Revise “Encrypting Secret Data at Rest” (#18810)

* Drop reference to old Kubernetes versions

At the time of writing, Kubernetes v1.13 is the oldest supported
version, and encryption-at-rest is no longer alpha.

* Tidy whitespace

* Add table caption

* Set metadata for required Kubernetes version

content/en/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data.md

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ reviewers:
 - smarterclayton
 title: Encrypting Secret Data at Rest
 content_template: templates/task
+min-kubernetes-server-version: 1.13
 ---
 
 {{% capture overview %}}
@@ -13,9 +14,7 @@ This page shows how to enable and configure encryption of secret data at rest.
 
 * {{< include "task-tutorial-prereqs.md" >}} {{< version-check >}}
 
-* Kubernetes version 1.13.0 or later is required
-
-* etcd v3 or later is required
+* etcd v3.0 or later is required
 
 {{% /capture %}}
 
@@ -27,9 +26,6 @@ The `kube-apiserver` process accepts an argument `--encryption-provider-config`
 that controls how API data is encrypted in etcd. An example configuration
 is provided below.
 
-Note:
-The alpha version of the encryption feature prior to 1.13 used the `--experimental-encryption-provider-config` flag.
-
 ## Understanding the encryption at rest configuration.
 
 ```yaml
@@ -69,10 +65,6 @@ resources from storage each provider that matches the stored data attempts to de
 order. If no provider can read the stored data due to a mismatch in format or secret key, an error 
 is returned which prevents clients from accessing that resource. 
 
-Note:
-The alpha version of the encryption feature prior to 1.13 required to be configured with
-`kind: EncryptionConfig` and `apiVersion: v1`.
-
 {{< caution >}}
 **IMPORTANT:** If any resource is not readable via the encryption config (because keys were changed), 
 the only recourse is to delete that key from the underlying etcd directly. Calls that attempt to 
@@ -81,11 +73,12 @@ read that resource will fail until it is deleted or a valid decryption key is pr
 
 ### Providers:
 
+{{< table caption="Providers for Kubernetes encryption at rest" >}}
 Name | Encryption | Strength | Speed | Key Length | Other Considerations
 -----|------------|----------|-------|------------|---------------------
 `identity` | None | N/A | N/A | N/A | Resources written as-is without encryption. When set as the first provider, the resource will be decrypted as new values are written.
 `aescbc` | AES-CBC with PKCS#7 padding | Strongest | Fast | 32-byte | The recommended choice for encryption at rest but may be slightly slower than `secretbox`.
-`secretbox` | XSalsa20 and Poly1305 | Strong | Faster | 32-byte | A newer standard and may not be considered acceptable in environments that require high levels of review. 
+`secretbox` | XSalsa20 and Poly1305 | Strong | Faster | 32-byte | A newer standard and may not be considered acceptable in environments that require high levels of review.
 `aesgcm` | AES-GCM with random nonce | Must be rotated every 200k writes | Fastest | 16, 24, or 32-byte | Is not recommended for use except when an automated key rotation scheme is implemented.
 `kms` | Uses envelope encryption scheme: Data is encrypted by data encryption keys (DEKs) using AES-CBC with PKCS#7 padding, DEKs are encrypted by key encryption keys (KEKs) according to configuration in Key Management Service (KMS) | Strongest | Fast | 32-bytes |  The recommended choice for using a third party tool for key management. Simplifies key rotation, with a new DEK generated for each encryption, and KEK rotation controlled by the user. [Configure the KMS provider](/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/kms-provider/)
 
@@ -95,12 +88,12 @@ is the first provider, the first key is used for encryption.
 __Storing the raw encryption key in the EncryptionConfig only moderately improves your security posture, compared to no encryption.
 Please use `kms` provider for additional security.__ By default, the `identity` provider is used to protect secrets in etcd, which
 provides no encryption. `EncryptionConfiguration` was introduced to encrypt secrets locally, with a locally managed key.
+
 Encrypting secrets with a locally managed key protects against an etcd compromise, but it fails to protect against a host compromise.
 Since the encryption keys are stored on the host in the EncryptionConfig YAML file, a skilled attacker can access that file and
-extract the encryption keys. This was a stepping stone in development to the `kms` provider, introduced in 1.10, and beta since 1.12. Envelope encryption
-creates dependence on a separate key, not stored in Kubernetes. In this case, an attacker would need to compromise etcd, the
-kubeapi-server, and the third-party KMS provider to retrieve the plaintext values, providing a higher level of security than
-locally-stored encryption keys.
+extract the encryption keys.
+
+Envelope encryption creates dependence on a separate key, not stored in Kubernetes. In this case, an attacker would need to compromise etcd, the kubeapi-server, and the third-party KMS provider to retrieve the plaintext values, providing a higher level of security than locally-stored encryption keys.
 
 ## Encrypting your data
 
@@ -137,7 +130,7 @@ Your config file contains keys that can decrypt content in etcd, so you must pro
 {{< /caution >}}
 
 
-## Verifying that data is encrypted 
+## Verifying that data is encrypted
 
 Data is encrypted when written to etcd. After restarting your `kube-apiserver`, any newly created or
 updated secret should be encrypted when stored. To check, you can use the `etcdctl` command line
@@ -217,5 +210,3 @@ and restart all `kube-apiserver` processes. Then run the command `kubectl get se
 to force all secrets to be decrypted.
 
 {{% /capture %}}
-
-