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* Closes #235: Cloudshell CSWSH * Update gcp-cloudshell-cswsh.yaml --------- Co-authored-by: Amitai Cohen <[email protected]>
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title: GCP Cloudshell Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) | ||
slug: gcp-cloudshell-cswsh | ||
cves: null | ||
affectedPlatforms: | ||
- GCP | ||
affectedServices: | ||
- GCP Cloudshell | ||
image: https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1543789289-2fcb1e565eb6?ixlib=rb-4.0.3&ixid=M3wxMjA3fDB8MHxwaG90by1wYWdlfHx8fGVufDB8fHx8fA%3D%3D&auto=format&fit=crop&w=3270&q=80 | ||
severity: Low | ||
discoveredBy: | ||
name: Psi | ||
org: null | ||
domain: ψ.fun | ||
twitter: null | ||
publishedAt: 2020/03/11 | ||
disclosedAt: null | ||
exploitabilityPeriod: null | ||
knownITWExploitation: false | ||
summary: | | ||
Google Cloudshell leveraged websockets without validating that the origin matched the current instance host. | ||
An attacker could therefore host a CSWSH attack on a Cloudshell instance they own, disabling authentication via | ||
access to the underlying VM. They could then start the OAuth process with a spoofed host header, using | ||
phishing to get the target Cloud Shell user into following a redirection link, completing the OAuth process | ||
and ending in successful CSWSH, which would allow the attacker to hijack the target user's requests. | ||
manualRemediation: | | ||
null | ||
detectionMethods: null | ||
contributor: https://github.com/ramimac | ||
references: | ||
- https://ψ.fun/i/yvpMj | ||
- https://security.googleblog.com/2020/03/announcing-our-first-gcp-vrp-prize.html |
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