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pgwire: make it possible for a SQL proxy to override the client addr
Release note (security update): When using a SQL proxy, in the default configuration CockroachDB only knows about the network address of the proxy. That *peer* address is then used for logging, authentication rules, etc. This is undesirable, as security logging and authentication rules need to operate on the actual (final) client address instead. CockroachDB can now be configured to solve this problem (conf mechanism detailed below). When so configured, a SQL proxy can inform the CockroachDB server of the real address of the client via a server status parameter called `crdb:remote_addr`. The value must be the IP address of the client, followed by a colon, followed by the port number, using the standard Go syntax (e.g. `11.22.33.44:5566` for IPv4, `[11:22::33]:4455` for IPv6). When provided, this value overrides the SQL proxy's address for logging and authentication purposes. In any case, the original peer address is also logged alongside the client address (overridden or not), via the new logging tag `peer`. Security considerations: - enabling this feature allows the peer to spoof its address wrt authentication and thus bypass authentication rules that would otherwise apply to its address, which can introduce a serious security vulnerability if the peer is not trusted. This is why this feature is not enabled by default, and must only be enabled when using a trusted SQL proxy. - this feature should only be used with SQL proxies which actively scrub a `crdb:remote_addr` parameter received by a remote client, and replaces it by its own. If the proxy mistakenly forwards the parameter as provided by the client, it opens the door to the aforementioned security vulnerability. - care must be taken in HBA rules: TLS client cert validation, if requested by a rule, is still performed using the certificate presented by the proxy, not that presented by the client. This means that this new feature is not sufficient to forward TLS client cert authn through a proxy. (If TLS client cert authn is required, it must be performed by the proxy directly.) - care must be taken in HBA rules: the 'protocol' field (first column) continues to apply to the connection type between CockroachDB and the proxy, not between the proxy and the client. Only the 4th column (the CIDR pattern) is matched against the proxy-provided remote address override. Therefore, it is not possible to apply different rules to different client address when proxying TCP connections via a unix socket, because HBA rules for unix connections don't use the address column. Also when proxying client SSL connections via a non-SSL proxy connection, or proxying client non-SSL connections via a SSL proxy connection, care must be taken to configure address-based rule matching using the proper connection type. A reliable way to bypass this complexity is to only use the `host` connection type which applies equally to SSL and non-SSL connections. As of this implementation, the feature is enabled using the non-documented environment variable `COCKROACH_TRUST_CLIENT_PROVIDED_SQL_REMOTE_ADDR`. The use of an env var is a stop-gap so that this feature can be used in CC SQL pods which do not have access to cluster settings. The env var will be eventually removed and replaced by another mechanism.
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