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Validate self-signatures and require subkey bindings on PGP public keys #1788

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Validate self-signatures and require subkey bindings on PGP public keys #1788

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46c45e9
Process MPI's from all kinds of signatures
pmatilai Sep 30, 2021
2642412
Refactor pgpDigParams construction to helper function
pmatilai Sep 30, 2021
1dcfa3c
Validate self-signatures and require subkey bindings on PGP public keys
pmatilai Sep 30, 2021
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147 changes: 130 additions & 17 deletions rpmio/rpmpgp.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ pgpDigAlg pgpDigAlgFree(pgpDigAlg alg)
return NULL;
}

static int pgpPrtSigParams(pgpTag tag, uint8_t pubkey_algo, uint8_t sigtype,
static int pgpPrtSigParams(pgpTag tag, uint8_t pubkey_algo,
const uint8_t *p, const uint8_t *h, size_t hlen,
pgpDigParams sigp)
{
Expand All @@ -556,10 +556,8 @@ static int pgpPrtSigParams(pgpTag tag, uint8_t pubkey_algo, uint8_t sigtype,
int mpil = pgpMpiLen(p);
if (pend - p < mpil)
break;
if (sigtype == PGPSIGTYPE_BINARY || sigtype == PGPSIGTYPE_TEXT) {
if (sigalg->setmpi(sigalg, i, p))
break;
}
if (sigalg->setmpi(sigalg, i, p))
break;
Comment on lines +559 to +560
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With this change, RPM needs to check that package signatures are in fact signatures of binary documents. I am not aware of an actual exploit, but it is the Right Thing To Do, since a security patch should not regress security elsewhere.

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Well, instead of removing the check maybe we should check for the kinds that we actually support in the PGP parser. We dont do TEXT anyway.

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A certification or binding signature isn’t a valid package signature and should not be accepted where a package signature is required. The parser doesn’t currently know what kind of signature is expected and so can’t make that decision. That said, another option would be to add a new API function that only parses signatures, and which expects the type of the signature as an argument.

p += mpil;
}

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -619,7 +617,7 @@ static int pgpPrtSig(pgpTag tag, const uint8_t *h, size_t hlen,
}

p = ((uint8_t *)v) + sizeof(*v);
rc = pgpPrtSigParams(tag, v->pubkey_algo, v->sigtype, p, h, hlen, _digp);
rc = pgpPrtSigParams(tag, v->pubkey_algo, p, h, hlen, _digp);
} break;
case 4:
{ pgpPktSigV4 v = (pgpPktSigV4)h;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -678,7 +676,7 @@ static int pgpPrtSig(pgpTag tag, const uint8_t *h, size_t hlen,
if (p > hend)
return 1;

rc = pgpPrtSigParams(tag, v->pubkey_algo, v->sigtype, p, h, hlen, _digp);
rc = pgpPrtSigParams(tag, v->pubkey_algo, p, h, hlen, _digp);
} break;
default:
rpmlog(RPMLOG_WARNING, _("Unsupported version of signature: V%d\n"), version);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1057,38 +1055,154 @@ unsigned int pgpDigParamsAlgo(pgpDigParams digp, unsigned int algotype)
return algo;
}

static pgpDigParams pgpDigParamsNew(uint8_t tag)
{
pgpDigParams digp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*digp));
digp->tag = tag;
return digp;
}

static int hashKey(DIGEST_CTX hash, const struct pgpPkt *pkt, int exptag)
{
int rc = -1;
if (pkt->tag == exptag) {
uint8_t head[] = {
0x99,
(pkt->blen >> 8),
(pkt->blen ),
};

rpmDigestUpdate(hash, head, 3);
rpmDigestUpdate(hash, pkt->body, pkt->blen);
rc = 0;
}
return rc;
}

static int hashUser(DIGEST_CTX hash, const struct pgpPkt *pkt, int exptag)
{
int rc = -1;
if (pkt->tag == exptag) {
uint8_t head[] = {
0xb4,
(pkt->blen >> 24),
(pkt->blen >> 16),
(pkt->blen >> 8),
(pkt->blen ),
};
rpmDigestUpdate(hash, head, 5);
rpmDigestUpdate(hash, pkt->body, pkt->blen);
rc = 0;
}
return rc;
}

static int pgpVerifySelf(pgpDigParams key, pgpDigParams selfsig,
const struct pgpPkt *all, int i)
{
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@DemiMarie DemiMarie Oct 11, 2021 •
edited
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Suggested change
{
{
assert(i > 0 && "pgpVerifySelf passed invalid i");

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You're suggesting to add two lines of a comment to explain what an assert() is? Come on.
Review of the PGP matters is totally welcome, but material like this is only good for raising my blood pressure.

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Edited

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The point is that we don't sprinkle material like this around. This is just redundant clutter in the codebase which makes it unreadable. Whenever you feel the need to add a comment or an assert, it's more likely because the code in question is dumb and could be written in a better way. Such as here.

int rc = -1;
DIGEST_CTX hash = NULL;

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You might want to verify the package types of the package you're hashing, i.e. all[i-1] should be of the required type.

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Does it actually matter though? I mean, if the type is wrong then the hash will also be wrong and simply fail to pass? Okay, as a belt and suspenders kind of thing I suppose...

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I also think that it does not matter, but it's the right thing to do for security relevant code ;-)

Anyway, for the _CERT verification you can't use all[i-1] as there may be multiple signatures.

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Oh, good point on the CERT verification (annoying as it may be...)

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Changed it to check for the types and more errors overall, userid lookup in the CERT case still missing.

switch (selfsig->sigtype) {
case PGPSIGTYPE_SUBKEY_BINDING:
hash = rpmDigestInit(selfsig->hash_algo, 0);
if (hash) {
rc = hashKey(hash, &all[0], PGPTAG_PUBLIC_KEY);
if (!rc)
rc = hashKey(hash, &all[i-1], PGPTAG_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);
}
break;
case PGPSIGTYPE_GENERIC_CERT:
case PGPSIGTYPE_PERSONA_CERT:
case PGPSIGTYPE_CASUAL_CERT:
case PGPSIGTYPE_POSITIVE_CERT:
hash = rpmDigestInit(selfsig->hash_algo, 0);
if (hash) {
rc = hashKey(hash, &all[0], PGPTAG_PUBLIC_KEY);
if (!rc)
rc = hashUser(hash, &all[i-1], PGPTAG_USER_ID);
}
break;
default:
/* ignore unknown types */
rc = 0;
Comment on lines +1127 to +1128
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Suggested change
/* ignore unknown types */
rc = 0;
/* reject unknown types */

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No, rejecting types we cannot handle would only cause us to fail on perfectly legitimate keys. IIRC the PGP spec quite specifically tells you to ignore what you don't know, which generally is the key to future expandable standards.

break;
}

if (hash && rc == 0)
rc = pgpVerifySignature(key, selfsig, hash);

rpmDigestFinal(hash, NULL, NULL, 0);

return rc;
}

int pgpPrtParams(const uint8_t * pkts, size_t pktlen, unsigned int pkttype,
pgpDigParams * ret)
{
const uint8_t *p = pkts;
const uint8_t *pend = pkts + pktlen;
pgpDigParams digp = NULL;
struct pgpPkt pkt;
pgpDigParams selfsig = NULL;
int i = 0;
int alloced = 16; /* plenty for normal cases */
struct pgpPkt *all = xmalloc(alloced * sizeof(*all));
int rc = -1; /* assume failure */
int expect = 0;

while (p < pend) {
if (decodePkt(p, (pend - p), &pkt))
struct pgpPkt *pkt = &all[i];
if (decodePkt(p, (pend - p), pkt))
break;

if (pkt->tag == PGPTAG_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
expect = PGPTAG_SIGNATURE;
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Should we also enforce a self-sig on a User ID Packet?

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I considered that, but it'd be against the spec:

Immediately following each User ID packet, there are zero or more Signature packets.

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It'd be good to differentiate between verified and non-verified somehow though.

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I believe GPG ignores User ID packets that have no self-signatures. RPM should either reject such packets or ignore them; processing them as if they were verified is a bad idea.


if (digp == NULL) {
if (pkttype && pkt.tag != pkttype) {
if (pkttype && pkt->tag != pkttype) {
break;
} else {
digp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*digp));
digp->tag = pkt.tag;
digp = pgpDigParamsNew(pkt->tag);
}
}

if (pgpPrtPkt(&pkt, digp))
if (digp->tag == PGPTAG_PUBLIC_KEY && pkt->tag == PGPTAG_SIGNATURE)
selfsig = pgpDigParamsNew(pkt->tag);
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The code assumes that the self-sig always comes first if there are multiple signatures. Does the standard say something about this?

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Maybe you should also check that the issuer id matches and ignore non-selfsigned sigs.

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https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4880#section-11.1 says:

Each Subkey packet MUST be followed by one Signature packet, which should be a subkey binding signature issued by the top-level key.

Surely a signature with a different issuer will simply not pass?

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@mlschroe mlschroe Oct 11, 2021 •
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Sure, but that's a problem as the signature checking code below is done for all signatures, not just the subkey binding one.

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@pmatilai pmatilai Oct 11, 2021 •
edited
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I'm probably Monday dense here, but I fail to see the problem.

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Maybe it's me ;)

My point is that selfsig will also be set for signatures that use a different key (i.e. not self-signed) and the code below will call pgpVerifySelf on them and then break the loop as the verification will fail.

(Of course I'm talking about _CERT sigs, not the subkey binding one)

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I am fine with assuming and requiring that the self-signature comes first, provided that doing so is interoperable. Keys with non-self-signatures obviously need to be accepted, but I am fine with RPM ignoring the extra signatures and omitting them from the parsed result.

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My point is that selfsig will also be set for signatures that use a different key (i.e. not self-signed) and the code below will call pgpVerifySelf on them and then break the loop as the verification will fail.

Right, got it. I think.

This is all a surprisingly nasty tangle of logic. Perhaps I should split the _CERT part out of this to simplify, that's not part of the CVE anyway and that's what I want to get out of the way.


if (pgpPrtPkt(pkt, selfsig ? selfsig : digp))
break;

p += (pkt.body - pkt.head) + pkt.blen;
/* subkeys must be followed by binding signature */
if (i > 0 && all[i-1].tag == PGPTAG_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
if (!(selfsig && selfsig->sigtype == PGPSIGTYPE_SUBKEY_BINDING))
break;

if (selfsig) {
int xx = -1;

if (i > 0)
xx = pgpVerifySelf(digp, selfsig, all, i);

selfsig = pgpDigParamsFree(selfsig);
if (xx)
break;
expect = 0;
}

i++;
p += (pkt->body - pkt->head) + pkt->blen;
if (pkttype == PGPTAG_SIGNATURE)
break;

if (alloced <= i) {
alloced *= 2;
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Suggested change
alloced *= 2;
if (alloced > INT_MAX / 2 || alloced > SIZE_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*all)))
abort();
alloced *= 2;

This is a last-ditch check against memory corruption due to integer overflow. Such long keys should be rejected earlier in any case.

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No. Just no. I've told you before, we wont be littering the code-base with stuff like this. If we did, nobody could find the actual code from underneath.

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@pmatilai pmatilai Oct 13, 2021 •
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To elaborate on that a bit, the suggested change is simply absurd when you could simply place an upper bound and error out if exceeded.

all = xrealloc(all, alloced * sizeof(*all));
}
}

rc = (digp && (p == pend)) ? 0 : -1;
rc = (digp && (p == pend) && expect == 0) ? 0 : -1;

free(all);
if (ret && rc == 0) {
*ret = digp;
} else {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1123,8 +1237,7 @@ int pgpPrtParamsSubkeys(const uint8_t *pkts, size_t pktlen,
digps = xrealloc(digps, alloced * sizeof(*digps));
}

digps[count] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**digps));
digps[count]->tag = PGPTAG_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
digps[count] = pgpDigParamsNew(PGPTAG_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);
/* Copy UID from main key to subkey */
digps[count]->userid = xstrdup(mainkey->userid);

Expand Down
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions tests/Makefile.am
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ EXTRA_DIST += data/SPECS/hello-config-buildid.spec
EXTRA_DIST += data/SPECS/hello-cd.spec
EXTRA_DIST += data/keys/rpm.org-rsa-2048-test.pub
EXTRA_DIST += data/keys/rpm.org-rsa-2048-test.secret
EXTRA_DIST += data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-badbind.asc
EXTRA_DIST += data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-baduser.asc
EXTRA_DIST += data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-nosubsig.asc
EXTRA_DIST += data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-nosubsig-last.asc
EXTRA_DIST += data/macros.testfile
EXTRA_DIST += data/macros.debug
EXTRA_DIST += data/SOURCES/foo.c
Expand Down
25 changes: 25 additions & 0 deletions tests/data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-badbind.asc
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: rpm-4.17.90 (NSS-3)

mQENBFjmORgBCAC7TMEk6wnjSs8Dr4yqSScWdU2pjcqrkTxuzdWvowcIUPZI0w/g
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=WCfs
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

31 changes: 31 additions & 0 deletions tests/data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-baduser.asc
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-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: rpm-4.17.90 (NSS-3)

mQENBFjmORgBCAC7TMEk6wnjSs8Dr4yqSScWdU2pjcqrkTxuzdWvowcIUPZI0w/g
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=sE8L
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

25 changes: 25 additions & 0 deletions tests/data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-nosubsig-last.asc
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-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: rpm-4.17.90 (NSS-3)

mQENBFjmORgBCAC7TMEk6wnjSs8Dr4yqSScWdU2pjcqrkTxuzdWvowcIUPZI0w/g
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=WCfs
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

37 changes: 37 additions & 0 deletions tests/data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-nosubsig.asc
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: rpm-4.17.90 (NSS-3)

mQENBFjmORgBCAC7TMEk6wnjSs8Dr4yqSScWdU2pjcqrkTxuzdWvowcIUPZI0w/g
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E4XX4jtDmdZPreZALsiB
=rRop
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

36 changes: 36 additions & 0 deletions tests/rpmsigdig.at
View file
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -240,6 +240,42 @@ gpg(185e6146f00650f8) = 4:185e6146f00650f8-58e63918
[])
AT_CLEANUP

AT_SETUP([rpmkeys --import invalid keys])
AT_KEYWORDS([rpmkeys import])
RPMDB_INIT

AT_CHECK([
runroot rpmkeys --import /data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-badbind.asc
],
[1],
[],
[error: /data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-badbind.asc: key 1 import failed.]
)
AT_CHECK([
runroot rpmkeys --import /data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-baduser.asc
],
[1],
[],
[error: /data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-baduser.asc: key 1 import failed.]
)

AT_CHECK([
runroot rpmkeys --import /data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-nosubsig.asc
],
[1],
[],
[error: /data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-nosubsig.asc: key 1 import failed.]
)

AT_CHECK([
runroot rpmkeys --import /data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-nosubsig-last.asc
],
[1],
[],
[error: /data/keys/CVE-2021-3521-nosubsig-last.asc: key 1 import failed.]
)
AT_CLEANUP

# ------------------------------
# Test pre-built package verification
AT_SETUP([rpmkeys -K <signed> 1])
Expand Down