diff --git a/docs/alternative-networks.md b/docs/alternative-networks.md index 0cf9a769a5..d15a984f95 100644 --- a/docs/alternative-networks.md +++ b/docs/alternative-networks.md @@ -4,10 +4,15 @@ icon: material/vector-polygon description: These tools allow you to access networks other than the World Wide Web. cover: alternative-networks.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } +- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue } +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } ## Anonymizing Networks -When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](advanced/tor-overview.md) is our top choice. It is by far the most utilized, robustly studied, and actively developed anonymous network. Using other networks could be more likely to endanger your anonymity, unless you know what you're doing. +When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](advanced/tor-overview.md) is our top choice. It is by far the most utilized, robustly studied, and actively developed anonymous network. Using other networks could be more likely to endanger your [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple }, unless you know what you're doing. ### Tor @@ -15,7 +20,7 @@ When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](adva ![Tor logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/tor.svg){ align=right } -The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool. +The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } circumvention tool. [:octicons-home-16:](https://torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } diff --git a/docs/android/distributions.md b/docs/android/distributions.md index 421cd8f3c5..387833636a 100644 --- a/docs/android/distributions.md +++ b/docs/android/distributions.md @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ schema: "@type": WebPage url: "./" --- +[:material-target-account:](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } [:material-bug-outline:](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } + A **custom Android-based operating system** (often known as a **custom ROM**) is a popular way to achieve higher levels of privacy and security on your device. This is in contrast to the "stock" version of Android which comes with your phone from the factory, and is often deeply integrated with Google Play Services. We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems. diff --git a/docs/android/general-apps.md b/docs/android/general-apps.md index 5858adac3d..7444196e0c 100644 --- a/docs/android/general-apps.md +++ b/docs/android/general-apps.md @@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure ### Secure PDF Viewer +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } +
![Secure PDF Viewer logo](../assets/img/android/secure_pdf_viewer.svg#only-light){ align=right } diff --git a/docs/browser-extensions.md b/docs/browser-extensions.md index a9a87dbeeb..5cda2b5d9a 100644 --- a/docs/browser-extensions.md +++ b/docs/browser-extensions.md @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ icon: material/puzzle-outline description: These browser extensions can enhance your browsing experience and protect your privacy. cover: browser-extensions.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum to decrease your attack surface. They have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation. @@ -56,7 +59,7 @@ uBlock Origin also has a "Lite" version of their extension, which offers a very ![uBlock Origin Lite logo](assets/img/browsers/ublock_origin_lite.svg){ align=right } -**uBlock Origin Lite** is a Manifest V3 compatible content blocker. Compared to the original *uBlock Origin*, this extension does not require broad "read/modify data" permissions to function. +**uBlock Origin Lite** is a Manifest V3 compatible content blocker. Compared to the original *uBlock Origin*, this extension does not require broad "read/modify data" permissions to function, which lowers the risk of [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } on your browser if a malicious rule is added to a filter list. [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } diff --git a/docs/calendar.md b/docs/calendar.md index 19508eb90c..62e414b917 100644 --- a/docs/calendar.md +++ b/docs/calendar.md @@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ icon: material/calendar description: Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement encryption at rest. cover: calendar.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + **Calendars** contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them. ## Tuta diff --git a/docs/cloud.md b/docs/cloud.md index ee359710b9..91a4d56882 100644 --- a/docs/cloud.md +++ b/docs/cloud.md @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ icon: material/file-cloud description: Many cloud storage providers require your trust that they will not look at your files. These are private alternatives! cover: cloud.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + Many **cloud storage providers** require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by implementing secure E2EE. If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into using encryption software like [Cryptomator](encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud) with another cloud provider. Using Cryptomator in conjunction with **any** cloud provider (including these) may be a good idea to reduce the risk of encryption flaws in a provider's native clients. @@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ They have also received the Digital Trust Label, a certification from the [Swiss ![Peergos logo](assets/img/cloud/peergos.svg){ align=right } -**Peergos** is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, and view their photos, videos, documents, etc. Peergos secures your files with quantum-resistant end-to-end encryption and ensures all data about your files remains private. It is built on top of [IPFS (InterPlanetary File System)](https://ipfs.tech). +**Peergos** is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, and view their photos, videos, documents, etc. Peergos secures your files with quantum-resistant end-to-end encryption and ensures all data about your files remains private. It is built on top of [IPFS (InterPlanetary File System)](https://ipfs.tech), a peer-to-peer architecture that protects against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://peergos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://peergos.net/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } diff --git a/docs/cryptocurrency.md b/docs/cryptocurrency.md index edd1d3c2db..7ac7523b92 100644 --- a/docs/cryptocurrency.md +++ b/docs/cryptocurrency.md @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ title: Cryptocurrency icon: material/bank-circle cover: cryptocurrency.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue } +- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } Making payments online is one of the biggest challenges to privacy. These cryptocurrencies provide transaction privacy by default (something which is **not** guaranteed by the majority of cryptocurrencies), provided you have a strong understanding of how to make private payments effectively. We strongly encourage you first read our payments overview article before making any purchases: @@ -22,7 +26,7 @@ Many if not most cryptocurrency projects are scams. Make transactions carefully ![Monero logo](assets/img/cryptocurrency/monero.svg){ align=right } -**Monero** uses a blockchain with privacy-enhancing technologies that obfuscate transactions to achieve anonymity. Every Monero transaction hides the transaction amount, sending and receiving addresses, and source of funds without any hoops to jump through, making it an ideal choice for cryptocurrency novices. +**Monero** uses a blockchain with privacy-enhancing technologies that obfuscate transactions to achieve [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple }. Every Monero transaction hides the transaction amount, sending and receiving addresses, and source of funds without any hoops to jump through, making it an ideal choice for cryptocurrency novices. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getmonero.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://getmonero.org/resources/user-guides){ .card-link title=Documentation} diff --git a/docs/desktop-browsers.md b/docs/desktop-browsers.md index b059aad197..74b841456b 100644 --- a/docs/desktop-browsers.md +++ b/docs/desktop-browsers.md @@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ schema: "@type": WebPage url: "./" --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } + These are our currently recommended **desktop web browsers** and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. We recommend [Mullvad Browser](#mullvad-browser) if you are focused on strong privacy protections and anti-fingerprinting out of the box, [Firefox](#firefox) for casual internet browsers looking for a good alternative to Google Chrome, and [Brave](#brave) if you need Chromium browser compatibility. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. We make some configuration recommendations on this page, but all browsers other than Tor Browser will be traceable by *somebody* in some manner or another. @@ -66,7 +70,7 @@ If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) ins ![Mullvad Browser logo](assets/img/browsers/mullvad_browser.svg){ align=right } -**Mullvad Browser** is a version of [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) with Tor network integrations removed, aimed at providing Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting browser technologies to VPN users. It is developed by the Tor Project and distributed by [Mullvad](vpn.md#mullvad), and does **not** require the use of Mullvad's VPN. +**Mullvad Browser** is a version of [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) with Tor network integrations removed. It aims to provide to VPN users Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting browser technologies, which are key protections against [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }. It is developed by the Tor Project and distributed by [Mullvad](vpn.md#mullvad), and does **not** require the use of Mullvad's VPN. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net/en/browser){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } diff --git a/docs/device-integrity.md b/docs/device-integrity.md index a3f14c12cc..d2bf1c369d 100644 --- a/docs/device-integrity.md +++ b/docs/device-integrity.md @@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ These tools provide analysis based on the information they have the ability to a ## External Verification Tools +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } + External verification tools run on your computer and scan your mobile device for forensic traces, which are helpful to identify potential compromise.
@@ -127,6 +131,11 @@ iMazing automates and interactively guides you through the process of using [MVT ## On-Device Verification +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } + These are apps you can install which check your device and operating system for signs of tampering, and validate the identity of your device.
@@ -180,6 +189,10 @@ If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could co ## On-Device Scanners +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } + These are apps you can install on your device which scan your device for signs of compromise.
@@ -220,7 +233,7 @@ Hypatia is particularly good at detecting common stalkerware: If you suspect you ![iVerify logo](assets/img/device-integrity/iverify.webp){ align=right } -**iVerify Basic** is an iOS app which can scan your device to check configuration settings, patch level, and other areas of security. It also checks your device for indicators of compromise by jailbreak tools or spyware such as Pegasus. +**iVerify Basic** is an iOS app which can scan your device to check configuration settings, patch level, and other areas of security. It also checks your device for indicators of compromise by jailbreak tools or of [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } such as [Pegasus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_(spyware)). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://iverify.io/products/basic){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://iverify.io/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } diff --git a/docs/dns.md b/docs/dns.md index 6db9e2b1c6..aad010efd4 100644 --- a/docs/dns.md +++ b/docs/dns.md @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ cover: dns.webp global: - [randomize-element, "table tbody"] --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity. diff --git a/docs/document-collaboration.md b/docs/document-collaboration.md index a986e96a1e..7f909d92c0 100644 --- a/docs/document-collaboration.md +++ b/docs/document-collaboration.md @@ -4,7 +4,10 @@ icon: material/account-group description: Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. cover: document-collaboration.webp --- - +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The provider's privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints. ## Collaboration Platforms diff --git a/docs/email-aliasing.md b/docs/email-aliasing.md index 0f9f8de058..6c546724ea 100644 --- a/docs/email-aliasing.md +++ b/docs/email-aliasing.md @@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ icon: material/email-lock description: An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. cover: email-aliasing.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } +- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green } + An **email aliasing service** allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your [email provider](email.md). True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like `yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com`, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the `+` sign. Organizations like the [IAB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_Advertising_Bureau) require that advertisers [normalize email addresses](https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2023/01/the-iab-loves-tracking-users-but-it-hates-users-tracking-them) so that they can be correlated and tracked, regardless of users' privacy wishes.
diff --git a/docs/encryption.md b/docs/encryption.md index ade956ff43..8ccae76fc9 100644 --- a/docs/encryption.md +++ b/docs/encryption.md @@ -13,11 +13,15 @@ The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted back ### Cryptomator (Cloud) +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } +
![Cryptomator logo](assets/img/encryption-software/cryptomator.svg){ align=right } -**Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud provider. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider. +**Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud [:material-server-network: Service Provider](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }, eliminating the need to trust that they won't access your files. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -48,6 +52,10 @@ Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs. ### Picocrypt (File) +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } +
![Picocrypt logo](assets/img/encryption-software/picocrypt.svg){ align=right } @@ -71,6 +79,10 @@ Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs. ### VeraCrypt (Disk) +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } +
![VeraCrypt logo](assets/img/encryption-software/veracrypt.svg#only-light){ align=right } @@ -102,6 +114,10 @@ Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tru ## OS Full Disk Encryption +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } + For encrypting the drive your operating system boots from, we generally recommend enabling the encryption software that comes with your operating system rather than using a third-party tool. This is because your operating system's native encryption tools often make use of OS and hardware-specific features like the [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor) in your device to protect your computer against more advanced physical attacks. For secondary drives and external drives which you *don't* boot from, we still recommend using open-source tools like [VeraCrypt](#veracrypt-disk) over the tools below, because they offer additional flexibility and let you avoid vendor lock-in. ### BitLocker @@ -226,6 +242,10 @@ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.im ## Command-line +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } + Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script). ### Kryptor @@ -272,6 +292,12 @@ Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](ht ## OpenPGP +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options. When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in your `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf). diff --git a/docs/file-sharing.md b/docs/file-sharing.md index 9a8b94d958..60b3127d9f 100644 --- a/docs/file-sharing.md +++ b/docs/file-sharing.md @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ icon: material/share-variant description: Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online. cover: file-sharing.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online. ## File Sharing @@ -38,7 +42,7 @@ ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE ![OnionShare logo](assets/img/file-sharing-sync/onionshare.svg){ align=right } -**OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and anonymously share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files. +**OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and [:material-incognito: anonymously](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -56,6 +60,8 @@ ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+OnionShare provides the option to connect via [Tor bridges](https://docs.onionshare.org/2.6.2/en/tor.html#automatic-censorship-circumvention) to circumvent [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. + ### Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. diff --git a/docs/language-tools.md b/docs/language-tools.md index 500c002851..28b4e22235 100644 --- a/docs/language-tools.md +++ b/docs/language-tools.md @@ -4,6 +4,13 @@ icon: material/alphabetical-variant description: These language tools do not send your input text to a server and can be used offline and self-hosted. cover: language-tools.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } +- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue } +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } +- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } + Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation services, can contain sensitive information which may be stored on their servers for an indefinite amount of time. The language tools listed on this page do not send your submitted text to a server, and can be self-hosted and used offline for maximum control of your data. ## LanguageTool diff --git a/docs/mobile-browsers.md b/docs/mobile-browsers.md index 9a1e0e5c8a..cd6171d26a 100644 --- a/docs/mobile-browsers.md +++ b/docs/mobile-browsers.md @@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ schema: "@type": WebPage url: "./" --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } + These are our currently recommended **mobile web browsers** and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. ## Android diff --git a/docs/mobile-phones.md b/docs/mobile-phones.md index b7bdc3e279..c8fcb807b6 100644 --- a/docs/mobile-phones.md +++ b/docs/mobile-phones.md @@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ schema: "@type": Organization name: Privacy Guides --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } + Most **mobile phones** receive short or limited windows of security updates from OEMs; after these devices reach the end of their support period, they **cannot** be considered secure as they no longer receive firmware or driver security updates. The mobile devices listed here provide a long lifespan of guaranteed security updates and allow you to install a custom operating system without violating the Android security model. diff --git a/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md b/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md index 6155ae9329..da5ebb32c7 100644 --- a/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md +++ b/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication' description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party. cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }

Hardware Keys

diff --git a/docs/notebooks.md b/docs/notebooks.md index 28246a4d2d..9a7058b133 100644 --- a/docs/notebooks.md +++ b/docs/notebooks.md @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ icon: material/notebook-edit-outline description: These encrypted note-taking apps let you keep track of your notes without giving them to a third-party. cover: notebooks.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party. diff --git a/docs/os/ios-overview.md b/docs/os/ios-overview.md index 2fdef159d5..14fe987a2d 100644 --- a/docs/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/docs/os/ios-overview.md @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email-aliasing.md) just for these features alone. -**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. +[**Private Relay**](https://apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/icloud-relay) is a proxy service which relays all of your Safari traffic, your DNS queries, and unencrypted traffic on your device through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic that's already encrypted. **Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. diff --git a/docs/passwords.md b/docs/passwords.md index da619a1a52..b33b1f487a 100644 --- a/docs/passwords.md +++ b/docs/passwords.md @@ -131,6 +131,12 @@ schema: "@type": WebPage url: "./" --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + **Password managers** allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password. [Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md) diff --git a/docs/photo-management.md b/docs/photo-management.md index fc709dbb23..542b28f2e7 100644 --- a/docs/photo-management.md +++ b/docs/photo-management.md @@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ icon: material/image description: Photo management tools to keep your personal photos safe from the prying eyes of cloud storage providers and other unauthorized access. cover: photo-management.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + Most cloud **photo management solutions** like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon Photos don't secure your photos against being accessed by the cloud storage provider themselves. These options keep your personal photos private, while allowing you to share them only with family and trusted people. ## Ente Photos diff --git a/docs/real-time-communication.md b/docs/real-time-communication.md index 4bd1f966b3..cac9a74b9a 100644 --- a/docs/real-time-communication.md +++ b/docs/real-time-communication.md @@ -5,6 +5,12 @@ icon: material/chat-processing description: Other instant messengers make all of your private conversations available to the company that runs them. cover: real-time-communication.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } +- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue } +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**. @@ -67,7 +73,7 @@ We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installati ![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } -**SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations. +**SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -98,7 +104,7 @@ SimpleX Chat supports basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, and ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } diff --git a/docs/security-keys.md b/docs/security-keys.md index df1761a08b..9a55bb2567 100644 --- a/docs/security-keys.md +++ b/docs/security-keys.md @@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ icon: 'material/key-chain' description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party. cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } + A physical **security key** adds a very strong layer of protection to your online accounts. Compared to [authenticator apps](multi-factor-authentication.md), the FIDO2 security key protocol is immune to phishing, and cannot be compromised without physical possession of the key itself. Many services support FIDO2/WebAuthn as a multi-factor authentication option for securing your account, and some services allow you to use a security key as a strong single-factor authenticator with passwordless authentication. ## Yubico Security Key diff --git a/docs/tools.md b/docs/tools.md index 673afaa2ad..151677d971 100644 --- a/docs/tools.md +++ b/docs/tools.md @@ -37,6 +37,15 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
+
+

Threat Model Labels

+ +You may find any of the following icons on some of the recommendation pages: :material-incognito: :material-target-account: :material-package-variant-closed-remove: :material-bug-outline: :material-server-network: :material-eye-outline: :material-account-cash: :material-account-search: :material-close-outline: + +We are testing a new feature that allows readers to better identify and understand the kinds of threats that privacy tools best defend against. Let us know what you think about this feature by replying to this dedicated forum [thread](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/implement-threat-model-labels/18659)! + +
+ ## Private Web Browsers
diff --git a/docs/tor.md b/docs/tor.md index fafc72725a..81f7f0c57e 100644 --- a/docs/tor.md +++ b/docs/tor.md @@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ schema: "@type": WebPage url: "./" --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } +- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue } +- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } **Tor** is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool. @@ -34,11 +39,11 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
-There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android. +There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } browsing for desktop computers and Android. Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile. -If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization. +If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against de-anonymization. ## Tor Browser diff --git a/docs/vpn.md b/docs/vpn.md index b8cbc74e3a..d86959c2dd 100644 --- a/docs/vpn.md +++ b/docs/vpn.md @@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ cover: vpn.webp global: - [randomize-element, "table tbody"] --- - +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } If you're looking for additional *privacy* from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a **VPN** may be the solution for you.