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obront - If a token's oracle goes down or price falls to zero, liquidations will be frozen #161
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obront
medium
If a token's oracle goes down or price falls to zero, liquidations will be frozen
Summary
In some extreme cases, oracles can be taken offline or token prices can fall to zero. In these cases, liquidations will be frozen (all calls will revert) for any debt holders holding this token, even though they may be some of the most important times to allow liquidations to retain the solvency of the protocol.
Vulnerability Detail
Chainlink has taken oracles offline in extreme cases. For example, during the UST collapse, Chainlink paused the UST/ETH price oracle, to ensure that it wasn't providing inaccurate data to protocols.
In such a situation (or one in which the token's value falls to zero), all liquidations for users holding the frozen asset would revert. This is because any call to
liquidate()
callsisLiquidatable()
, which callsgetPositionRisk()
, which calls the oracle to get the values of all the position's tokens (underlying, debt, and collateral).Depending on the specifics, one of the following checks would cause the revert:
registry.latestRoundData
would failif (updatedAt < block.timestamp - maxDelayTime) revert PRICE_OUTDATED(_token);
if (px == 0) revert PRICE_FAILED(token);
If the oracle price lookup reverts, liquidations will be frozen, and the user will be immune to liquidations. Although there are ways this could be manually fixed with fake oracles, by definition this happening would represent a cataclysmic time where liquidations need to be happening promptly to avoid the protocol falling into insolvency.
Impact
Liquidations may not be possible at a time when the protocol needs them most. As a result, the value of user's asset may fall below their debts, turning off any liquidation incentive and pushing the protocol into insolvency.
Code Snippet
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-blueberry/blob/main/contracts/BlueBerryBank.sol#L511-L517
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-blueberry/blob/main/contracts/BlueBerryBank.sol#L497-L505
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-blueberry/blob/main/contracts/BlueBerryBank.sol#L477-L488
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-blueberry/blob/main/contracts/oracle/CoreOracle.sol#L182-L189
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-blueberry/blob/main/contracts/oracle/CoreOracle.sol#L95-L99
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-blueberry/blob/main/contracts/oracle/ChainlinkAdapterOracle.sol#L66-L84
Tool used
Manual Review
Recommendation
Ensure there is a safeguard in place to protect against this possibility.
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