add \ before *

BEPs/BEP-341.md

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ As shown in the graph, it is evident that continuous block production cannot dou
 
 ### 4.2 Implementation Specification 
 #### 4.2.1 Priority Allocation 
-Each epoch predefines a set of validators, with a total of validatorN validators, and each validator within the set has a unique index ranging from [0, validatorNum). If the current block height is blockN, then the validators with the following indices obtain priority block-producing rights.
+Each epoch predefines a set of validators, with a total of validatorN validators, and each validator within the set has a unique index ranging from [0, validatorN). If the current block height is blockN, then the validators with the following indices obtain priority block-producing rights.
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 <img src=./assets/bep-341/4.2.1.png width=36% />
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@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Each epoch will choose a new validator set, assuming an epoch contains epochSlot
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 #### 4.2.3 Block Avoidance
-To prevent fewer than 1/2 of the nodes from controlling the entire network, block producers are required to produce fewer than n blocks within the previous validatorN*n/2 historical blocks.
+To prevent fewer than 1/2 of the nodes from controlling the entire network, block producers are required to produce fewer than n blocks within the previous validatorN/2\*n historical blocks.
 
 #### 4.2.4 Governable Number of Consecutive Blocks
 When n=1, it is equivalent to disabling the feature of consecutive block production, while significant optimization is observed when n belongs to the range [3,5]. Currently, the range for the value of n is set to [1,9] but except 2.
@@ -102,12 +102,12 @@ Within a single epoch, tail validators have fewer block-producing opportunities,
 ## 6. Security Analysis
 This BEP relies on BSC's Fast Finality feature. If Fast Finality fails, it may result in the following issues:
 1. Nodes intentionally hide mined blocks, potentially leading to longer short-term reorganizations. 
-2. The probability of finality for transactions increases, requiring waiting for 2/3 validatorN * n + blocks. 
+2. The probability of finality for transactions increases, requiring waiting for 2/3\*validatorN\*n + blocks. 
 
 ## 7. Liveness Analysis
 The liveness of the chain remains unchanged, meaning it is required to ensure that at least (validatorN/2+1) validators are active. The proof is as follows:
 
-Given that (validatorN/2+1) validators are active, and at a certain moment none of them are allowed to produce blocks, then each validator must have produced at least n blocks within the past validatorN*n/2 blocks. Thus, collectively, within the past validatorN*n/2 blocks, there must have been at least (validatorN/2+1)*n blocks produced, which is impossible. Therefore, at any given moment, at least one node from the set of (validatorN/2+1) must be allowed to produce blocks.
+Given that (validatorN/2+1) validators are active, and at a certain moment none of them are allowed to produce blocks, then each validator must have produced at least n blocks within the past validatorN/2\*n blocks. Thus, collectively, within the past validatorN/2\*n blocks, there must have been at least (validatorN/2+1)\*n blocks produced, which is impossible. Therefore, at any given moment, at least one node from the set of (validatorN/2+1) must be allowed to produce blocks.
 
 ## 8. License
 The content is licensed under [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).