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crypto: update root certificates (v9.x) #19634

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crypto: update root certificates (v9.x) #19634

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616238c
tools: update certdata.txt
bnoordhuis Mar 13, 2018
ea7eff4
crypto: update root certificates
bnoordhuis Mar 13, 2018
6fd5835
src: drop CNNIC+StartCom certificate whitelisting
bnoordhuis Mar 13, 2018
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1,647 changes: 0 additions & 1,647 deletions src/CNNICHashWhitelist.inc
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89 changes: 0 additions & 89 deletions src/StartComAndWoSignData.inc
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195 changes: 42 additions & 153 deletions src/node_crypto.cc
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -34,14 +34,6 @@
#include "string_bytes.h"
#include "util-inl.h"
#include "v8.h"
// CNNIC Hash WhiteList is taken from
// https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/98820360ab66/security/
// certverifier/CNNICHashWhitelist.inc
#include "CNNICHashWhitelist.inc"
// StartCom and WoSign root CA list is taken from
// https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/file/tip/security/certverifier/
// StartComAndWoSignData.inc
#include "StartComAndWoSignData.inc"

#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h> // INT_MAX
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -233,34 +225,6 @@ void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX* ctx) {
}
#endif // OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L

// Subject DER of CNNIC ROOT CA and CNNIC EV ROOT CA are taken from
// https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/file/98820360ab66/security/
// certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp#l672
// C = CN, O = CNNIC, CN = CNNIC ROOT
static const uint8_t CNNIC_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA[] =
"\x30\x32\x31\x0B\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x43\x4E\x31\x0E\x30"
"\x0C\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0A\x13\x05\x43\x4E\x4E\x49\x43\x31\x13\x30\x11\x06"
"\x03\x55\x04\x03\x13\x0A\x43\x4E\x4E\x49\x43\x20\x52\x4F\x4F\x54";
static const uint8_t* cnnic_p = CNNIC_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA;
static X509_NAME* cnnic_name =
d2i_X509_NAME(nullptr, &cnnic_p, sizeof(CNNIC_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA)-1);

// C = CN, O = China Internet Network Information Center, CN = China
// Internet Network Information Center EV Certificates Root
static const uint8_t CNNIC_EV_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA[] =
"\x30\x81\x8A\x31\x0B\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x43\x4E\x31\x32"
"\x30\x30\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0A\x0C\x29\x43\x68\x69\x6E\x61\x20\x49\x6E\x74"
"\x65\x72\x6E\x65\x74\x20\x4E\x65\x74\x77\x6F\x72\x6B\x20\x49\x6E\x66\x6F"
"\x72\x6D\x61\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x20\x43\x65\x6E\x74\x65\x72\x31\x47\x30\x45"
"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0C\x3E\x43\x68\x69\x6E\x61\x20\x49\x6E\x74\x65\x72"
"\x6E\x65\x74\x20\x4E\x65\x74\x77\x6F\x72\x6B\x20\x49\x6E\x66\x6F\x72\x6D"
"\x61\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x20\x43\x65\x6E\x74\x65\x72\x20\x45\x56\x20\x43\x65"
"\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x73\x20\x52\x6F\x6F\x74";
static const uint8_t* cnnic_ev_p = CNNIC_EV_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA;
static X509_NAME *cnnic_ev_name =
d2i_X509_NAME(nullptr, &cnnic_ev_p,
sizeof(CNNIC_EV_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA)-1);

static const char* const root_certs[] = {
#include "node_root_certs.h" // NOLINT(build/include_order)
};
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -3171,124 +3135,49 @@ void Connection::Initialize(Environment* env, Local<Object> target) {
}


inline int compar(const void* a, const void* b) {
return memcmp(a, b, CNNIC_WHITELIST_HASH_LEN);
}


inline int IsSelfSigned(X509* cert) {
return X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
X509_get_issuer_name(cert)) == 0;
}


inline X509* FindRoot(STACK_OF(X509)* sk) {
for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
X509* cert = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (IsSelfSigned(cert))
return cert;
}
return nullptr;
}


inline bool CertIsStartComOrWoSign(X509_NAME* name) {
const unsigned char* startcom_wosign_data;
X509_NAME* startcom_wosign_name;

for (const auto& dn : StartComAndWoSignDNs) {
startcom_wosign_data = dn.data;
startcom_wosign_name = d2i_X509_NAME(nullptr, &startcom_wosign_data,
dn.len);
int cmp = X509_NAME_cmp(name, startcom_wosign_name);
X509_NAME_free(startcom_wosign_name);
if (cmp == 0)
return true;
}

return false;
}

// Revoke the certificates issued by StartCom or WoSign that has
// notBefore after 00:00:00 on October 21, 2016 (1477008000 in epoch).
inline bool CheckStartComOrWoSign(X509_NAME* root_name, X509* cert) {
if (!CertIsStartComOrWoSign(root_name))
return true;

time_t october_21_2016 = static_cast<time_t>(1477008000);
if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(cert), &october_21_2016) < 0)
return true;

return false;
}


// Whitelist check for certs issued by CNNIC, StartCom and WoSign. See
// https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/04/02
// /distrusting-new-cnnic-certificates/ and
// https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2016/10/24/
// distrusting-new-wosign-and-startcom-certificates
inline CheckResult CheckWhitelistedServerCert(X509_STORE_CTX* ctx) {
unsigned char hash[CNNIC_WHITELIST_HASH_LEN];
unsigned int hashlen = CNNIC_WHITELIST_HASH_LEN;

StackOfX509 chain(X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx));
CHECK(chain);
CHECK_GT(sk_X509_num(chain.get()), 0);

// Take the last cert as root at the first time.
X509* root_cert = sk_X509_value(chain.get(), sk_X509_num(chain.get())-1);
X509_NAME* root_name = X509_get_subject_name(root_cert);

if (!IsSelfSigned(root_cert)) {
root_cert = FindRoot(chain.get());
CHECK_NE(root_cert, nullptr);
root_name = X509_get_subject_name(root_cert);
}

X509* leaf_cert = sk_X509_value(chain.get(), 0);
if (!CheckStartComOrWoSign(root_name, leaf_cert))
return CHECK_CERT_REVOKED;

// When the cert is issued from either CNNNIC ROOT CA or CNNNIC EV
// ROOT CA, check a hash of its leaf cert if it is in the whitelist.
if (X509_NAME_cmp(root_name, cnnic_name) == 0 ||
X509_NAME_cmp(root_name, cnnic_ev_name) == 0) {
int ret = X509_digest(leaf_cert, EVP_sha256(), hash,
&hashlen);
CHECK(ret);

void* result = bsearch(hash, WhitelistedCNNICHashes,
arraysize(WhitelistedCNNICHashes),
CNNIC_WHITELIST_HASH_LEN, compar);
if (result == nullptr)
return CHECK_CERT_REVOKED;
}

return CHECK_OK;
}


inline int VerifyCallback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX* ctx) {
// Failure on verification of the cert is handled in
// Connection::VerifyError.
if (preverify_ok == 0 || X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) != X509_V_OK)
return CHECK_OK;

// Server does not need to check the whitelist.
SSL* ssl = static_cast<SSL*>(
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()));

if (SSL_is_server(ssl))
return CHECK_OK;

// Client needs to check if the server cert is listed in the
// whitelist when it is issued by the specific rootCAs.
CheckResult ret = CheckWhitelistedServerCert(ctx);
if (ret == CHECK_CERT_REVOKED)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);

return ret;
// Quoting SSL_set_verify(3ssl):
//
// The VerifyCallback function is used to control the behaviour when
// the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be supplied by the
// application and receives two arguments: preverify_ok indicates,
// whether the verification of the certificate in question was passed
// (preverify_ok=1) or not (preverify_ok=0). x509_ctx is a pointer to
// the complete context used for the certificate chain verification.
//
// The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting
// level (the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the peer's
// certificate. At each level signatures and issuer attributes are
// checked. Whenever a verification error is found, the error number is
// stored in x509_ctx and VerifyCallback is called with preverify_ok=0.
// By applying X509_CTX_store_* functions VerifyCallback can locate the
// certificate in question and perform additional steps (see EXAMPLES).
// If no error is found for a certificate, VerifyCallback is called
// with preverify_ok=1 before advancing to the next level.
//
// The return value of VerifyCallback controls the strategy of the
// further verification process. If VerifyCallback returns 0, the
// verification process is immediately stopped with "verification
// failed" state. If SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a verification failure
// alert is sent to the peer and the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If
// VerifyCallback returns 1, the verification process is continued. If
// VerifyCallback always returns 1, the TLS/SSL handshake will not be
// terminated with respect to verification failures and the connection
// will be established. The calling process can however retrieve the
// error code of the last verification error using
// SSL_get_verify_result(3) or by maintaining its own error storage
// managed by VerifyCallback.
//
// If no VerifyCallback is specified, the default callback will be
// used. Its return value is identical to preverify_ok, so that any
// verification failure will lead to a termination of the TLS/SSL
// handshake with an alert message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set.
//
// Since we cannot perform I/O quickly enough in this callback, we ignore
// all preverify_ok errors and let the handshake continue. It is
// imparative that the user use Connection::VerifyError after the
// 'secure' callback has been made.
return 1;
}


Expand Down
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