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Update cross-program and program address proposals (bp #10234) (#10241)
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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/src/SUMMARY.md
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* [Validator Timestamp Oracle](implemented-proposals/validator-timestamp-oracle.md)
* [Commitment](implemented-proposals/commitment.md)
* [Snapshot Verification](implemented-proposals/snapshot-verification.md)
* [Cross-Program Invocation](implemented-proposals/cross-program-invocation.md)
* [Program Derived Addresses](implemented-proposals/program-derived-addresses.md)
* [Accepted Design Proposals](proposals/README.md)
* [Optimistic Confirmation and Slashing](proposals/optimistic-confirmation-and-slashing.md)
* [Secure Vote Signing](proposals/vote-signing-to-implement.md)
* [Cluster Test Framework](proposals/cluster-test-framework.md)
* [Validator](proposals/validator-proposal.md)
* [Simple Payment and State Verification](proposals/simple-payment-and-state-verification.md)
* [Cross-Program Invocation](proposals/cross-program-invocation.md)
* [Program Keys and Signatures](proposals/program-keys-and-signatures.md)
* [Inter-chain Transaction Verification](proposals/interchain-transaction-verification.md)
* [Snapshot Verification](proposals/snapshot-verification.md)
* [Bankless Leader](proposals/bankless-leader.md)
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95 changes: 95 additions & 0 deletions docs/src/implemented-proposals/cross-program-invocation.md
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# Cross-Program Invocation

## Problem

In today's implementation, a client can create a transaction that modifies two accounts, each owned by a separate on-chain program:

```rust,ignore
let message = Message::new(vec![
token_instruction::pay(&alice_pubkey),
acme_instruction::launch_missiles(&bob_pubkey),
]);
client.send_message(&[&alice_keypair, &bob_keypair], &message);
```

However, the current implementation does not allow the `acme` program to conveniently invoke `token` instructions on the client's behalf:

```rust,ignore
let message = Message::new(vec![
acme_instruction::pay_and_launch_missiles(&alice_pubkey, &bob_pubkey),
]);
client.send_message(&[&alice_keypair, &bob_keypair], &message);
```

Currently, there is no way to create instruction `pay_and_launch_missiles` that executes `token_instruction::pay` from the `acme` program. A possible workaround is to extend the `acme` program with the implementation of the `token` program and create `token` accounts with `ACME_PROGRAM_ID`, which the `acme` program is permitted to modify. With that workaround, `acme` can modify token-like accounts created by the `acme` program, but not token accounts created by the `token` program.

## Proposed Solution

The goal of this design is to modify Solana's runtime such that an on-chain program can invoke an instruction from another program.

Given two on-chain programs `token` and `acme`, each implementing instructions `pay()` and `launch_missiles()` respectively, we would ideally like to implement the `acme` module with a call to a function defined in the `token` module:

```rust,ignore
mod acme {
use token;
fn launch_missiles(keyed_accounts: &[KeyedAccount]) -> Result<()> {
...
}
fn pay_and_launch_missiles(keyed_accounts: &[KeyedAccount]) -> Result<()> {
token::pay(&keyed_accounts[1..])?;
launch_missiles(keyed_accounts)?;
}
```

The above code would require that the `token` crate be dynamically linked so that a custom linker could intercept calls and validate accesses to `keyed_accounts`. Even though the client intends to modify both `token` and `acme` accounts, only `token` program is permitted to modify the `token` account, and only the `acme` program is allowed to modify the `acme` account.

Backing off from that ideal direct cross-program call, a slightly more verbose solution is to allow `acme` to invoke `token` by issuing a token instruction via the runtime.

```rust,ignore
mod acme {
use token_instruction;
fn launch_missiles(keyed_accounts: &[KeyedAccount]) -> Result<()> {
...
}
fn pay_and_launch_missiles(keyed_accounts: &[KeyedAccount]) -> Result<()> {
let alice_pubkey = keyed_accounts[1].key;
let instruction = token_instruction::pay(&alice_pubkey);
invoke(&instruction, accounts)?;
launch_missiles(keyed_accounts)?;
}
```

`invoke()` is built into Solana's runtime and is responsible for routing the given instruction to the `token` program via the instruction's `program_id` field.

Before invoking `pay()`, the runtime must ensure that `acme` didn't modify any accounts owned by `token`. It does this by applying the runtime's policy to the current state of the accounts at the time `acme` calls `invoke` vs. the initial state of the accounts at the beginning of the `acme`'s instruction. After `pay()` completes, the runtime must again ensure that `token` didn't modify any accounts owned by `acme` by again applying the runtime's policy, but this time with the `token` program ID. Lastly, after `pay_and_launch_missiles()` completes, the runtime must apply the runtime policy one more time, where it normally would, but using all updated `pre_*` variables. If executing `pay_and_launch_missiles()` up to `pay()` made no invalid account changes, `pay()` made no invalid changes, and executing from `pay()` until `pay_and_launch_missiles()` returns made no invalid changes, then the runtime can transitively assume `pay_and_launch_missiles()` as whole made no invalid account changes, and therefore commit all these account modifications.

### Instructions that require privileges

The runtime uses the privileges granted to the caller program to determine what privileges can be extended to the callee. Privileges in this context refer to signers and writable accounts. For example, if the instruction the caller is processing contains a signer or writable account, then the caller can invoke an instruction that also contains that signer and/or writable account.

This privilege extension relies on the fact that programs are immutable. In the case of the `acme` program, the runtime can safely treat the transaction's signature as a signature of a `token` instruction. When the runtime sees the `token` instruction references `alice_pubkey`, it looks up the key in the `acme` instruction to see if that key corresponds to a signed account. In this case, it does and thereby authorizes the `token` program to modify Alice's account.

### Program signed accounts

Programs can issue instructions that contain signed accounts that were not signed in the original transaction by
using [Program derived addresses](program-derived-addresses.md).

To sign an account with program derived addresses, a program may `invoke_signed()`.

```rust,ignore
invoke_signed(
&instruction,
accounts,
&[&["First addresses seed"],
&["Second addresses first seed", "Second addresses second seed"]],
)?;
### Reentrancy
Reentrancy is currently limited to direct self recursion capped at a fixed depth. This restriction prevents situations where a program might invoke another from an intermediary state without the knowledge that it might later be called back into. Direct recursion gives the program full control of its state at the point that it gets called back.
154 changes: 154 additions & 0 deletions docs/src/implemented-proposals/program-derived-addresses.md
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# Program Derived Addresses

## Problem

Programs cannot generate signatures when issuing instructions to
other programs as defined in the [Cross-Program Invocations](cross-program-invocation.md)
design.

The lack of programmatic signature generation limits the kinds of programs
that can be implemented in Solana. A program may be given the
authority over an account and later want to transfer that authority to another.
This is impossible today because the program cannot act as the signer in the transaction that gives authority.

For example, if two users want
to make a wager on the outcome of a game in Solana, they must each
transfer their wager's assets to some intermediary that will honor
their agreement. Currently, there is no way to implement this intermediary
as a program in Solana because the intermediary program cannot transfer the
assets to the winner.

This capability is necessary for many DeFi applications since they
require assets to be transferred to an escrow agent until some event
occurs that determines the new owner.

* Decentralized Exchanges that transfer assets between matching bid and
ask orders.

* Auctions that transfer assets to the winner.

* Games or prediction markets that collect and redistribute prizes to
the winners.

## Proposed Solution

The key to the design is two-fold:

1. Allow programs to control specific addresses, called Program-Addresses, in such a way that no external
user can generate valid transactions with signatures for those
addresses.

2. Allow programs to programmatically sign for Program-Addresses that are
present in instructions invoked via [Cross-Program Invocations](cross-program-invocation.md).

Given the two conditions, users can securely transfer or assign
the authority of on-chain assets to Program-Addresses and the program
can then assign that authority elsewhere at its discretion.

### Private keys for Program Addresses

A Program -Address has no private key associated with it, and generating
a signature for it is impossible. While it has no private key of
its own, it can issue an instruction that includes the Program-Address as a signer.

### Hash-based generated Program Addresses

All 256-bit values are valid ed25519 curve points and valid ed25519 public
keys. All are equally secure and equally as hard to break.
Based on this assumption, Program Addresses can be deterministically
derived from a base seed using a 256-bit preimage resistant hash function.

Deterministic Program Addresses for programs follow a similar derivation
path as Accounts created with `SystemInstruction::CreateAccountWithSeed`
which is implemented with `system_instruction::create_address_with_seed`.

For reference that implementation is as follows:

```rust,ignore
pub fn create_address_with_seed(
base: &Pubkey,
seed: &str,
program_id: &Pubkey,
) -> Result<Pubkey, SystemError> {
if seed.len() > MAX_ADDRESS_SEED_LEN {
return Err(SystemError::MaxSeedLengthExceeded);
}
Ok(Pubkey::new(
hashv(&[base.as_ref(), seed.as_ref(), program_id.as_ref()]).as_ref(),
))
}
```

Programs can deterministically derive any number of addresses by
using keywords. These keywords can symbolically identify how the addresses are used.

```rust,ignore
//! Generate a derived program address
//! * seeds, symbolic keywords used to derive the key
//! * owner, program that the key is derived for
pub fn create_program_address(seeds: &[&str], owner: &Pubkey) -> Result<Pubkey, PubkeyError> {
let mut hasher = Hasher::default();
for seed in seeds.iter() {
if seed.len() > MAX_SEED_LEN {
return Err(PubkeyError::MaxSeedLengthExceeded);
}
hasher.hash(seed.as_ref());
}
hasher.hashv(&[owner.as_ref(), "ProgramDerivedAddress".as_ref()]);
Ok(Pubkey::new(hashv(&[hasher.result().as_ref()]).as_ref()))
}
```

### Using Program Addresses

Clients can use the `create_program_address` function to generate
a destination address.

```rust,ignore
//deterministically derive the escrow key
let escrow_pubkey = create_program_address(&[&["escrow"]], &escrow_program_id);
let message = Message::new(vec![
token_instruction::transfer(&alice_pubkey, &escrow_pubkey, 1),
]);
//transfer 1 token to escrow
client.send_message(&[&alice_keypair], &message);
```

Programs can use the same function to generate the same address.
In the function below the program issues a `token_instruction::transfer` from
Program Address as if it had the private key to sign the transaction.

```rust,ignore
fn transfer_one_token_from_escrow(
program_id: &Pubkey,
keyed_accounts: &[KeyedAccount]
) -> Result<()> {
// User supplies the destination
let alice_pubkey = keyed_accounts[1].unsigned_key();
// Deterministically derive the escrow pubkey.
let escrow_pubkey = create_program_address(&[&["escrow"]], program_id);
// Create the transfer instruction
let instruction = token_instruction::transfer(&escrow_pubkey, &alice_pubkey, 1);
// The runtime deterministically derives the key from the currently
// executing program ID and the supplied keywords.
// If the derived key matches a key marked as signed in the instruction
// then that key is accepted as signed.
invoke_signed(&instruction, &[&["escrow"]])?
}
```

### Instructions that require signers

The addresses generated with `create_program_address` are indistinguishable
from any other public key. The only way for the runtime to verify that the
address belongs to a program is for the program to supply the keywords used
to generate the address.

The runtime will internally call `create_program_address`, and compare the
result against the addresses supplied in the instruction.
71 changes: 0 additions & 71 deletions docs/src/proposals/cross-program-invocation.md

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