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Isolate Python SDK snippets from PR aptos-labs#6356
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The following commands were run in below paths:

aptos-core/:
pre-commit run --all-files

aptos-core/developer-docs-site/:
prettier '**/*.(tsx|ts|js)'
pnpm spellcheck
pnpm lint

aptos-core/ecosystem/python/sdk:
make fmt
make test

Changes to `bcs.py` as a result of `make fmt` were
disregarded since the BCS module was not modified
per this PR's content.
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alnoki committed Feb 27, 2023
1 parent ed6e609 commit 4a41aa8
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Showing 9 changed files with 271 additions and 5,026 deletions.
4 changes: 0 additions & 4 deletions aptos-move/framework/aptos-framework/doc/account.md
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Expand Up @@ -348,10 +348,6 @@ Second, this struct is signed by the new public key that the account owner wants
knowledge of this new public key's associated secret key. These two signatures cannot be replayed in another
context because they include the TXN's unique sequence number.

Note that the challenge message to sign includes the <code><a href="account.md#0x1_account_RotationProofChallenge">RotationProofChallenge</a></code> type info prepended to the
relevant bytes, such that serializing then signing only the below four struct fields will lead to rotation
failure. For the verification implementation, see <code>aptos_stdlib::ed25519::signature_verify_strict_t()</code>.


<pre><code><b>struct</b> <a href="account.md#0x1_account_RotationProofChallenge">RotationProofChallenge</a> <b>has</b> <b>copy</b>, drop
</code></pre>
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4 changes: 0 additions & 4 deletions aptos-move/framework/aptos-framework/sources/account.move
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Expand Up @@ -68,10 +68,6 @@ module aptos_framework::account {
/// Second, this struct is signed by the new public key that the account owner wants to rotate to, which proves
/// knowledge of this new public key's associated secret key. These two signatures cannot be replayed in another
/// context because they include the TXN's unique sequence number.
///
/// Note that the challenge message to sign includes the `RotationProofChallenge` type info prepended to the
/// relevant bytes, such that serializing then signing only the below four struct fields will lead to rotation
/// failure. For the verification implementation, see `aptos_stdlib::ed25519::signature_verify_strict_t()`.
struct RotationProofChallenge has copy, drop {
sequence_number: u64, // the sequence number of the account whose key is being rotated
originator: address, // the address of the account whose key is being rotated
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