chore(deps): update ⬆️ gomod to v1.56.3

[mend-for-github-com]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
google.golang.org/grpc	v1.16.0 -> v1.56.3

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

GHSA-m425-mq94-257g

Impact

In affected releases of gRPC-Go, it is possible for an attacker to send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests, which is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit.

Patches

This vulnerability was addressed by #​6703 and has been included in patch releases: 1.56.3, 1.57.1, 1.58.3. It is also included in the latest release, 1.59.0.

Along with applying the patch, users should also ensure they are using the grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams server option to apply a limit to the server's resources used for any single connection.

Workarounds

None.

References

#​6703

CVE-2023-44487

HTTP/2 Rapid reset attack

The HTTP/2 protocol allows clients to indicate to the server that a previous stream should be canceled by sending a RST_STREAM frame. The protocol does not require the client and server to coordinate the cancellation in any way, the client may do it unilaterally. The client may also assume that the cancellation will take effect immediately when the server receives the RST_STREAM frame, before any other data from that TCP connection is processed.

Abuse of this feature is called a Rapid Reset attack because it relies on the ability for an endpoint to send a RST_STREAM frame immediately after sending a request frame, which makes the other endpoint start working and then rapidly resets the request. The request is canceled, but leaves the HTTP/2 connection open.

The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack built on this capability is simple: The client opens a large number of streams at once as in the standard HTTP/2 attack, but rather than waiting for a response to each request stream from the server or proxy, the client cancels each request immediately.

The ability to reset streams immediately allows each connection to have an indefinite number of requests in flight. By explicitly canceling the requests, the attacker never exceeds the limit on the number of concurrent open streams. The number of in-flight requests is no longer dependent on the round-trip time (RTT), but only on the available network bandwidth.

In a typical HTTP/2 server implementation, the server will still have to do significant amounts of work for canceled requests, such as allocating new stream data structures, parsing the query and doing header decompression, and mapping the URL to a resource. For reverse proxy implementations, the request may be proxied to the backend server before the RST_STREAM frame is processed. The client on the other hand paid almost no costs for sending the requests. This creates an exploitable cost asymmetry between the server and the client.

Multiple software artifacts implementing HTTP/2 are affected. This advisory was originally ingested from the swift-nio-http2 repo advisory and their original conent follows.

swift-nio-http2 specific advisory

swift-nio-http2 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service vulnerability in which a malicious client can create and then reset a large number of HTTP/2 streams in a short period of time. This causes swift-nio-http2 to commit to a large amount of expensive work which it then throws away, including creating entirely new Channels to serve the traffic. This can easily overwhelm an EventLoop and prevent it from making forward progress.

swift-nio-http2 1.28 contains a remediation for this issue that applies reset counter using a sliding window. This constrains the number of stream resets that may occur in a given window of time. Clients violating this limit will have their connections torn down. This allows clients to continue to cancel streams for legitimate reasons, while constraining malicious actors.

---

gRPC-Go HTTP/2 Rapid Reset vulnerability

GHSA-m425-mq94-257g / GO-2023-2153

More information

Details

Impact

In affected releases of gRPC-Go, it is possible for an attacker to send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests, which is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit.

Patches

This vulnerability was addressed by #​6703 and has been included in patch releases: 1.56.3, 1.57.1, 1.58.3. It is also included in the latest release, 1.59.0.

Along with applying the patch, users should also ensure they are using the grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams server option to apply a limit to the server's resources used for any single connection.

Workarounds

None.

References

#​6703

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-m425-mq94-257g
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/6703
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/f2180b4d5403d2210b30b93098eb7da31c05c721
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Denial of service from HTTP/2 Rapid Reset in google.golang.org/grpc

GHSA-m425-mq94-257g / GO-2023-2153

More information

Details

An attacker can send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests. This is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit, grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams. This results in a denial of service due to resource consumption.

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/6703
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/f2180b4d5403d2210b30b93098eb7da31c05c721

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

HTTP/2 Stream Cancellation Attack

BIT-apisix-2023-44487 / BIT-aspnet-core-2023-44487 / BIT-contour-2023-44487 / BIT-dotnet-2023-44487 / BIT-dotnet-sdk-2023-44487 / BIT-envoy-2023-44487 / BIT-golang-2023-44487 / BIT-jenkins-2023-44487 / BIT-kong-2023-44487 / BIT-nginx-2023-44487 / BIT-nginx-ingress-controller-2023-44487 / BIT-node-2023-44487 / BIT-solr-2023-44487 / BIT-tomcat-2023-44487 / BIT-varnish-2023-44487 / CVE-2023-44487 / GHSA-2m7v-gc89-fjqf / GHSA-qppj-fm5r-hxr3 / GHSA-vx74-f528-fxqg / GHSA-xpw8-rcwv-8f8p

More information

Details

HTTP/2 Rapid reset attack

The HTTP/2 protocol allows clients to indicate to the server that a previous stream should be canceled by sending a RST_STREAM frame. The protocol does not require the client and server to coordinate the cancellation in any way, the client may do it unilaterally. The client may also assume that the cancellation will take effect immediately when the server receives the RST_STREAM frame, before any other data from that TCP connection is processed.

Abuse of this feature is called a Rapid Reset attack because it relies on the ability for an endpoint to send a RST_STREAM frame immediately after sending a request frame, which makes the other endpoint start working and then rapidly resets the request. The request is canceled, but leaves the HTTP/2 connection open.

The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack built on this capability is simple: The client opens a large number of streams at once as in the standard HTTP/2 attack, but rather than waiting for a response to each request stream from the server or proxy, the client cancels each request immediately.

The ability to reset streams immediately allows each connection to have an indefinite number of requests in flight. By explicitly canceling the requests, the attacker never exceeds the limit on the number of concurrent open streams. The number of in-flight requests is no longer dependent on the round-trip time (RTT), but only on the available network bandwidth.

In a typical HTTP/2 server implementation, the server will still have to do significant amounts of work for canceled requests, such as allocating new stream data structures, parsing the query and doing header decompression, and mapping the URL to a resource. For reverse proxy implementations, the request may be proxied to the backend server before the RST_STREAM frame is processed. The client on the other hand paid almost no costs for sending the requests. This creates an exploitable cost asymmetry between the server and the client.

Multiple software artifacts implementing HTTP/2 are affected. This advisory was originally ingested from the swift-nio-http2 repo advisory and their original conent follows.

swift-nio-http2 specific advisory

swift-nio-http2 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service vulnerability in which a malicious client can create and then reset a large number of HTTP/2 streams in a short period of time. This causes swift-nio-http2 to commit to a large amount of expensive work which it then throws away, including creating entirely new Channels to serve the traffic. This can easily overwhelm an EventLoop and prevent it from making forward progress.

swift-nio-http2 1.28 contains a remediation for this issue that applies reset counter using a sliding window. This constrains the number of stream resets that may occur in a given window of time. Clients violating this limit will have their connections torn down. This allows clients to continue to cancel streams for legitimate reasons, while constraining malicious actors.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/apple/swift-nio-http2/security/advisories/GHSA-qppj-fm5r-hxr3
• https://github.com/h2o/h2o/security/advisories/GHSA-2m7v-gc89-fjqf
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-44487
• https://github.com/Azure/AKS/issues/3947
• https://github.com/akka/akka-http/issues/4323
• https://github.com/alibaba/tengine/issues/1872
• https://github.com/apache/apisix/issues/10320
• https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/5877
• https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/277
• https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/issues/10679
• https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/issues/16740
• https://github.com/golang/go/issues/63417
• https://github.com/haproxy/haproxy/issues/2312
• https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/issues/3337
• https://github.com/junkurihara/rust-rpxy/issues/97
• https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/http2/issues/93
• https://github.com/ninenines/cowboy/issues/1615
• https://github.com/openresty/openresty/issues/930
• https://github.com/opensearch-project/data-prepper/issues/3474
• https://github.com/tempesta-tech/tempesta/issues/1986
• https://github.com/varnishcache/varnish-cache/issues/3996
• https://github.com/apache/httpd-site/pull/10
• https://github.com/apache/trafficserver/pull/10564
• https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/pull/30055
• https://github.com/facebook/proxygen/pull/466
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/6703
• https://github.com/h2o/h2o/pull/3291
• https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/121120
• https://github.com/line/armeria/pull/5232
• https://github.com/linkerd/website/pull/1695/commits/4b9c6836471bc8270ab48aae6fd2181bc73fd632
• https://github.com/microsoft/CBL-Mariner/pull/6381
• https://github.com/nghttp2/nghttp2/pull/1961
• https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/50121
• https://github.com/projectcontour/contour/pull/5826
• https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/http2/commit/f61d41a502bd0f60eb24e1ce14edc7b6df6722a1
• https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/58f75f665aa81a8cbcf6ffa74820042a285c5e61
• https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2023-44487
• https://arstechnica.com/security/2023/10/how-ddosers-used-the-http-2-protocol-to-deliver-attacks-of-unprecedented-size/
• https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/AWS-2023-011/
• https://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-breakdown-http2-rapid-reset-ddos-attack/
• https://blog.cloudflare.com/zero-day-rapid-reset-http2-record-breaking-ddos-attack/
• https://blog.litespeedtech.com/2023/10/11/rapid-reset-http-2-vulnerablilty/
• https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2023/10/10/cve-2023-44487-http-2-rapid-reset-attack
• https://blog.vespa.ai/cve-2023-44487/
• https://bugzilla.proxmox.com/show_bug.cgi?id=4988
• https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2242803
• https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1216123
• https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/commit/?id=c64c329c2c1752f46b73e3e6ce9f4329be6629f9
• https://chaos.social/@​icing/111210915918780532
• https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/google-cloud-mitigated-largest-ddos-attack-peaking-above-398-million-rps/
• https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/how-it-works-the-novel-http2-rapid-reset-ddos-attack
• https://community.traefik.io/t/is-traefik-vulnerable-to-cve-2023-44487/20125
• https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2023-32-vault-consul-and-boundary-affected-by-http-2-rapid-reset-denial-of-service-vulnerability-cve-2023-44487/59715
• https://edg.io/lp/blog/resets-leaks-ddos-and-the-tale-of-a-hidden-cve
• https://forums.swift.org/t/swift-nio-http2-security-update-cve-2023-44487-http-2-dos/67764
• https://gist.github.com/adulau/7c2bfb8e9cdbe4b35a5e131c66a0c088
• https://github.com/Kong/kong/discussions/11741
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qppj-fm5r-hxr3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vx74-f528-fxqg
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xpw8-rcwv-8f8p
• https://github.com/apache/httpd/blob/afcdbeebbff4b0c50ea26cdd16e178c0d1f24152/modules/http2/h2_mplx.c#L1101-L1113
• https://github.com/apache/tomcat/tree/main/java/org/apache/coyote/http2
• https://github.com/apple/swift-nio-http2
• https://github.com/arkrwn/PoC/tree/main/CVE-2023-44487
• https://github.com/bcdannyboy/CVE-2023-44487
• https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/releases/tag/v2.7.5
• https://github.com/dotnet/core/blob/e4613450ea0da7fd2fc6b61dfb2c1c1dec1ce9ec/release-notes/6.0/6.0.23/6.0.23.md?plain=1#L73
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases
• https://github.com/icing/mod_h2/blob/0a864782af0a942aa2ad4ed960a6b32cd35bcf0a/mod_http2/README.md?plain=1#L239-L244
• https://github.com/micrictor/http2-rst-stream
• https://github.com/nghttp2/nghttp2/releases/tag/v1.57.0
• https://github.com/oqtane/oqtane.framework/discussions/3367
• https://go.dev/cl/534215
• https://go.dev/cl/534235
• https://go.dev/issue/63417
• https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/iNNxDTCjZvo
• https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/iNNxDTCjZvo/m/UDd7VKQuAAAJ
• https://istio.io/latest/news/security/istio-security-2023-004/
• https://linkerd.io/2023/10/12/linkerd-cve-2023-44487/
• https://lists.apache.org/thread/5py8h42mxfsn8l1wy6o41xwhsjlsd87q
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/10/msg00020.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/10/msg00023.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/10/msg00024.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/10/msg00045.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/10/msg00047.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/11/msg00001.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/11/msg00012.html
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2MBEPPC36UBVOZZNAXFHKLFGSLCMN5LI/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/3N4NJ7FR4X4FPZUGNTQAPSTVB2HB2Y4A/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/BFQD3KUEMFBHPAPBGLWQC34L4OWL5HAZ/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/CLB4TW7KALB3EEQWNWCN7OUIWWVWWCG2/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/E72T67UPDRXHIDLO3OROR25YAMN4GGW5/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/FNA62Q767CFAFHBCDKYNPBMZWB7TWYVU/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HT7T2R4MQKLIF4ODV4BDLPARWFPCJ5CZ/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/JIZSEFC3YKCGABA2BZW6ZJRMDZJMB7PJ/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/JMEXY22BFG5Q64HQCM5CK2Q7KDKVV4TY/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/KSEGD2IWKNUO3DWY4KQGUQM5BISRWHQE/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LKYHSZQFDNR7RSA7LHVLLIAQMVYCUGBG/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LNMZJCDHGLJJLXO4OXWJMTVQRNWOC7UL/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/VHUHTSXLXGXS7JYKBXTA3VINUPHTNGVU/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/VSRDIV77HNKUSM7SJC5BKE5JSHLHU2NK/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WE2I52RHNNU42PX6NZ2RBUHSFFJ2LVZX/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WLPRQ5TWUQQXYWBJM7ECYDAIL2YVKIUH/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/X6QXN4ORIVF6XBW4WWFE7VNPVC74S45Y/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/XFOIBB4YFICHDM7IBOP7PWXW3FX4HLL2/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZB43REMKRQR62NJEI7I5NQ4FSXNLBKRT/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZKQSIKIAT5TJ3WSLU3RDBQ35YX4GY4V3/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZLU6U2R2IC2K64NDPNMV55AUAO65MAF4/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/3N4NJ7FR4X4FPZUGNTQAPSTVB2HB2Y4A/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/BFQD3KUEMFBHPAPBGLWQC34L4OWL5HAZ/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/CLB4TW7KALB3EEQWNWCN7OUIWWVWWCG2/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/E72T67UPDRXHIDLO3OROR25YAMN4GGW5/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/FNA62Q767CFAFHBCDKYNPBMZWB7TWYVU/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/HT7T2R4MQKLIF4ODV4BDLPARWFPCJ5CZ/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/JIZSEFC3YKCGABA2BZW6ZJRMDZJMB7PJ/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/JMEXY22BFG5Q64HQCM5CK2Q7KDKVV4TY/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/KSEGD2IWKNUO3DWY4KQGUQM5BISRWHQE/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/LKYHSZQFDNR7RSA7LHVLLIAQMVYCUGBG/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/LNMZJCDHGLJJLXO4OXWJMTVQRNWOC7UL/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/VHUHTSXLXGXS7JYKBXTA3VINUPHTNGVU/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/VSRDIV77HNKUSM7SJC5BKE5JSHLHU2NK/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/WLPRQ5TWUQQXYWBJM7ECYDAIL2YVKIUH/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/X6QXN4ORIVF6XBW4WWFE7VNPVC74S45Y/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/XFOIBB4YFICHDM7IBOP7PWXW3FX4HLL2/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/ZB43REMKRQR62NJEI7I5NQ4FSXNLBKRT/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/ZKQSIKIAT5TJ3WSLU3RDBQ35YX4GY4V3/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/ZLU6U2R2IC2K64NDPNMV55AUAO65MAF4/
• https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/2023OctDec/0025.html
• https://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2023-October/S36Q5HBXR7CAIMPLLPRSSSYR4PCMWILK.html
• https://martinthomson.github.io/h2-stream-limits/draft-thomson-httpbis-h2-stream-limits.html
• https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2023/10/microsoft-response-to-distributed-denial-of-service-ddos-attacks-against-http/2/
• https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-44487
• https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000137106
• https://netty.io/news/2023/10/10/4-1-100-Final.html
• https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37830987
• https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37830998
• https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37831062
• https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37837043
• https://openssf.org/blog/2023/10/10/http-2-rapid-reset-vulnerability-highlights-need-for-rapid-response/
• https://seanmonstar.com/post/730794151136935936/hyper-http2-rapid-reset-unaffected
• https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202311-09
• https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231016-0001/
• https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2023-44487
• https://tomcat.apache.org/security-10.html#Fixed_in_Apache_Tomcat_10.1.14
• https://tomcat.apache.org/security-11.html#Fixed_in_Apache_Tomcat_11.0.0-M12
• https://tomcat.apache.org/security-8.html#Fixed_in_Apache_Tomcat_8.5.94
• https://tomcat.apache.org/security-9.html#Fixed_in_Apache_Tomcat_9.0.81
• https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-44487
• https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-http-2-rapid-reset-zero-day-attack-breaks-ddos-records/
• https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/10/10/http2-rapid-reset-vulnerability-cve-2023-44487
• https://www.darkreading.com/cloud/internet-wide-zero-day-bug-fuels-largest-ever-ddos-event
• https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5521
• https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5522
• https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5540
• https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5549
• https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5558
• https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5570
• https://www.haproxy.com/blog/haproxy-is-not-affected-by-the-http-2-rapid-reset-attack-cve-2023-44487
• https://www.netlify.com/blog/netlify-successfully-mitigates-cve-2023-44487/
• https://www.nginx.com/blog/http-2-rapid-reset-attack-impacting-f5-nginx-products/
• https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/10/6
• https://www.phoronix.com/news/HTTP2-Rapid-Reset-Attack
• https://www.theregister.com/2023/10/10/http2_rapid_reset_zeroday/
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/13/4
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/13/9
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/18/4
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/18/8
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/19/6
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/20/8

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

grpc/grpc-go (google.golang.org/grpc)

v1.56.3: Release 1.56.3

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Security

• server: prohibit more than MaxConcurrentStreams handlers from running at once (CVE-2023-44487)

  In addition to this change, applications should ensure they do not leave running tasks behind related to the RPC before returning from method handlers, or should enforce appropriate limits on any such work.

v1.56.2: Release 1.56.2

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• status: To fix a panic, status.FromError now returns an error with codes.Unknown when the error implements the GRPCStatus() method, and calling GRPCStatus() returns nil. (#​6374)

v1.56.1: Release 1.56.1

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• client: handle empty address lists correctly in addrConn.updateAddrs

v1.56.0: Release 1.56.0

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New Features

• client: support channel idleness using WithIdleTimeout dial option (#​6263)
  • This feature is currently disabled by default, but will be enabled with a 30 minute default in the future.
• client: when using pickfirst, keep channel state in TRANSIENT_FAILURE until it becomes READY (gRFC A62) (#​6306)
• xds: Add support for Custom LB Policies (gRFC A52) (#​6224)
• xds: support pick_first Custom LB policy (gRFC A62) (#​6314) (#​6317)
• client: add support for pickfirst address shuffling (gRFC A62) (#​6311)
• xds: Add support for String Matcher Header Matcher in RDS (#​6313)
• xds/outlierdetection: Add Channelz Logger to Outlier Detection LB (#​6145)
  • Special Thanks: @​s-matyukevich
• xds: enable RLS in xDS by default (#​6343)
• orca: add support for application_utilization field and missing range checks on several metrics setters
• balancer/weightedroundrobin: add new LB policy for balancing between backends based on their load reports (gRFC A58) (#​6241)
• authz: add conversion of json to RBAC Audit Logging config (#​6192)
• authz: add support for stdout logger (#​6230 and #​6298)
• authz: support customizable audit functionality for authorization policy (#​6192 #​6230 #​6298 #​6158 #​6304 and #​6225)

Bug Fixes

• orca: fix a race at startup of out-of-band metric subscriptions that would cause the report interval to request 0 (#​6245)
• xds/xdsresource: Fix Outlier Detection Config Handling and correctly set xDS Defaults (#​6361)
• xds/outlierdetection: Fix Outlier Detection Config Handling by setting defaults in ParseConfig() (#​6361)

API Changes

• orca: allow a ServerMetricsProvider to be passed to the ORCA service and ServerOption (#​6223)

v1.55.1: Release 1.55.1

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• status: To fix a panic, status.FromError now returns an error with codes.Unknown when the error implements the GRPCStatus() method, and calling GRPCStatus() returns nil. (#​6374)

v1.55.0: Release 1.55.0

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Behavior Changes

• xds: enable federation support by default (#​6151)
• status: status.Code and status.FromError handle wrapped errors (#​6031 and #​6150)
  • Special Thanks: @​psyhatter

New Features

• xds/xdsclient: support ignore_resource_deletion server feature as per gRFC A53 (#​6035)
• security/advancedtls: add min/max TLS version selection options (#​6007)
  • Special Thanks: @​joeljeske

Bug Fixes

• xds: stop routing RPCs to deleted clusters (#​6125)
• client: fix race between stream creation and GOAWAY receipt, which could lead to spurious UNAVAILABLE stream errors (#​6142)

Performance Improvements

• server: improve stream handler goroutine worker allocation when NumStreamWorkers is used (#​6004)
  • Special Thanks: @​SaveTheRbtz

v1.54.1: Release 1.54.1

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Bug Fixes

• credentials/alts: revert a change that causes a crash in the handshaker

v1.54.0: Release 1.54.0

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Behavior Changes

• xds: remove support for xDS v2 transport API (#​6013)

New Features

• server: expose SetSendCompressor API to set send compressor name (#​5744)
  • Special Thanks: @​jronak
• xdsclient: include Node proto only in the first discovery request message, to improve performance (#​6078)

Bug Fixes

• metadata: fix validation logic and properly validate metadata appended via AppendToOutgoingContext (#​6001)
  • Special Thanks: @​ktalg
• transport: do not close connections when we encounter I/O errors until after all data is consumed (#​6110)
• ringhash: ensure addresses are consistently hashed across updates (#​6066)
• xds/clusterimpl: fix a bug causing unnecessary closing and re-opening of LRS streams (#​6112)
• xds: NACK route configuration if sum of weights of weighted clusters exceeds uint32_max (#​6085)

Documentation

• resolver: update Resolver.Scheme() docstring to mention requirement of lowercase scheme names (#​6014)
• resolver: document expected error handling of UpdateState errors (#​6002)
  • Special Thanks: @​fho
• examples: add example for ORCA load reporting (#​6114)
• examples: add an example to illustrate authorization (authz) support (#​5920)
  • Special Thanks: @​KenxinKun

v1.53.0: Release 1.53.0

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API Changes

• balancer: support injection of per-call metadata from LB policies (#​5853)
• resolver: remove deprecated field resolver.Target.Endpoint and replace with resolver.Target.Endpoint() (#​5852)
  • Special Thanks: @​kylejb

New Features

• xds/ringhash: introduce GRPC_RING_HASH_CAP environment variable to override the maximum ring size. (#​5884)
• rls: propagate headers received in RLS response to backends (#​5883)

Bug Fixes

• transport: drain client transport when streamID approaches MaxStreamID (#​5889)
• server: after GracefulStop, ensure connections are closed when final RPC completes (#​5968)
• server: fix a few issues where grpc server uses RST_STREAM for non-HTTP/2 errors (#​5893)
• xdsclient: fix race which can happen when multiple load reporting calls are made at the same time. (#​5927)
• rls: fix a data race involving the LRU cache (#​5925)
• xds: fix panic involving double close of channel in xDS transport (#​5959)
• gcp/observability: update method name validation (#​5951)

Documentation

• credentials/oauth: mark NewOauthAccess as deprecated (#​5882)
  • Special Thanks: @​buzzsurfr

v1.52.3: Release 1.52.3

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Bug Fixes

• Fix user-agent version

v1.52.1: Release 1.52.1

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Bug Fixes

• grpclb: rename grpclbstate package back to state (#​5963)

v1.52.0: Release 1.52.0

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New Features

• xdsclient: log node ID with verbosity INFO (#​5860)
• ringhash: impose cap on max_ring_size to reduce possibility of OOMs (#​5801)

Behavior Changes

• client: return an error from Dial if an empty target is passed and no custom dialer is present; the ClientConn would otherwise be unable to connect and perform RPCs (#​5732)
  • Special Thanks: @​huangchong94

Bug Fixes

• transport (net/http server handler): respond to bad HTTP requests with status 400 (Bad Request) instead of 500 (Internal Server Error). (#​5804)
  • Special Thanks: @​sjbarag
• transport: Fixed closing a closed channel panic in handlePing (#​5854)
• server: fix ChainUnaryInterceptor and ChainStreamInterceptor to allow retrying handlers (#​5666)
  • Special Thanks: @​yiminc
• transport: ensure value of :authority header matches server name used in TLS handshake when the latter is overridden by the name resolver (#​5748)
  • Special Thanks: @​holdno

Documentation

• examples: add an example to illustrate the usage of stats handler (#​5657)
  • Special Thanks: @​Yash-Handa
• examples: add new example to show updating metadata in interceptors (#​5788)
  • Special Thanks: @​richzw

v1.51.0: Release 1.51.0

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Behavior Changes

• xds: NACK EDS resources with duplicate addresses in accordance with a recent spec change (#​5715)
  • Special Thanks: @​erni27
• grpc: restrict status codes that can be generated by the control plane (gRFC A54) (#​5653)

New Features

• client: set grpc-accept-encoding header with all registered compressors (#​5541)
  • Special Thanks: @​jronak
• xds/weightedtarget: return a more meaningful error when all child policies are in TRANSIENT_FAILURE (#​5711)
• gcp/observability: add "started rpcs" metric (#​5768)
• xds: de-experimentalize the google-c2p-resolver (#​5707)
• balancer: add experimental Producer types and methods (#​5669)
• orca: provide a way for LB policies to receive OOB load reports (#​5669)

Bug Fixes

• go.mod: upgrade x/text dependency to address CVE 2022-32149 (#​5769)
• client: fix race that could lead to an incorrect connection state if it was closed immediately after the server's HTTP/2 preface was received (#​5714)
  • Special Thanks: @​fuweid
• xds: ensure sum of the weights of all EDS localities at the same priority level does not exceed uint32 max (#​5703)
  • Special Thanks: @​erni27
• client: fix binary logging bug which logs a server header on a trailers-only response (#​5763)
• balancer/priority: fix a bug where unreleased references to removed child policies (and associated state) was causing a memory leak (#​5682)
• xds/google-c2p: validate URI schema for no authorities (#​5756)

v1.50.1: Release 1.50.1

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New Features

• gcp/observability: support new configuration defined in public preview user guide

v1.50.0: Release 1.50.0

Compare Source

Behavior Changes

• client: use proper "@​" semantics for connecting to abstract unix sockets. (#​5678)

  • This is technically a bug fix; the result is that the address was including a trailing NULL byte, which it should not have. This may break users creating the socket in Go by prefixing a NULL instead of an "@​", though, so calling it out as a behavior change.
  • Special Thanks: @​jachor

New Features

• metadata: add experimental ValueFromIncomingContext to more efficiently retrieve a single value (#​5596)
  • Special Thanks: @​horpto
• stats: provide peer information in HandleConn context (#​5589)
  • Special Thanks: @​feihu-stripe
• xds: add support for Outlier Detection, enabled by default (#​5435, #​5673)

Bug Fixes

• client: fix deadlock in transport caused by GOAWAY racing with stream creation (#​5652)
  • This should only occur with an HTTP/2 server that does not follow best practices of an advisory GOAWAY (not a grpc-go server).
• xds/xdsclient: fix a bug which was causing routes with cluster_specifier_plugin set to be NACKed when GRPC_EXPERIMENTAL_XDS_RLS_LB was off (#​5670)
• xds/xdsclient: NACK cluster resource if config_source_specifier in lrs_server is not self (#​5613)
• xds/ringhash: fix a bug which sometimes prevents the LB policy from retrying connection attempts (#​5601)
• xds/ringhash: do nothing when asked to exit IDLE instead of falling back on the default channel behavior of connecting to all addresses (#​5614)
• xds/rls: fix a bug which was causing the channel to be stuck in IDLE ([#​5656](https://togithub.com/grpc/grpc-go/issu

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