Redundant PSU Control with EDM #26751
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thinkyhead
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Feb 1, 2024
thinkyhead
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Feb 29, 2024
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Adds redundant PS_ON pins with EDM Monitoring feedback.
In order to bring the machine control safety functions closer in-line with standard industrial safety methodology, this adds redundant control with 2 output pins, as well as the option for EDM (External Device Monitoring) feedback that ensures the action is followed. Typically you would use dual SPDT force guided relays, and the safe load potential carries through in series. Each relay is fired by an independent pin, and has a monitoring line to the EDM channel on the second contact set.
While the overall nature of the system does not allow for actual safety ratings to be determined with the variability in hardware, this achieves a circuit which could be held to somewhere between category 2 and 3 safety when properly implemented with the correct external hardware however gaps in trigger conditions do not allow for the rating to be applied.