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Security Self Assessment: [STRIDE-SPOOF-4][STRIDE-SPOOF-5] Machine attestation for secure kubelet registration #3762
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/milestone Next To be determined if we can get this in v1alpha4 |
Issues go stale after 90d of inactivity. If this issue is safe to close now please do so with Send feedback to sig-testing, kubernetes/test-infra and/or fejta. |
/lifecycle frozen |
I know we don't have a label for it, but just for tracking /area node-agent |
@randomvariable: The label(s) In response to this:
Instructions for interacting with me using PR comments are available here. If you have questions or suggestions related to my behavior, please file an issue against the kubernetes/test-infra repository. |
just wanted to note that k8s docs address the kubelet as the "primary node agent": https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/
but if this is a "CAPI node agent" people are likely not going to be that confused. |
@neolit123 Yes it's a Cluster API Node Agent :) |
Would it make sense to use https://spiffe.io/ for abstracting the node attestation part so it's cloud-agnostic (and works on prem; e.g. with the TPM attestor? ) |
@randomvariable @yastij |
Thanks for the link to the proposal. This looks very interesting. |
/area security |
/triage accepted |
@fabriziopandini: GuidelinesPlease ensure that the issue body includes answers to the following questions:
For more details on the requirements of such an issue, please see here and ensure that they are met. If this request no longer meets these requirements, the label can be removed In response to this:
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This issue has not been updated in over 1 year, and should be re-triaged. You can:
For more details on the triage process, see https://www.kubernetes.dev/docs/guide/issue-triage/ /remove-triage accepted |
/priority backlog |
User Story
As a security operator, I want to ensure developers who have access to create MachineDeployments are not able to gain access to data for workloads on a cluster they are not supposed to.
Detailed Description
kubeadm bootstrap tokens allow registration as arbitrary node names. GCP, EKS and Kops provide mechanisms to attest to the identity of a node such that they do not inadvertently get access to secrets and volumes not intended for that node. Provide a mechanism to resolve.
Anything else you would like to add:
[Miscellaneous information that will assist in solving the issue.]
/kind feature
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