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+# Path Functorialism: A Wittgensteinean Critique of Naturalism
+by Sven Nilsen, 2023
+
+Neither Naturalism or Scientism have been properly formalized in mathematics.
+In this blog post I suggest a weak overarching framework for natural science: Path Functorialism.
+I will discuss how Naturalism fits inside this framework and why there is some reason to criticize Naturalism
+as a philosophical position for Scientism.
+
+When science uses experiments as the foundation for consensus,
+this naturally leads to Functorialism as a mathematical understanding of natural science.
+The reason is that experiments are local hubs of mathematical knowledge in space-time.
+The relations between these local islands of "knowledge sources"
+leans the language bias toward functors as means of transferring knowledge in repetive experiments,
+where the form of knowledge is assumed similar to something like a category in Category Theory.
+
+However, natural science has traditionally been more strongly biased than Functorialism.
+This implies that one needs a perspective modifier `X` as in `X Functorialism`.
+
+One argument is that `X` should stand for "Space" since natural scientific theories
+often are grounded in some notion of mathematical spaces.
+
+I argue that `X` should stand for "Path" since "Space" often implies some notion of symmetry
+which is not necessary. The word "Path" both illustrates the modern intuitionistic understanding
+of mathematical foundations and a weaker notion of space that allows some level of mathematical plurality.
+
+This is how "Path Functorialism" became my recent position, taken at least temporarily,
+for a more formal understanding of Naturalism.
+
+Most people are concerned about the supernatural in relation to Naturalism.
+However, I am not criticizing Naturalism from this point of view.
+
+There are various notions of Naturalism, which implies that Naturalism is a set of subjective philosophical positions.
+Therefore, as scientific progress is taking place,
+one must consider the perspective of Naturalism as positions being relative to experiments.
+
+Now, if I choose Path Functorialism as my position to understand science,
+one can see the Wittgensteinean problematic stance in this position:
+
+- On one hand, in order to talk about scientific theories, one usually implies some language of paths
+- On the other hand, embracing general functoriality does not imply a single language of paths
+
+From this can one recognize generating hypotheses and testing them by experiments to rule out theories,
+as the driving mechanism by the mathematical plurality of Path Functorialism.
+
+The mechanism of generating hypotheses is independent of the mathematical plurality,
+a way to solve the Wittgensteinean conflicts between incompatible ontologies,
+hence also not depending on the notion of Naturalism that is preferred.
+
+While Naturalism is a strong motivation for driving scientific progress,
+and it is a reasonable position to assume established theories by scientific consensus,
+this overall does not include the understanding of science from a bird perspective.
+
+For example, when a new theory is established by consensus,
+it is easy to forget the past developments since the utility and interest of old theories might go down.
+This is both a good and a bad thing, so one should not take this as a point for one-sided critique.
+
+The argument is whether Naturalism can claim authority on science as a discipline.
+If Path Functorialism is taken as position, then Naturalism seems more like an overall driving motivation for science,
+aka Ready-at-Hand, while Path Functorialism is more like Present-at-Hand.
+
+The mathematical formalism is likely to lead to new developments of understanding science
+that are more Present-at-Hand in comparison to experimental science.
+Thus, by Wittgensteinean synthesis, there ought to be people present in such communities
+who are aware of the problematics of such developments.
+
+Today, Path Semanticists are frequently exploring language biases that leans toward Avatar Extensions,
+such as religion and some variants of philosophy, e.g. Continental Philosophy.
+One can contrast these explorations with the emphasis on Functorialism in science.
+Since Path Semanticists might also explore language biases in science,
+this means that Path Semanticists do not find it easy to self-identify as a scientific discipline,
+when the approach is more about Wittgensteinean problematics.
+
+At the same time, the toolbox of Path Semantics allows taking on problematics of language biases,
+which includes the possible development of Path Functoralism as a framework for science.
+This means that Path Semanticists might take more pluralistic approaches than usual,
+at least when compared to individual notions of Naturalism.
+
+A Path Semanticist might be interested in ontological differences between various positions of Naturalism,
+which probably is not ruled out by scientific experiments and hence not an authentic position within Naturalism (in sense of Heidegger).
+
+For example, in principle it not a problem that some notion of Naturalism seek to claim authority over the understanding of science.
+However, since language biases often come to play in conflicts between different notions of Naturalism,
+it is a good idea to use frameworks developed by Path Semanticists to settle debates,
+in order to not risk stagmentation in pure language bias.
+
+In the case that one notion of Naturalism wins, the past developments of scentific progress
+is "handed over" to Path Semanticists, as there is no reason for an established notion of Naturalism
+to claim fair Intellectual History over competing notions,
+something that is over and over confirmed by history, that a such stance is a bad idea.
+
+The reason to do this, is like the difference between an athlete competing in Olympics for a gold medal
+and the people who arrange the Olympics itself with fair and formal rules.
+Here, the athlete striving toward the goal is like some notion of Naturalism,
+but the overall arrangement must be according to well developed frameworks of science that can give
+fair rules between different ontologies.
+
+It is probably not necessary to have a correct notion of science in order to develop a framework
+for fair rules between different notions of ontology that relate to science.
+A Present-at-Hand approach to science does not mean we have a full understanding.
+Also, it is unclear whether a Read-at-Hand approach can ever be finalized.
+
+Since Naturalism usually self-portrays various notions as seeking dominance,
+this implies caution is adviced, as the lack of Wittgensteinean problematics does not provide
+success or solutions to real world problems (e.g. the historically naive philosophical approach to AI).
+
+The problem here is that if no single notion of Naturalism can win,
+then Path Semanticists dominate simply in terms of synthesizing various language biases,
+but if a single notion of Naturalism can win,
+then it must be according to some framework, possibly synthesized by Path Semanticists,
+to provide fair competition between competing language biases.
+It looks like, in either case, Path Semanticists will be the overall winners of this game.
+
+Another perspective is that Naturalism is by definition self-defeating and
+when its ultimate goal is reached, the remaining utility is in Path Semantics.
+
+There is something strange about this, so I suggest that the language bias of science
+is Path Functorialism with some notion of internal skepticism.