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curve25519.rs
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curve25519.rs
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//
// Copyright 2020-2021 Signal Messenger, LLC.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
//
use curve25519_dalek::constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE;
use curve25519_dalek::edwards::EdwardsPoint;
use curve25519_dalek::montgomery::MontgomeryPoint;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha512};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
const AGREEMENT_LENGTH: usize = 32;
pub const PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32;
pub const PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32;
pub const SIGNATURE_LENGTH: usize = 64;
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct PrivateKey {
secret: StaticSecret,
}
impl PrivateKey {
pub fn new<R>(csprng: &mut R) -> Self
where
R: CryptoRng + Rng,
{
// This is essentially StaticSecret::random_from_rng only with clamping
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
csprng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
bytes = scalar::clamp_integer(bytes);
let secret = StaticSecret::from(bytes);
PrivateKey { secret }
}
pub fn calculate_agreement(
&self,
their_public_key: &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH],
) -> [u8; AGREEMENT_LENGTH] {
*self
.secret
.diffie_hellman(&PublicKey::from(*their_public_key))
.as_bytes()
}
/// Calculates an XEdDSA signature using the X25519 private key directly.
///
/// Refer to <https://signal.org/docs/specifications/xeddsa/#curve25519> for more details.
///
/// Note that this implementation varies slightly from that paper in that the sign bit is not
/// fixed to 0, but rather passed back in the most significant bit of the signature which would
/// otherwise always be 0. This is for compatibility with the implementation found in
/// libsignal-protocol-java.
pub fn calculate_signature<R>(
&self,
csprng: &mut R,
message: &[&[u8]],
) -> [u8; SIGNATURE_LENGTH]
where
R: CryptoRng + Rng,
{
let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 64];
csprng.fill_bytes(&mut random_bytes);
let key_data = self.secret.to_bytes();
let a = Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(key_data);
let ed_public_key_point = &a * ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE;
let ed_public_key = ed_public_key_point.compress();
let sign_bit = ed_public_key.as_bytes()[31] & 0b1000_0000_u8;
let mut hash1 = Sha512::new();
let hash_prefix = [
0xFEu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8,
0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8,
0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8, 0xFFu8,
];
// Explicitly pass a slice to avoid generating multiple versions of update().
hash1.update(&hash_prefix[..]);
hash1.update(&key_data[..]);
for message_piece in message {
hash1.update(message_piece);
}
hash1.update(&random_bytes[..]);
let r = Scalar::from_hash(hash1);
let cap_r = (&r * ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE).compress();
let mut hash = Sha512::new();
hash.update(cap_r.as_bytes());
hash.update(ed_public_key.as_bytes());
for message_piece in message {
hash.update(message_piece);
}
let h = Scalar::from_hash(hash);
let s = (h * a) + r;
let mut result = [0u8; SIGNATURE_LENGTH];
result[..32].copy_from_slice(cap_r.as_bytes());
result[32..].copy_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
result[SIGNATURE_LENGTH - 1] &= 0b0111_1111_u8;
result[SIGNATURE_LENGTH - 1] |= sign_bit;
result
}
pub fn verify_signature(
their_public_key: &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH],
message: &[&[u8]],
signature: &[u8; SIGNATURE_LENGTH],
) -> bool {
let mont_point = MontgomeryPoint(*their_public_key);
let ed_pub_key_point =
match mont_point.to_edwards((signature[SIGNATURE_LENGTH - 1] & 0b1000_0000_u8) >> 7) {
Some(x) => x,
None => return false,
};
let cap_a = ed_pub_key_point.compress();
let mut cap_r = [0u8; 32];
cap_r.copy_from_slice(&signature[..32]);
let mut s = [0u8; 32];
s.copy_from_slice(&signature[32..]);
s[31] &= 0b0111_1111_u8;
if (s[31] & 0b1110_0000_u8) != 0 {
return false;
}
let minus_cap_a = -ed_pub_key_point;
let mut hash = Sha512::new();
// Explicitly pass a slice to avoid generating multiple versions of update().
hash.update(&cap_r[..]);
hash.update(cap_a.as_bytes());
for message_piece in message {
hash.update(message_piece);
}
let h = Scalar::from_hash(hash);
let cap_r_check_point = EdwardsPoint::vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint(
&h,
&minus_cap_a,
&Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(s),
);
let cap_r_check = cap_r_check_point.compress();
bool::from(cap_r_check.as_bytes().ct_eq(&cap_r))
}
pub fn derive_public_key_bytes(&self) -> [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH] {
*PublicKey::from(&self.secret).as_bytes()
}
pub fn private_key_bytes(&self) -> [u8; PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH] {
self.secret.to_bytes()
}
}
impl From<[u8; PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH]> for PrivateKey {
fn from(private_key: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
let secret = StaticSecret::from(scalar::clamp_integer(private_key));
PrivateKey { secret }
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
use rand::RngCore;
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_agreement() {
let alice_public: [u8; 32] = [
0x1b, 0xb7, 0x59, 0x66, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x3a, 0x36, 0x91, 0xdf, 0xff, 0x94, 0x2b, 0xb2,
0xa4, 0x66, 0xa1, 0xc0, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x78, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x4d, 0x6d, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xbf,
0xa2, 0xe4, 0xee, 0x28,
];
let alice_private: [u8; 32] = [
0xc8, 0x06, 0x43, 0x9d, 0xc9, 0xd2, 0xc4, 0x76, 0xff, 0xed, 0x8f, 0x25, 0x80, 0xc0,
0x88, 0x8d, 0x58, 0xab, 0x40, 0x6b, 0xf7, 0xae, 0x36, 0x98, 0x87, 0x90, 0x21, 0xb9,
0x6b, 0xb4, 0xbf, 0x59,
];
let bob_public: [u8; 32] = [
0x65, 0x36, 0x14, 0x99, 0x3d, 0x2b, 0x15, 0xee, 0x9e, 0x5f, 0xd3, 0xd8, 0x6c, 0xe7,
0x19, 0xef, 0x4e, 0xc1, 0xda, 0xae, 0x18, 0x86, 0xa8, 0x7b, 0x3f, 0x5f, 0xa9, 0x56,
0x5a, 0x27, 0xa2, 0x2f,
];
let bob_private: [u8; 32] = [
0xb0, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xc3, 0x3a, 0x1c, 0x44, 0xf2, 0x25, 0xb6, 0x62, 0xd2, 0xbf, 0x48,
0x59, 0xb8, 0x13, 0x54, 0x11, 0xfa, 0x7b, 0x03, 0x86, 0xd4, 0x5f, 0xb7, 0x5d, 0xc5,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0x44, 0x66,
];
let shared: [u8; 32] = [
0x32, 0x5f, 0x23, 0x93, 0x28, 0x94, 0x1c, 0xed, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x3b, 0x86, 0xba, 0x41,
0x01, 0x74, 0x48, 0xe9, 0x9b, 0x64, 0x9a, 0x9c, 0x38, 0x06, 0xc1, 0xdd, 0x7c, 0xa4,
0xc4, 0x77, 0xe6, 0x29,
];
let alice_key = PrivateKey::from(alice_private);
let bob_key = PrivateKey::from(bob_private);
assert_eq!(alice_public, alice_key.derive_public_key_bytes());
assert_eq!(bob_public, bob_key.derive_public_key_bytes());
let alice_computed_secret = alice_key.calculate_agreement(&bob_public);
let bob_computed_secret = bob_key.calculate_agreement(&alice_public);
assert_eq!(shared, alice_computed_secret);
assert_eq!(shared, bob_computed_secret);
}
#[test]
fn test_random_agreements() {
let mut csprng = OsRng;
for _ in 0..50 {
let alice_key = PrivateKey::new(&mut csprng);
let bob_key = PrivateKey::new(&mut csprng);
let alice_computed_secret =
alice_key.calculate_agreement(&bob_key.derive_public_key_bytes());
let bob_computed_secret =
bob_key.calculate_agreement(&alice_key.derive_public_key_bytes());
assert_eq!(alice_computed_secret, bob_computed_secret);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_signature() {
let alice_identity_private: [u8; PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH] = [
0xc0, 0x97, 0x24, 0x84, 0x12, 0xe5, 0x8b, 0xf0, 0x5d, 0xf4, 0x87, 0x96, 0x82, 0x05,
0x13, 0x27, 0x94, 0x17, 0x8e, 0x36, 0x76, 0x37, 0xf5, 0x81, 0x8f, 0x81, 0xe0, 0xe6,
0xce, 0x73, 0xe8, 0x65,
];
let alice_identity_public: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH] = [
0xab, 0x7e, 0x71, 0x7d, 0x4a, 0x16, 0x3b, 0x7d, 0x9a, 0x1d, 0x80, 0x71, 0xdf, 0xe9,
0xdc, 0xf8, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0x1c, 0xea, 0x33, 0x39, 0xb6, 0x35, 0x6b, 0xe8, 0x4d, 0x88,
0x7e, 0x32, 0x2c, 0x64,
];
let alice_ephemeral_public: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH + 1] = [
0x05, 0xed, 0xce, 0x9d, 0x9c, 0x41, 0x5c, 0xa7, 0x8c, 0xb7, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x72, 0xc2,
0xc4, 0xa5, 0x54, 0xd3, 0xeb, 0x29, 0x48, 0x5a, 0x0e, 0x1d, 0x50, 0x31, 0x18, 0xd1,
0xa8, 0x2d, 0x99, 0xfb, 0x4a,
];
let alice_signature: [u8; SIGNATURE_LENGTH] = [
0x5d, 0xe8, 0x8c, 0xa9, 0xa8, 0x9b, 0x4a, 0x11, 0x5d, 0xa7, 0x91, 0x09, 0xc6, 0x7c,
0x9c, 0x74, 0x64, 0xa3, 0xe4, 0x18, 0x02, 0x74, 0xf1, 0xcb, 0x8c, 0x63, 0xc2, 0x98,
0x4e, 0x28, 0x6d, 0xfb, 0xed, 0xe8, 0x2d, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0xcd, 0x9f, 0xae, 0x0b, 0xfb,
0xb8, 0x21, 0x56, 0x9b, 0x3d, 0x90, 0x01, 0xbd, 0x81, 0x30, 0xcd, 0x11, 0xd4, 0x86,
0xce, 0xf0, 0x47, 0xbd, 0x60, 0xb8, 0x6e, 0x88,
];
let alice_identity_key = PrivateKey::from(alice_identity_private);
assert_eq!(
alice_identity_public,
alice_identity_key.derive_public_key_bytes()
);
assert!(
PrivateKey::verify_signature(
&alice_identity_public,
&[&alice_ephemeral_public],
&alice_signature,
),
"signature check failed"
);
for i in 0..alice_signature.len() {
let mut alice_signature_copy: [u8; SIGNATURE_LENGTH] = [0; SIGNATURE_LENGTH];
alice_signature_copy.copy_from_slice(&alice_signature);
alice_signature_copy[i] ^= 0x01u8;
assert!(
!PrivateKey::verify_signature(
&alice_identity_public,
&[&alice_ephemeral_public],
&alice_signature_copy,
),
"signature check passed when it should not have"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_random_signatures() {
let mut csprng = OsRng;
for _ in 0..50 {
let mut message = [0u8; 64];
csprng.fill_bytes(&mut message);
let key = PrivateKey::new(&mut csprng);
let signature = key.calculate_signature(&mut csprng, &[&message]);
assert!(
PrivateKey::verify_signature(
&key.derive_public_key_bytes(),
&[&message],
&signature,
),
"signature check failed"
);
}
}
}