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resolve conficts
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skounis committed Dec 13, 2024
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Expand Up @@ -586,9 +586,28 @@ Unit, and it may complicate attestation inventory management.

### General note: Diminishing the costs of issuing multiple attestations

Another drawback of this method is that the Attestation Provider is
dependent on the correct implementation by the Wallet Unit to ensure
that it is used correctly.
The operational costs of issuing an attestation are determined to some
extent by the requirement that, for security reasons, the Wallet Unit
must generate a new cryptographic key pair for each attestation. It
stores the private key in its WSCA/WSCD and sends the public key to the
Attestation Provider for inclusion in the attestation. The operational
costs of issuing many attestation may therefore be lessened in two ways:

- By allowing re-use of existing key pairs (under specific
conditions).

- By relying on a Hierarchical Deterministic Key (HDK) function as
described in clause 4.4.4.2 of \[ETSI 119476\]. Using a HDK
function, the Attestation Provider only needs to keep track of a
single public key and use it to derive unique per-attestation public
keys. Each public key is then sent to the Wallet Unit, and the
Wallet Unit can derive the corresponding private key in the
WSCA/WSCD.

These two possibilities will be discussed in Topic B (Re-issuance and
batch issuance of PIDs and Attestations) and Topic C (Wallet Unit
Attestation (WUA) and key attestation), respectively. They will
therefore not be further discussed here.

## Ensuring User privacy when checking the revocation status of attestations

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