checks.yaml

# Copyright 2021 Security Scorecard Authors
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
#      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.

# This is the source of truth for all check descriptions and remediation steps.
# Run `cd checks/main && go run /main` to generate `checks.json` and `checks.md`.
checks:
  Maintained:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project is "actively maintained".
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (possibly unpatched vulnerabilities)
         
      This check determines whether the project is actively maintained. If the project
      is archived, it receives the lowest score. If there is at least one commit per
      week during the previous 90 days, the project receives the highest score.  If there
      is activity on issues from users who are collaborators, members, or owners of the
      project, the project receives a partial score.

      A project which is not active might not be patched, have its
      dependencies patched, or be actively tested and used. However, a lack
      of active maintenance is not necessarily always a problem. Some software,
      especially smaller utility functions, does not normally need to be maintained.
      For example, a library that determines if an integer is even would not normally
      need maintenance unless an underlying implementation language definition
      changed. A lack of active maintenance should signal that potential users should
      investigate further to judge the situation.   
    remediation:
      - >-
        There is no remediation work needed from projects with a low score; this
        check simply provides insight into the project activity and maintenance
        commitment. External users should determine whether the software is the type
        that would not normally need active maintenance.
  Dependency-Update-Tool:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, dependencies
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project uses a dependency update tool.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (possibly vulnerable to attacks on known flaws)  

      This check tries to determine if the project uses a dependency update tool,
      specifically [dependabot](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/keeping-your-dependencies-updated-automatically/configuration-options-for-dependency-updates) or
      [renovatebot](https://docs.renovatebot.com/configuration-options/). Out-of-date
      dependencies make a project vulnerable to known flaws and prone to attacks.
      These tools automate the process of updating dependencies by scanning for
      outdated or insecure requirements, and opening a pull request to update them if
      found.   

      This check can determine only whether the dependency update tool is enabled; it
      does not ensure that the tool is run or that the tool's pull requests are
      merged.   

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to implement dependency updates,
      and it is challenging for an automated tool like Scorecard to detect them all. A
      low score is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk.  

    remediation:
      - >-
        Signup for automatic dependency updates with
        [dependabot](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/keeping-your-dependencies-updated-automatically/configuration-options-for-dependency-updates) or
        [renovatebot](https://docs.renovatebot.com/configuration-options/) and place
        the config file in the locations that are recommended by these tools. Due to
        https://github.com/dependabot/dependabot-core/issues/2804 Dependabot can
        be enabled for forks where security updates have ever been turned on so projects
        maintaining stable forks should evaluate whether this behavior is satisfactory
        before turning it on.
      - >-
        Unlike dependabot, renovatebot has support to migrate dockerfiles' dependencies from version pinning to hash pinning 
        via the [pinDigests setting](https://docs.renovatebot.com/configuration-options/#pindigests) without
        aditional manual effort.
  Binary-Artifacts:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, dependencies
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project has generated executable (binary) artifacts in the source repository.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (non-reviewable code)

      This check determines whether the project has generated executable (binary)
      artifacts in the source repository.

      Including generated executables in the source repository increases user risk.
      Many programming language systems can generate executables from source code
      (e.g., C/C++ generated machine code, Java `.class` files, Python `.pyc` files,
      and minified JavaScript). Users will often directly use executables if they are
      included in the source repository, leading to many dangerous behaviors.

      Problems with generated executable (binary) artifacts:

        - Binary artifacts cannot be reviewed, allowing possible obsolete or
          maliciously subverted executables. Reviews generally review source code, not
          executables, since it's difficult to audit executables to ensure that they
          correspond to the source code. Over time the included executables might not
          correspond to the source code. 
        - Generated executables allow the executable generation process to atrophy,
          which can lead to an inability to create working executables. These problems
          can be countered with verified reproducible builds, but it's easier to
          implement verified reproducible builds when executables are not included in
          the source repository (since the executable generation process is less
          likely to have atrophied). 

      Allowed by Scorecards:

        - Files in the source repository that are simultaneously reviewable source
          code and executables, since these are reviewable. (Some interpretive
          systems, such as many operating system shells, don't have a mechanism for
          storing generated executables that are different from the source file.) 
        - Source code in the source repository generated by other tools (e.g., by
          bison, yacc, flex, and lex). There are potential downsides to generated
          source code, but generated source code tends to be much easier to review and
          thus presents a lower risk. Generated source code is also often difficult
          for external tools to detect. 
        - Generated documentation in source repositories. Generated documentation is
          intended for use by humans (not computers) who can evaluate the context.
          Thus, generated documentation doesn't pose the same level of risk.  

    remediation:
      - >-
        Remove the generated executable artifacts from the repository.
      - >-
        Build from source.
  Branch-Protection:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, source-code, code-reviews
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the default and release branches are protected with GitHub's branch protection settings.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (vulnerable to intentional malicious code injection)  
      
      This check determines whether a project's default and release branches are
      protected with GitHub's [branch protection](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/defining-the-mergeability-of-pull-requests/about-protected-branches) settings. 
      Branch protection allows maintainers to define rules that enforce
      certain workflows for branches, such as requiring review or passing certain
      status checks before acceptance into a main branch, or preventing rewriting of
      public history.

      Note: The following settings queried by the Branch-Protection check require an admin token: `DismissStaleReviews`, `EnforceAdmin`, and `StrictStatusCheck`. If
      the provided token does not have admin access, the check will query the branch
      settings accessible to non-admins and provide results based only on these settings.
      Even so, we recommend using a non-admin token, which provides a thorough enough
      result to meet most user needs. 

      Different types of branch protection protect against different risks:

        - Require code review: requires at least one reviewer, which greatly
          reduces the risk that a compromised contributor can inject malicious code.
          Review also increases the likelihood that an unintentional vulnerability in
          a contribution will be detected and fixed before the change is accepted.

        - Prevent force push: prevents use of the `--force` command on public
          branches, which overwrites code irrevocably. This protection prevents the
          rewriting of public history without external notice.

        - Require [status checks](https://docs.github.com/en/github/collaborating-with-pull-requests/collaborating-on-repositories-with-code-quality-features/about-status-checks):
          ensures that all required CI tests are met before a change is accepted. 

      Although requiring code review can greatly reduce the chance that
      unintentional or malicious code enters the "main" branch, it is not feasible for
      all projects, such as those that don't have many active participants. For more
      discussion, see [Code Reviews](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#code-reviews).

      Additionally, in some cases these rules will need to be suspended. For example,
      if a past commit includes illegal content such as child pornography, it may be
      necessary to use a force push to rewrite the history rather than simply hide the
      commit. 

      This test has tiered scoring. Each tier must be fully satisfied to achieve points at the next tier. For example, if you fulfill the Tier 3 checks but do not fulfill all the Tier 2 checks, you will not receive any points for Tier 3.

      Note: If Scorecard is run without an administrative access token, the requirements that specify “For administrators” are ignored.

      Tier 1 Requirements (3/10 points):
        - Prevent force push
        - Prevent branch deletion
        - For administrators: Include administrator for review
      
      Tier 2 Requirements (6/10 points):
        - Required reviewers >=1 ​
        - For administrators: Strict status checks (require branches to be up-to-date before merging)
      
      Tier 3 Requirements (8/10 points):
        - Status checks defined
      
      Tier 4 Requirements (9/10 points):
        - Required reviewers >= 2
      
      Tier 5 Requirements (10/10 points):
        - For administrators: Dismiss stale reviews

    remediation:
      - >-
        Enable branch protection settings in your source hosting provider to
        avoid force pushes or deletion of your important branches.
      - >-
        For GitHub, check out the steps [here](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/managing-a-branch-protection-rule).
  CI-Tests:
    risk: Low
    tags: supply-chain, testing
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project runs tests before pull requests are merged.
    description: |
      Risk: `Low` (possible unknown vulnerabilities)

      This check tries to determine if the project runs tests before pull requests are
      merged. It is currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not
      support other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      Running tests helps developers catch mistakes early on, which can reduce the
      number of vulnerabilities that find their way into a project.

      The check works by looking for a set of CI-system names in GitHub `CheckRuns`
      and `Statuses` among the recent commits (~30). A CI-system is considered
      well-known if its name contains any of the following: appveyor, buildkite,
      circleci, e2e, github-actions, jenkins, mergeable, test, travis-ci.

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to implement CI testing, and it is
      challenging for an automated tool like Scorecard to detect them all. A low score
      is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk.

      If a project's system was not detected and you think it should be, please
      [open an issue in the scorecard project](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/issues/new/choose). 
    remediation:
      - Check-in scripts that run all the tests in your repository.
      - >-
        Integrate those scripts with a CI/CD platform that runs it on every pull
        request (e.g. if hosted on GitHub, [GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/learn-github-actions/introduction-to-github-actions),
        [Prow](https://github.com/kubernetes/test-infra/tree/master/prow), etc).
  CII-Best-Practices:
    risk: Low
    tags: security-awareness, security-training, security
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project has a CII Best Practices Badge.
    description: |
      Risk: `Low` (possibly not following security best practices)

      This check determines whether the project has earned a [CII Best Practices Badge](https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/), 
      which indicates that the project uses a set of security-focused best development practices for open
      source software. The check uses the URL for the Git repo and the CII API.

      The CII Best Practices badge has 3 tiers: passing, silver, and gold. We give
      full credit to projects that meet the [passing criteria](https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/criteria/0), which is a
      significant achievement for many projects. Lower scores represent a project that
      is at least working to achieve a badge, with increasingly more points awarded as
      more criteria are met.

      To earn the passing badge, the project MUST: 

        - publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site
        - provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software
          from source code (where applicable)
        - have a general policy that tests will be added to an automated test suite
          when major new functionality is added
        - meet various cryptography criteria where applicable
        - have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software
        - have at least one primary developer who knows of common kinds of errors
          that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software (and at least one
          method to counter or mitigate each of them) 
        - apply at least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and
          "safe" language modes) to any proposed major production release. 

      Some of these criteria overlap with other Scorecards checks.
    remediation:
      - >-
        Sign up for the [CII Best Practices program](https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/en).
  Code-Review:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, source-code, code-reviews
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project requires code review before pull requests (aka merge requests) are merged.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (unintentional vulnerabilities or possible injection of malicious
      code)

      This check determines whether the project requires code review before pull
      requests (merge requests) are merged.

      Reviews detect various unintentional problems, including vulnerabilities that
      can be fixed immediately before they are merged, which improves the quality of
      the code. Reviews may also detect or deter an attacker trying to insert
      malicious code (either as a malicious contributor or as an attacker who has
      subverted a contributor's account), because a reviewer might detect the
      subversion.

      The check first tries to detect whether [Branch-Protection](checks.md#branch-protection) is enabled on the
      default branch with at least one required reviewer. If this fails, the check
      determines whether the most recent (~30) commits have a Github-approved review
      or if the merger is different from the committer (implicit review). It also
      performs a similar check for reviews using
      [Prow](https://github.com/kubernetes/test-infra/tree/master/prow#readme) (labels
      "lgtm" or "approved") and [Gerrit](https://www.gerritcodereview.com/) ("Reviewed-on" and "Reviewed-by").

      Note: Requiring reviews for all changes is infeasible for some projects, such as
      those with only one active participant. Even a project with multiple active
      contributors may not have enough active participation to be able to require
      review of all proposed changes. Projects with a small number of active
      participants instead sometimes aim for a review of a
      percentage of proposals (e.g., "at least half of all proposed changes are
      reviewed").

      Requiring review does not eliminate all risks. The other reviewers might fail to
      notice unintentional vulnerabilities or malicious code, be colluding with a
      malicious developer, or even be the same person (using a "[sock
      puppet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sock_puppet_account)" account).  

    remediation:
      - >-
        If the project has only one contributor, or does not have enough
        reviewers to practically require that all contributions be reviewed, try to
        recruit more maintainers to the project who will be willing to review
        others' work. Ideally at least some of these people will be from different
        organizations (see [Contributors](checks.md#contributors)). If the project has very limited utility, consider expanding
        its intended utility so more people will be interested in improving it, and
        make that larger scope clear to potential contributors.
      - >-
        Follow security best practices by performing strict code reviews for every
        new pull request / merge request.
      - >-
        Make "code reviews" mandatory in your repository configuration.
        ([Instructions for GitHub.](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/about-protected-branches#require-pull-request-reviews-before-merging))
      - >-
        Enforce the rule for administrators / code owners as well.
        ([Instructions for GitHub.](https://docs.github.com/en/github/administering-a-repository/about-protected-branches#include-administrators))
  Contributors:
    risk: Low
    tags: source-code
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project has a set of contributors from multiple organizations (e.g., companies).
    description: |
      Risk: `Low` (lower number of trusted code reviewers)

      This check tries to determine if the project has recent contributors from
      multiple organizations (e.g., companies). It is currently limited to
      repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not support other source hosting
      repositories (i.e., Forges).

      The check looks at the `Company` field on the GitHub user profile for authors of
      recent commits. To receive the highest score, the project must have had
      contributors from at least 3 different companies in the last 30 commits; each of
      those contributors must have had at least 5 commits in the last 30 commits.

      Note: Some projects cannot meet this requirement, such as small projects with
      only one active participant, or projects with a narrow scope that cannot attract
      the interest of multiple organizations. See
      [Code Reviews](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#code-reviews)
      for more information about evaluating projects with a small number of
      participants.   
    remediation:
      - >-
        Ask contributors to
        [join their respective organizations](https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/managing-membership-in-your-organization/inviting-users-to-join-your-organization),
        if they have not already. Otherwise, there is no remediation for this check;
        it simply provides insight into which organizations have contributed so that
        you can make a trust-based decision based on that information.  
  Fuzzing:
    risk: Medium
    tags: supply-chain, security, testing
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project uses fuzzing.
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (possible vulnerabilities in code)

      This check tries to determine if the project uses
      [fuzzing](https://owasp.org/www-community/Fuzzing) by checking:
      1. if the repository name is included in the [OSS-Fuzz](https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz) project list;
      2. if [ClusterFuzzLite](https://google.github.io/clusterfuzzlite/) is deployed in the repository;
      3. if there are user-defined language-specified fuzzing functions (currently only supports [Go fuzzing](https://go.dev/doc/fuzz/)) in the repository.
      4. if it contains a [OneFuzz](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz) integration [detection file](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz/blob/main/docs/getting-started.md#detecting-the-use-of-onefuzz);

      Fuzzing, or fuzz testing, is the practice of feeding unexpected or random data
      into a program to expose bugs. Regular fuzzing is important to detect
      vulnerabilities that may be exploited by others, especially since attackers can
      also use fuzzing to find the same flaws.

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to implement fuzzing, and it is
      challenging for an automated tool like Scorecard to detect them all. A low score
      is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk.   
    remediation:
      - >-
        Integrate the project with OSS-Fuzz by following the instructions
        [here](https://google.github.io/oss-fuzz/).
  Packaging:
    risk: Medium
    tags: supply-chain, security, releases
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project is published as a package that others can easily download, install, easily update, and uninstall.
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (users possibly missing security updates)

      This check tries to determine if the project is published as a package. It is
      currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not support other
      source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      Packages give users of a project an easy way to download, install, update, and
      uninstall the software by a package manager. In particular, they make it easy
      for users to receive security patches as updates.

      The check currently looks for
      [GitHub packaging workflows](https://docs.github.com/en/packages/learn-github-packages/publishing-a-package)
      and language-specific GitHub Actions that upload the package to a corresponding
      hub, e.g., [Npm](https://www.npmjs.com/). We plan to add better support to query
      package manager hubs directly in the future, e.g., for
      [Npm](https://www.npmjs.com/), [PyPi](https://pypi.org/).

      You can create a package in several ways:

        - Many program language ecosystems have a generally-used packaging format
          supported by a language-level package manager tool and public package
          repository. 
        - Many operating system platforms also have at least one package format,
          tool, and public repository (in some cases the source repository generates
          system-independent source packages, which are then used by others to
          generate system executable packages). 
        - Using container images.

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to package software, and it is
      challenging for an automated tool like Scorecards to detect them all. A low
      score is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk. If
      Scorecards fails to detect the way you publish a package and you think we should
      support your use case, please let us know by [opening an
      issue](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/issues/new/choose). 
    remediation:
      - Publish your project as a downloadable package, e.g., if hosted on GitHub, use [GitHub's mechanisms for publishing a package](https://docs.github.com/en/packages/learn-github-packages/publishing-a-package).
      - If hosted on GitHub, use a GitHub action to release your package to language-specific hubs.
  Pinned-Dependencies:
    risk: Medium
    tags: supply-chain, security, dependencies
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project has declared and pinned its dependencies.
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (possible compromised dependencies)

      This check tries to determine if the project pins its dependencies. 
      A "pinned dependency" is a dependency that is explicitly set to a specific hash instead of 
      allowing a mutable version or range of versions. It
      is currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not support
      other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges). 

      The check works by looking for unpinned dependencies in Dockerfiles, shell scripts and GitHub workflows.

      Pinned dependencies reduce several security risks:

        - They ensure that checking and deployment are all done with the same
          software, reducing deployment risks, simplifying debugging, and enabling
          reproducibility. 
        - They can help mitigate compromised dependencies from undermining the
          security of the project (in the case where you've evaluated the pinned
          dependency, you are confident it's not compromised, and a later version is
          released that is compromised). 
        - They are one way to [counter dependency confusion (aka substitution) attacks](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/resources/3-ways-to-mitigate-risk-using-private-package-feeds/),
          in which an application uses multiple feeds to acquire software packages (a
          "hybrid configuration"), and attackers fool the user into using a malicious
          package via a feed that was not expected for that package.

      However, pinning dependencies can inhibit software updates, either because of a
      security vulnerability or because the pinned version is compromised. Mitigate
      this risk by:

        - [having applications and _not_ libraries pin to specific hashes](https://jbeckwith.com/2019/12/18/package-lock/);
        - using automated tools to notify applications when their dependencies are
          outdated;
        - quickly updating applications that do pin dependencies.

      For projects hosted on GitHub, you can learn more about
      dependencies using the [GitHub dependency graph](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/understanding-your-software-supply-chain/about-the-dependency-graph).
    remediation:
      - >- 
        First determine if your project is producing a library or
        application. If it is a library, you generally don't want to pin dependencies of
        library users, and should not follow any remediation steps.
      - >-
        If your project is producing an application, declare all your dependencies with specific versions in your package
        format file (e.g. `package.json` for npm, `requirements.txt` for python).
        For C/C++, check in the code from a trusted source and add a `README` on the
        specific version used (and the archive SHA hashes).
      - >-
        If the package manager supports lock files (e.g. `package-lock.json` for
        npm), make sure to check these in the source code as well. These files
        maintain signatures for the entire dependency tree and saves from future
        exploitation in case the package is compromised.
      - >-
        For Dockerfiles, pin dependencies by hash. See [Dockerfile](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/cron/internal/worker/Dockerfile) for example. If you are using a manifest list to support builds
        across multiple architectures, you can pin to the manifest list hash instead
        of a single image hash. You can use a tool like [crane](https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/main/cmd/crane/README.md) 
        to obtain the hash of the manifest list like in this [example](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/issues/1773#issuecomment-1076699039).
      - >- 
        For GitHub workflows, pin dependencies by hash. See [main.yaml](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/f55b86d6627cc3717e3a0395e03305e81b9a09be/.github/workflows/main.yml#L27) for example.
        To determine the permissions needed for your workflows, you may use [StepSecurity's online tool](https://app.stepsecurity.io/) by ticking
        the "Pin actions to a full length commit SHA". You may also tick the "Restrict permissions for GITHUB_TOKEN" to fix issues found
        by the Token-Permissions check.
      - >-
        To help update your dependencies after pinning them, use tools such as
         Github's [dependabot](https://github.blog/2020-06-01-keep-all-your-packages-up-to-date-with-dependabot/)
        or [renovate bot](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate).
  SAST:
    risk: Medium
    tags: supply-chain, security, testing
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project uses static code analysis.
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (possible unknown bugs)

      This check tries to determine if the project uses Static Application Security
      Testing (SAST), also known as [static code analysis](https://owasp.org/www-community/controls/Static_Code_Analysis).
      It is currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does not support
      other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      SAST is testing run on source code before the application is run. Using SAST
      tools can prevent known classes of bugs from being inadvertently introduced in the
      codebase.

      The checks currently looks for known Github apps such as
      [CodeQL](https://codeql.github.com/) (github-code-scanning),
      [LGTM](https://lgtm.com/) and
      [SonarCloud](https://sonarcloud.io/) in the recent (~30) merged PRs, or the use
      of "github/codeql-action" in a GitHub workflow.

      Note: A project that fulfills this criterion with other tools may still receive
      a low score on this test. There are many ways to implement SAST, and it is
      challenging for an automated tool like Scorecard to detect them all. A low score
      is therefore not a definitive indication that the project is at risk.   
    remediation:
      - >-
        Run CodeQL checks in your CI/CD by following the instructions
        [here](https://github.com/github/codeql-action#usage).
  Security-Policy:
    risk: Medium
    short: Determines if the project has published a security policy.
    repos: GitHub
    tags: supply-chain, security, policy
    description: |
      Risk: `Medium` (possible insecure reporting of vulnerabilities)

      This check tries to determine if the project has published a security policy. It
      works by looking for a file named `SECURITY.md` (case-insensitive) in a few
      well-known directories.

      A security policy (typically a `SECURITY.md` file) can give users information
      about what constitutes a vulnerability and how to report one securely so that
      information about a bug is not publicly visible.   
    remediation:
      - >-
        Place a security policy file `SECURITY.md` in the root directory of your
        repository. This makes it easily discoverable by a vulnerability reporter.
      - >-
        The file should contain information on what constitutes a vulnerability
        and a way to report it securely (e.g. issue tracker with private issue
        support, encrypted email with a published public key). Follow the 
        [coordinated vulnerability disclosure guidelines](https://github.com/ossf/oss-vulnerability-guide/blob/main/guide.md)
        to respond to vulnerability disclosures.
      - >-
        For GitHub, see more information
        [here](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/getting-started/adding-a-security-policy-to-your-repository).
  Signed-Releases:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, releases
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project cryptographically signs release artifacts.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (possibility of installing malicious releases)

      This check tries to determine if the project cryptographically signs release
      artifacts. It is currently limited to repositories hosted on GitHub, and does
      not support other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      Signed releases attest to the provenance of the artifact.

      This check looks for the following filenames in the project's last five
      releases: [*.minisig](https://github.com/jedisct1/minisign), *.asc (pgp),
      *.sig, *.sign.

      Note: The check does not verify the signatures. 
    remediation:
      - >-
        Publish the release.
      - >-
        Generate a signing key.
      - >-
        Download the release as an archive locally.
      - >-
        Sign the release archive with this key (should output a signature file).
      - >-
        Attach the signature file next to the release archive.
      - >-
        If the source is hosted on GitHub, check out the steps
        [here](https://wiki.debian.org/Creating%20signed%20GitHub%20releases).
  Token-Permissions:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, infrastructure
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project's workflows follow the principle of least privilege.
    description: |
      Risk: `High` (vulnerable to malicious code additions)

      This check determines whether the project's automated workflows tokens are set
      to read-only by default. It is currently limited to repositories hosted on
      GitHub, and does not support other source hosting repositories (i.e., Forges).

      Setting token permissions to read-only follows the principle of least privilege.
      This is important because attackers may use a compromised token with write
      access to push malicious code into the project.

      The highest score is awarded when the permissions definitions in each workflow's
      yaml file are set as read-only at the
      [top level](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions)
      and the required write permissions are declared at the
      [run-level](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#jobsjob_idpermissions).
      One point is reduced from the score if all jobs have their permissions defined but the top level permissions are not defined. 
      This configuration is secure, but there is a chance that when a new job is added to the workflow, its job permissions could be 
      left undefined because of human error.

      The check cannot detect if the "read-only" GitHub permission setting is
      enabled, as there is no API available.

      Additionally, points are reduced if certain write permissions are defined for a job. 

      ### Write permissions causing a small reduction
      * `statuses` - May allow an attacker to change the result of pre-submit checks and get a PR merged.
      * `checks` - May allow an attacker to remove pre-submit checks and introduce a bug.
      * `security-events` - May allow an attacker to read vulnerability reports before a patch is available. However, points are not reduced if the job utilizes a recognized action for uploading SARIF results.
      * `deployments` - May allow an attacker to charge repo owner by triggering VM runs, and tiny chance an attacker can trigger a remote service with code they own if server accepts code/location variables unsanitized.

      ### Write permissions causing a large reduction
      * `contents` - Allows an attacker to commit unreviewed code. However, points are not reduced if the job utilizes a recognized packaging action or command.
      * `packages` - Allows an attacker to publish packages. However, points are not reduced if the job utilizes a recognized packaging action or command.
      * `actions` - May allow an attacker to steal GitHub secrets by approving to run an action that needs approval.
 
    remediation:
      - >-
        Set permissions as `read-all` or `contents: read` as described in
        GitHub's [documentation](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions).
      - >-
        To help determine the permissions needed for your workflows, you may use [StepSecurity's online tool](https://app.stepsecurity.io/) by ticking
        the "Restrict permissions for GITHUB_TOKEN". You may also tick the "Pin actions to a full length commit SHA" to fix issues found
        by the Pinned-dependencies check.
  Vulnerabilities:
    risk: High
    tags: supply-chain, security, vulnerabilities
    repos: GitHub
    short: Determines if the project has open, known unfixed vulnerabilities.
    description: |
      Risk: `High`  (known vulnerabilities)
        
      This check determines whether the project has open, unfixed vulnerabilities
      using the [OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)](https://osv.dev/) service. An open
      vulnerability is readily exploited by attackers and should be fixed as soon as
      possible.     
    remediation:
      - >-
        Fix the vulnerabilities. The details of each vulnerability can be found
        on <https://osv.dev>.

  Dangerous-Workflow:
    risk: Critical
    tags: supply-chain, security, infrastructure
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project's GitHub Action workflows avoid dangerous patterns.
    description: |
      Risk: `Critical`  (vulnerable to repository compromise)
        
      This check determines whether the project's GitHub Action workflows has dangerous 
      code patterns. Some examples of these patterns are untrusted code checkouts, 
      logging github context and secrets, or use of potentially untrusted inputs in scripts.
      The following patterns are checked:

      Untrusted Code Checkout: This is the misuse of potentially dangerous triggers. 
      This checks if a `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run` workflow trigger was used in conjunction 
      with an explicit pull request checkout. Workflows triggered with `pull_request_target` / `workflow_run`
      have write permission to the target repository and access to target repository 
      secrets. With the PR checkout, PR authors may compromise the repository, for 
      example, by using build scripts controlled by the author of the PR or reading 
      token in memory. This check does not detect whether untrusted code checkouts are 
      used safely, for example, only on pull request that have been assigned a label.

      Script Injection with Untrusted Context Variables: This pattern detects whether a 
      workflow's inline script may execute untrusted input from attackers. This occurs when 
      an attacker adds malicious commands and scripts to a context. When a workflow runs, 
      these strings may be interpreted as code that is executed on the runner. Attackers 
      can add their own content to certain github context variables that are considered 
      untrusted, for example, `github.event.issue.title`. These values should not flow 
      directly into executable code.

      The highest score is awarded when all workflows avoid the dangerous code patterns.
    remediation:
      - >-
        Avoid the dangerous workflow patterns. 
        See this [post](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)
        for information on avoiding untrusted code checkouts.
        See this [document](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#understanding-the-risk-of-script-injections)
        for information on avoiding and mitigating the risk of script injections.

  License:
    risk: Low
    tags: license
    repos: GitHub, local
    short: Determines if the project has defined a license.
    description: |
      Risk: `Low` (possible impediment to security review)

      This check tries to determine if the project has published a license. It
      works by checking standard locations for a file named according to common
      conventions for licenses.

      A license can give users information about how the source code may or may
      not be used. The lack of a license will impede any kind of security review
      or audit and creates a legal risk for potential users.

      This check will detect files in the top-level directory with any combination
      of the following names and extensions:`LICENSE`, `LICENCE`, `COPYING`,
      `COPYRIGHT` and .html, .txt, .md. It will also detect these files in a
      directory named `LICENSES`. (Files in a `LICENSES` directory are typically
      named as their [SPDX](https://spdx.org/licenses/) license identifier followed
      by an appropriate file extension, as described in the [REUSE](https://reuse.software/spec/) Specification.)

    remediation:
      - >-
        Determine [which license](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/licensing-a-repository) to apply to your project.
      - >-
        Create the license in a .txt, .html, or .md file named LICENSE or COPYING,
        and place it in the top-level directory.
      - >-
        Alternately, create a `LICENSE` directory and add license files with a name
        that matches your [SPDX license identifier](https://spdx.dev/ids/).

  Webhooks:
    risk: High
    tags: security, infrastructure
    repos: GitHub
    short: This check validate if the webhook defined in the repository have a token configured.
    description: |
      Risk: `Critical` (service possibly accessible to third parties)

      This check determines whether the webhook defined in the repository has a token configured to authenticate the origins of requests.
    remediation:
    - >-
      Check whether your service supports token authentication.
    - >-
      If there is support for token authentication, set the secret in the webhook configuration. See [Setting up a webhook](https://docs.github.com/en/developers/webhooks-and-events/webhooks/creating-webhooks#setting-up-a-webhook)
    - >-
      If there is no support for token authentication, consider implementing it by following [these directions](https://docs.github.com/en/developers/webhooks-and-events/webhooks/securing-your-webhooks).