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PIF fork that provides attestation by bypassing the Android KeyStore while using a valid keybox. Not complete and explicitly set to work only in the context of Key Attestation app

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giguhbo019jda/PlayIntegrityForkKsBypass

 
 

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Play Integrity Fork KeyStore Bypass

This fork-fork aim is to bypass the AndroidKeyStore by implementing a similar process software side. The current implementation provides DEVICE through the classic PIF, while having a test environment that runs the KeyStore bypass in the KeyAttestation app. At the moment this repository contains:

  • Import and parsing of keybox.xml from module folder
  • Keypair and its certificate attestation generation through a simplified software implementation of AndroidKeyStore
  • Certificate chain retrieval

The whole implementation provides a valid attestation to the KeyAttestation app.

This integration is inspired by chiteroman's BootloaderSpoofer and FrameworkPatch. Parts of the certificate parsing and attestation generation are based on his work

Lack of time to work on the module

Due to lack of time I am unable to keep working on the implementation. I will provide some open points to expand on the work I did.

Open points

  • In order to better grasp the droidguard key requirements, an analysis of the AlgorithmParameterSpec provided while initializing the CustomkeyPairGenerator should suffice in order to understand the attestation requirements and implement the relative, half implemented and commented, spec handlers.
  • Testing could be done with a keybox.xml with associated device parameters, even if the keybox has been invalidated.
  • This implementation has not been tested in droidguard yet. This means that droidguard could implement checks that validate the KeyPairGenerator, as well as the KeyStoreSpi, through, for example, checking their class name. As well as other checks that could detect any of the current injection methods.
  • Remember that each test you do with a valid keybox in droidguard could be detected and result in its future invalidation. I never had the pleasure of testing droidguard with a valid keybox (even if i had multiple prior to the last ban wave) due to not having time to check out the whole AlgorithmParameterSpec requested by droidguard, I did only test the current implemented features with key attestation app.

Thoughs on the future

As far as I can tell, even with a bypass working, without a reliable way to retrieve the key from the device you own (prior to RKP), this approach is and will be unsustainable in the long run, due to possible improvements in droidguard detection. The already existing remote key provisioning system also limits the usage of provisioned keys to a limited time. Expanding on that, emulating the provisioning system will also required reliable extraction from the device TEE that, will be certainly done but, will never be reliable enough for a wide spread use.

The key point being that google has finally found a way to kick the modding community, custom rom/unlocked bootloader users, out of its ecosystem in a consistent way.

A message to the walled garden keepers

While I do appreciate your dedication and your ways of providing the community with working tools, the way you act shows you more as "entitled" than "helpful". That is at least in my non-existing experience because, even trying, I was unable to have a private conversation with any of you in any way. This could, and probably already is, blocking out useful contributions making this look less like a community effort and more like a personal achievement.

Original Play Integrity Fork README

PIF forked to be more futureproof and develop more methodically

GitHub release (latest by date) GitHub Release Date GitHub Releases GitHub All Releases

A Zygisk module which fixes "ctsProfileMatch" (SafetyNet) and "MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY" (Play Integrity).

To use this module you must have one of the following (latest versions):

About module

It injects a classes.dex file to modify fields in the android.os.Build class. Also, it creates a hook in the native code to modify system properties. These are spoofed only to Google Play Services' DroidGuard (SafetyNet/Play Integrity) service.

The purpose of the module is to avoid hardware attestation.

About 'custom.pif.json' file

You can fill out the included template example.pif.json from the module directory (/data/adb/modules/playintegrityfix) then rename it to custom.pif.json to spoof custom values to the GMS unstable process. It will be used instead of any included pif.json (none included currently).

Note this is just a template with the current suggested defaults, but with this fork you can include as few or as many android.os.Build class fields and Android system properties as needed to pass DEVICE verdict now and in the future if the enforced checks by Play Integrity change.

As a general rule you can't use values from recent devices due to them only being allowed with full hardware backed attestation. See the Resources below for information and scripts to help find a working fingerprint.

Older formatted custom.pif.json files from cross-forks and previous releases will be automatically migrated to the latest format. Simply ensure the filename is custom.pif.json and place it in the module directory before upgrading.

A migration may also be performed manually with sh migrate.sh and custom.pif.json in the same directory, or from a file explorer app that supports script execution.

Resources
  • FAQ:

    • PIF FAQ - Frequently Asked Questions (READ FIRST!)
  • Guides:

  • Scripts:

    • gen_pif_custom.sh - Script to generate a custom.pif.json from device dump build.prop files
    • autopif.sh - Script to extract the latest working Xiaomi.eu fingerprint (though frequently banned) to test an initial setup
    • install-random-fp.sh - Script to randomly switch between multiple working fingerprints found by the user

About 'custom.app_replace.list' file

You can customize the included default example.app_replace.list from the module directory (/data/adb/modules/playintegrityfix) then rename it to custom.app_replace.list to systemlessly replace any additional conflicting custom ROM spoof injection app paths to disable them.

Troubleshooting

Make sure Google Play Services (com.google.android.gms) is NOT on the Magisk DenyList if Enforce DenyList is enabled since this interferes with the module; the module does prevent this using scripts but it only happens once during each reboot.

Failing BASIC verdict

If you are failing basicIntegrity (SafetyNet) or MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY (Play Integrity) something is wrong in your setup. Recommended steps in order to find the problem:

  • Disable all modules except this one
  • Try a different (ideally known working) custom.pif.json

Note: Some modules which modify system (e.g. Xposed) can trigger DroidGuard detections, as can any which hook GMS processes (e.g. custom fonts).

Failing DEVICE verdict (on KernelSU/APatch)

  • Disable Zygisk Next
  • Reboot
  • Enable Zygisk Next
  • Reboot again

Failing DEVICE verdict (on custom kernel/ROM)

  • Check the kernel release string with command adb shell uname -r or uname -r
  • If it's on the Known Banned Kernel List then inform your kernel developer/ROM maintainer to remove their branding for their next build
  • You may also try a different custom kernel, or go back to the default kernel for your ROM, if available/possible

Play Protect/Store Certification and Google Wallet Tap To Pay Setup Security Requirements

Follow these steps:

  • Reflash the module in your root manager app
  • Clear Google Wallet (com.google.android.apps.walletnfcrel) and/or Google Pay (com.google.android.apps.nbu.paisa.user) cache, if you have them installed
  • Clear Google Play Store (com.android.vending) cache and data
  • Clear Google Play Services (com.google.android.gms) cache and data, or, optionally skip clearing data and wait some time (~24h) for it to resolve on its own
  • Reboot

Note: Clearing Google Play Services app data will then require you to reset any WearOS devices paired to your device.

Read module logs

You can read module logs using one of these commands directly after boot:

adb shell "logcat | grep 'PIF/'" or su -c "logcat | grep 'PIF/'"

Add a "verboseLogs" entry with a value of "0", "1", "2", "3" or "100" to your custom.pif.json to enable higher logging levels; "100" will dump all Build fields, and all the system properties that DroidGuard is checking. Adding the entry can also be done using the migration script with the sh migrate.sh --force --advanced or sh migrate.sh -f -a command.

Can this module pass MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY?

No.

About Play Integrity (SafetyNet is deprecated)

Play Integrity API - FAQ/information about PI (Play Integrity) replacing SN (SafetyNet)

Credits

Module scripts were adapted from those of kdrag0n/Displax's Universal SafetyNet Fix (USNF) module, please see the commit history of Displax's USNF Fork for proper attribution.

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PIF fork that provides attestation by bypassing the Android KeyStore while using a valid keybox. Not complete and explicitly set to work only in the context of Key Attestation app

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