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chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v1.26.19 [security] #77

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@renovate renovate bot commented Oct 4, 2023

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
urllib3 (changelog) ==1.26.13 -> ==1.26.19 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-43804

urllib3 doesn't treat the Cookie HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a Cookie header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.

Users must handle redirects themselves instead of relying on urllib3's automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the Cookie header, thus we decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.

Affected usages

We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:

  • Using an affected version of urllib3 (patched in v1.26.17 and v2.0.6)
  • Using the Cookie header on requests, which is mostly typical for impersonating a browser.
  • Not disabling HTTP redirects
  • Either not using HTTPS or for the origin server to redirect to a malicious origin.

Remediation

  • Upgrading to at least urllib3 v1.26.17 or v2.0.6
  • Disabling HTTP redirects using redirects=False when sending requests.
  • Not using the Cookie header.

CVE-2023-45803

urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 303 "See Other" after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like POST) to GET as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although the behavior of removing the request body is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers.

From RFC 9110 Section 9.3.1:

A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately supported.

Affected usages

Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable.

Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability:

  • If you're using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON)
  • The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 303 to a malicious peer or the redirected-to service becomes compromised.

Remediation

You can remediate this vulnerability with any of the following steps:

  • Upgrade to a patched version of urllib3 (v1.26.18 or v2.0.7)
  • Disable redirects for services that you aren't expecting to respond with redirects with redirects=False.
  • Disable automatic redirects with redirects=False and handle 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body.

CVE-2024-37891

When using urllib3's proxy support with ProxyManager, the Proxy-Authorization header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.

However, when sending HTTP requests without using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the Proxy-Authorization header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat the Proxy-Authorization HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects.

Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.

Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the Proxy-Authorization header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.

Affected usages

We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:

  • Setting the Proxy-Authorization header without using urllib3's built-in proxy support.
  • Not disabling HTTP redirects.
  • Either not using an HTTPS origin server or for the proxy or target origin to redirect to a malicious origin.

Remediation

  • Using the Proxy-Authorization header with urllib3's ProxyManager.
  • Disabling HTTP redirects using redirects=False when sending requests.
  • Not using the Proxy-Authorization header.

Release Notes

urllib3/urllib3 (urllib3)

v1.26.19

Compare Source

====================

  • Added the Proxy-Authorization header to the list of headers to strip from requests when redirecting to a different host. As before, different headers can be set via Retry.remove_headers_on_redirect.
  • Fixed handling of OpenSSL 3.2.0 new error message for misconfiguring an HTTP proxy as HTTPS. (#&#8203;3405 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3405>__)

v1.26.18

Compare Source

====================

  • Made body stripped from HTTP requests changing the request method to GET after HTTP 303 "See Other" redirect responses.

v1.26.17

Compare Source

====================

  • Added the Cookie header to the list of headers to strip from requests when redirecting to a different host. As before, different headers can be set via Retry.remove_headers_on_redirect. (#&#8203;3139 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/pull/3139>_)

v1.26.16

Compare Source

====================

  • Fixed thread-safety issue where accessing a PoolManager with many distinct origins
    would cause connection pools to be closed while requests are in progress (#&#8203;2954 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/pull/2954>_)

v1.26.15

Compare Source

====================

  • Fix socket timeout value when HTTPConnection is reused (#&#8203;2645 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/2645>__)
  • Remove "!" character from the unreserved characters in IPv6 Zone ID parsing
    (#&#8203;2899 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/2899>__)
  • Fix IDNA handling of '\x80' byte (#&#8203;2901 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/2901>__)

v1.26.14

Compare Source

====================

  • Fixed parsing of port 0 (zero) returning None, instead of 0. (#&#8203;2850 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/2850>__)
  • Removed deprecated getheaders() calls in contrib module. Fixed the type hint of PoolKey.key_retries by adding bool to the union. (#&#8203;2865 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/2865>__)

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" in timezone Asia/Singapore, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v1.26.17 [security] chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v1.26.18 [security] Oct 18, 2023
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch from 81caa9c to 20e4252 Compare October 18, 2023 00:14
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v1.26.18 [security] chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v1.26.17 [security] Oct 26, 2023
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch from 20e4252 to bfcef03 Compare October 26, 2023 15:46
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v1.26.17 [security] chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v1.26.18 [security] Oct 26, 2023
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch from bfcef03 to 6390817 Compare October 26, 2023 20:16
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from d871ac1 to 505fa37 Compare February 4, 2024 10:20
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v1.26.18 [security] chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v1.26.19 [security] Jun 18, 2024
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from b710564 to 79a1a33 Compare June 18, 2024 13:16
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch from 79a1a33 to 686d6ef Compare July 7, 2024 03:43
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