RCX: 000055edd4373238 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f8317510970 RBP: 00007fffe859afd0 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000064 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000055edd4373040 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffe859afe8 R15: 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e855fa9 ] When using GPIO as IRQ source, the GPIO must be configured in INPUT. Callbacks dedicated for this was missing in pinctrl-st driver. This fix the following kernel error when trying to lock a gpio as IRQ: [ 7.521095] gpio gpiochip7: (PIO11): gpiochip_lock_as_irq: tried to flag a GPIO set as output for IRQ [ 7.526018] gpio gpiochip7: (PIO11): unable to lock HW IRQ 6 for IRQ [ 7.529405] genirq: Failed to request resources for 0-0053 (irq 81) on irqchip GPIO Signed-off-by: Patrice Chotard <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a71e3cd ] lpfc cannot establish connection with targets that send PRLI in P2P configurations. If lpfc rejects a PRLI that is sent from a target the target will not resend and will reject the PRLI send from the initiator. [mkp: applied by hand] Signed-off-by: Dick Kennedy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Smart <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fb6c819 ] Quoting from the Intel SDM, volume 3, section 28.3.3.4: Guidelines for Use of the INVEPT Instruction: If EPT was in use on a logical processor at one time with EPTP X, it is recommended that software use the INVEPT instruction with the "single-context" INVEPT type and with EPTP X in the INVEPT descriptor before a VM entry on the same logical processor that enables EPT with EPTP X and either (a) the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control was changed from 0 to 1; or (b) the value of the APIC-access address was changed. In the nested case, the burden falls on L1, unless L0 enables EPT in vmcs02 when L1 doesn't enable EPT in vmcs12. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 24dccf8 ] After async pf setup successfully, there is a broadcast wakeup w/ special token 0xffffffff which tells vCPU that it should wake up all processes waiting for APFs though there is no real process waiting at the moment. The async page present tracepoint print prematurely and fails to catch the special token setup. This patch fixes it by moving the async page present tracepoint after the special token setup. Before patch: qemu-system-x86-8499 [006] ...1 5973.473292: kvm_async_pf_ready: token 0x0 gva 0x0 After patch: qemu-system-x86-8499 [006] ...1 5973.473292: kvm_async_pf_ready: token 0xffffffff gva 0x0 Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 08d839c ] This can be reproduced by running L2 on L1, and disable VPID on L0 if w/o commit "KVM: nVMX: Fix nested VPID vmx exec control", the L2 crash as below: KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0x7 EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=000306c3 ESI=00000000 EDI=00000000 EBP=00000000 ESP=00000000 EIP=0000fff0 EFL=00000002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0 ES =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 CS =f000 ffff0000 0000ffff 00009b00 SS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 DS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 FS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 GS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 LDT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200 TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00 GDT= 00000000 0000ffff IDT= 00000000 0000ffff CR0=60000010 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000000 DR0=0000000000000000 DR1=0000000000000000 DR2=0000000000000000 DR3=0000000000000000 DR6=00000000ffff0ff0 DR7=0000000000000400 EFER=0000000000000000 Reference SDM 30.3 INVVPID: Protected Mode Exceptions - #UD - If not in VMX operation. - If the logical processor does not support VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=0). - If the logical processor supports VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=1) but does not support the INVVPID instruction (IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP[32]=0). So we should check both VPID enable bit in vmx exec control and INVVPID support bit in vmx capability MSRs to enable VPID. This patch adds the guarantee to not enable VPID if either INVVPID or single-context/all-context invalidation is not exposed in vmx capability MSRs. Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d79f60 ] dtc recently added PCI bus checks. Fix these warnings. Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]> Cc: "Benoît Cousson" <[email protected]> Cc: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a2125d0 ] The latest gcc-7 snapshot adds a warning to point out that when atk_read_value_old or atk_read_value_new fails, we copy uninitialized data into sensor->cached_value: drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c: In function 'atk_input_show': drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c:651:26: error: 'value' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] Adding an error check avoids this. All versions of the driver are affected. Fixes: 2c03d07 ("hwmon: Add Asus ATK0110 support") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luca Tettamanti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9257821 ] There is a new clone of the XIN MO arcade controller which has same issue with out of range like the original. This fix will solve the issue where 2 directions on the joystick are not recognized by the new THT 2P arcade controller with device ID 0x75e1. In details the new device ID is added the hid-id list and the hid-xinmo source code. Signed-off-by: Peter Stein <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3c9d3f1 ] reader->substream is used in IRQ handler for error case but is never set. Set value to pcm substream on DAI startup and clean it on dai shutdown. Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2f25abe ] The linking status may be changed when autosuspend. And, after autoresume, the driver may try to transmit packets when the device is carrier off, because the interrupt transfer doesn't update the linking status, yet. And, if the device is in ALDPS mode, the device would stop working. The another similar case is 1. unplug the cable. 2. interrupt transfer queue a work_queue for linking change. 3. device enters the ALDPS mode. 4. a tx occurs before the work_queue is called. Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d969d2 ] Depending on the device type, hard_start_xmit() builds different output buffer formats. For instance with HiperSockets, on both L2 and L3 we strip the ETH header from the skb - L3 doesn't need it, and L2 carries it in the buffer's header element. For this, we pass data_offset = ETH_HLEN all the way down to __qeth_fill_buffer(), where skb->data is then adjusted accordingly. But the initial size calculation still considers the *full* skb length (including the ETH header). So qeth_get_elements_no() can erroneously reject a skb as too big, even though it would actually fit into an output buffer once the ETH header has been trimmed off later. Fix this by passing an additional offset to qeth_get_elements_no(), that indicates where in the skb the on-wire data actually begins. Since the current code uses data_offset=-1 for some special handling on OSA, we need to clamp data_offset to 0... On HiperSockets this helps when sending ~MTU-size skbs with weird page alignment. No change for OSA or AF_IUCV. Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit acd9776 ] With AF_IUCV traffic, the skb passed to hard_start_xmit() has a 14 byte slot at skb->data, intended for an ETH header. qeth_l3_fill_af_iucv_hdr() fills this ETH header... and then immediately moves it to the skb's headroom, where it disappears and is never seen again. But it's still possible for us to return NETDEV_TX_BUSY after the skb has been modified. Since we didn't get a private copy of the skb, the next time the skb is delivered to hard_start_xmit() it no longer has the expected layout (we moved the ETH header to the headroom, so skb->data now starts at the IUCV_TRANS header). So when qeth_l3_fill_af_iucv_hdr() does another round of rebuilding, the resulting qeth header ends up all wrong. On transmission, the buffer is then rejected by the HiperSockets device with SBALF15 = x'04'. When this error is passed back to af_iucv as TX_NOTIFY_UNREACHABLE, it tears down the offending socket. As the ETH header for AF_IUCV serves no purpose, just align the code to what we do for IP traffic on L3 HiperSockets: keep the ETH header at skb->data, and pass down data_offset = ETH_HLEN to qeth_fill_buffer(). When mapping the payload into the SBAL elements, the ETH header is then stripped off. This avoids the skb manipulations in qeth_l3_fill_af_iucv_hdr(), and any buffer re-entering hard_start_xmit() after NETDEV_TX_BUSY is now processed properly. Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a5af839 ] The latest gcc-7 snapshot warns about bfa_ioc_send_enable/bfa_ioc_send_disable writing undefined values into the hardware registers: drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bfa_ioc.c: In function 'bfa_iocpf_sm_disabling_entry': arch/arm/include/asm/io.h:109:22: error: '*((void *)&disable_req+4)' is used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=uninitialized] arch/arm/include/asm/io.h:109:22: error: '*((void *)&disable_req+8)' is used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=uninitialized] The two functions look like they should do the same thing, but only one of them initializes the time stamp and clscode field. The fact that we only get a warning for one of the two functions seems to be arbitrary, based on the inlining decisions in the compiler. To address this, I'm making both functions do the same thing: - set the clscode from the ioc structure in both - set the time stamp from ktime_get_real_seconds (which also avoids the signed-integer overflow in 2038 and extends the well-defined behavior until 2106). - zero-fill the reserved field Fixes: 8b230ed ("bna: Brocade 10Gb Ethernet device driver") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 871a862 ] Netdev notification events are de-registered only when all client iwdev instances are removed. If a single client is closed and re-opened, netdev events could arrive even before the Control Queue-Pair (CQP) is created, causing a NULL pointer dereference crash in i40iw_get_cqp_request. Fix this by allowing netdev event notification only after we have reached the INET_NOTIFIER state with respect to device initialization. Reported-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shiraz Saleem <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 86f46ab ] We need to make sure that the cq work item does not run when we are destroying the cq. Unlike flush_work, cancel_work_sync protects against self-requeue of the work item (which we can do in ib_cq_poll_work). Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cb88645 ] When vmalloc_user is used to create memory that is supposed to be mmap'd to user space, it is necessary for the mmap cookie (eg the offset) to be aligned to SHMLBA. This creates a situation where all virtual mappings of the same physical page share the same virtual cache index and guarantees VIPT coherence. Otherwise the cache is non-coherent and the kernel will not see writes by userspace when reading the shared page (or vice-versa). Reported-by: Josh Beavers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f858685 ] We can't just set the timeout on the tagset, we have to set it on the queue as it would have been setup already at this point. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…interfaces [ Upstream commit 95f2552 ] This change basically codifies what I think was already the limitations on the busy_poll and busy_read sysctl interfaces. We weren't checking the lower bounds and as such could input negative values. The behavior when that was used was dependent on the architecture. In order to prevent any issues with that I am just disabling support for values less than 0 since this way we don't have to worry about any odd behaviors. By limiting the sysctl values this way it also makes it consistent with how we handle the SO_BUSY_POLL socket option since the value appears to be reported as a signed integer value and negative values are rejected. Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ded2602 ] "goto err;" has it's own kfree_skb() call so it's a double free. We only need to free on the "goto exit;" path. Fixes: 8700e3e ("Soft RoCE driver") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9fcd67d ] According to C9-147, MSN should only be incremented when the last packet of a multi packet request has been received. "Logically, the requester associates a sequential Send Sequence Number (SSN) with each WQE posted to the send queue. The SSN bears a one- to-one relationship to the MSN returned by the responder in each re- sponse packet. Therefore, when the requester receives a response, it in- terprets the MSN as representing the SSN of the most recent request completed by the responder to determine which send WQE(s) can be completed." Fixes: 8700e3e ("Soft RoCE driver") Signed-off-by: David Marchand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 13a8cd1 ] When testing the epoll w/ busy poll code I found that I could get into a state where the i40e driver had q_vectors w/ active NAPI that had no rings. This was resulting in a divide by zero error. To correct it I am updating the driver code so that we only support NAPI on q_vectors that have 1 or more rings allocated to them. Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ea174c9 ] When the rdma device is removed, we must cleanup all the rdma resources within the DEVICE_REMOVAL event handler to let the device teardown gracefully. When this happens with live I/O, some memory regions are occupied. Thus, track them too and dereg all the mr's. We are safe with mr access by iscsi_iser_cleanup_task. Reported-by: Raju Rangoju <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Max Gurtovoy <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Max Gurtovoy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6ac3b77 ] vlsi_alloc_ring() checks for DMA mapping errors by comparing returned address with zero, while pci_dma_mapping_error() should be used. Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…table [ Upstream commit 83d9021 ] The nf_ct_helper_hash table is protected by nf_ct_helper_mutex, while nfct_helper operation is protected by nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTHELPER). So it's possible that one CPU is walking the nf_ct_helper_hash for cthelper add/get/del, another cpu is doing nf_conntrack_helpers_unregister at the same time. This is dangrous, and may cause use after free error. Note, delete operation will flush all cthelpers added via nfnetlink, so using rcu to do protect is not easy. Now introduce a dummy list to record all the cthelpers added via nfnetlink, then we can walk the dummy list instead of walking the nf_ct_helper_hash. Also, keep nfnl_cthelper_dump_table unchanged, it may be invoked without nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTHELPER) held. Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1bc7896 ] When experimenting with bpf_send_signal() helper in our production environment (5.2 based), we experienced a deadlock in NMI mode: Freescale#5 [ffffc9002219f770] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8110be24 Freescale#6 [ffffc9002219f770] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff81a43012 Freescale#7 [ffffc9002219f780] try_to_wake_up at ffffffff810e7ecd Freescale#8 [ffffc9002219f7e0] signal_wake_up_state at ffffffff810c7b55 Freescale#9 [ffffc9002219f7f0] __send_signal at ffffffff810c8602 Freescale#10 [ffffc9002219f830] do_send_sig_info at ffffffff810ca31a Freescale#11 [ffffc9002219f868] bpf_send_signal at ffffffff8119d227 Freescale#12 [ffffc9002219f988] bpf_overflow_handler at ffffffff811d4140 Freescale#13 [ffffc9002219f9e0] __perf_event_overflow at ffffffff811d68cf Freescale#14 [ffffc9002219fa10] perf_swevent_overflow at ffffffff811d6a09 Freescale#15 [ffffc9002219fa38] ___perf_sw_event at ffffffff811e0f47 Freescale#16 [ffffc9002219fc30] __schedule at ffffffff81a3e04d Freescale#17 [ffffc9002219fc90] schedule at ffffffff81a3e219 Freescale#18 [ffffc9002219fca0] futex_wait_queue_me at ffffffff8113d1b9 Freescale#19 [ffffc9002219fcd8] futex_wait at ffffffff8113e529 Freescale#20 [ffffc9002219fdf0] do_futex at ffffffff8113ffbc Freescale#21 [ffffc9002219fec0] __x64_sys_futex at ffffffff81140d1c Freescale#22 [ffffc9002219ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002602 Freescale#23 [ffffc9002219ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81c00068 The above call stack is actually very similar to an issue reported by Commit eac9153 ("bpf/stackmap: Fix deadlock with rq_lock in bpf_get_stack()") by Song Liu. The only difference is bpf_send_signal() helper instead of bpf_get_stack() helper. The above deadlock is triggered with a perf_sw_event. Similar to Commit eac9153, the below almost identical reproducer used tracepoint point sched/sched_switch so the issue can be easily caught. /* stress_test.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #define THREAD_COUNT 1000 char *filename; void *worker(void *p) { void *ptr; int fd; char *pptr; fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return NULL; while (1) { struct timespec ts = {0, 1000 + rand() % 2000}; ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096 * 64, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); usleep(1); if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) { printf("failed to mmap\n"); break; } munmap(ptr, 4096 * 64); usleep(1); pptr = malloc(1); usleep(1); pptr[0] = 1; usleep(1); free(pptr); usleep(1); nanosleep(&ts, NULL); } close(fd); return NULL; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { void *ptr; int i; pthread_t threads[THREAD_COUNT]; if (argc < 2) return 0; filename = argv[1]; for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) { if (pthread_create(threads + i, NULL, worker, NULL)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error creating thread\n"); return 0; } } for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) pthread_join(threads[i], NULL); return 0; } and the following command: 1. run `stress_test /bin/ls` in one windown 2. hack bcc trace.py with the following change: # --- a/tools/trace.py # +++ b/tools/trace.py @@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(%s); __data.tgid = __tgid; __data.pid = __pid; bpf_get_current_comm(&__data.comm, sizeof(__data.comm)); + bpf_send_signal(10); %s %s %s.perf_submit(%s, &__data, sizeof(__data)); 3. in a different window run ./trace.py -p $(pidof stress_test) t:sched:sched_switch The deadlock can be reproduced in our production system. Similar to Song's fix, the fix is to delay sending signal if irqs is disabled to avoid deadlocks involving with rq_lock. With this change, my above stress-test in our production system won't cause deadlock any more. I also implemented a scale-down version of reproducer in the selftest (a subsequent commit). With latest bpf-next, it complains for the following potential deadlock. [ 32.832450] -> Freescale#1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}: [ 32.833100] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80 [ 32.833696] task_rq_lock+0x2c/0xa0 [ 32.834182] task_sched_runtime+0x59/0xd0 [ 32.834721] thread_group_cputime+0x250/0x270 [ 32.835304] thread_group_cputime_adjusted+0x2e/0x70 [ 32.835959] do_task_stat+0x8a7/0xb80 [ 32.836461] proc_single_show+0x51/0xb0 ... [ 32.839512] -> #0 (&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock){....}: [ 32.840275] __lock_acquire+0x1358/0x1a20 [ 32.840826] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x1d0 [ 32.841309] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80 [ 32.841916] __lock_task_sighand+0x79/0x160 [ 32.842465] do_send_sig_info+0x35/0x90 [ 32.842977] bpf_send_signal+0xa/0x10 [ 32.843464] bpf_prog_bc13ed9e4d3163e3_send_signal_tp_sched+0x465/0x1000 [ 32.844301] trace_call_bpf+0x115/0x270 [ 32.844809] perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x4a/0xc0 [ 32.845411] perf_trace_sched_switch+0x10f/0x180 [ 32.846014] __schedule+0x45d/0x880 [ 32.846483] schedule+0x5f/0xd0 ... [ 32.853148] Chain exists of: [ 32.853148] &(&sighand->siglock)->rlock --> &p->pi_lock --> &rq->lock [ 32.853148] [ 32.854451] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 32.854451] [ 32.855173] CPU0 CPU1 [ 32.855745] ---- ---- [ 32.856278] lock(&rq->lock); [ 32.856671] lock(&p->pi_lock); [ 32.857332] lock(&rq->lock); [ 32.857999] lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock); Deadlock happens on CPU0 when it tries to acquire &sighand->siglock but it has been held by CPU1 and CPU1 tries to grab &rq->lock and cannot get it. This is not exactly the callstack in our production environment, but sympotom is similar and both locks are using spin_lock_irqsave() to acquire the lock, and both involves rq_lock. The fix to delay sending signal when irq is disabled also fixed this issue. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) Freescale#1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 Freescale#2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 Freescale#3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 Freescale#4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 Freescale#5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 Freescale#6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 Freescale#7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 Freescale#8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 Freescale#9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 Freescale#10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 Freescale#11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 Freescale#12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 Freescale#13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 Freescale#14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 Freescale#15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 Freescale#16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 Freescale#17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 Freescale#18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 Freescale#19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 Freescale#20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 Freescale#21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 Freescale#22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 Freescale#23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 Freescale#24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 Freescale#25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 Freescale#26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96298f6 ] According to Core Spec Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part A 6.1.5, the incoming L2CAP_ConfigReq should be handled during OPEN state. The section below shows the btmon trace when running L2CAP/COS/CFD/BV-12-C before and after this change. === Before === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 Freescale#22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 Freescale#23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 Freescale#24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 Freescale#27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 Freescale#28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 Freescale#30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 Freescale#31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ...... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 14 Freescale#32 L2CAP: Command Reject (0x01) ident 3 len 6 Reason: Invalid CID in request (0x0002) Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#33 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... === After === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 Freescale#22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 Freescale#23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 Freescale#24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 Freescale#27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 Freescale#28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 Freescale#30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 Freescale#31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ..... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 Freescale#32 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 Freescale#33 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#34 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#35 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) Freescale#1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 Freescale#2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 Freescale#3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 Freescale#4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 Freescale#5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 Freescale#6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 Freescale#7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 Freescale#8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 Freescale#9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 Freescale#10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 Freescale#11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 Freescale#12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 Freescale#13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 Freescale#14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 Freescale#15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 Freescale#16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 Freescale#17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 Freescale#18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 Freescale#19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 Freescale#20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 Freescale#21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 Freescale#22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 Freescale#23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 Freescale#24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 Freescale#25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 Freescale#26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96298f6 ] According to Core Spec Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part A 6.1.5, the incoming L2CAP_ConfigReq should be handled during OPEN state. The section below shows the btmon trace when running L2CAP/COS/CFD/BV-12-C before and after this change. === Before === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 Freescale#22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 Freescale#23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 Freescale#24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 Freescale#27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 Freescale#28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 Freescale#30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 Freescale#31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ...... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 14 Freescale#32 L2CAP: Command Reject (0x01) ident 3 len 6 Reason: Invalid CID in request (0x0002) Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#33 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... === After === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 Freescale#22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 Freescale#23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 Freescale#24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 Freescale#27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 Freescale#28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 Freescale#30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 Freescale#31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ..... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 Freescale#32 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 Freescale#33 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#34 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Freescale#35 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4ff753f ] When an UE or memory error exception is encountered the MCE handler tries to find the pfn using addr_to_pfn() which takes effective address as an argument, later pfn is used to poison the page where memory error occurred, recent rework in this area made addr_to_pfn to run in real mode, which can be fatal as it may try to access memory outside RMO region. Have two helper functions to separate things to be done in real mode and virtual mode without changing any functionality. This also fixes the following error as the use of addr_to_pfn is now moved to virtual mode. Without this change following kernel crash is seen on hitting UE. [ 485.128036] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [Freescale#1] [ 485.128040] LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries [ 485.128047] Modules linked in: [ 485.128067] CPU: 15 PID: 6536 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 5.7.0 Freescale#22 [ 485.128074] NIP: c00000000009b24c LR: c0000000000398d8 CTR: c000000000cd57c0 [ 485.128078] REGS: c000000003f1f970 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G OE (5.7.0) [ 485.128082] MSR: 8000000000001003 <SF,ME,RI,LE> CR: 28008284 XER: 00000001 [ 485.128088] CFAR: c00000000009b190 DAR: c0000001fab00000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 1 [ 485.128088] GPR00: 0000000000000001 c000000003f1fbf0 c000000001634300 0000b0fa01000000 [ 485.128088] GPR04: d000000002220000 0000000000000000 00000000fab00000 0000000000000022 [ 485.128088] GPR08: c0000001fab00000 0000000000000000 c0000001fab00000 c000000003f1fc14 [ 485.128088] GPR12: 0000000000000008 c000000003ff5880 d000000002100008 0000000000000000 [ 485.128088] GPR16: 000000000000ff20 000000000000fff1 000000000000fff2 d0000000021a1100 [ 485.128088] GPR20: d000000002200000 c00000015c893c50 c000000000d49b28 c00000015c893c50 [ 485.128088] GPR24: d0000000021a0d08 c0000000014e5da8 d0000000021a0818 000000000000000a [ 485.128088] GPR28: 0000000000000008 000000000000000a c0000000017e2970 000000000000000a [ 485.128125] NIP [c00000000009b24c] __find_linux_pte+0x11c/0x310 [ 485.128130] LR [c0000000000398d8] addr_to_pfn+0x138/0x170 [ 485.128133] Call Trace: [ 485.128135] Instruction dump: [ 485.128138] 3929ffff 7d4a3378 7c883c36 7d2907b4 794a1564 7d294038 794af082 3900ffff [ 485.128144] 79291f24 790af00e 78e70020 7d095214 <7c69502a> 2fa30000 419e011c 70690040 [ 485.128152] ---[ end trace d34b27e29ae0e340 ]--- Fixes: 9ca766f ("powerpc/64s/pseries: machine check convert to use common event code") Signed-off-by: Ganesh Goudar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e79f02 ] When running in BE mode on LPAE hardware with a PA-to-VA translation that exceeds 4 GB, we patch bits 39:32 of the offset into the wrong byte of the opcode. So fix that, by rotating the offset in r0 to the right by 8 bits, which will put the 8-bit immediate in bits 31:24. Note that this will also move bit Freescale#22 in its correct place when applying the rotation to the constant #0x400000. Fixes: d9a790d ("ARM: 7883/1: fix mov to mvn conversion in case of 64 bit phys_addr_t and BE") Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e125fbe ] This patch fixes an deadlock issue when dlm_lowcomms_close() is called. When dlm_lowcomms_close() is called the clusters_root.subsys.su_mutex is held to remove configfs items. At this time we flushing (e.g. cancel_work_sync()) the workers of send and recv workqueue. Due the fact that we accessing configfs items (mark values), these workers will lock clusters_root.subsys.su_mutex as well which are already hold by dlm_lowcomms_close() and ends in a deadlock situation. [67170.703046] ====================================================== [67170.703965] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [67170.704758] 5.11.0-rc4+ Freescale#22 Tainted: G W [67170.705433] ------------------------------------------------------ [67170.706228] dlm_controld/280 is trying to acquire lock: [67170.706915] ffff9f2f475a6948 ((wq_completion)dlm_recv){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x203/0x4c0 [67170.708026] but task is already holding lock: [67170.708758] ffffffffa132f878 (&clusters_root.subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: configfs_rmdir+0x29b/0x310 [67170.710016] which lock already depends on the new lock. The new behaviour adds the mark value to the node address configuration which doesn't require to held the clusters_root.subsys.su_mutex by accessing mark values in a separate datastructure. However the mark values can be set now only after a node address was set which is the case when the user is using dlm_controld. Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Teigland <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit b4d25ab upstream. In commit 142639a ("drm/msm/a6xx: fix crashstate capture for A650") we changed a6xx_get_gmu_registers() to read 3 sets of registers. Unfortunately, we didn't change the memory allocation for the array. That leads to a KASAN warning (this was on the chromeos-5.4 kernel, which has the problematic commit backported to it): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _a6xx_get_gmu_registers+0x144/0x430 Write of size 8 at addr ffffff80c89432b0 by task A618-worker/209 CPU: 5 PID: 209 Comm: A618-worker Tainted: G W 5.4.156-lockdep Freescale#22 Hardware name: Google Lazor Limozeen without Touchscreen (rev5 - rev8) (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x248 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0x128/0x1ec print_address_description+0x88/0x4a0 __kasan_report+0xfc/0x120 kasan_report+0x10/0x18 __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x24 _a6xx_get_gmu_registers+0x144/0x430 a6xx_gpu_state_get+0x330/0x25d4 msm_gpu_crashstate_capture+0xa0/0x84c recover_worker+0x328/0x838 kthread_worker_fn+0x32c/0x574 kthread+0x2dc/0x39c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Allocated by task 209: __kasan_kmalloc+0xfc/0x1c4 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1f0/0x2a0 a6xx_gpu_state_get+0x164/0x25d4 msm_gpu_crashstate_capture+0xa0/0x84c recover_worker+0x328/0x838 kthread_worker_fn+0x32c/0x574 kthread+0x2dc/0x39c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Fixes: 142639a ("drm/msm/a6xx: fix crashstate capture for A650") Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211103153049.1.Idfa574ccb529d17b69db3a1852e49b580132035c@changeid Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…port_id() [ Upstream commit 1d72d9f ] The array param[] in elantech_change_report_id() must be at least 3 bytes, because elantech_read_reg_params() is calling ps2_command() with PSMOUSE_CMD_GETINFO, that is going to access 3 bytes from param[], but it's defined in the stack as an array of 2 bytes, therefore we have a potential stack out-of-bounds access here, also confirmed by KASAN: [ 6.512374] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0 [ 6.512397] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881024d77c2 by task kworker/2:1/118 [ 6.512416] CPU: 2 PID: 118 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.13.0-22-generic Freescale#22+arighi20211110 [ 6.512428] Hardware name: LENOVO 20T8000QGE/20T8000QGE, BIOS R1AET32W (1.08 ) 08/14/2020 [ 6.512436] Workqueue: events_long serio_handle_event [ 6.512453] Call Trace: [ 6.512462] show_stack+0x52/0x58 [ 6.512474] dump_stack+0xa1/0xd3 [ 6.512487] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x140 [ 6.512502] ? __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0 [ 6.512516] __kasan_report.cold+0x7d/0x112 [ 6.512527] ? _raw_write_lock_irq+0x20/0xd0 [ 6.512539] ? __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0 [ 6.512552] kasan_report+0x3c/0x50 [ 6.512564] __asan_load1+0x6a/0x70 [ 6.512575] __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0 [ 6.512589] ? ps2_drain+0x240/0x240 [ 6.512601] ? dev_printk_emit+0xa2/0xd3 [ 6.512612] ? dev_vprintk_emit+0xc5/0xc5 [ 6.512621] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 6.512634] ? mutex_lock+0x8f/0xe0 [ 6.512643] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x20/0x20 [ 6.512655] ps2_command+0x52/0x90 [ 6.512670] elantech_ps2_command+0x4f/0xc0 [psmouse] [ 6.512734] elantech_change_report_id+0x1e6/0x256 [psmouse] [ 6.512799] ? elantech_report_trackpoint.constprop.0.cold+0xd/0xd [psmouse] [ 6.512863] ? ps2_command+0x7f/0x90 [ 6.512877] elantech_query_info.cold+0x6bd/0x9ed [psmouse] [ 6.512943] ? elantech_setup_ps2+0x460/0x460 [psmouse] [ 6.513005] ? psmouse_reset+0x69/0xb0 [psmouse] [ 6.513064] ? psmouse_attr_set_helper+0x2a0/0x2a0 [psmouse] [ 6.513122] ? phys_pmd_init+0x30e/0x521 [ 6.513137] elantech_init+0x8a/0x200 [psmouse] [ 6.513200] ? elantech_init_ps2+0xf0/0xf0 [psmouse] [ 6.513249] ? elantech_query_info+0x440/0x440 [psmouse] [ 6.513296] ? synaptics_send_cmd+0x60/0x60 [psmouse] [ 6.513342] ? elantech_query_info+0x440/0x440 [psmouse] [ 6.513388] ? psmouse_try_protocol+0x11e/0x170 [psmouse] [ 6.513432] psmouse_extensions+0x65d/0x6e0 [psmouse] [ 6.513476] ? psmouse_try_protocol+0x170/0x170 [psmouse] [ 6.513519] ? mutex_unlock+0x22/0x40 [ 6.513526] ? ps2_command+0x7f/0x90 [ 6.513536] ? psmouse_probe+0xa3/0xf0 [psmouse] [ 6.513580] psmouse_switch_protocol+0x27d/0x2e0 [psmouse] [ 6.513624] psmouse_connect+0x272/0x530 [psmouse] [ 6.513669] serio_driver_probe+0x55/0x70 [ 6.513679] really_probe+0x190/0x720 [ 6.513689] driver_probe_device+0x160/0x1f0 [ 6.513697] device_driver_attach+0x119/0x130 [ 6.513705] ? device_driver_attach+0x130/0x130 [ 6.513713] __driver_attach+0xe7/0x1a0 [ 6.513720] ? device_driver_attach+0x130/0x130 [ 6.513728] bus_for_each_dev+0xfb/0x150 [ 6.513738] ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x10/0x10 [ 6.513748] ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x30/0x30 [ 6.513757] driver_attach+0x2d/0x40 [ 6.513764] serio_handle_event+0x199/0x3d0 [ 6.513775] process_one_work+0x471/0x740 [ 6.513785] worker_thread+0x2d2/0x790 [ 6.513794] ? process_one_work+0x740/0x740 [ 6.513802] kthread+0x1b4/0x1e0 [ 6.513809] ? set_kthread_struct+0x80/0x80 [ 6.513816] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 6.513832] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 6.513838] page:00000000bc35e189 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1024d7 [ 6.513847] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 6.513860] raw: 0017ffffc0000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 6.513867] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 6.513872] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 6.513879] addr ffff8881024d77c2 is located in stack of task kworker/2:1/118 at offset 34 in frame: [ 6.513887] elantech_change_report_id+0x0/0x256 [psmouse] [ 6.513941] this frame has 1 object: [ 6.513947] [32, 34) 'param' [ 6.513956] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 6.513962] ffff8881024d7680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 6.513969] ffff8881024d7700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 6.513976] >ffff8881024d7780: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 02 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 [ 6.513982] ^ [ 6.513988] ffff8881024d7800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 6.513995] ffff8881024d7880: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 03 f2 03 f2 03 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 [ 6.514000] ================================================================== Define param[] in elantech_change_report_id() as an array of 3 bytes to prevent the out-of-bounds access in the stack. Fixes: e4c9062 ("Input: elantech - fix protocol errors for some trackpoints in SMBus mode") BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1945590 Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4224cfd ] When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... Freescale#9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Freescale#10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] Freescale#11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] Freescale#12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] Freescale#13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] Freescale#14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] Freescale#15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] Freescale#16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] Freescale#17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 Freescale#18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 Freescale#19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 Freescale#20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf Freescale#21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 Freescale#22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 Freescale#23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 Freescale#24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff Freescale#25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f Freescale#26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8cfb085 ] Li Huafei reports that mcount-based ftrace with module PLTs was broken by commit: a625357 ("arm64: ftrace: consistently handle PLTs.") When a module PLTs are used and a module is loaded sufficiently far away from the kernel, we'll create PLTs for any branches which are out-of-range. These are separate from the special ftrace trampoline PLTs, which the module PLT code doesn't directly manipulate. When mcount is in use this is a problem, as each mcount callsite in a module will be initialized to point to a module PLT, but since commit a625357 ftrace_make_nop() will assume that the callsite has been initialized to point to the special ftrace trampoline PLT, and ftrace_find_callable_addr() rejects other cases. This means that when ftrace tries to initialize a callsite via ftrace_make_nop(), the call to ftrace_find_callable_addr() will find that the `_mcount` stub is out-of-range and is not handled by the ftrace PLT, resulting in a splat: | ftrace_test: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. | ftrace: no module PLT for _mcount | ------------[ ftrace bug ]------------ | ftrace failed to modify | [<ffff800029180014>] 0xffff800029180014 | actual: 44:00:00:94 | Initializing ftrace call sites | ftrace record flags: 2000000 | (0) | expected tramp: ffff80000802eb3c | ------------[ cut here ]------------ | WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 157 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2120 ftrace_bug+0x94/0x270 | Modules linked in: | CPU: 3 PID: 157 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 6.0.0-rc6-00151-gcd722513a189-dirty Freescale#22 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : ftrace_bug+0x94/0x270 | lr : ftrace_bug+0x21c/0x270 | sp : ffff80000b2bbaf0 | x29: ffff80000b2bbaf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff0000c4d38000 | x26: 0000000000000001 x25: ffff800009d7e000 x24: ffff0000c4d86e00 | x23: 0000000002000000 x22: ffff80000a62b000 x21: ffff8000098ebea8 | x20: ffff0000c4d38000 x19: ffff80000aa24158 x18: ffffffffffffffff | x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0a0d2d2d2d2d2d2d x15: ffff800009aa9118 | x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 6333626532303830 x12: 3030303866666666 | x11: 203a706d61727420 x10: 6465746365707865 x9 : 3362653230383030 | x8 : c0000000ffffefff x7 : 0000000000017fe8 x6 : 000000000000bff4 | x5 : 0000000000057fa8 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 | x2 : ad2cb14bb5438900 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000022 | Call trace: | ftrace_bug+0x94/0x270 | ftrace_process_locs+0x308/0x430 | ftrace_module_init+0x44/0x60 | load_module+0x15b4/0x1ce8 | __do_sys_init_module+0x1ec/0x238 | __arm64_sys_init_module+0x24/0x30 | invoke_syscall+0x54/0x118 | el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0x84/0x100 | do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xd0 | el0_svc+0x1c/0x50 | el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xb8 | el0t_64_sync+0x15c/0x160 | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | ---------test_init----------- Fix this by reverting to the old behaviour of ignoring the old instruction when initialising an mcount callsite in a module, which was the behaviour prior to commit a625357. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Fixes: a625357 ("arm64: ftrace: consistently handle PLTs.") Reported-by: Li Huafei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected] Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e264be ] When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 #10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 #11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] #12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] #13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] #14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 #15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 #16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 #17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 #18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 #19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc #20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d #21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 #22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e264be ] When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb Freescale#1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d Freescale#2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc Freescale#3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 Freescale#4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] Freescale#5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 Freescale#6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa Freescale#7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc Freescale#8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e Freescale#9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 Freescale#10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 Freescale#11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] Freescale#12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] Freescale#13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] Freescale#14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 Freescale#15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 Freescale#16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 Freescale#17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 Freescale#18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 Freescale#19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc Freescale#20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d Freescale#21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 Freescale#22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 0b0747d upstream. The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29 to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29 was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled. PID: 17360 TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40 CPU: 41 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0 !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0 # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0 # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0 # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0 # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0 # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0 # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0 # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0 Freescale#10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0 Freescale#11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0 Freescale#12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0 Freescale#13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0 Freescale#14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0 Freescale#15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0 Freescale#16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0 Freescale#17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0 Freescale#18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0 Freescale#19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 Freescale#20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 Freescale#21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 Freescale#22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 Freescale#23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 Freescale#24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 Freescale#25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 Freescale#26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 Freescale#27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 PID: 17355 TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0 # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0 # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0 # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0 # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0 # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0 # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0 # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0 # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 Freescale#10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 Freescale#11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 Freescale#12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 Freescale#13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 Freescale#14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 Freescale#15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 Freescale#16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 Freescale#17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix the deadlock. Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c319882 ] When the skb is reorganized during esp_output (!esp->inline), the pages coming from the original skb fragments are supposed to be released back to the system through put_page. But if the skb fragment pages are originating from a page_pool, calling put_page on them will trigger a page_pool leak which will eventually result in a crash. This leak can be easily observed when using CONFIG_DEBUG_VM and doing ipsec + gre (non offloaded) forwarding: BUG: Bad page state in process ksoftirqd/16 pfn:1451b6 page:00000000de2b8d32 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1451b6000 pfn:0x1451b6 flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0200000000000000 dead000000000040 ffff88810d23c000 0000000000000000 raw: 00000001451b6000 0000000000000001 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: page_pool leak Modules linked in: ip_gre gre mlx5_ib mlx5_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink iptable_nat nf_nat xt_addrtype br_netfilter rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core] CPU: 16 PID: 96 Comm: ksoftirqd/16 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4+ Freescale#22 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x36/0x50 bad_page+0x70/0xf0 free_unref_page_prepare+0x27a/0x460 free_unref_page+0x38/0x120 esp_ssg_unref.isra.0+0x15f/0x200 esp_output_tail+0x66d/0x780 esp_xmit+0x2c5/0x360 validate_xmit_xfrm+0x313/0x370 ? validate_xmit_skb+0x1d/0x330 validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4c/0x70 sch_direct_xmit+0x23e/0x350 __dev_queue_xmit+0x337/0xba0 ? nf_hook_slow+0x3f/0xd0 ip_finish_output2+0x25e/0x580 iptunnel_xmit+0x19b/0x240 ip_tunnel_xmit+0x5fb/0xb60 ipgre_xmit+0x14d/0x280 [ip_gre] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x208/0xba0 ? nf_hook_slow+0x3f/0xd0 ip_finish_output2+0x1ca/0x580 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x32/0x40 ip_sublist_rcv+0x1b2/0x1f0 ? ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0x460/0x460 ip_list_rcv+0x103/0x130 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x181/0x1e0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1b3/0x2c0 napi_gro_receive+0xc8/0x200 gro_cell_poll+0x52/0x90 __napi_poll+0x25/0x1a0 net_rx_action+0x28e/0x300 __do_softirq+0xc3/0x276 ? sort_range+0x20/0x20 run_ksoftirqd+0x1e/0x30 smpboot_thread_fn+0xa6/0x130 kthread+0xcd/0x100 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> The suggested fix is to introduce a new wrapper (skb_page_unref) that covers page refcounting for page_pool pages as well. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 6a5bcd8 ("page_pool: Allow drivers to hint on SKB recycling") Reported-and-tested-by: Anatoli N.Chechelnickiy <[email protected]> Reported-by: Ian Kumlien <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAA85sZvvHtrpTQRqdaOx6gd55zPAVsqMYk_Lwh4Md5knTq7AyA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 79d72c6 upstream. When configuring a hugetlb filesystem via the fsconfig() syscall, there is a possible NULL dereference in hugetlbfs_fill_super() caused by assigning NULL to ctx->hstate in hugetlbfs_parse_param() when the requested pagesize is non valid. E.g: Taking the following steps: fd = fsopen("hugetlbfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC); fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "pagesize", "1024", 0); fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0); Given that the requested "pagesize" is invalid, ctxt->hstate will be replaced with NULL, losing its previous value, and we will print an error: ... ... case Opt_pagesize: ps = memparse(param->string, &rest); ctx->hstate = h; if (!ctx->hstate) { pr_err("Unsupported page size %lu MB\n", ps / SZ_1M); return -EINVAL; } return 0; ... ... This is a problem because later on, we will dereference ctxt->hstate in hugetlbfs_fill_super() ... ... sb->s_blocksize = huge_page_size(ctx->hstate); ... ... Causing below Oops. Fix this by replacing cxt->hstate value only when then pagesize is known to be valid. kernel: hugetlbfs: Unsupported page size 0 MB kernel: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 kernel: #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page kernel: PGD 800000010f66c067 P4D 800000010f66c067 PUD 1b22f8067 PMD 0 kernel: Oops: 0000 [Freescale#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 5659 Comm: syscall Tainted: G E 6.8.0-rc2-default+ Freescale#22 5a47c3fef76212addcc6eb71344aabc35190ae8f kernel: Hardware name: Intel Corp. GROVEPORT/GROVEPORT, BIOS GVPRCRB1.86B.0016.D04.1705030402 05/03/2017 kernel: RIP: 0010:hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0 kernel: Code: 48 8b 3b e8 3e c6 ed ff 48 85 c0 48 89 45 20 0f 84 d6 00 00 00 48 b8 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 e7 49 89 44 24 20 48 8b 03 <8b> 48 28 b8 00 10 00 00 48 d3 e0 49 89 44 24 18 48 8b 03 8b 40 28 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffbe9960fcbd48 EFLAGS: 00010246 kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9af5272ae780 RCX: 0000000000372004 kernel: RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: ffff9af555e9b000 kernel: RBP: ffff9af52ee66b00 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000370004 kernel: R10: ffffbe9960fcbd48 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff9af555e9b000 kernel: R13: ffffffffa66b86c0 R14: ffff9af507d2f400 R15: ffff9af507d2f400 kernel: FS: 00007ffbc0ba4740(0000) GS:ffff9b0bd7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 kernel: CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 00000001b1ee0000 CR4: 00000000001506f0 kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <TASK> kernel: ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60 kernel: ? page_fault_oops+0x16f/0x4a0 kernel: ? search_bpf_extables+0x65/0x70 kernel: ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x310 kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150 kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 kernel: ? __pfx_hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10 kernel: ? hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0 kernel: ? hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x28/0x1a0 kernel: ? __pfx_hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10 kernel: vfs_get_super+0x40/0xa0 kernel: ? __pfx_bpf_lsm_capable+0x10/0x10 kernel: vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xd0 kernel: vfs_cmd_create+0x64/0xe0 kernel: __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x395/0x410 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x80/0x160 kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x82/0x240 kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x160 kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x82/0x240 kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x160 kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7ffbc0cb87c9 kernel: Code: 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 97 96 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffc29d2f388 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffbc0cb87c9 kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000003 kernel: RBP: 00007ffc29d2f3b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 kernel: R13: 00007ffc29d2f4c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 kernel: </TASK> kernel: Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5(E) auth_rpcgss(E) nfsv4(E) dns_resolver(E) nfs(E) lockd(E) grace(E) sunrpc(E) netfs(E) af_packet(E) bridge(E) stp(E) llc(E) iscsi_ibft(E) iscsi_boot_sysfs(E) intel_rapl_msr(E) intel_rapl_common(E) iTCO_wdt(E) intel_pmc_bxt(E) sb_edac(E) iTCO_vendor_support(E) x86_pkg_temp_thermal(E) intel_powerclamp(E) coretemp(E) kvm_intel(E) rfkill(E) ipmi_ssif(E) kvm(E) acpi_ipmi(E) irqbypass(E) pcspkr(E) igb(E) ipmi_si(E) mei_me(E) i2c_i801(E) joydev(E) intel_pch_thermal(E) i2c_smbus(E) dca(E) lpc_ich(E) mei(E) ipmi_devintf(E) ipmi_msghandler(E) acpi_pad(E) tiny_power_button(E) button(E) fuse(E) efi_pstore(E) configfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) ext4(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) hid_generic(E) usbhid(E) sd_mod(E) t10_pi(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) crc32_pclmul(E) crc32c_intel(E) polyval_clmulni(E) ahci(E) xhci_pci(E) polyval_generic(E) gf128mul(E) ghash_clmulni_intel(E) sha512_ssse3(E) sha256_ssse3(E) xhci_pci_renesas(E) libahci(E) ehci_pci(E) sha1_ssse3(E) xhci_hcd(E) ehci_hcd(E) libata(E) kernel: mgag200(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) usbcore(E) wmi(E) sg(E) dm_multipath(E) dm_mod(E) scsi_dh_rdac(E) scsi_dh_emc(E) scsi_dh_alua(E) scsi_mod(E) scsi_common(E) aesni_intel(E) crypto_simd(E) cryptd(E) kernel: Unloaded tainted modules: acpi_cpufreq(E):1 fjes(E):1 kernel: CR2: 0000000000000028 kernel: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- kernel: RIP: 0010:hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0 kernel: Code: 48 8b 3b e8 3e c6 ed ff 48 85 c0 48 89 45 20 0f 84 d6 00 00 00 48 b8 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 e7 49 89 44 24 20 48 8b 03 <8b> 48 28 b8 00 10 00 00 48 d3 e0 49 89 44 24 18 48 8b 03 8b 40 28 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffbe9960fcbd48 EFLAGS: 00010246 kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9af5272ae780 RCX: 0000000000372004 kernel: RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: ffff9af555e9b000 kernel: RBP: ffff9af52ee66b00 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000370004 kernel: R10: ffffbe9960fcbd48 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff9af555e9b000 kernel: R13: ffffffffa66b86c0 R14: ffff9af507d2f400 R15: ffff9af507d2f400 kernel: FS: 00007ffbc0ba4740(0000) GS:ffff9b0bd7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 kernel: CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 00000001b1ee0000 CR4: 00000000001506f0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 3202198 ("hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context") Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vamsi Krishna Brahmajosyula <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ] ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated memory in hist_browser__run(). Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string. Committer notes: Further explanation from Ian Rogers: My command line using tui is: $ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report' I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan error (from the log file): ``` ==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address 0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180 65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10 READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0 #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461 #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251) #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9) #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60 #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266 #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288 #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206 #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458 #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412 #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527 #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613 #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661 #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671 #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141 #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805 #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374 #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516 #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350 #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403 #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447 #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561 #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId: 84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93) Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746 This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is inside this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork ``` hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit. There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade anyway. Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Gainey <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]> Cc: Li Dong <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Oliver Upton <[email protected]> Cc: Paran Lee <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]> Cc: Sun Haiyong <[email protected]> Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Yanteng Si <[email protected]> Cc: Yicong Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…uddy pages [ Upstream commit 8cf360b ] When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00 flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff) raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180 RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0 RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69 R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009 FS: 00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887 RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0 R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state: BUG: Bad page state in process page-types pfn:8cee00 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00 flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff) page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy) raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000 page dumped because: nonzero mapcount Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty #22 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0 bad_page+0x63/0xf0 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8 R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040 </TASK> The root cause should be the below race: memory_failure try_memory_failure_hugetlb me_huge_page __page_handle_poison dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction. take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list. -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction. page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1. Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning. And bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to allocate this page. Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when it returns 1. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

ummakynes and others added 30 commits December 25, 2017 14:23

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4.9 1.0.x imx stable merge #22

4.9 1.0.x imx stable merge #22

agners commented Jan 24, 2018

4.9 1.0.x imx stable merge #22

4.9 1.0.x imx stable merge #22

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agners commented Jan 24, 2018