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Merge bitcoin#30051: crypto, refactor: add new KeyPair class
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ec973dd refactor: remove un-tested early returns (josibake)
72a5822 tests: add tests for KeyPair (josibake)
cebb08b refactor: move SignSchnorr to KeyPair (josibake)
c39fd39 crypto: add KeyPair wrapper class (josibake)
5d507a0 tests: add key tweak smoke test (josibake)
f14900b bench: add benchmark for signing with a taptweak (josibake)

Pull request description:

  Broken out from bitcoin#28201

  ---

  The wallet returns an untweaked internal key for taproot outputs. If the output commits to a tree of scripts, this key needs to be tweaked with the merkle root. Even if the output does not commit to a tree of scripts, BIP341/342 recommend commiting to a hash of the public key.

  Previously, this logic for applying the taptweak was implemented in the `CKey::SignSchnorr` method.

  This PR moves introduces a KeyPair class which wraps a `secp256k1_keypair` type and refactors SignSchnorr to use this new KeyPair. The KeyPair class is created with an optional merkle_root argument and the logic from BIP341 is applied depending on the state of the merkle_root argument.

  The motivation for this refactor is to be able to use the tap tweak logic outside of signing, e.g. in silent payments when retrieving the private key (see bitcoin#28201).

  Outside of silent payments, since we almost always convert a `CKey` to a `secp256k1_keypair` when doing anything with taproot keys, it seems generally useful to have a way to model this type in our code base.

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Tree-SHA512: 34947e3eac39bd959807fa21b6045191fc80113bd650f6f08606e4bcd89aa17d6afd48dd034f6741ac4ff304b104fa8c1c1898e297467edcf262d5f97425da7b
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ryanofsky committed Aug 7, 2024
2 parents ce1c881 + ec973dd commit b38fb19
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29 changes: 29 additions & 0 deletions src/bench/sign_transaction.cpp
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <script/script.h>
#include <script/sign.h>
#include <uint256.h>
#include <test/util/random.h>
#include <util/translation.h>

enum class InputType {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -66,5 +67,33 @@ static void SignTransactionSingleInput(benchmark::Bench& bench, InputType input_
static void SignTransactionECDSA(benchmark::Bench& bench) { SignTransactionSingleInput(bench, InputType::P2WPKH); }
static void SignTransactionSchnorr(benchmark::Bench& bench) { SignTransactionSingleInput(bench, InputType::P2TR); }

static void SignSchnorrTapTweakBenchmark(benchmark::Bench& bench, bool use_null_merkle_root)
{
ECC_Context ecc_context{};

auto key = GenerateRandomKey();
auto msg = InsecureRand256();
auto merkle_root = use_null_merkle_root ? uint256() : InsecureRand256();
auto aux = InsecureRand256();
std::vector<unsigned char> sig(64);

bench.minEpochIterations(100).run([&] {
bool success = key.SignSchnorr(msg, sig, &merkle_root, aux);
assert(success);
});
}

static void SignSchnorrWithMerkleRoot(benchmark::Bench& bench)
{
SignSchnorrTapTweakBenchmark(bench, /*use_null_merkle_root=*/false);
}

static void SignSchnorrWithNullMerkleRoot(benchmark::Bench& bench)
{
SignSchnorrTapTweakBenchmark(bench, /*use_null_merkle_root=*/true);
}

BENCHMARK(SignTransactionECDSA, benchmark::PriorityLevel::HIGH);
BENCHMARK(SignTransactionSchnorr, benchmark::PriorityLevel::HIGH);
BENCHMARK(SignSchnorrWithMerkleRoot, benchmark::PriorityLevel::HIGH);
BENCHMARK(SignSchnorrWithNullMerkleRoot, benchmark::PriorityLevel::HIGH);
61 changes: 40 additions & 21 deletions src/key.cpp
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -271,27 +271,8 @@ bool CKey::SignCompact(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig)

bool CKey::SignSchnorr(const uint256& hash, Span<unsigned char> sig, const uint256* merkle_root, const uint256& aux) const
{
assert(sig.size() == 64);
secp256k1_keypair keypair;
if (!secp256k1_keypair_create(secp256k1_context_sign, &keypair, UCharCast(begin()))) return false;
if (merkle_root) {
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pubkey;
if (!secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_context_sign, &pubkey, nullptr, &keypair)) return false;
unsigned char pubkey_bytes[32];
if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1_context_sign, pubkey_bytes, &pubkey)) return false;
uint256 tweak = XOnlyPubKey(pubkey_bytes).ComputeTapTweakHash(merkle_root->IsNull() ? nullptr : merkle_root);
if (!secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(secp256k1_context_static, &keypair, tweak.data())) return false;
}
bool ret = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32(secp256k1_context_sign, sig.data(), hash.data(), &keypair, aux.data());
if (ret) {
// Additional verification step to prevent using a potentially corrupted signature
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pubkey_verify;
ret = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_context_static, &pubkey_verify, nullptr, &keypair);
ret &= secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(secp256k1_context_static, sig.data(), hash.begin(), 32, &pubkey_verify);
}
if (!ret) memory_cleanse(sig.data(), sig.size());
memory_cleanse(&keypair, sizeof(keypair));
return ret;
KeyPair kp = ComputeKeyPair(merkle_root);
return kp.SignSchnorr(hash, sig, aux);
}

bool CKey::Load(const CPrivKey &seckey, const CPubKey &vchPubKey, bool fSkipCheck=false) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -363,6 +344,11 @@ ECDHSecret CKey::ComputeBIP324ECDHSecret(const EllSwiftPubKey& their_ellswift, c
return output;
}

KeyPair CKey::ComputeKeyPair(const uint256* merkle_root) const
{
return KeyPair(*this, merkle_root);
}

CKey GenerateRandomKey(bool compressed) noexcept
{
CKey key;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -420,6 +406,39 @@ void CExtKey::Decode(const unsigned char code[BIP32_EXTKEY_SIZE]) {
if ((nDepth == 0 && (nChild != 0 || ReadLE32(vchFingerprint) != 0)) || code[41] != 0) key = CKey();
}

KeyPair::KeyPair(const CKey& key, const uint256* merkle_root)
{
static_assert(std::tuple_size<KeyType>() == sizeof(secp256k1_keypair));
MakeKeyPairData();
auto keypair = reinterpret_cast<secp256k1_keypair*>(m_keypair->data());
bool success = secp256k1_keypair_create(secp256k1_context_sign, keypair, UCharCast(key.data()));
if (success && merkle_root) {
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pubkey;
unsigned char pubkey_bytes[32];
assert(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_context_sign, &pubkey, nullptr, keypair));
assert(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1_context_sign, pubkey_bytes, &pubkey));
uint256 tweak = XOnlyPubKey(pubkey_bytes).ComputeTapTweakHash(merkle_root->IsNull() ? nullptr : merkle_root);
success = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(secp256k1_context_static, keypair, tweak.data());
}
if (!success) ClearKeyPairData();
}

bool KeyPair::SignSchnorr(const uint256& hash, Span<unsigned char> sig, const uint256& aux) const
{
assert(sig.size() == 64);
if (!IsValid()) return false;
auto keypair = reinterpret_cast<const secp256k1_keypair*>(m_keypair->data());
bool ret = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32(secp256k1_context_sign, sig.data(), hash.data(), keypair, aux.data());
if (ret) {
// Additional verification step to prevent using a potentially corrupted signature
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pubkey_verify;
ret = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_context_static, &pubkey_verify, nullptr, keypair);
ret &= secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(secp256k1_context_static, sig.data(), hash.begin(), 32, &pubkey_verify);
}
if (!ret) memory_cleanse(sig.data(), sig.size());
return ret;
}

bool ECC_InitSanityCheck() {
CKey key = GenerateRandomKey();
CPubKey pubkey = key.GetPubKey();
Expand Down
73 changes: 73 additions & 0 deletions src/key.h
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ constexpr static size_t ECDH_SECRET_SIZE = CSHA256::OUTPUT_SIZE;
// Used to represent ECDH shared secret (ECDH_SECRET_SIZE bytes)
using ECDHSecret = std::array<std::byte, ECDH_SECRET_SIZE>;

class KeyPair;

/** An encapsulated private key. */
class CKey
{
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -202,6 +204,22 @@ class CKey
ECDHSecret ComputeBIP324ECDHSecret(const EllSwiftPubKey& their_ellswift,
const EllSwiftPubKey& our_ellswift,
bool initiating) const;
/** Compute a KeyPair
*
* Wraps a `secp256k1_keypair` type.
*
* `merkle_root` is used to optionally perform tweaking of
* the internal key, as specified in BIP341:
*
* - If merkle_root == nullptr: no tweaking is done, use the internal key directly (this is
* used for signatures in BIP342 script).
* - If merkle_root->IsNull(): tweak the internal key with H_TapTweak(pubkey) (this is used for
* key path spending when no scripts are present).
* - Otherwise: tweak the internal key with H_TapTweak(pubkey || *merkle_root)
* (this is used for key path spending with the
* Merkle root of the script tree).
*/
KeyPair ComputeKeyPair(const uint256* merkle_root) const;
};

CKey GenerateRandomKey(bool compressed = true) noexcept;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -235,6 +253,61 @@ struct CExtKey {
void SetSeed(Span<const std::byte> seed);
};

/** KeyPair
*
* Wraps a `secp256k1_keypair` type, an opaque data structure for holding a secret and public key.
* This is intended for BIP340 keys and allows us to easily determine if the secret key needs to
* be negated by checking the parity of the public key. This class primarily intended for passing
* secret keys to libsecp256k1 functions expecting a `secp256k1_keypair`. For all other cases,
* CKey should be preferred.
*
* A KeyPair can be created from a CKey with an optional merkle_root tweak (per BIP342). See
* CKey::ComputeKeyPair for more details.
*/
class KeyPair
{
public:
KeyPair() noexcept = default;
KeyPair(KeyPair&&) noexcept = default;
KeyPair& operator=(KeyPair&&) noexcept = default;
KeyPair& operator=(const KeyPair& other)
{
if (this != &other) {
if (other.m_keypair) {
MakeKeyPairData();
*m_keypair = *other.m_keypair;
} else {
ClearKeyPairData();
}
}
return *this;
}

KeyPair(const KeyPair& other) { *this = other; }

friend KeyPair CKey::ComputeKeyPair(const uint256* merkle_root) const;
[[nodiscard]] bool SignSchnorr(const uint256& hash, Span<unsigned char> sig, const uint256& aux) const;

//! Check whether this keypair is valid.
bool IsValid() const { return !!m_keypair; }

private:
KeyPair(const CKey& key, const uint256* merkle_root);

using KeyType = std::array<unsigned char, 96>;
secure_unique_ptr<KeyType> m_keypair;

void MakeKeyPairData()
{
if (!m_keypair) m_keypair = make_secure_unique<KeyType>();
}

void ClearKeyPairData()
{
m_keypair.reset();
}
};

/** Check that required EC support is available at runtime. */
bool ECC_InitSanityCheck();

Expand Down
41 changes: 41 additions & 0 deletions src/test/key_tests.cpp
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <key_io.h>
#include <span.h>
#include <streams.h>
#include <secp256k1_extrakeys.h>
#include <test/util/random.h>
#include <test/util/setup_common.h>
#include <uint256.h>
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -299,6 +300,13 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(bip340_test_vectors)
// Verify those signatures for good measure.
BOOST_CHECK(pubkey.VerifySchnorr(msg256, sig64));

// Repeat the same check, but use the KeyPair directly without any merkle tweak
KeyPair keypair = key.ComputeKeyPair(/*merkle_root=*/nullptr);
bool kp_ok = keypair.SignSchnorr(msg256, sig64, aux256);
BOOST_CHECK(kp_ok);
BOOST_CHECK(pubkey.VerifySchnorr(msg256, sig64));
BOOST_CHECK(std::vector<unsigned char>(sig64, sig64 + 64) == sig);

// Do 10 iterations where we sign with a random Merkle root to tweak,
// and compare against the resulting tweaked keys, with random aux.
// In iteration i=0 we tweak with empty Merkle tree.
Expand All @@ -312,6 +320,12 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(bip340_test_vectors)
bool ok = key.SignSchnorr(msg256, sig64, &merkle_root, aux256);
BOOST_CHECK(ok);
BOOST_CHECK(tweaked_key.VerifySchnorr(msg256, sig64));

// Repeat the same check, but use the KeyPair class directly
KeyPair keypair = key.ComputeKeyPair(&merkle_root);
bool kp_ok = keypair.SignSchnorr(msg256, sig64, aux256);
BOOST_CHECK(kp_ok);
BOOST_CHECK(tweaked_key.VerifySchnorr(msg256, sig64));
}
}
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -345,4 +359,31 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(bip341_test_h)
BOOST_CHECK(XOnlyPubKey::NUMS_H == H);
}

BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(key_schnorr_tweak_smoke_test)
{
// Sanity check to ensure we get the same tweak using CPubKey vs secp256k1 functions
secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);

CKey key;
key.MakeNewKey(true);
uint256 merkle_root = InsecureRand256();

// secp256k1 functions
secp256k1_keypair keypair;
BOOST_CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(secp256k1_context_sign, &keypair, UCharCast(key.begin())));
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pubkey;
BOOST_CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_context_sign, &xonly_pubkey, nullptr, &keypair));
unsigned char xonly_bytes[32];
BOOST_CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1_context_sign, xonly_bytes, &xonly_pubkey));
uint256 tweak_old = XOnlyPubKey(xonly_bytes).ComputeTapTweakHash(&merkle_root);

// CPubKey
CPubKey pubkey = key.GetPubKey();
uint256 tweak_new = XOnlyPubKey(pubkey).ComputeTapTweakHash(&merkle_root);

BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(tweak_old, tweak_new);

secp256k1_context_destroy(secp256k1_context_sign);
}

BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()

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