Bump openpgp from 3.0.10 to 4.3.0 in /misc/misc-1/challenge

[dependabot]

Bumps openpgp from 3.0.10 to 4.3.0.

Release notes

Sourced from openpgp's releases.

v4.3.0 - Security Release

This release fixes more security issues. Please upgrade to the latest version as soon as possible.

Security fixes

• Validate ECC public keys, to prevent an attack extracting private keys
• Remove non-AES CFB quick check, to prevent side-channel timing attacks
• Reject messages encrypted with a symmetric algorithm not in preferred algorithms
• Check signature public key algorithm against issuer key algorithm
• Always look at the same literal data packet in getText() and verify()
• Return generic error on PKESK checksum mismatch when decrypting

Other changes

• Fix undefined behavior when reading 3DES-encrypted packet
• Consider non-expired signatures from expired keys to still be valid
• Check that signing key was not expired at signature creation time
• Check that message signatures are not expired when verifying them
• Fix revocation example in README, use revocationCertificate instead of revocationSignature
• Fix CMAC of the empty string
• Add config values to preferred algorithms
• Fall back to RFC4880bis-mandated symmetric algorithms (AES128 and EAX) instead of config value

Example of behavior changes for preferred algorithms

As an example, previously, if you set openpgp.config.encryption_cipher = openpgp.enums.symmetric.twofish, OpenPGP.js would:

1. When generating a key, not add Twofish to the preferred algorithms
2. When encrypting to that generated key, not use Twofish (since it wasn't in the preferred algorithms)
3. When encrypting to a key with non-supported preferred algorithms, or multiple keys with no overlapping preferred algorithms, fall back to Twofish

Then, if you were to decrypt that last message using GPG, it would warn that the message was encrypted with an algorithm that's not in the preferred algorithms. This could happen even with the default config value of AES256, since RFC4880 mandates falling back to 3DES, not AES256. (RFC4880bis mandates falling back to AES128.)

Since this version, if you set openpgp.config.encryption_cipher = openpgp.enums.symmetric.twofish, OpenPGP.js will instead:

1. When generating a key, add Twofish to the preferred algorithms
2. When encrypting to that generated key, use Twofish (since it is in the preferred algorithms)
3. When encrypting to a key with non-supported preferred algorithms, or multiple keys with no overlapping preferred algorithms, fall back to AES128 (since that's the algorithm mandated by RFC4880bis)

Example of backwards-incompatible behavior

In some edge cases, some of the above changes are not backwards-compatible. For example, if you use OpenPGP.js < 4.3.0 and:

1. Set openpgp.config.encryption_cipher to any value other than openpgp.enums.symmetric.aes256, openpgp.enums.symmetric.aes128 or openpgp.enums.symmetric.tripledes, and
2. Encrypt messages to a key with non-supported preferred algorithms, or multiple keys with no overlapping preferred algorithms

And then try to decrypt those messages using OpenPGP.js >= 4.3.0, you will get an error. (Similarly, GPG gives a warning in this situation, but still decrypts the messages as well.)

v4.2.1

When verifying signatures, compute data to verify based on expected signature type rather than the type of the signature to be verified. (#799)

... (truncated)

Commits

• d24bdd5 Release new version
• f0f9a5c Fix key generation tests on Node
• b1b1994 Merge pull request #816 from twiss/security-fixes
• 804e911 Add config values to preferred algorithms
• 926047f Default to RFC4880bis-mandated symmetric algos
• 0660831 Fix CMAC of the empty string
• 9b83f6f Return generic error on PKESK checksum mismatch when decrypting
• e727097 Always look at the same literal data packet in getText() and verify()
• 8720adc Check signature public key algorithm against issuer key algorithm
• 3b9676f Reject messages encrypted with a symmetric algo not in preferred algos
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting @dependabot rebase.

---

Dependabot commands and options

You can trigger Dependabot actions by commenting on this PR:

• @dependabot rebase will rebase this PR
• @dependabot recreate will recreate this PR, overwriting any edits that have been made to it
• @dependabot merge will merge this PR after your CI passes on it
• @dependabot squash and merge will squash and merge this PR after your CI passes on it
• @dependabot cancel merge will cancel a previously requested merge and block automerging
• @dependabot reopen will reopen this PR if it is closed
• @dependabot close will close this PR and stop Dependabot recreating it. You can achieve the same result by closing it manually
• @dependabot ignore this major version will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this major version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)
• @dependabot ignore this minor version will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this minor version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)
• @dependabot ignore this dependency will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this dependency (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)
• @dependabot use these labels will set the current labels as the default for future PRs for this repo and language
• @dependabot use these reviewers will set the current reviewers as the default for future PRs for this repo and language
• @dependabot use these assignees will set the current assignees as the default for future PRs for this repo and language
• @dependabot use this milestone will set the current milestone as the default for future PRs for this repo and language

You can disable automated security fix PRs for this repo from the Security Alerts page.