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ADR 028: Public Key Addresses #7086
ADR 028: Public Key Addresses #7086
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I don't think the prefix will solve the security problem here. I was reading #3685 and I'm not sure if the solution solves the security problem. Here is my reasoning (maybe it's wrong):
Let's say we have to PK algorithms:
A
andB
. For a user with(pk1, sk1)
key pair, we have two possible attacks:A
became vulnerable. Attacker is able to create a valid signature without knowingsk1
. In this case we don't solve anything with this proposal.(pk2, sk2)
, possible belonging to a different PK scheme, such thataddress(typ(pk2), pk2) == address(typ(pk1), pk1)
. Then he basically broke the cryptographic hash function. The key type (and the prefix) is not important here, because the attacker has an algorithm how to find an pre-image.There was a problem hiding this comment.
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To be clear - I'm not saying that adding prefix is bad. I'm not sure it solves anything. @ethanfrey ?
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There is one more attack, which in fact is important here, and this update address it:
(1.)
:A
became vulnerable. Attacker is able to forge a signature forpk \in A
. In all places where we don't store any relationship between addresses and(PK, PK scheme)
pair, the attacker will be able to spend address assets.This proposal (including
scheme
url / name in the address algorithm) protects against the attack described #3685 (isolating address spaces to protect against attacks when one of the PK scheme is broken).There was a problem hiding this comment.
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When implementing this we should use use
make([]byte, correctSize)
and copy they content usingfor
orcopy
(into slice starting from index2
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Random oracle indifferentiability is cryptographically irrelevant for constructing addresses.
https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/07/17/indifferentiability/
Cause see the prefix of an address always specifies the length of suffix. Ie. sr25519 key is always 32bytes. In the context of this protocol, a MD hash like sha256 is "random oracle indeffentiable"
I'm just saying this because I'm always going to strongly advocate for a really high bar for adding a new hash function to the Cosmos trusted computing base.
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@zmanian I agree with your general approach. But we don't propose a any exotic algorithm. Blake2 is a part of at least Go and Python3 stdlib and it's an improvement. Some cryptographers claim that sha256 is easier to break than blake2 because we already know how to break other hash functions from the MD family.
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Some references would be appreciated 👍
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So I want to summarize what I heard from @zmanian on our last call about this. Basically:
Thus for now it's probably preferable to stick with SHA256. Is that accurate @zmanian ?
@alessio any progress on getting the cryptographer at AiB to take a look at this?
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W3F Research / Polkadot is using blake2b and avoiding sha2.
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Same thoughts as above re hex (and maybe the "/"s).
Why not proto-encode the above PubKey structure here and otherwise use the same address format as the non-multisig, where the pubkey bytes are just the proto encoding of the Proto multisig PubKey structure?
Each nested PubKey would have to be typed too, but that seems fine? Then no need to convert nested keys to addresses or have more ad hoc encoding.
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Because we have to deal with non-deterministic encoding of protobuf (i.e. ADR 027). This avoids that. Can you see if what I have their now which does sorting is okay?
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Would it be helpful to try and put this info in bech32 encodings? Is access to this info really that important?
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I don't know. You're saying that maybe we can have the bech32 have an extra prefix that isn't present in the actual address? Would this be something like
cosmossecp256k1sdgh3sghlsdsdg
. Or would the prefix get added before bech32 encoding?