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commit 7fd078337201cf7468f53c3d9ef81ff78cb6df3b upstream. A CDC Ethernet functional descriptor with wMaxSegmentSize = 0 will cause a divide error in usbnet_probe: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8-44453-g1fdc1a82c34f #56 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event task: ffff88006bef5c00 task.stack: ffff88006bf60000 RIP: 0010:usbnet_update_max_qlen+0x24d/0x390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:355 RSP: 0018:ffff88006bf67508 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000163c8 RBX: ffff8800621fce40 RCX: ffff8800621fcf34 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff837ecb7a RDI: ffff8800621fcf34 RBP: ffff88006bf67520 R08: ffff88006bef5c00 R09: ffffed000c43f881 R10: ffffed000c43f880 R11: ffff8800621fc406 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: ffffffff85c71de0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffe9c0d6dac CR3: 00000000614f4000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: usbnet_probe+0x18b5/0x2790 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1783 qmi_wwan_probe+0x133/0x220 drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c:1338 usb_probe_interface+0x324/0x940 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413 driver_probe_device+0x522/0x740 drivers/base/dd.c:557 Fix by simply ignoring the bogus descriptor, as it is optional for QMI devices anyway. Fixes: 423ce8c ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: New driver for Huawei QMI based WWAN devices") Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: Iedd66fd9331de72480a9a65fb1d32997f42d6b18
commit 1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2 upstream. This is a fix for CVE-2017-16939 suitable for older stable branches. The upstream fix is commit 1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2, from which the following explanation is taken: An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program. The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive buffer is full. It was not possible to define a 'start' callback for netlink dumps until Linux 4.5, so instead add a check for the initialisation flag in the 'done' callback. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> CVE-2017-16939 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]> Change-Id: I365992c54ce31aba4635a4858da314fa04b610bd (cherry picked from commit 4bf519910cf4cd4d3959b6b069de9f621c2e0afa)
commit 373c4557d2aa362702c4c2d41288fb1e54990b7c upstream.
This matters at least for the mincore syscall, which will otherwise copy
uninitialized memory from the page allocator to userspace. It is
probably also a correctness error for /proc/$pid/pagemap, but I haven't
tested that.
Removing the `walk->hugetlb_entry` condition in walk_hugetlb_range() has
no effect because the caller already checks for that.
This only reports holes in hugetlb ranges to callers who have specified
a hugetlb_entry callback.
This issue was found using an AFL-based fuzzer.
v2:
- don't crash on ->pte_hole==NULL (Andrew Morton)
- add Cc stable (Andrew Morton)
Changed for 4.4/4.9 stable backport:
- fix up conflict in the huge_pte_offset() call
Fixes: 1e25a271c8ac ("mincore: apply page table walker on do_mincore()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I061e812d7cb0419be432388b23766636d9e4442b
commit 916a27901de01446bcf57ecca4783f6cff493309 upstream.
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the
system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d
These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS
fingerprint list. Add new capable() checks so that they can't.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
A malicious USB device with crafted descriptors can cause the kernel to access unallocated memory by setting the bNumInterfaces value too high in a configuration descriptor. Although the value is adjusted during parsing, this adjustment is skipped in one of the error return paths. This patch prevents the problem by setting bNumInterfaces to 0 initially. The existing code already sets it to the proper value after parsing is complete. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> CC: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> CVE-2017-17558 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]> Change-Id: I709389aa543cdef07b16afa3e827744904597285 (cherry picked from commit 68eb603eb0e3dff746771d5c5f86e195bbad5410)
commit ecaaab5649781c5a0effdaf298a925063020500e upstream.
When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86
implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when
doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)',
because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized.
The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when
nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to
be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided.
The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one
call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly
divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization"
and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do.
Reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
int algfd, reqfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "salsa20",
};
char key[16] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0);
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key));
}
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eb6f13e ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 4dca6ea1d9432052afb06baf2e3ae78188a4410b upstream. When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However, there is actually no permission check. This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING) then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring. Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring. Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key(). Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used. We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also, request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable. We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf497 ("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where /sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users who actually do that, though...) Fixes: 3e30148 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - s/KEY_NEED_WRITE/KEY_WRITE/ - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> CVE-2017-17807 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]> Change-Id: I3fefd566fe562f342776e8612cfd84d38ec4e658
commit 2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901 upstream. Denys provided an awesome KASAN report pointing to an use after free in xt_TCPMSS I have provided three patches to fix this issue, either in xt_TCPMSS or in xt_tcpudp.c. It seems xt_TCPMSS patch has the smallest possible impact. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> [wt: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
commit 340d394a789518018f834ff70f7534fc463d3226 upstream. The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt() with a NULL pointer: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050 IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: CPU 0 Modules linked in: Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40 RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082 RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050 RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0 R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500) Stack: ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000 <d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098 <d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0 [<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0 [<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20 [<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10 [<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170 [<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50 [<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180 [<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0 [<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0 [<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11 [<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0 [<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260 [<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 [<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0 [<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90 [<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b [<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20 To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is NULL or not. Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers. Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <[email protected]> [dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed upstream.
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…rent
commit 853bc26a7ea39e354b9f8889ae7ad1492ffa28d2 upstream.
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[[email protected]: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Change-Id: Iaa77a0646677540adba42386857082879cccfa39
commit d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982 upstream.
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 30a61ddf8117c26ac5b295e1233eaa9629a94ca3 upstream.
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- add_free_nid() returns 0 in case of any error (except low memory)
- Tree/list addition has not been moved into __insert_nid_to_list()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit b86e33075ed1909d8002745b56ecf73b833db143 upstream. A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case as below: ... fd = open(); fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296); ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf); ... It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block(): ... bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits; ... map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t will result in an overflow. In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap() will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again. Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift. Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 6aeb75e6adfaed16e58780309613a578fe1ee90b upstream. Fix a division-by-zero in set_termios when debugging is enabled and a high-enough speed has been requested so that the divisor value becomes zero. Instead of just fixing the offending debug statement, cap the baud rate at the base as a zero divisor value also appears to crash the firmware. Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99253eb750fda6a644d5188fb26c43bad8d5a745 ]
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I8d48f4611a2f2d0cb7ad5146036f571f12ecb1fc
CVE-2017-18509
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
commit 89c6efa61f5709327ecfa24bff18e57a4e80c7fa upstream. On a I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA read request, if data->block[0] is greater than I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 1, the underlying I2C driver writes data out of the msgbuf1 array boundary. It is possible from a user application to run into that issue by calling the I2C_SMBUS ioctl with data.block[0] greater than I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 1. This patch makes the code compliant with Documentation/i2c/dev-interface by raising an error when the requested size is larger than 32 bytes. Call Trace: [<ffffffff8139f695>] dump_stack+0x67/0x92 [<ffffffff811802a4>] panic+0xc5/0x1eb [<ffffffff810ecb5f>] ? vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff817456d3>] ? i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x303/0x320 [<ffffffff8109a68b>] __stack_chk_fail+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff817456d3>] i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x303/0x320 [<ffffffff81745aed>] i2cdev_ioctl+0x4d/0x1e0 [<ffffffff811f761a>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x2ba/0x490 [<ffffffff81336e43>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x43/0x60 [<ffffffff811f7869>] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 [<ffffffff81a22e97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a Signed-off-by: Jeremy Compostella <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] [[email protected]: 4.9 backport: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 3e21f4af170bebf47c187c1ff8bf155583c9f3b1 upstream. The lp_setup() code doesn't apply any bounds checking when passing "lp=none", and only in this case, resulting in an overflow of the parport_nr[] array. All versions in Git history are affected. Reported-By: Roee Hay <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
The last rule in the blob has next_entry offset that is same as total size.
This made "ebtables32 -A OUTPUT -d de:ad:be:ef:01:02" fail on 64 bit kernel.
Fixes: b71812168571fa ("netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit 8e4b5eae5decd9dfe5a4ee369c22028f90ab4c44 upstream. If the root directory has an i_links_count of zero, then when the file system is mounted, then when ext4_fill_super() notices the problem and tries to call iput() the root directory in the error return path, ext4_evict_inode() will try to free the inode on disk, before all of the file system structures are set up, and this will result in an OOPS caused by a NULL pointer dereference. This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1092. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199179 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560777 Change-Id: I6f9180af19ceaaee76b86c27497385d94531954b Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Use EIO instead of EFSCORRUPTED - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 67f93df79aeefc3add4e4b31a752600f834236e2 ]
dccp_disconnect() sets 'dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid' tx handler to NULL,
therefore if DCCP socket is disconnected and dccp_sendmsg() is
called after it, it will cause a NULL pointer dereference in
dccp_write_xmit().
This crash and the reproducer was reported by syzbot. Looks like
it is reproduced if commit 69c64866ce07 ("dccp: CVE-2017-8824:
use-after-free in DCCP code") is applied.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
In rmnet_usb_ctrl_init dev is freed again it is dereferenced with in same block. Fix this issue by taking derefernced value into a local variable prior to freeing dev. Change-Id: Ic51accc8949e97c8aaeda558adcc9d404fb2a26d Signed-off-by: Sai Krishna Juturi <[email protected]> CVE-2018-3584 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c095508770aebf1b9218e77026e48345d719b17c ] When args->nr_local is 0, nr_pages gets also 0 due some size calculation via rds_rm_size(), which is later used to allocate pages for DMA, this bug produces a heap Out-Of-Bound write access to a specific memory region. Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7d11f77f84b27cef452cee332f4e469503084737 ] set rm->atomic.op_active to 0 when rds_pin_pages() fails or the user supplied address is invalid, this prevents a NULL pointer usage in rds_atomic_free_op() Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f4a3313d8e2ca9fd8d8f45e40a2903ba782607e7 ] Right after a TCP flow is created, receiving tiny out of order packets allways hit the condition : if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf) tcp_clamp_window(sk); tcp_clamp_window() increases sk_rcvbuf to match sk_rmem_alloc (guarded by tcp_rmem[2]) Calling tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() in this case is not useful, and offers a O(N^2) surface attack to malicious peers. Better not attempt anything before full queue capacity is reached, forcing attacker to spend lots of resource and allow us to more easily detect the abuse. Change-Id: Ib4fabbd6f22b51fd6eea66a0f3b210543d3ebe01 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3d4bf93ac12003f9b8e1e2de37fe27983deebdcf ] In case an attacker feeds tiny packets completely out of order, tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() might scan the whole rb-tree, performing expensive copies, but not changing socket memory usage at all. 1) Do not attempt to collapse tiny skbs. 2) Add logic to exit early when too many tiny skbs are detected. We prefer not doing aggressive collapsing (which copies packets) for pathological flows, and revert to tcp_prune_ofo_queue() which will be less expensive. In the future, we might add the possibility of terminating flows that are proven to be malicious. Change-Id: I635a058ea387b224d1d0ac7653cc4dfc0aadab3a Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <[email protected]>
commit 43cdd1b716b26f6af16da4e145b6578f98798bf6 upstream. There's no need to be printing a raw kernel pointer to the kernel log at every boot. So just remove it, and change the whole message to use the correct dev_info() call at the same time. Reported-by: Wang Qize <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 07f2c7ab6f8d0a7e7c5764c4e6cc9c52951b9d9c upstream.
When SCTP makes INIT or INIT_ACK packet the total chunk length
can exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN which leads to kernel panic when
transmitting these packets, e.g. the crash on sending INIT_ACK:
[ 597.804948] skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:00000000ffae06e4 len:120168
put:120156 head:000000007aa47635 data:00000000d991c2de
tail:0x1d640 end:0xfec0 dev:<NULL>
...
[ 597.976970] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 598.033408] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104!
[ 600.314841] Call Trace:
[ 600.345829] <IRQ>
[ 600.371639] ? sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[ 600.436934] skb_put+0x16c/0x200
[ 600.477295] sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[ 600.540630] ? sctp_packet_config+0x890/0x890 [sctp]
[ 600.601781] ? __sctp_packet_append_chunk+0x3b4/0xd00 [sctp]
[ 600.671356] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x3f/0x90 [sctp]
[ 600.731482] sctp_outq_flush+0x663/0x30d0 [sctp]
[ 600.788565] ? sctp_make_init+0xbf0/0xbf0 [sctp]
[ 600.845555] ? sctp_check_transmitted+0x18f0/0x18f0 [sctp]
[ 600.912945] ? sctp_outq_tail+0x631/0x9d0 [sctp]
[ 600.969936] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x3be1/0x5cb0 [sctp]
[ 601.041593] ? sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x85f/0xc30 [sctp]
[ 601.104837] ? sctp_generate_t1_cookie_event+0x20/0x20 [sctp]
[ 601.175436] ? sctp_eat_data+0x1710/0x1710 [sctp]
[ 601.233575] sctp_do_sm+0x182/0x560 [sctp]
[ 601.284328] ? sctp_has_association+0x70/0x70 [sctp]
[ 601.345586] ? sctp_rcv+0xef4/0x32f0 [sctp]
[ 601.397478] ? sctp6_rcv+0xa/0x20 [sctp]
...
Here the chunk size for INIT_ACK packet becomes too big, mostly
because of the state cookie (INIT packet has large size with
many address parameters), plus additional server parameters.
Later this chunk causes the panic in skb_put_data():
skb_packet_transmit()
sctp_packet_pack()
skb_put_data(nskb, chunk->skb->data, chunk->skb->len);
'nskb' (head skb) was previously allocated with packet->size
from u16 'chunk->chunk_hdr->length'.
As suggested by Marcelo we should check the chunk's length in
_sctp_make_chunk() before trying to allocate skb for it and
discard a chunk if its size bigger than SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Keep using WORD_ROUND() instead of SCTP_PAD4()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
CVE-2018-5803
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I68b9b08d0e57ebb4e9f4c93d0e10b4ea20b6b269
There is no return statement in case of invalid sequence length in __wlan_hdd_cfg80211_add_key api. Return an error code in case of invalid seq_len. Change-Id: Ib240f6cf91d9d563dd87148c15e06ae8b48919d5 CRs-Fixed: 2153553
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18 signed integer overflow: 0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int' Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue. Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Erick Reyes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Oleg Matcovschi <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cherry-picked from fbe0e839d1e22d88810f3ee3e2f1479be4c0aa4a Bug: 76106267 Change-Id: I954cc2848678318b60ec3f103d0c15f87b4605a4 CVE-2018-6927 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
Propagate from cld-3.0 to prima. When beacon report request action frame is received, rrmProcessBeaconReportReq() is called and num_channels value is calculated from the action frame directly from user. This value is assigned to pSmeBcnReportReq->channelList.numChannels and this num channels value along with the channel list is posted to sme for further processing. The sme function sme_RrmProcessBeaconReportReqInd() processes this sme message eWNI_SME_BEACON_REPORT_REQ_IND. In this function, the channels in channel list are looped through the received value pBeaconReq->channelList.numChannels and is copied to the destination pSmeRrmContext->channelList array from the pBeaconReq->channelList.channelNumber[] array. The maximum possible number of channels in channel list BeaconReq->channelList.channelNumber[] allocated statically in the definition of tSirChannelList is SIR_ESE_MAX_MEAS_IE_REQS (8). So when the pBeaconReq->channelList.numChannels, possible OOB read occurs. Validate the value of pBeaconReq->channelList.numChannels received from the action frame against the maximum supported number of channels in channel list SIR_ESE_MAX_MEAS_IE_REQS (8). Place this validation inside the function sme_RrmProcessBeaconReportReqInd() instead of validating it at rrmProcessBeaconReportReq() so that it defends from other caller sme_SetEseBeaconRequest() which is from user space command through IOCTL. Change-Id: I2074b04081328ceab7eeb29c33631a635e9d93c3 CRs-Fixed: 2462152
Change-Id: I61f2add5e5382b791c802170502c3a243890bc35
Currently during roaming for LFR make before break feature under stress testing RX thread is stuck in while loop resulting in host RX low resource and firmware watch dog bite. In this change refactor the code to check for null termination of the received frames rather than checking for the local variable pointer assigned to the input received frames. Change-Id: I47b40566d52134b58304541c708cd87263fabfc6 CRs-Fixed: 2009414
Drop inalid EAPOL packets in SAP mode which are not destined to self mac address. Change-Id: I9754dddf580e60bd88ddc6e28355162499a8d125 CRs-Fixed: 2868054
Drop AMSDU subframes if AMSDU subframe header's DA is equal to LLC header. Change-Id: Ieeb680cd395f275fe2b3bd98afdf4a2e57609b10 CRs-Fixed: 2867994
Drop AMSDU subframes if AMSDU subframe header's DA is equal to broadcast address. Change-Id: I21f2b95b45fb150a857d23ba158a0f9df15d5c46 CRs-Fixed: 2897293
…key_register [ Upstream commit 9a564bccb78a76740ea9d75a259942df8143d02c ] Add __GFP_ZERO flag for compose_sadb_supported in function pfkey_register to initialize the buffer of supp_skb to fix a kernel-info-leak issue. 1) Function pfkey_register calls compose_sadb_supported to request a sk_buff. 2) compose_sadb_supported calls alloc_sbk to allocate a sk_buff, but it doesn't zero it. 3) If auth_len is greater 0, then compose_sadb_supported treats the memory as a struct sadb_supported and begins to initialize. But it just initializes the field sadb_supported_len and field sadb_supported_exttype without field sadb_supported_reserved. Reported-by: TCS Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Haimin Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
commit f71f01394f742fc4558b3f9f4c7ef4c4cf3b07c8 upstream. Interrupt handler bad_flp_intr() may cause a UAF on the recently freed request just to increment the error count. There's no point keeping that one in the request anyway, and since the interrupt handler uses a static pointer to the error which cannot be kept in sync with the pending request, better make it use a static error counter that's reset for each new request. This reset now happens when entering redo_fd_request() for a new request via set_next_request(). One initial concern about a single error counter was that errors on one floppy drive could be reported on another one, but this problem is not real given that the driver uses a single drive at a time, as that PC-compatible controllers also have this limitation by using shared signals. As such the error count is always for the "current" drive. Reported-by: Minh Yuan <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Tested-by: Denis Efremov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 233087ca063686964a53c829d547c7571e3f67bf upstream. Minh Yuan reported a concurrency use-after-free issue in the floppy code between raw_cmd_ioctl and seek_interrupt. [ It turns out this has been around, and that others have reported the KASAN splats over the years, but Minh Yuan had a reproducer for it and so gets primary credit for reporting it for this fix - Linus ] The problem is, this driver tends to break very easily and nowadays, nobody is expected to use FDRAWCMD anyway since it was used to manipulate non-standard formats. The risk of breaking the driver is higher than the risk presented by this race, and accessing the device requires privileges anyway. Let's just add a config option to completely disable this ioctl and leave it disabled by default. Distros shouldn't use it, and only those running on antique hardware might need to enable it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKcFiNC=MfYVW-Jt9A3=FPJpTwCD2PL_ULNCpsCVE5s8ZeBQgQ@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAEAjamu1FRhz6StCe_55XY5s389ZP_xmCF69k987En+1z53=eg@mail.gmail.com Reported-by: Minh Yuan <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Reported-by: cruise k <[email protected]> Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Tested-by: Denis Efremov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 23d2b94043ca8835bd1e67749020e839f396a1c2 upstream. I got below panic when doing fuzz test: Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 4056 Comm: syz-executor.3 Tainted: G B 5.14.0-rc1-00195-gcff5c4254439-dirty #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0x9b panic+0x2cd/0x5af end_report.cold+0x5a/0x5a kasan_report+0xec/0x110 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x556/0x5d0 __mkroute_output+0x895/0x1740 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2d0/0x1050 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x182/0x2e0 ip_route_output_flow+0x28/0x130 udp_sendmsg+0x165d/0x2280 udpv6_sendmsg+0x121e/0x24f0 inet6_sendmsg+0xf7/0x140 sock_sendmsg+0xe9/0x180 ____sys_sendmsg+0x2b8/0x7a0 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf0/0x160 __sys_sendmmsg+0x17e/0x3c0 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9e/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x462eb9 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f3df5af1c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462eb9 RDX: 0000000000000312 RSI: 0000000020001700 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3df5af26bc R13: 00000000004c372d R14: 0000000000700b10 R15: 00000000ffffffff It is one use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu. In ip_mc_del_src, the ip_sf_list of pmc has been freed under pmc->lock protection. But access to ip_sf_list in ip_check_mc_rcu is not protected by the lock. Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> CVE-2022-20141 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]> Change-Id: I258318da710410750ec380d9382fd09f2c225ace
commit 89f3594d0de58e8a57d92d497dea9fee3d4b9cda upstream. dev->buf does not need to be released if it already exists before executing dev_config. Bug: 220261709 Acked-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: Id53d6770fbae0a7fcf0fa136157c0ab34fb5da64 CVE-2022-24958 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
Stall the control endpoint in case provided index exceeds array size of MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES or when the retrieved function pointer is null. Bug: 213172319 Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 75e5b4849b81e19e9efe1654b30d7f3151c33c2c) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Change-Id: I78f46b6f2140394a6bc6cff9f829c0742d7ad2fc (cherry picked from commit c7732dbce590ef33ac2345f21efa6703f78b9e95) CVE-2022-25258 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
Check the size of the RNDIS_MSG_SET command given to us before attempting to respond to an invalid message size. Bug: 162326603 Reported-by: Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Tested-by: Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 38ea1eac7d88072bbffb630e2b3db83ca649b826) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Change-Id: I61168b48de4ca79a3a28dd4d3b81779bc25554c1 (cherry picked from commit 16d19b656133457225cf69a4825faf30a0ca59a4) CVE-2022-25375 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
…or path commit c70222752228a62135cee3409dccefd494a24646 upstream. There is no need to call dev_kfree_skb() when usb_submit_urb() fails beacause can_put_echo_skb() deletes the original skb and can_free_echo_skb() deletes the cloned skb. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Fixes: 702171a ("ems_usb: Added support for EMS CPC-USB/ARM7 CAN/USB interface") Cc: [email protected] Cc: Sebastian Haas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Race is happening when both audio_pcm_close() and audio_send() executes in parallel. When the PCM session is closed, the substream attribute of the audio_dev structure is set to NULL in audio_pcm_close(). As there is no synchronization protection for the audio_dev subtream attributes in audio_send(), it is causing NULL pointer dereference. Hence fixing the issue by adding proper synchronization protection for the audio_dev subtream attributes in audio_send(). CRs-Fixed: 613498 Change-Id: Id9ab0d4e347b8bb2f551f9033829e541bdcaf0e8 Signed-off-by: ChandanaKishori Chiluveru <[email protected]>
Add null check for pm_ops in pm_ops unregister to avoid null pointer dereference. Change-Id: Ifdad0a0fecc9b8cd97910e4f491ee08ae4a58483 CRs-Fixed: 690191 Signed-off-by: Pradeep Kumar Goudagunta <[email protected]>
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commit 74e98eb085889b0d2d4908f59f6e00026063014f upstream. There was no verification that an underlying transport exists when creating a connection, this would cause dereferencing a NULL ptr. It might happen on sockets that weren't properly bound before attempting to send a message, which will cause a NULL ptr deref: [135546.047719] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessgeneral protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [135546.051270] Modules linked in: [135546.051781] CPU: 4 PID: 15650 Comm: trinity-c4 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150902-sasha-00041-gbaa1222-dirty #2527 [135546.053217] task: ffff8800835bc000 ti: ffff8800bc708000 task.ti: ffff8800bc708000 [135546.054291] RIP: __rds_conn_create (net/rds/connection.c:194) [135546.055666] RSP: 0018:ffff8800bc70fab0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [135546.056457] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000f2c RCX: ffff8800835bc000 [135546.057494] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff8800835bccd8 RDI: 0000000000000038 [135546.058530] RBP: ffff8800bc70fb18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [135546.059556] R10: ffffed014d7a3a23 R11: ffffed014d7a3a21 R12: 0000000000000000 [135546.060614] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8801ec3d0000 R15: 0000000000000000 [135546.061668] FS: 00007faad4ffb700(0000) GS:ffff880252000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [135546.062836] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [135546.063682] CR2: 000000000000846a CR3: 000000009d137000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [135546.064723] Stack: [135546.065048] ffffffffafe2055c ffffffffafe23fc1 ffffed00493097bf ffff8801ec3d0008 [135546.066247] 0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 0000000000000000 ac194a24c0586342 [135546.067438] 1ffff100178e1f78 ffff880320581b00 ffff8800bc70fdd0 ffff880320581b00 [135546.068629] Call Trace: [135546.069028] ? __rds_conn_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:856 net/rds/connection.c:134) [135546.069989] ? rds_message_copy_from_user (net/rds/message.c:298) [135546.071021] rds_conn_create_outgoing (net/rds/connection.c:278) [135546.071981] rds_sendmsg (net/rds/send.c:1058) [135546.072858] ? perf_trace_lock (include/trace/events/lock.h:38) [135546.073744] ? lockdep_init (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3298) [135546.074577] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.075508] ? __might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.076349] ? __might_fault (mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.077179] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.078114] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:611 net/socket.c:620) [135546.078856] SYSC_sendto (net/socket.c:1657) [135546.079596] ? SYSC_connect (net/socket.c:1628) [135546.080510] ? trace_dump_stack (kernel/trace/trace.c:1926) [135546.081397] ? ring_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2479 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2558 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2674) [135546.082390] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.083410] ? trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.084481] ? do_audit_syscall_entry (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.085438] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.085515] rds_ib_laddr_check(): addr 36.74.25.172 ret -99 node type -1 Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <[email protected]>
voron00
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If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @U
keyctl add user user "a" @U
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @U
keyctl add trusted user "a" @U
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Change-Id: I28a3b1ab25c076c3afdbfe1ce76b6b16fe3bcdb6
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CVE-2015-8539
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
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…2 client [ Upstream commit 18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da ] ---Steps to Reproduce-- <nfs-server> # cat /etc/exports /nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt) /nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt) <nfs-client> # mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/ # ll /mnt/*/ <nfs-server> # cat /etc/exports /nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server) /nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt) # service nfs restart <nfs-client> # ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here [ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4] [ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0 [ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1] [ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd] [ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214 [ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014 [ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000 [ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4] [ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240 [ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908 [ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800 [ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240 [ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 [ 5123.112888] Stack: [ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000 [ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6 [ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800 [ 5123.115264] Call Trace: [ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4] [ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4] [ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4] [ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0 [ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160 [ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160 [ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33 [ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4] [ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8> [ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000 Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops") Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+ Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 8e96a87c5431c256feb65bcfc5aec92d9f7839b6 upstream. Userspace can quite legitimately perform an exec() syscall with a suspended transaction. exec() does not return to the old process, rather it load a new one and starts that, the expectation therefore is that the new process starts not in a transaction. Currently exec() is not treated any differently to any other syscall which creates problems. Firstly it could allow a new process to start with a suspended transaction for a binary that no longer exists. This means that the checkpointed state won't be valid and if the suspended transaction were ever to be resumed and subsequently aborted (a possibility which is exceedingly likely as exec()ing will likely doom the transaction) the new process will jump to invalid state. Secondly the incorrect attempt to keep the transactional state while still zeroing state for the new process creates at least two TM Bad Things. The first triggers on the rfid to return to userspace as start_thread() has given the new process a 'clean' MSR but the suspend will still be set in the hardware MSR. The second TM Bad Thing triggers in __switch_to() as the processor is still transactionally suspended but __switch_to() wants to zero the TM sprs for the new process. This is an example of the outcome of calling exec() with a suspended transaction. Note the first 700 is likely the first TM bad thing decsribed earlier only the kernel can't report it as we've loaded userspace registers. c000000000009980 is the rfid in fast_exception_return() Bad kernel stack pointer 3fffcfa1a370 at c000000000009980 Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1] CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Not tainted NIP: c000000000009980 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000003ffefd40 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted MSR: 8000000300201031 <SF,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 00000000 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c0000000000098b4 SOFTE: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033 GPR00: 0000000000000000 00003fffcfa1a370 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 00003fff966611c0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 NIP [c000000000009980] fast_exception_return+0xb0/0xb8 LR [0000000000000000] (null) Call Trace: Instruction dump: f84d0278 e9a100d8 7c7b03a6 e84101a0 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 e8010070 e8410080 e8610088 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed023b Kernel BUG at c000000000043e80 [verbose debug info unavailable] Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c000000000043e80 (msr 0x201033) Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#2] CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Tainted: G D task: c0000000fbea6d80 ti: c00000003ffec000 task.ti: c0000000fb7ec000 NIP: c000000000043e80 LR: c000000000015a24 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000003ffef7e0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G D MSR: 8000000300201033 <SF,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 28002828 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c000000000015a20 SOFTE: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033 GPR00: 0000000000000000 c00000003ffefa60 c000000000db5500 c0000000fbead000 GPR04: 8000000300001033 2222222222222222 2222222222222222 00000000ff160000 GPR08: 0000000000000000 800000010000d033 c0000000fb7e3ea0 c00000000fe00004 GPR12: 0000000000002200 c00000000fe00000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000fbea7410 00000000ff160000 GPR24: c0000000ffe1f600 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbead000 GPR28: c000000000e20198 c0000000fbea6d80 c0000000fbeab680 c0000000fbea6d80 NIP [c000000000043e80] tm_restore_sprs+0xc/0x1c LR [c000000000015a24] __switch_to+0x1f4/0x420 Call Trace: Instruction dump: 7c800164 4e800020 7c0022a6 f80304a8 7c0222a6 f80304b0 7c0122a6 f80304b8 4e800020 e80304a8 7c0023a6 e80304b0 <7c0223a6> e80304b8 7c0123a6 4e800020 This fixes CVE-2016-5828. Fixes: bc2a9408fa65 ("powerpc: Hook in new transactional memory code") Cc: [email protected] # v3.9+ Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
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commit 03dab869b7b239c4e013ec82aea22e181e441cfc upstream. This fixes CVE-2016-7042. Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption. The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout rendered as weeks: (gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7) $2 = 30500568904943 That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL. Expand the buffer to 16 chars. I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a 64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that isn't checked again on the other side. The panic incurred looks something like: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
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commit f5527fffff3f002b0a6b376163613b82f69de073 upstream. This fixes CVE-2016-8650. If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus. However, if the result was initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a NULL-pointer exception ensues. Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space when the result is 0. This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8138ce5d>] [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0 RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0 RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50 FS: 00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81376cd4>] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66 [<ffffffff81376d12>] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d [<ffffffff81376f37>] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd [<ffffffff8138ba3a>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146 [<ffffffff8132a95c>] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee [<ffffffff8132acca>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb [<ffffffff8132af40>] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1 [<ffffffff8133cb5e>] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228 [<ffffffff8133d974>] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4 [<ffffffff8133cdde>] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133d609>] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133c3d7>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61 [<ffffffff812fc9f3>] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399 [<ffffffff812fe227>] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e [<ffffffff81001c2b>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191 [<ffffffff816825e4>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce <49> c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f RIP [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP <ffff880401297ad8> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]--- Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526 Fixes: cdec9cb ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)") Change-Id: I8d4e66b98449a975559865bd76905b8df51c8ca2 Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
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…rse nlmsg properly commit c88f0e6b06f4092995688211a631bb436125d77b upstream. ChunYu found a kernel crash by syzkaller: [ 651.617875] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled [ 651.618217] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ 651.618731] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN [ 651.621543] CPU: 1 PID: 9539 Comm: scsi Not tainted 4.11.0.cov #32 [ 651.621938] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 651.622309] task: ffff880117780000 task.stack: ffff8800a3188000 [ 651.622762] RIP: 0010:skb_release_data+0x26c/0x590 [...] [ 651.627260] Call Trace: [ 651.629156] skb_release_all+0x4f/0x60 [ 651.629450] consume_skb+0x1a5/0x600 [ 651.630705] netlink_unicast+0x505/0x720 [ 651.632345] netlink_sendmsg+0xab2/0xe70 [ 651.633704] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 [ 651.633942] ___sys_sendmsg+0x833/0x980 [ 651.637117] __sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x240 [ 651.638820] SyS_sendmsg+0x32/0x50 [ 651.639048] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 It's caused by skb_shared_info at the end of sk_buff was overwritten by ISCSI_KEVENT_IF_ERROR when parsing nlmsg info from skb in iscsi_if_rx. During the loop if skb->len == nlh->nlmsg_len and both are sizeof(*nlh), ev = nlmsg_data(nlh) will acutally get skb_shinfo(SKB) instead and set a new value to skb_shinfo(SKB)->nr_frags by ev->type. This patch is to fix it by checking nlh->nlmsg_len properly there to avoid over accessing sk_buff. Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]> Acked-by: Chris Leech <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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voron00/android_kernel_lge_mako#1 Signed-off-by: Tad <[email protected]>
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commit 5ec0811d30378ae104f250bfc9b3640242d81e3f upstream. When the first propgated copy was a slave the following oops would result: > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 > IP: [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0 > PGD bacd4067 PUD bac66067 PMD 0 > Oops: 0000 [voron00#1] SMP > Modules linked in: > CPU: 1 PID: 824 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.6.0-rc5userns+ #1523 > Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007 > task: ffff8800bb0a8000 ti: ffff8800bac3c000 task.ti: ffff8800bac3c000 > RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811fba4e>] [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0 > RSP: 0018:ffff8800bac3fd38 EFLAGS: 00010283 > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800bb77ec00 RCX: 0000000000000010 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8800bb58c000 RDI: ffff8800bb58c480 > RBP: ffff8800bac3fd48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000001ca1 R11: 0000000000001c9d R12: 0000000000000000 > R13: ffff8800ba713800 R14: ffff8800bac3fda0 R15: ffff8800bb77ec00 > FS: 00007f3c0cd9b7e0(0000) GS:ffff8800bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 00000000bb79d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 > Stack: > ffff8800bb77ec00 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fd88 ffffffff811fbf85 > ffff8800bac3fd98 ffff8800bb77f080 ffff8800ba713800 ffff8800bb262b40 > 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fdd8 ffffffff811f1da0 > Call Trace: > [<ffffffff811fbf85>] propagate_mnt+0x105/0x140 > [<ffffffff811f1da0>] attach_recursive_mnt+0x120/0x1e0 > [<ffffffff811f1ec3>] graft_tree+0x63/0x70 > [<ffffffff811f1f6b>] do_add_mount+0x9b/0x100 > [<ffffffff811f2c1a>] do_mount+0x2aa/0xdf0 > [<ffffffff8117efbe>] ? strndup_user+0x4e/0x70 > [<ffffffff811f3a45>] SyS_mount+0x75/0xc0 > [<ffffffff8100242b>] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0xa0 > [<ffffffff81988f3c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 > Code: 00 00 75 ec 48 89 0d 02 22 22 01 8b 89 10 01 00 00 48 89 05 fd 21 22 01 39 8e 10 01 00 00 0f 84 e0 00 00 00 48 8b 80 d8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 48 89 05 df 21 22 01 48 89 15 d0 21 22 01 8b 53 30 > RIP [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0 > RSP <ffff8800bac3fd38> > CR2: 0000000000000010 > ---[ end trace 2725ecd95164f217 ]--- This oops happens with the namespace_sem held and can be triggered by non-root users. An all around not pleasant experience. To avoid this scenario when finding the appropriate source mount to copy stop the walk up the mnt_master chain when the first source mount is encountered. Further rewrite the walk up the last_source mnt_master chain so that it is clear what is going on. The reason why the first source mount is special is that it it's mnt_parent is not a mount in the dest_mnt propagation tree, and as such termination conditions based up on the dest_mnt mount propgation tree do not make sense. To avoid other kinds of confusion last_dest is not changed when computing last_source. last_dest is only used once in propagate_one and that is above the point of the code being modified, so changing the global variable is meaningless and confusing. fixes: f2ebb3a921c1ca1e2ddd9242e95a1989a50c4c68 ("smarter propagate_mnt()") Reported-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <[email protected]> Tested-by: Seth Forshee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ie55a2c52db9773b461acc6ebe427221acb7093f0
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…ction
(cherry-pick from commit 81da9b13f73653bf5f38c63af8029fc459198ac0)
There is no point in overriding the size class below. It causes fatal
corruption on the next chunk on the 3264-bytes size class, which is the
last size class that is not huge.
For example, if the requested size was exactly 3264 bytes, current
zsmalloc allocates and returns a chunk from the size class of 3264 bytes,
not 4096. User access to this chunk may overwrite head of the next
adjacent chunk.
Here is the panic log captured when freelist was corrupted due to this:
Kernel BUG at ffffffc00030659c [verbose debug info unavailable]
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 96000006 [voron00#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
exynos-snapshot: core register saved(CPU:5)
CPUMERRSR: 0000000000000000, L2MERRSR: 0000000000000000
exynos-snapshot: context saved(CPU:5)
exynos-snapshot: item - log_kevents is disabled
CPU: 5 PID: 898 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 3.10.61-4497415-eng voron00#1
task: ffffffc0b8783d80 ti: ffffffc0b71e8000 task.ti: ffffffc0b71e8000
PC is at obj_idx_to_offset+0x0/0x1c
LR is at obj_malloc+0x44/0xe8
pc : [<ffffffc00030659c>] lr : [<ffffffc000306604>] pstate: a0000045
sp : ffffffc0b71eb790
x29: ffffffc0b71eb790 x28: ffffffc00204c000
x27: 000000000001d96f x26: 0000000000000000
x25: ffffffc098cc3500 x24: ffffffc0a13f2810
x23: ffffffc098cc3501 x22: ffffffc0a13f2800
x21: 000011e1a02006e3 x20: ffffffc0a13f2800
x19: ffffffbc02a7e000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000feb
x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 00000000a01003e3
x13: 0000000000000020 x12: fffffffffffffff0
x11: ffffffc08b264000 x10: 00000000e3a01004
x9 : ffffffc08b263fea x8 : ffffffc0b1e611c0
x7 : ffffffc000307d24 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000038 x4 : 000000000000011e
x3 : ffffffbc00003e90 x2 : 0000000000000cc0
x1 : 00000000d0100371 x0 : ffffffbc00003e90
Bug: 25951511
Change-Id: I0c82f61aa779ddf906212ab6e47e16c088fe683c
Reported-by: Sooyong Suk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Heesub Shin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sooyong Suk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
wartle
pushed a commit
to wartle/android_kernel_lge_mako
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 6, 2022
(cherry picked from commit 3d5fe03a3ea013060ebba2a811aeb0f23f56aefa)
We can end up allocating a new compression stream with GFP_KERNEL from
within the IO path, which may result is nested (recursive) IO
operations. That can introduce problems if the IO path in question is a
reclaimer, holding some locks that will deadlock nested IOs.
Allocate streams and working memory using GFP_NOIO flag, forbidding
recursive IO and FS operations.
An example:
inconsistent {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} -> {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} usage.
git/20158 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
(jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: start_this_handle+0x4ca/0x555
{IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} state was registered at:
__lock_acquire+0x8da/0x117b
lock_acquire+0x10c/0x1a7
start_this_handle+0x52d/0x555
jbd2__journal_start+0xb4/0x237
__ext4_journal_start_sb+0x108/0x17e
ext4_dirty_inode+0x32/0x61
__mark_inode_dirty+0x16b/0x60c
iput+0x11e/0x274
__dentry_kill+0x148/0x1b8
shrink_dentry_list+0x274/0x44a
prune_dcache_sb+0x4a/0x55
super_cache_scan+0xfc/0x176
shrink_slab.part.14.constprop.25+0x2a2/0x4d3
shrink_zone+0x74/0x140
kswapd+0x6b7/0x930
kthread+0x107/0x10f
ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
irq event stamp: 138297
hardirqs last enabled at (138297): debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x113/0x12f
hardirqs last disabled at (138296): debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x33/0x12f
softirqs last enabled at (137818): __do_softirq+0x2d3/0x3e9
softirqs last disabled at (137813): irq_exit+0x41/0x95
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(jbd2_handle);
<Interrupt>
lock(jbd2_handle);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by git/20158:
#0: (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81155411>] mnt_want_write+0x24/0x4b
voron00#1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#2/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81145087>] lock_rename+0xd9/0xe3
#2: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8114f8e2>] lock_two_nondirectories+0x3f/0x6b
#3: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11/4){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8114f909>] lock_two_nondirectories+0x66/0x6b
#4: (jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff811e31db>] start_this_handle+0x4ca/0x555
stack backtrace:
CPU: 2 PID: 20158 Comm: git Not tainted 4.1.0-rc7-next-20150615-dbg-00016-g8bdf555-dirty #211
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x4c/0x6e
mark_lock+0x384/0x56d
mark_held_locks+0x5f/0x76
lockdep_trace_alloc+0xb2/0xb5
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x32/0x1e2
zcomp_strm_alloc+0x25/0x73 [zram]
zcomp_strm_multi_find+0xe7/0x173 [zram]
zcomp_strm_find+0xc/0xe [zram]
zram_bvec_rw+0x2ca/0x7e0 [zram]
zram_make_request+0x1fa/0x301 [zram]
generic_make_request+0x9c/0xdb
submit_bio+0xf7/0x120
ext4_io_submit+0x2e/0x43
ext4_bio_write_page+0x1b7/0x300
mpage_submit_page+0x60/0x77
mpage_map_and_submit_buffers+0x10f/0x21d
ext4_writepages+0xc8c/0xe1b
do_writepages+0x23/0x2c
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x84/0x8b
filemap_flush+0x1c/0x1e
ext4_alloc_da_blocks+0xb8/0x117
ext4_rename+0x132/0x6dc
? mark_held_locks+0x5f/0x76
ext4_rename2+0x29/0x2b
vfs_rename+0x540/0x636
SyS_renameat2+0x359/0x44d
SyS_rename+0x1e/0x20
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
[[email protected]: add stable mark]
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Kyeongdon Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
voron00
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 16, 2023
commit 48fb6f4db940e92cfb16cd878cddd59ea6120d06 upstream.
Commit 65d8fc777f6d ("futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in
get_futex_key()") removed an unnecessary lock_page() with the
side-effect that page->mapping needed to be treated very carefully.
Two defensive warnings were added in case any assumption was missed and
the first warning assumed a correct application would not alter a
mapping backing a futex key. Since merging, it has not triggered for
any unexpected case but Mark Rutland reported the following bug
triggering due to the first warning.
kernel BUG at kernel/futex.c:679!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3695 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc3-00020-g307fec773ba3 #3
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
task: ffff80001e271780 task.stack: ffff000010908000
PC is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679
LR is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679
pc : [<ffff00000821ac14>] lr : [<ffff00000821ac14>] pstate: 80000145
The fact that it's a bug instead of a warning was due to an unrelated
arm64 problem, but the warning itself triggered because the underlying
mapping changed.
This is an application issue but from a kernel perspective it's a
recoverable situation and the warning is unnecessary so this patch
removes the warning. The warning may potentially be triggered with the
following test program from Mark although it may be necessary to adjust
NR_FUTEX_THREADS to be a value smaller than the number of CPUs in the
system.
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define NR_FUTEX_THREADS 16
pthread_t threads[NR_FUTEX_THREADS];
void *mem;
#define MEM_PROT (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)
#define MEM_SIZE 65536
static int futex_wrapper(int *uaddr, int op, int val,
const struct timespec *timeout,
int *uaddr2, int val3)
{
syscall(SYS_futex, uaddr, op, val, timeout, uaddr2, val3);
}
void *poll_futex(void *unused)
{
for (;;) {
futex_wrapper(mem, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI, 1, NULL, mem + 4, 1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int i;
mem = mmap(NULL, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
printf("Mapping @ %p\n", mem);
printf("Creating futex threads...\n");
for (i = 0; i < NR_FUTEX_THREADS; i++)
pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, poll_futex, NULL);
printf("Flipping mapping...\n");
for (;;) {
mmap(mem, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Change-Id: I52f642cfcd3e109e6d69bdb1ca17950e6e251dfc
Reported-and-tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <[email protected]>
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This is 391 patches covering at least 319 CVEs. Not all are relevant to this device, but they're automatically checked by my program.
I've tested it working with many more in my DivestOS a few days ago.
List of CVEs
CVE-2012-6704 CVE-2013-3076 CVE-2013-3222 CVE-2013-3225 CVE-2013-3227 CVE-2013-3228 CVE-2013-3229 CVE-2013-3231 CVE-2013-4312 CVE-2013-4470 CVE-2013-4738 CVE-2014-3688 CVE-2014-6410 CVE-2014-7842 CVE-2014-7975 CVE-2014-8173 CVE-2014-9904 CVE-2015-2042 CVE-2015-3290 CVE-2015-6937 CVE-2015-7509 CVE-2015-7513 CVE-2015-7515 CVE-2015-7566 CVE-2015-8539 CVE-2015-8553 CVE-2015-8575 CVE-2015-8746 CVE-2015-8812 CVE-2015-8962 CVE-2015-8970 CVE-2015-9004 CVE-2016-2085 CVE-2016-2185 CVE-2016-2186 CVE-2016-2187 CVE-2016-2188 CVE-2016-2384 CVE-2016-2543 CVE-2016-2549 CVE-2016-3135 CVE-2016-3136 CVE-2016-3137 CVE-2016-3138 CVE-2016-3140 CVE-2016-3156 CVE-2016-3672 CVE-2016-3857 CVE-2016-3859 CVE-2016-3907 CVE-2016-3955 CVE-2016-4565 CVE-2016-4580 CVE-2016-4913 CVE-2016-4998 CVE-2016-5244 CVE-2016-5828 CVE-2016-5829 CVE-2016-6480 CVE-2016-6740 CVE-2016-6828 CVE-2016-7042 CVE-2016-7097 CVE-2016-7425 CVE-2016-7916 CVE-2016-8399 CVE-2016-8406 CVE-2016-8650 CVE-2016-8655 CVE-2016-9555 CVE-2016-9576 CVE-2016-9604 CVE-2016-9793 CVE-2016-9794 CVE-2016-9806 CVE-2016-10142 CVE-2016-10153 CVE-2016-10200 CVE-2016-10208 CVE-2016-10318 CVE-2016-10741 CVE-2017-0463 CVE-2017-0627 CVE-2017-0751 CVE-2017-0786 CVE-2017-0824 CVE-2017-0861 CVE-2017-0862 CVE-2017-2636 CVE-2017-2671 CVE-2017-5549 CVE-2017-5669 CVE-2017-5986 CVE-2017-6345 CVE-2017-6348 CVE-2017-6353 CVE-2017-6951 CVE-2017-7273 CVE-2017-7374 CVE-2017-7472 CVE-2017-7645 CVE-2017-7889 CVE-2017-8246 CVE-2017-8247 CVE-2017-8254 CVE-2017-8824 CVE-2017-9074 CVE-2017-9242 CVE-2017-9984 CVE-2017-10662 CVE-2017-10663 CVE-2017-10911 CVE-2017-11176 CVE-2017-11473 CVE-2017-11600 CVE-2017-12762 CVE-2017-13078 CVE-2017-13166 CVE-2017-13695 CVE-2017-14051 CVE-2017-14106 CVE-2017-14489 CVE-2017-15649 CVE-2017-16526 CVE-2017-16527 CVE-2017-16531 CVE-2017-16532 CVE-2017-16534 CVE-2017-16537 CVE-2017-16650 CVE-2017-16939 CVE-2017-16994 CVE-2017-17450 CVE-2017-17558 CVE-2017-17805 CVE-2017-17807 CVE-2017-18017 CVE-2017-18079 CVE-2017-18203 CVE-2017-18216 CVE-2017-18241 CVE-2017-18249 CVE-2017-18257 CVE-2017-18360 CVE-2017-18509 CVE-2017-18551 CVE-2017-1000363 CVE-2018-1068 CVE-2018-1092 CVE-2018-1130 CVE-2018-3584 CVE-2018-5332 CVE-2018-5333 CVE-2018-5390 CVE-2018-5750 CVE-2018-5803 CVE-2018-5835 CVE-2018-6927 CVE-2018-7492 CVE-2018-7755 CVE-2018-7757 CVE-2018-8781 CVE-2018-8822 CVE-2018-9389 CVE-2018-9422 CVE-2018-9516 CVE-2018-9517 CVE-2018-9568 CVE-2018-10021 CVE-2018-10087 CVE-2018-10124 CVE-2018-10675 CVE-2018-10876 CVE-2018-10877 CVE-2018-10879 CVE-2018-10880 CVE-2018-10882 CVE-2018-10883 CVE-2018-10940 CVE-2018-11506 CVE-2018-11832 CVE-2018-11939 CVE-2018-12233 CVE-2018-13053 CVE-2018-13099 CVE-2018-13917 CVE-2018-14614 CVE-2018-15594 CVE-2018-16276 CVE-2018-16658 CVE-2018-18710 CVE-2018-19824 CVE-2018-19985 CVE-2018-20169 CVE-2018-20511 CVE-2018-1000199 CVE-2018-1000204 CVE-2019-2001 CVE-2019-2101 CVE-2019-2331 CVE-2019-3459 CVE-2019-3460 CVE-2019-3701 CVE-2019-3846 CVE-2019-5489 CVE-2019-7222 CVE-2019-8912 CVE-2019-9456 CVE-2019-10142 CVE-2019-10607 CVE-2019-10638 CVE-2019-11477 CVE-2019-11478 CVE-2019-11810 CVE-2019-11833 CVE-2019-11884 CVE-2019-14040 CVE-2019-14053 CVE-2019-14283 CVE-2019-14821 CVE-2019-14835 CVE-2019-14896 CVE-2019-15117 CVE-2019-15118 CVE-2019-15213 CVE-2019-15214 CVE-2019-15216 CVE-2019-15219 CVE-2019-15239 CVE-2019-15505 CVE-2019-15807 CVE-2019-15926 CVE-2019-16233 CVE-2019-16746 CVE-2019-17052 CVE-2019-17133 CVE-2019-18806 CVE-2019-19051 CVE-2019-19063 CVE-2019-19066 CVE-2019-19073 CVE-2019-19074 CVE-2019-19448 CVE-2019-19524 CVE-2019-19527 CVE-2019-19528 CVE-2019-19532 CVE-2019-19537 CVE-2019-20054 CVE-2019-20096 CVE-2019-20636 CVE-2019-20812 CVE-2020-0009 CVE-2020-0040 CVE-2020-0404 CVE-2020-0431 CVE-2020-0465 CVE-2020-0466 CVE-2020-8647 CVE-2020-8648 CVE-2020-9383 CVE-2020-10732 CVE-2020-10773 CVE-2020-11267 CVE-2020-11565 CVE-2020-12653 CVE-2020-12654 CVE-2020-12656 CVE-2020-12770 CVE-2020-13974 CVE-2020-14314 CVE-2020-14331 CVE-2020-15393 CVE-2020-15436 CVE-2020-16119 CVE-2020-24588 CVE-2020-25211 CVE-2020-25643 CVE-2020-25669 CVE-2020-27066 CVE-2020-27068 CVE-2020-27815 CVE-2020-28974 CVE-2020-29371 CVE-2020-29568 CVE-2020-29661 CVE-2020-36158 CVE-2021-0512 CVE-2021-0961 CVE-2021-1048 CVE-2021-3178 CVE-2021-3428 CVE-2021-3483 CVE-2021-3609 CVE-2021-3612 CVE-2021-3653 CVE-2021-3655 CVE-2021-3753 CVE-2021-3896 CVE-2021-20261 CVE-2021-27363 CVE-2021-28713 CVE-2021-28972 CVE-2021-31916 CVE-2021-34693 CVE-2021-37576 CVE-2021-39634 CVE-2021-39685 CVE-2021-42008 CVE-2021-45095 CVE-2021-45868 CVE-2022-1353 CVE-2022-1652 CVE-2022-1836 CVE-2022-20141 CVE-2022-24958 CVE-2022-25258 CVE-2022-25375 CVE-2022-28390Edit: I really hope those other 76 people in the sidebar didn't get an email for this :(