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Command Reference Gui
Table of Contents
- sessions
- wndscan
- deskscan
- atomscan
- atoms
- clipboard
- eventhooks
- gahti
- messagehooks
- userhandles
- screenshot
- gditimers
- windows
- wintree
The win32k.sys suite of plugins analyzes GUI memory. Most of these plugins are more thoroughly described (including details on underlying data structures, example use cases, etc) on the Volatility Labs Blog, so the content here is just a quick summary.
This command analyzes the unique _MM_SESSION_SPACE objects and prints details related to the processes running in each logon session, mapped drivers, paged/non-paged pools etc. The alternate process lists output by this plugin are leveraged by the psxview plugin for rootkit detection. For more information, see MoVP 1.1 Logon Sessions, Processes, and Images.
$ python vol.py -f win7x64.dd --profile=Win7SP1x64 sessions
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
**************************************************
Session(V): fffff88002ec7000 ID: 0 Processes: 20
PagedPoolStart: fffff900c0000000 PagedPoolEnd fffff920bfffffff
Process: 316 csrss.exe 2011-12-30 08:25:45
Process: 352 wininit.exe 2011-12-30 08:25:54
Process: 448 services.exe 2011-12-30 08:25:57
Process: 464 lsass.exe 2011-12-30 08:25:57
Process: 472 lsm.exe 2011-12-30 08:25:57
Process: 564 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 08:26:00
Process: 632 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 08:26:01
Process: 824 sppsvc.exe 2011-12-30 08:26:14
Process: 868 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 08:26:15
Process: 892 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 08:26:15
Process: 928 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 08:26:15
Process: 268 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 08:27:04
Process: 296 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 08:27:04
Process: 1144 spoolsv.exe 2011-12-30 08:27:08
Process: 1176 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 08:27:08
Process: 1868 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 07:29:10
Process: 2016 svchost.exe 2011-12-30 07:29:13
Process: 1240 SearchIndexer. 2011-12-30 07:29:13
Process: 1904 svchost.exe 2012-01-19 14:27:08
Process: 2284 f-response-ent 2012-03-14 16:45:57
Image: 0xfffffa800284b860, Address fffff96000080000, Name: win32k.sys
Image: 0xfffffa800234d200, Address fffff960004e0000, Name: dxg.sys
Image: 0xfffffa80028178a0, Address fffff960007d0000, Name: TSDDD.dll
This command scans for tagWINDOWSTATION objects and prints details on the window station, its global atom table, available clipboard formats, and processes or threads currently interacting with the clipboard. For more information see MoVP 1.2 Window Stations and Clipboard Malware.
$ python vol.py -f rdp.mem --profile=Win2003SP2x86 wndscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
**************************************************
WindowStation: 0x8581e40, Name: WinSta0, Next: 0x0
SessionId: 2, AtomTable: 0xe7981648, Interactive: True
Desktops: Default, Disconnect, Winlogon
ptiDrawingClipboard: pid - tid -
spwndClipOpen: 0x0, spwndClipViewer: 0xbc6f2ca8 6772 rdpclip.exe
cNumClipFormats: 4, iClipSerialNumber: 9
pClipBase: 0xe6fe8ec8, Formats: CF_UNICODETEXT,CF_LOCALE,CF_TEXT,CF_OEMTEXT
[snip]
This command subclasses the wndscan plugin and for each window station found, it walks the list of desktops. It can be used for the following purposes:
- Find rogue desktops used to hide applications from logged-on users
- Detect desktops created by ransomware
- Link threads to their desktops
- Analyze the desktop heap for memory corruptions
- Profile dekstop heap allocations to locate USER objects
Here's an example of the output. For more information see MoVP 1.3 Desktops, Heaps, and Ransomware.
$ python vol.py -f rdp.mem --profile=Win2003SP2x86 deskscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
**************************************************
Desktop: 0x8001038, Name: WinSta0\Default, Next: 0x8737bc10
SessionId: 2, DesktopInfo: 0xbc6f0650, fsHooks: 2128
spwnd: 0xbc6f06e8, Windows: 238
Heap: 0xbc6f0000, Size: 0x300000, Base: 0xbc6f0000, Limit: 0xbc9f0000
7808 (notepad.exe 6236 parent 5544)
7760 (csrss.exe 7888 parent 432)
5116 (csrss.exe 7888 parent 432)
8168 (PccNTMon.exe 5812 parent 5132)
3040 (cmd.exe 5544 parent 5132)
6600 (csrss.exe 7888 parent 432)
7392 (explorer.exe 5132 parent 8120)
5472 (explorer.exe 5132 parent 8120)
548 (PccNTMon.exe 5812 parent 5132)
6804 (mbamgui.exe 5220 parent 5132)
2008 (ctfmon.exe 4576 parent 5132)
3680 (PccNTMon.exe 5812 parent 5132)
2988 (VMwareTray.exe 3552 parent 5132)
1120 (explorer.exe 5132 parent 8120)
4500 (explorer.exe 5132 parent 8120)
7732 (explorer.exe 5132 parent 8120)
6836 (explorer.exe 5132 parent 8120)
7680 (winlogon.exe 3272 parent 432)
7128 (rdpclip.exe 6772 parent 3272)
5308 (rdpclip.exe 6772 parent 3272)
**************************************************
Desktop: 0x737bc10, Name: WinSta0\Disconnect, Next: 0x8a2f2068
SessionId: 2, DesktopInfo: 0xbc6e0650, fsHooks: 0
spwnd: 0xbc6e06e8, Windows: 25
Heap: 0xbc6e0000, Size: 0x10000, Base: 0xbc6e0000, Limit: 0xbc6f0000
**************************************************
Desktop: 0xa2f2068, Name: WinSta0\Winlogon, Next: 0x0
SessionId: 2, DesktopInfo: 0xbc6c0650, fsHooks: 0
spwnd: 0xbc6c06e8, Windows: 6
Heap: 0xbc6c0000, Size: 0x20000, Base: 0xbc6c0000, Limit: 0xbc6e0000
6912 (winlogon.exe 3272 parent 432)
1188 (winlogon.exe 3272 parent 432)
8172 (winlogon.exe 3272 parent 432)
**************************************************
[snip]
This command scans physical memory for atom tables. For each table found, it enumerates the bucket of atoms - including session global atoms and window station global atoms. It does not include process local atoms. Atoms are reported the order in which they were found, unless you specify --sort-by=atom (sorts by atom ID) or --sort-by=refcount (sorts by number of references to the atom). Using this plugin you can find registered window messages, rogue injected DLL paths, window class names, etc. For more information see MoVP 2.1 Atoms (The New Mutex), Classes, and DLL Injection.
$ python vol.py -f mutihack.vmem atomscan
AtomOfs(V) Atom Refs Pinned Name
---------- ---------- ------ ------ ----
[snip]
0xe179d850 0xc038 1 1 OleMainThreadWndClass
0xe17a7e40 0xc094 2 0 Shell_TrayWnd
0xe17c34b8 0xc0c4 2 0 UnityAppbarWindowClass
0xe17c7678 0xc006 1 1 FileName
0xe17d40a0 0xc0ff 2 0
0xe17d4128 0xc027 1 1 SysCH
0xe17e78f0 0xc01c 1 1 ComboBox
0xe17e9070 0xc065 26 0 6.0.2600.6028Combobox
0xe17ec350 0xc13e 1 0 Xaml
0xe18119c0 0xc08c 5 0 OM_POST_WM_COMMAND
[snip]
This command is similar to atomscan above, but it allows us to associate atom tables with their owning window station. We need this command in conjunction with atomscan because there are many reasons an atom must be tied to its session or window station (for example when resolving ihmod values from windows message hooks or event hooks.
This command recovers data from users' clipboards. It walks the array of tagCLIP objects pointed to by tagWINDOWSTATION.pClipBase and takes the format (i.e. unicode, ansi, ole, bmp) and the handle value. Then it walks the USER handle table (also see the userhandles plugin) and filters for TYPE_CLIPDATA objects. It matches the handle value of those objects with the handles from tagCLIP so that a format can be associated with the raw data. For more information, see MoVP 3.4: Recovering tagCLIPDATA What's In Your Clipboard?.
The output below shows an extracted unicode command that a user had copied to the clipboard:
$ python vol.py -f dfrws2008-rodeo-memory.img clipboard
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
Session WindowStation Format Handle Object Data
-------- ------------- ---------------- ---------- ---------- ------------
0 WinSta0 CF_UNICODETEXT 0x4900c3 0xe12a7c98 pp -B -p -o out.pl file
0 WinSta0 CF_LOCALE 0x80043 0xe12362d0
0 WinSta0 CF_TEXT 0x1 ----------
0 WinSta0 CF_OEMTEXT 0x1 ----------
The next example is a format type CF_HDROP which is a copy & paste operating of a file from windows explorer. Notice the entire file's content isn't copied to the clipboard, just the full path.
$ python vol.py -f xpsp3.vmem clipboard -v
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
[snip]
0 WinSta0 CF_HDROP 0x10230131 0xe1fa6590
0xe1fa659c 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
0xe1fa65ac 01 00 00 00 43 00 3a 00 5c 00 44 00 6f 00 63 00 ....C.:.\.D.o.c.
0xe1fa65bc 75 00 6d 00 65 00 6e 00 74 00 73 00 20 00 61 00 u.m.e.n.t.s...a.
0xe1fa65cc 6e 00 64 00 20 00 53 00 65 00 74 00 74 00 69 00 n.d...S.e.t.t.i.
0xe1fa65dc 6e 00 67 00 73 00 5c 00 41 00 64 00 6d 00 69 00 n.g.s.\.A.d.m.i.
0xe1fa65ec 6e 00 69 00 73 00 74 00 72 00 61 00 74 00 6f 00 n.i.s.t.r.a.t.o.
0xe1fa65fc 72 00 5c 00 44 00 65 00 73 00 6b 00 74 00 6f 00 r.\.D.e.s.k.t.o.
0xe1fa660c 70 00 5c 00 6e 00 6f 00 74 00 65 00 2e 00 74 00 p.\.n.o.t.e...t.
0xe1fa661c 78 00 74 00 00 00 00 00 x.t.....
This command enumerates event hooks installed via the SetWinEventHook API. It prints the minimum and maximum event IDs to which the hook applies, the targeted threads, owning processes, and offset to the hook procedure. For more information, see MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem.
$ python vol.py -f win7x64.dd --profile=Win7SP1x64 eventhooks
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
Handle: 0x300cb, Object: 0xfffff900c01eda10, Session: 1
Type: TYPE_WINEVENTHOOK, Flags: 0, Thread: 1516, Process: 880
eventMin: 0x4 EVENT_SYSTEM_MENUSTART
eventMax: 0x7 EVENT_SYSTEM_MENUPOPUPEND
Flags: none, offPfn: 0xff567cc4, idProcess: 0, idThread: 0
ihmod: -1
This command uses an algorithmic approach to finding the win32kgahti symbol which is an array of tagHANDLETYPEINFO structures - one for each type of USER object for the system. Windows XP has typically 20 objects and Windows 7 has 22, including TYPE_FREE. The plugin shows you the 4-byte tag associated with allocations, where the objects are allocated from (desktop heap, shared heap, session pool), and how the objects are owned (thread owned, process owned, or anonymous). For more information, see MoVP 3.3 Analyzing USER Handles and the Win32k Gahti.
$ python vol.py -f win7x64cmd.dd --profile=Win7SP1x64 gahti
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
Session Type Tag fnDestroy Flags
-------- -------------------- -------- ------------------ -----
0 TYPE_FREE 0x0000000000000000
0 TYPE_WINDOW Uswd 0xfffff9600014f660 OCF_DESKTOPHEAP, OCF_THREADOWNED, OCF_USEPOOLIFNODESKTOP, OCF_USEPOOLQUOTA
0 TYPE_MENU 0xfffff960001515ac OCF_DESKTOPHEAP, OCF_PROCESSOWNED
0 TYPE_CURSOR Uscu 0xfffff960001541a0 OCF_MARKPROCESS, OCF_PROCESSOWNED, OCF_USEPOOLQUOTA
0 TYPE_SETWINDOWPOS Ussw 0xfffff960001192b4 OCF_THREADOWNED, OCF_USEPOOLQUOTA
0 TYPE_HOOK 0xfffff9600018e5c8 OCF_DESKTOPHEAP, OCF_THREADOWNED
0 TYPE_CLIPDATA Uscb 0xfffff9600017c5ac
0 TYPE_CALLPROC 0xfffff9600017c5cc OCF_DESKTOPHEAP, OCF_PROCESSOWNED
0 TYPE_ACCELTABLE Usac 0xfffff9600017c5cc OCF_PROCESSOWNED, OCF_USEPOOLQUOTA
0 TYPE_DDEACCESS Usd9 0xfffff9600017c5ac OCF_THREADOWNED, OCF_USEPOOLQUOTA
0 TYPE_DDECONV UsdA 0xfffff960001ba1fc OCF_THREADOWNED, OCF_USEPOOLQUOTA
0 TYPE_DDEXACT UsdB 0xfffff960001ba22c OCF_THREADOWNED, OCF_USEPOOLQUOTA
0 TYPE_MONITOR Usdi 0xfffff960001ca76c OCF_SHAREDHEAP
0 TYPE_KBDLAYOUT Uskb 0xfffff960001b7c28
0 TYPE_KBDFILE Uskf 0xfffff960001b77c8
0 TYPE_WINEVENTHOOK Uswe 0xfffff9600018f148 OCF_THREADOWNED
0 TYPE_TIMER Ustm 0xfffff960001046dc OCF_PROCESSOWNED
0 TYPE_INPUTCONTEXT Usim 0xfffff9600014c660 OCF_DESKTOPHEAP, OCF_THREADOWNED
0 TYPE_HIDDATA Usha 0xfffff960001d2a34 OCF_THREADOWNED
0 TYPE_DEVICEINFO UsDI 0xfffff960000d8cd4
0 TYPE_TOUCH Ustz 0xfffff9600017c5cc OCF_THREADOWNED
0 TYPE_GESTURE Usgi 0xfffff9600017c5cc OCF_THREADOWNED
This command prints both local and global message hooks, installed via SetWindowsHookEx APIs. This is a common trick used by malware to inject code into other processes and log keystrokes, record mouse movements, etc. For more information, see MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem.
$ python vol.py -f laqma.vmem messagehooks --output=block
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
Offset(V) : 0xbc693988
Session : 0
Desktop : WinSta0\Default
Thread : <any>
Filter : WH_GETMESSAGE
Flags : HF_ANSI, HF_GLOBAL
Procedure : 0x1fd9
ihmod : 1
Module : C:\WINDOWS\system32\Dll.dll
Offset(V) : 0xbc693988
Session : 0
Desktop : WinSta0\Default
Thread : 1584 (explorer.exe 1624)
Filter : WH_GETMESSAGE
Flags : HF_ANSI, HF_GLOBAL
Procedure : 0x1fd9
ihmod : 1
Module : C:\WINDOWS\system32\Dll.dll
Offset(V) : 0xbc693988
Session : 0
Desktop : WinSta0\Default
Thread : 252 (VMwareUser.exe 1768)
Filter : WH_GETMESSAGE
Flags : HF_ANSI, HF_GLOBAL
Procedure : 0x1fd9
ihmod : 1
Module : C:\WINDOWS\system32\Dll.dll
[snip]
This command takes a screenshot from each desktop on the system. The screenshot is a wire-frame diagram, with labeled window titles, according to the Z-Order (i.e. front to back) arrangement of the windows and their coordinates at the time of the memory dump. For more information, see MoVP 4.3 Taking Screenshots From Memory Dumps.
$ python vol.py -f users.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86 screenshot -D shots/
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
Wrote shots/session_0.Service-0x0-3e4$.Default.png
Wrote shots/session_0.Service-0x0-3e5$.Default.png
Wrote shots/session_0.msswindowstation.mssrestricteddesk.png
Wrote shots/session_0.Service-0x0-3e7$.Default.png
Wrote shots/session_1.WinSta0.Default.png
Wrote shots/session_1.WinSta0.Disconnect.png
Wrote shots/session_1.WinSta0.Winlogon.png
Wrote shots/session_0.WinSta0.Default.png
Wrote shots/session_0.WinSta0.Disconnect.png
Wrote shots/session_0.WinSta0.Winlogon.png
Wrote shots/session_2.WinSta0.Default.png
Wrote shots/session_2.WinSta0.Disconnect.png
Wrote shots/session_2.WinSta0.Winlogon.png
Here's an example of one of the desktops:
This command locates the session-specific tagSHAREDINFO structure, walks the aheList member (an array of _HANDLEENTRY) structures. It determines if each handle entry is thread or process owned, shows the object type, and its offset in session space. This plugin is not very verbose, its just meant to show an overview of the USER objects currently in use by each thread or process; and it serves as an API for other plugins that do want verbose details on an object type. For example the gditimers and eventhooks plugins leverage the APIs from this plugin. For more information, see http://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-33-analyzing-user-handles-and.html MoVP 3.3 Analyzing USER Handles and the Win32k Gahti.
$ python vol.py -f win7x64.dd --profile=Win7SP1x64 userhandles
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
**************************************************
SharedInfo: 0xfffff9600035d300, SessionId: 0
aheList: 0xfffff900c0400000, Table size: 0x2000, Entry size: 0x18
Object(V) Handle bType Flags Thread Process
------------------ ------------ --------------- -------- -------- -------
0xfffff900c05824b0 0x10001 TYPE_MONITOR 0 -------- -
0xfffff900c01bad20 0x10002 TYPE_WINDOW 64 432 316
0xfffff900c00b6730 0x10003 TYPE_CURSOR 0 -------- 316
0xfffff900c0390b90 0x10004 TYPE_WINDOW 0 432 316
0xfffff900c00d7ab0 0x10005 TYPE_CURSOR 0 -------- 316
0xfffff900c0390e60 0x10006 TYPE_WINDOW 0 432 316
0xfffff900c00d7640 0x10007 TYPE_CURSOR 0 -------- 316
[snip]
0xfffff900c0630bf0 0x467c054b TYPE_HOOK 0 2368 2348
0xfffff900c0616d60 0x72055f TYPE_MENU 0 -------- 880
0xfffff900c0654610 0x494c0581 TYPE_MENU 0 -------- 880
0xfffff900c1a14b10 0x539f0583 TYPE_CURSOR 0 -------- 880
[snip]
This command leverages the USER handle table API as described above and for each TYPE_TIMER, it dereferences the object as a tagTIMER and prints details on the fields. Malware uses timers often to schedule routine functions, such as contacting a C2 server or making sure a hidden process remains hidden. For more information, see MoVP 4.1 Detecting Malware with GDI Timers.
$ python vol.py -f laqma.vmem gditimers
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
Thread Process nID Rate(ms) Countdown(ms) Func
-------- -------------------- ---------- ---------- ------------- ----------
696 csrss.exe:660 0x7ffe 1000 734 0xbf8012b8
1648 explorer.exe:1624 0x15 60000 45109 0x00000000
1480 svchost.exe:1064 0x7476 60000 16234 0x74f51070
696 csrss.exe:660 0x7ffd 35000 25625 0xbf8f4d9a
1648 explorer.exe:1624 0x19 86400000 70004672 0x00000000
1764 VMwareTray.exe:1760 0x0 5000 4859 0x00000000
1648 explorer.exe:1624 0xe 43200000 26805359 0x00000000
1764 VMwareTray.exe:1760 0x11 60000 45859 0x00000000
700 csrss.exe:660 0xfff5 100 100 0xbf807d00
356 svchost.exe:1064 0x0 300000 131234 0x77532ebb
2024 lanmanwrk.exe:920 0x2eb 600000 589578 0x00401fc8
2024 lanmanwrk.exe:920 0x161 3000 1578 0x004010aa
1648 explorer.exe:1624 0x0 60000 11922 0x00000000
384 KernelDrv.exe:352 0x8b 600000 595359 0x00404c2b
384 KernelDrv.exe:352 0x8c 3000 1359 0x004010aa
384 KernelDrv.exe:352 0xd 2000 1359 0x00410850
This command enumerates all windows (visible or not) in all desktops of the system. It walks windows in their Z-Order (i.e. front to back focus) starting at the desktops spwnd value (the foreground window). For each window it shows details on the window's title, class atoms, the owning thread and process, the visibility properties, the left/right/top/bottom coordinates, the flags and ex-flags, and the window procedure address. For more information on windows, see MoVP 2.2 Malware In Your Windows.
$ python vol.py -f win7x64.dd --profile=Win7SP1x64 windows
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
**************************************************
Window context: 1\WinSta0\Default
Window Handle: #40170 at 0xfffff900c06258a0, Name: Download: Microsoft Windows SDK 7.1 - Microsoft Download Center - Confirmation - Windows Internet Explorer
ClassAtom: 0xc193, Class: IEFrame
SuperClassAtom: 0xc193, SuperClass: IEFrame
pti: 0xfffff900c24c4c30, Tid: 680 at 0xfffffa8002007060
ppi: 0xfffff900c28c2320, Process: iexplore.exe, Pid: 2328
Visible: Yes
Left: -32000, Top: -32000, Bottom: -32000, Right: -32000
Style Flags: WS_MINIMIZE,WS_MINIMIZEBOX,WS_TABSTOP,WS_DLGFRAME,WS_BORDER,WS_THICKFRAME,WS_CAPTION,WS_CLIPCHILDREN,WS_SYSMENU,WS_MAXIMIZEBOX,WS_GROUP,WS_OVERLAPPED,WS_VISIBLE,WS_CLIPSIBLINGS
ExStyle Flags: WS_EX_LTRREADING,WS_EX_RIGHTSCROLLBAR,WS_EX_WINDOWEDGE,WS_EX_LEFT
Window procedure: 0x714f6f7a
This command enumerates windows in the same way as the windows command above, but it prints less verbose details so that the parent/child relationship can be easily expressed in a tree form. Instead of a "flat" view, you can see which windows are contained within other windows.
$ python vol.py -f win7x64.dd --profile=Win7SP1x64 wintree
[snip]
.Debugging Tools for Windows (visible) hh.exe:1952 HH Parent
..#70422 (visible) hh.exe:1952 HH Child
...#90452 (visible) hh.exe:1952 SysTabControl32
....#a0202 (visible) hh.exe:1952 -
.....Found: 62 (visible) hh.exe:1952 Static
.....Select &topic: (visible) hh.exe:1952 Static
.....Type in the &word(s) to search for: (visible) hh.exe:1952 Static
.....Sea&rch titles only (visible) hh.exe:1952 Button
.....&Match similar words (visible) hh.exe:1952 Button
.....Search previous res&ults (visible) hh.exe:1952 Button
.....List1 (visible) hh.exe:1952 SysListView32
......#50164 (visible) hh.exe:1952 SysHeader32
.....&Display (visible) hh.exe:1952 Button
.....&List Topics (visible) hh.exe:1952 Button
.....#70424 (visible) hh.exe:1952 Button
.....#702cc (visible) hh.exe:1952 ComboBox
......#f038e (visible) hh.exe:1952 Edit
..#702ba (visible) hh.exe:1952 HH SizeBar
..#70420 (visible) hh.exe:1952 HH Child
...#a0478 (visible) hh.exe:1952 Shell Embedding
....#36029e (visible) hh.exe:1952 Shell DocObject View
.....#9013e (visible) hh.exe:1952 Internet Explorer_Server
..#18029a (visible) hh.exe:1952 ToolbarWindow32
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