detect workflow_run as a dangerous trigger

checks/dangerous_workflow.go

@@ -80,9 +80,11 @@ const (
 type triggerName string
 
 var (
-	triggerPullRequestTarget = triggerName("pull_request_target")
-	triggerPullRequest       = triggerName("pull_request")
-	checkoutUntrustedRef     = "github.event.pull_request"
+	triggerPullRequestTarget        = triggerName("pull_request_target")
+	triggerWorkflowRun              = triggerName("workflow_run")
+	triggerPullRequest              = triggerName("pull_request")
+	checkoutUntrustedPullRequestRef = "github.event.pull_request"
+	checkoutUntrustedWorkflowRunRef = "github.event.workflow_run"
 )
 
 // Holds stateful data to pass thru callbacks.
@@ -168,7 +170,9 @@ func validateSecretsInPullRequests(workflow *actionlint.Workflow, path string,
 	// We need pull request trigger.
 	usesPullRequest := usesEventTrigger(workflow, triggerPullRequest)
 	usesPullRequestTarget := usesEventTrigger(workflow, triggerPullRequestTarget)
-	if !usesPullRequest && !usesPullRequestTarget {
+	usesWorkflowRun := usesEventTrigger(workflow, triggerWorkflowRun)
+
+	if !usesPullRequest && !usesPullRequestTarget && !usesWorkflowRun {
 		return nil
 	}
 
@@ -179,6 +183,9 @@ func validateSecretsInPullRequests(workflow *actionlint.Workflow, path string,
 	if usesPullRequestTarget {
 		triggers[triggerPullRequestTarget] = usesPullRequestTarget
 	}
+	if usesWorkflowRun {
+		triggers[triggerWorkflowRun] = usesWorkflowRun
+	}
 
 	// Secrets used in env at the top of the wokflow.
 	if err := checkWorkflowSecretInEnv(workflow, triggers, path, dl, pdata); err != nil {
@@ -198,7 +205,7 @@ func validateSecretsInPullRequests(workflow *actionlint.Workflow, path string,
 func validateUntrustedCodeCheckout(workflow *actionlint.Workflow, path string,
 	dl checker.DetailLogger, pdata *patternCbData,
 ) error {
-	if !usesEventTrigger(workflow, triggerPullRequestTarget) {
+	if !usesEventTrigger(workflow, triggerPullRequestTarget) && !usesEventTrigger(workflow, triggerWorkflowRun) {
 		return nil
 	}
 
@@ -240,16 +247,7 @@ func checkJobForUsedSecrets(job *actionlint.Job, triggers map[triggerName]bool,
 
 	// If the job has an environment, assume it's an env secret gated by
 	// some approval and don't alert.
-	if jobUsesEnvironment(job) {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	// For pull request target, we need a ref to the pull request.
-	_, usesPullRequest := triggers[triggerPullRequest]
-	_, usesPullRequestTarget := triggers[triggerPullRequestTarget]
-	chk, ref := jobUsesCodeCheckout(job)
-	if !((chk && usesPullRequest) ||
-		(chk && usesPullRequestTarget && strings.Contains(ref, checkoutUntrustedRef))) {
+	if !jobUsesCodeCheckoutAndNoEnvironment(job, triggers) {
 		return nil
 	}
 
@@ -281,17 +279,32 @@ func workflowUsesCodeCheckoutAndNoEnvironment(workflow *actionlint.Workflow,
 		return false
 	}
 
+	for _, job := range workflow.Jobs {
+		if jobUsesCodeCheckoutAndNoEnvironment(job, triggers) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func jobUsesCodeCheckoutAndNoEnvironment(job *actionlint.Job, triggers map[triggerName]bool,
+) bool {
+	if job == nil {
+		return false
+	}
 	_, usesPullRequest := triggers[triggerPullRequest]
 	_, usesPullRequestTarget := triggers[triggerPullRequestTarget]
+	_, usesWorkflowRun := triggers[triggerWorkflowRun]
 
-	for _, job := range workflow.Jobs {
-		chk, ref := jobUsesCodeCheckout(job)
-		if ((chk && usesPullRequest) ||
-			(chk && usesPullRequestTarget && strings.Contains(ref, checkoutUntrustedRef))) &&
-			!jobUsesEnvironment(job) {
+	chk, ref := jobUsesCodeCheckout(job)
+	if !jobUsesEnvironment(job) {
+		if (chk && usesPullRequest) ||
+			(chk && usesPullRequestTarget && strings.Contains(ref, checkoutUntrustedPullRequestRef)) ||
+			(chk && usesWorkflowRun && strings.Contains(ref, checkoutUntrustedWorkflowRunRef)) {
 			return true
 		}
 	}
+
 	return false
 }
 
@@ -348,7 +361,9 @@ func checkJobForUntrustedCodeCheckout(job *actionlint.Job, path string,
 		if !ok || ref.Value == nil {
 			continue
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(ref.Value.Value, checkoutUntrustedRef) {
+
+		if strings.Contains(ref.Value.Value, checkoutUntrustedPullRequestRef) ||
+			strings.Contains(ref.Value.Value, checkoutUntrustedWorkflowRunRef) {
 			line := fileparser.GetLineNumber(step.Pos)
 			dl.Warn(&checker.LogMessage{
 				Path:   path,

checks/dangerous_workflow_test.go

@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ func TestGithubDangerousWorkflow(t *testing.T) {
 				NumberOfDebug: 0,
 			},
 		},
+		{
+			name:     "run untrusted code checkout test - workflow_run",
+			filename: "./testdata/.github/workflows/github-workflow-dangerous-pattern-untrusted-checkout-workflow_run.yml",
+			expected: scut.TestReturn{
+				Error:         nil,
+				Score:         checker.MinResultScore,
+				NumberOfWarn:  2,
+				NumberOfInfo:  0,
+				NumberOfDebug: 0,
+			},
+		},
 		{
 			name:     "run untrusted code checkout test",
 			filename: "./testdata/.github/workflows/github-workflow-dangerous-pattern-untrusted-checkout.yml",

checks/testdata/.github/workflows/github-workflow-dangerous-pattern-untrusted-checkout-workflow_run.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Copyright 2021 Security Scorecard Authors
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+#      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+on:
+  workflow_run:
+    workflows: ['dummy']
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    name: Build and test
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v2
+      with:
+        ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run }}
+
+    - uses: actions/setup-node@v1
+    - run: |
+        npm install
+        npm build
+
+    - uses: completely/fakeaction@v2
+      with:
+        arg1: ${{ secrets.supersecret }}
+
+    - uses: fakerepo/comment-on-pr@v1
+      with:
+        message: |
+          Thank you!

docs/checks.md

@@ -264,8 +264,8 @@ logging github context and secrets, or use of potentially untrusted inputs in sc
 The following patterns are checked:
 
 Untrusted Code Checkout: This is the misuse of potentially dangerous triggers. 
-This checks if a `pull_request_target` workflow trigger was used in conjunction 
-with an explicit pull request checkout. Workflows triggered with `pull_request_target`
+This checks if a `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run` workflow trigger was used in conjunction 
+with an explicit pull request checkout. Workflows triggered with `pull_request_target` / `workflow_run`
 have write permission to the target repository and access to target repository 
 secrets. With the PR checkout, PR authors may compromise the repository, for 
 example, by using build scripts controlled by the author of the PR or reading 
@@ -606,8 +606,10 @@ possible.
 Risk: `Critical` (service possibly accessible to third parties)
 
 This check determines whether the webhook defined in the repository has a token configured to authenticate the origins of requests.
+
 
 **Remediation steps**
 - Check whether your service supports token authentication.
 - If there is support for token authentication, set the secret in the webhook configuration. See [Setting up a webhook](https://docs.github.com/en/developers/webhooks-and-events/webhooks/creating-webhooks#setting-up-a-webhook)
 - If there is no support for token authentication, consider implementing it by following [these directions](https://docs.github.com/en/developers/webhooks-and-events/webhooks/securing-your-webhooks).
+

docs/checks/internal/checks.yaml

@@ -674,8 +674,8 @@ checks:
       The following patterns are checked:
 
       Untrusted Code Checkout: This is the misuse of potentially dangerous triggers. 
-      This checks if a `pull_request_target` workflow trigger was used in conjunction 
-      with an explicit pull request checkout. Workflows triggered with `pull_request_target`
+      This checks if a `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run` workflow trigger was used in conjunction 
+      with an explicit pull request checkout. Workflows triggered with `pull_request_target` / `workflow_run`
       have write permission to the target repository and access to target repository 
       secrets. With the PR checkout, PR authors may compromise the repository, for 
       example, by using build scripts controlled by the author of the PR or reading