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anapaya feedback #46

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merged 3 commits into from
Oct 16, 2024
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anapaya feedback #46

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anapaya feedback
nicorusti Oct 9, 2024
b334c06
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into anapaya-review
nicorusti Oct 16, 2024
b3e7f10
remove wrong sentence about TRC update
nicorusti Oct 16, 2024
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion draft-dekater-scion-pki.md
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Expand Up @@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ Compared to other trust architectures, in SCION there is no central authority th
This section deals with possible recovery from the compromises discussed in the previous paragraph.
As described in [](#substitutes-to-revocation), there is no revocation in the CP-PKI.

- On TRC level: If any of the root keys or voting keys contained in the TRC are compromised, the TRC MUST be updated as described in [](#update). Note that this is a sensitive TRC update, as the certificate related to the compromised private key MUST be replaced with an entirely new certificate (and not just changed). A trust reset is only required in the case the number of compromised keys at the same time is greater or equal than the TRC's quorum (see [](#quorum)).
- On TRC level: If any of the root keys or voting keys contained in the TRC are compromised, the TRC MUST be updated as described in [](#update). A trust reset is only required in the case the number of compromised keys at the same time is greater or equal than the TRC's quorum (see [](#quorum)) and a invalid update has been produced and distributed in the network.
- On CA level: If the private key related to a CA certificate is compromised, the impacted CA AS MUST obtain a new CA certificate from the corresponding root AS. CA certificates are generally short lived to limit the impact of compromise. Alternatively, with a TRC update, a new root keys can also be forced, invalidating the compromised CA.
- On AS level: In the event of a key compromise of a (non-core) AS, the impacted AS needs to obtain a new certificate from its CA. This process will vary depending on internal issuance protocols.

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