Impact
WireMock can be configured to only permit proxying (and therefore recording) to certain addresses. This is achieved via a list of allowed address rules and a list of denied address rules, where the allowed list is evaluated first. Documentation.
Until WireMock Webhooks Extension 3.0.0-beta-15, the filtering of target addresses from the proxy mode DID NOT work for Webhooks, so the users were potentially vulnerable regardless of the limitProxyTargets settings.
Via the WireMock webhooks configuration, POST requests from a webhook might be forwarded to an arbitrary service reachable from WireMock’s instance. For example, If someone is running the WireMock docker Container inside a private cluster, they can trigger internal POST requests against unsecured APIs or even against secure ones by passing a token, discovered using another exploit, via authentication headers.
Affected components
- WireMock Webhooks Extension 2.x versions until 2.35.1 (security patch)
- WireMock 3.x version until 3.0.3 (security patch)
- All versions of WireMock Studio (discontinued). This distribution bundles the WireMock Webhooks Extension and activates it by default
Patches and Mitigation
NOTE: It was confirmed that WireMock Cloud does not expose sensitive internal APIs and hence not vulnerable to the issue. No action is needed if you use this SaaS distribution.
Workarounds
- Use external firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations
References
Credits
- @W0rty for reporting CVE-2023-39967 in WireMock Studio
- WireMock Inc. team for discovering similar exploits in Webhooks and the risk in the Proxy mode defaults for WireMock
References
W0rty Reporter
oleg-nenashev Finder
Mahoney Remediation developer
tomakehurst Remediation developer
Impact
WireMock can be configured to only permit proxying (and therefore recording) to certain addresses. This is achieved via a list of allowed address rules and a list of denied address rules, where the allowed list is evaluated first. Documentation.
Until WireMock Webhooks Extension 3.0.0-beta-15, the filtering of target addresses from the proxy mode DID NOT work for Webhooks, so the users were potentially vulnerable regardless of the
limitProxyTargetssettings.Via the WireMock webhooks configuration, POST requests from a webhook might be forwarded to an arbitrary service reachable from WireMock’s instance. For example, If someone is running the WireMock docker Container inside a private cluster, they can trigger internal POST requests against unsecured APIs or even against secure ones by passing a token, discovered using another exploit, via authentication headers.
Affected components
Patches and Mitigation
NOTE: It was confirmed that WireMock Cloud does not expose sensitive internal APIs and hence not vulnerable to the issue. No action is needed if you use this SaaS distribution.
Workarounds
References
Credits
References