1. Postmodernism Derrida and Différance: A Critique
(DR BRENDAN SWEETMAN Rockhurst University)
(Abstract: This article provides through a discussion of the work of Jacques Derrida an examination of the philosophical basis of postmodernism. The first section identifies and explains the positive claims of postmodernism including the key claim that all identities presences etc. depend for their existence on something which is absent and different from themselves. The second section further illustrates the positive claims through an analysis of Derrida's "deconstructionist" reading of Plato. The final section raises a number of critical problems for postmodernism: that it confuses aesthetics with metaphysics; that it mistakes assertion for argument in philosophy; that it is guilty of relativism; and that it is self-contradictory.)
2. An influential new movement has emerged in philosophy in the past thirty years which has come to be known as Postmodernism. Some believe that the term "Postmodernism" is ambiguous and hard to define and it is true that it is often used in a number of ways which bear little relation to the postmodernist movement in philosophy. For the postmodernist approach to knowledge is also dominant in a variety of disciplines especially literature, history, theology, feminism, and multiculturalism (though I do not wish to suggest that everything in these disciplines is defined by postmodernism). Before I begin my discussion and critique of postmodernism I wish to present my own understanding of the term, a working definition which captures its philosophical import. I define postmodernism as a movement whose central theme is the critique of objective rationality and identity and a working out of the implications of this critique for central questions in philosophy, literature, and culture. My definition is motivated by my belief that postmodernism is mainly a philosophical theory about the nature of knowledge and the ability of the human mind to know reality. In short, postmodernism mainly revolves around a set of metaphysical claims about the natures of language and meaning. Jean-François Lyotard describes the postmodern condition as characterized by an "incredulity toward metanarratives"1 and this is as good a definition as we get from within the ranks of postmodernism as long as it is understood to mean an incredulity toward all metanarratives. (Of course, Lyotard will officially deny that postmodernism is a metaphysical thesis.) In this article I will attempt to develop a set of critical reflections on the philosophical basis of postmodernism and postmodernist thinking generally.
I believe that a careful examination of the philosophical basis of postmodernism is the most important question a serious thinker can raise about postmodernism; if this question is ignored or treated superficially, then the application of postmodernist ideas to philosophical issues and texts, to questions and issues in other disciplines, and to social, political, and educational agendas will be greatly undermined. (All college courses which are dealing with postmodernism should discuss this question.) My article will be an attempt to develop a set of critical reflections on the philosophical foundations of postmodernism, focusing in particular on the work of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Derrida's philosophy is often described as "deconstruction" and I consider his philosophy an ideal representative of postmodernist philosophy in general. I will therefore use the terms "deconstruction" and "postmodernism" synonymously for the purposes of this article.
I will illustrate that Derrida's claim that texts--especially philosophical texts--need to be deconstructed according to the method he proposes is easily shown to be fraught with serious difficulties. These difficulties will be illustrated partly by means of an analysis of Derrida's deconstructionist reading of Plato. I will then present and develop five criticisms of postmodernism: first, that it confuses aesthetics with metaphysics; second, that it mistakes assertion for argument in philosophy; third, that it is guilty of relativism; fourth, that it is self-contradictory; and fifth, that it is guilty of intellectual arrogance because its proponents seem to insist that its critique of traditional philosophy can still succeed even though its positive claims have not been established.
3. I. THE POSITIVE CLAIMS OF POSTMODERNISM
4. The main thesis of Derrida's position, as I understand it, can be stated in the following way. Western philosophers have been mistaken in their belief that being is presence, and the key to understanding presence is something along the lines of substance, sameness, identity, essence, clear and distinct ideas, etc. For according to Derrida, all identities, presences, predications, etc. depend for their existence on something outside themselves, something which is absent and different from themselves. Or again: all identities involve their differences and relations; these differences and relations are aspects or features outside of the object--different from it, yet related to it--yet they are never fully present. Or again: reality itself is a kind of "free play" of différance (a new term coined by Derrida); no identities really exist (in the traditional sense) at this level; identities are simply constructs of the mind and essentially of language.2
5. In order to elaborate these points further, it is helpful to distinguish in Derrida's work between two realms, the realm of reality (or of différance) and the realm of identities (or of predication and presence). Derrida believes that there are no identities, no self-contained presences, no fixed, settled meanings at the level of différance. Further, the realm of différance is non-cognitive; i.e., it cannot be fully captured or described by means of any set of concepts or logical system which makes objects "present" to the mind. Derrida makes this point well in Margins of Philosophy: "It is the domination of beings that différance everywhere comes to solicit . . . to shake . . . it is the determination of being as presence that is interrogated by the thought of différance. Différance is not. It is not a present being. It governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and nowhere exercises any authority . . . There is no essence of différance."3
6. Yet according to Derrida, although the realm of différance is non-cognitive, it never occurs without cognitive knowledge (the realm of presence). This is because our contact with it in human experience, our involvement with it through language, always takes place by means of concepts or predication.4 And this is simply to say that all knowledge is contextual in the sense that the relations of an object in any system of objects or meanings are always changing (differing) and hence meaning (i.e., identity) is continually being postponed (i.e., deferred). The realm of différance is appropriately conveyed or expressed in philosophical works by means of metaphor because it is the nature of metaphor to signify without signifying, and this illustrates nicely Derrida's point that an identity is what it is not and is not what it is. Derrida skillfully employs many different and often striking metaphors to make this same point repeatedly: margins, trace, flow, archi-writing, tain of the mirror, alterity, supplement, etc. We must now consider what all of this means for the task of evaluating particular worldviews and for the practice of textual analysis.
To relate all of this to the issue of worldviews (especially the worldview of traditional philosophy) and to express these points in more down to earth language, what the postmodernists are saying is that no particular worldview can claim to have the truth. All worldviews can be called into question (including the worldview of deconstruction itself, a point to which I will return later). The reason all worldviews can be called into question is because the meanings which are constitutive of a worldview cannot be known to be true objectively. This is because there is no objective knowledge. All knowledge is contextual and is influenced by culture, tradition, language, prejudices, background beliefs, etc., and is therefore in some very important sense relative to these phenomena. The influence of these phenomena on truth or meaning is not trivial or benign; it is such that it inevitably undermines all claims to objectivity that one might be tempted to make from the point of view of one's worldview. So the job of deconstruction is to challenge and call into question all claims to objective knowledge by illustrating alternative meanings and "truths" in any particular worldview which are really there, whether the adherents of the worldview recognize them or not. And these alternative meanings will undermine the worldview in question because they will be different from and often opposed to the original "objective" meanings claimed for that worldview. Deconstruction therefore quickly lends itself to a political agenda in the sense that worldviews are almost by definition oppressive, since they privilege some (literal) meanings and marginalize others; deconstruction thus becomes the method for rejecting and debunking worldviews. Conversely, it also allows those views and readings and alternative meanings which have usually belonged to minority groups and which have often been marginalized, to reclaim their rightful place in the marketplace of ideas. Note, however, that they do not reclaim their place because they are true (for that would be to acknowledge objective knowledge) but because, since there is no objective knowledge, they have just as much claim to legitimacy as any other view. Of course, they too will have to be deconstructed in the end. (This is a point many supporters of the deconstructionist approach conveniently overlook; they frequently talk as if the marginal views are somehow true and the mainstream views somehow false.)
In the language of textual analysis, Derrida is proposing that there are no fixed meanings present in the text, despite any appearance to the contrary. Rather, the apparent identities (i.e., literal meanings) present in a text also depend for their existence on something outside themselves, something which is absent and different from themselves (i.e., they depend on the operation of différance). As a result, the meanings in a text constantly shift both in relation to the subject who works with the text and in relation to the cultural and social world in which the text is immersed. In this way, the literal readings of texts, along with the intentions of the author, are called into question by Derrida's view of identity. His position privileges writing as opposed to speech and thought, for writing has a certain independence from author and reader which gives a priority to ambiguity, non-literality, and which frustrates the intentions of the author. As the French writer Roland Barthes suggests, our concern must be to look at how texts mean, not at what they mean.5 Derrida's thesis, however, is not restricted to books or art works, for texts may consist of any set of ever-changing meanings. Hence, the world and almost any object or combination of objects in it may be regarded as a "text." Postmodernist philosophy is therefore very radical indeed. Walt Anderson puts this very aptly when he says that "Deconstruction goes well beyond [saying] right-you-are-if-you-think-you-are; its message is closer to wrong you are whatever you think, unless you think you may be wrong in which case you may be right--but you don't really mean what you think you do anyway."6
7. Now before we proceed to elaborate further just what Derrida's view of identity entails, it is worth noting that postmodernist thinkers--in whose number I would include Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault in addition to Lyotard and Derrida--have sometimes tried to avoid the change that they are offering a philosophical theory about language and reality and have tried to insist that they are simply proposing a new method for reading texts. In short, they would deny that they are making substantive or metaphysical claims. In fact, some philosophers believe that Derrida should not be read as making any substantive claims at all. This is a view advocated by Richard Rorty.7
8. Rorty identifies two different ways in which Derrida has been read by his American admirers. On one side are those who read him as a "transcendental" philosopher, i.e., as a philosopher who gives us "rigorous arguments for surprising philosophical conclusions."8 A transcendental philosopher, therefore, is a philosopher who is making substantive claims which are either true or false and for which he offers arguments (and which, if true, could possibly motivate social and political agendas). This is obviously the way in which I am reading Derrida. On the other side, according to Rorty, are those who see him as "having invented a new, splendidly ironic way of writing about the philosophical tradition," which "emphasizes the playful distancing, oblique way in which Derrida handles traditional philosophical figures and topics"9 and which is not concerned with the substance of his views. That is to say, Derrida can either be read in the first way as a philosopher who is making substantive claims about language and reality, or in the second way as a kind of dilettante who experiments with texts. Rorty prefers to read Derrida in the second way. As a philosopher, however, I see little value in reading Derrida in the second way. Surely the most responsible option is to read him in the first way, especially since this is how he is most often read? Indeed, this is the way in which he must be read if his work is to provide philosophical support for social and political conclusions. In short, I believe that Derrida has to be taken at his word and read as a transcendental philosopher. But it is important to note that if a thinker in any discipline opts to read Derrida in the second way, then he or she cannot use his ideas to advocate educational, political, or social agendas; if, however, one does wish to employ his ideas in support of various agendas, then one is obliged to provide a philosophical justification for these ideas. For example, if an English professor wishes to deconstruct the texts of Jane Austen and read into them an analysis of the oppression of women in the nineteenth century, then that professor would have to begin this task with a philosophical justification of deconstruction. Let me move on to elaborate and illustrate the points I have been making by turning to Derrida's reading of Plato.
9. II. DERRIDA'S READING OF PLATO
10. Now reading Derrida as a transcendental philosopher, he holds that all of the leading figures of Western "logocentricism"10 have been seduced by the notion of being as presence. However, these philosophers fail to appreciate the reality of différance, which is really there and which is operative
