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GitHub Workflows security hardening #2810

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merged 1 commit into from
Aug 31, 2022

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sashashura
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This PR adds explicit permissions section to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with extended set of permissions (except from on: pull_request from external forks). By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an injection or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.
It is recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level and grant write permissions on job level case by case.

@sashashura sashashura requested review from a team as code owners August 30, 2022 19:20
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@sashashura LGTM, thanks a lot!

@joschi joschi added this to the 4.2.12 milestone Aug 31, 2022
@joschi joschi added security Pull requests that address a security vulnerability github_actions Pull requests that update Github_actions code labels Aug 31, 2022
@joschi joschi merged commit d1fc270 into dropwizard:release/4.2.x Aug 31, 2022
joschi pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 31, 2022
This commit adds explicit permissions section to workflows.

This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with extended set of permissions (except from on: pull_request from external forks).

By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an injection or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.

It is recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level and grant write permissions on job level case by case.

Refs #2810
joschi pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 31, 2022
This commit adds explicit permissions section to workflows.

This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with extended set of permissions (except from on: pull_request from external forks).

By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an injection or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.

It is recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level and grant write permissions on job level case by case.

Refs #2810
joschi added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 1, 2022
This commit adds explicit permissions section to workflows.

This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with extended set of permissions (except from on: pull_request from external forks).

By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an injection or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.

It is recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level and grant write permissions on job level case by case.

Refs #2810

Co-authored-by: Alex <[email protected]>
joschi added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 1, 2022
This commit adds explicit permissions section to workflows.

This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with extended set of permissions (except from on: pull_request from external forks).

By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an injection or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.

It is recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level and grant write permissions on job level case by case.

Refs #2810

Co-authored-by: Alex <[email protected]>
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2 participants