0x46 - Improper validation of exitContribution

[sherlock-admin2]

0x46

Medium

Improper validation of exitContribution

Summary

The missing check in BancorExchangeProvider.sol: setExitContribution() will cause transaction reversion in swap functions for users as the function allows exitContribution to reach its maximum value (MAX_WEIGHT), which creates divisibility issues in subsequent calculations.

Setting exitContribution to MAX_WEIGHT causes division by zero in calculations for determining scaledAmountIn and scaledAmountOut, leading to reverts in swap functions like _getScaledAmountIn and _getScaledAmountOut.

Root Cause

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-10-mento-update/blob/main/mento-core/contracts/goodDollar/BancorExchangeProvider.sol#L265
fails to account for the scenario when exitContribution equals MAX_WEIGHT, which creates a division by zero issue in calculations, specifically:
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-10-mento-update/blob/main/mento-core/contracts/goodDollar/BancorExchangeProvider.sol#L311
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-10-mento-update/blob/main/mento-core/contracts/goodDollar/BancorExchangeProvider.sol#L345

Internal pre-conditions

Admin must call setExitContribution() and set exitContribution to exactly MAX_WEIGHT.

External pre-conditions

No response

Attack Path

No response

Impact

The protocol cannot process any transactions in affected pools as every swapIn or swapOut operation will revert. This causes a full denial of service on the impacted pools, affecting users attempting to transact.

PoC

No response

Mitigation

In BancorExchangeProvider.sol: setExitContribution(), update the requirement to prevent exitContribution from equaling MAX_WEIGHT:

require(exitContribution < MAX_WEIGHT, "Exit contribution is too high");