From 25fa23402f714380b1fc3746d3bfec6ef0c0a382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Walsh Date: Sat, 9 Apr 2016 09:02:55 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Add man pages for ocitools Also fix up Makefile so that it will install ocitools and man pages. Signed-off-by: Dan Walsh --- .gitignore | 3 + Makefile | 16 ++- man/ocitools-generate.1.md | 283 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ man/ocitools-validate.1.md | 23 +++ man/ocitools.1.md | 36 +++++ 5 files changed, 359 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 man/ocitools-generate.1.md create mode 100644 man/ocitools-validate.1.md create mode 100644 man/ocitools.1.md diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 0c6c86a01..f4736847e 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -28,3 +28,6 @@ _testmain.go oci ocitools /runtimetest + +*.1 +*.patch diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 74a74ab8b..93b5f7636 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +PREFIX ?= $(DESTDIR)/usr +BINDIR ?= $(DESTDIR)/usr/bin + BUILDTAGS= export GOPATH:=$(CURDIR)/Godeps/_workspace:$(GOPATH) @@ -5,8 +8,17 @@ all: go build -tags "$(BUILDTAGS)" -o ocitools . go build -tags "$(BUILDTAGS)" -o runtimetest ./cmd/runtimetest -install: - cp ocitools /usr/local/bin/ocitools +.PHONY: man +man: + go-md2man -in "man/ocitools.1.md" -out "ocitools.1" + go-md2man -in "man/ocitools-generate.1.md" -out "ocitools-generate.1" + go-md2man -in "man/ocitools-validate.1.md" -out "ocitools-validate.1" + +install: man + install -d -m 755 $(BINDIR) + install -m 755 ocitools $(BINDIR) + install -d -m 755 $(PREFIX)/share/man/man1 + install -m 644 *.1 $(PREFIX)/share/man/man1 clean: rm -f ocitools runtimetest diff --git a/man/ocitools-generate.1.md b/man/ocitools-generate.1.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1b1da8513 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/ocitools-generate.1.md @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +% OCI(1) OCI User Manuals +% OCI Community +% APRIL 2016 +# NAME +ocitools-generate - Generate a config.json for an OCI container + +# SYNOPSIS +**ocitools generate** +[**--arch**[=*[]*] +[**--apparmor**[=*[]*]] +[**--args**[=*[]*]] +[**--bind**[=*[]*]] +[**--cap-add**[=*[]*]] +[**--cap-drop**[=*[]*]] +[**--cwd**[=*[]*]] +[**--env**[=*[]*]] +[**--gid**[=*GID*]] +[**--gidmappings**[=*[]*]]] +[**--groups**[=*[]*]] +[**--hostname**[=*[]*]] +[**--help**] +[**--ipc**] +[**--network**] +[**--no-new-privileges**] +[**--mount**] +[**--mount-cgroups**] +[**--os**[=*[]*]] +[**--pid**] +[**--poststart**[=*[]*]] +[**--poststop**[=*[]*]] +[**--prestart**[=*[]*]] +[**--privileged**] +[**--read-only**] +[**--root-propagation**[=*[]*]] +[**--rootfs**[=*[]*]] +[**--seccomp-default**[=*[]*]] +[**--seccomp-arch**[=*[]*]] +[**--seccomp-syscalls**[=*[]*]] +[**--selinux-label**[=*[]*]] +[**--sysctl**[=*[]*]] +[**--tmpfs**[=*[]*]] +[**--uid**[=*[]*]] +[**--uidmappings**[=*[]*]] +[**--uts**] +[ARG...] + +# DESCRIPTION +**ocitools generate** is used to generate a config.json (OCI spec file) to be used to +instantiate an OCI container. This config.json file can be placed into a +directory and used by an OCI compatable runtime like **runc** to run a +container. + +# OPTIONS +**--apparmor**="PROFILE" + Specifies the the apparmor profile for the container + +**--arch**="ARCH" + Architecture used within the container. + "amd64" + +**--args**=OPTION + Command to run in the container + +**--bind**=[=*[[HOST-DIR:CONTAINER-DIR][:OPTIONS]]*] Bind mount + directories src:dest:(rw,ro) If you specify, ` --bind + /HOST-DIR:/CONTAINER-DIR`, runc bind mounts `/HOST-DIR` in the host + to `/CONTAINER-DIR` in the OCI container. The `OPTIONS` are a comma + delimited list and can be: [rw|ro] The `HOST_DIR` and + `CONTAINER-DIR` must be absolute paths such as `/src/docs`. You + can add `:ro` or `:rw` suffix to a volume to mount it read-only or + read-write mode, respectively. By default, the volumes are mounted + read-write. + +**--cap-add**=[] + Add Linux capabilities + +**--cap-drop**=[] + Drop Linux capabilities + +**--cwd**=PATH + Current working directory for the process + +**--env**=[] + Set environment variables + + This option allows you to specify arbitrary +environment variables that are available for the process that will be launched +inside of the container. + +**--hostname**="" + Container host name + + Sets the container host name that is available inside the container. + +**--help** + Print usage statement + +**--gid**=GID + Gid for the process inside of container + +**--groups**=GROUP + Supplementary groups for the processes inside of container + +**--gidmappings**=GIDMAPPINGS + Add GIDMappings e.g HostID:ContainerID:Size for use with User Namespace + +**--ipc** + Use ipc namespace + +**--network** + Use network namespace + +**--no-new-privileges** + Set no new privileges bit for the container process. Setting this flag + will block the container processes from gaining any additional privileges + using tools like setuid apps. It is a good idea to run unprivileged + containers with this flag. + +**--mount** + Use a mount namespace + +**--mount-cgroups** + Mount cgroups (rw,ro,no) + +**--os**=OS + Operating system used within the container + +**--pid** + Use a pid namespace + +**--poststart**=CMD + Path to command to run in poststart hooks. This command will be run before + the container process gets launched but after the container environment and + main process has been created. + +**--poststop**=CMD + Path to command to run in poststop hooks. This command will be run after the + container completes but before the container process is destroyed + +**--prestart**=CMD + Path to command to run in prestart hooks. This command will be run before + the container process gets launched but after the container environment. + +**--privileged**=*true*|*false* + Give extended privileges to this container. The default is *false*. + + By default, OCI containers are +“unprivileged” (=false) and cannot do some of the things a normal root process can do. + + When the operator executes **ocitools generate --privileged**, OCI will enable access to all devices on the host as well as disable some of the confinement mechanisms like AppArmor, SELinux, and seccomp from blocking access to privileged processes. This gives the container processes nearly all the same access to the host as processes generating outside of a container on the host. + +**--read-only**=*true*|*false* + Mount the container's root filesystem as read only. + + By default a container will have its root filesystem writable allowing processes to write files anywhere. By specifying the `--read-only` flag the container will have its root filesystem mounted as read only prohibiting any writes. + +**--root-propagation**=PROPOGATIONMODE + Mount propagation for root filesystem. + Values are "SHARED, RSHARED, PRIVATE, RPRIVATE, SLAVE, RSLAVE" + +**--rootfs**="*ROOTFSPATH*" + Path to the rootfs + +**--sysctl**=SYSCTLSETTING + Add sysctl settings e.g net.ipv4.forward=1, only allowed if the syctl is + namespaced. + +**--seccomp-default**=ACTION + Specifies the the defaultaction of Seccomp syscall restrictions + Values: KILL,ERRNO,TRACE,ALLOW + +**--seccomp-arch**=ARCH + Specifies Additional architectures permitted to be used for system calls. + By default if you turn on seccomp, only the host architecture will be allowed. + +**--seccomp-syscalls**=SYSCALLS + Specifies Additional syscalls permitted to be used for system calls, + e.g Name:Action:Arg1_index/Arg1_value/Arg1_valuetwo/Arg1_op, Arg2_index/Arg2_value/Arg2_valuetwo/Arg2_op + +**--selinux-label**=[=*SELINUXLABEL*]] + SELinux Label + Depending on your SELinux policy, you would specify a label that looks like + this: + "system_u:system_r:svirt_lxc_net_t:s0:c1,c2" + + Note you would want your ROOTFS directory to be labeled with a context that + this process type can use. + + "system_u:object_r:usr_t:s0" might be a good label for a readonly container, + "system_u:system_r:svirt_sandbox_file_t:s0:c1,c2" for a read/write container. + +**--tmpfs**=[] Create a tmpfs mount + Mount a temporary filesystem (`tmpfs`) mount into a container, for example: + + $ ocitools generate -d --tmpfs /tmp:rw,size=787448k,mode=1777 my_image + + This command mounts a `tmpfs` at `/tmp` within the container. The supported mount options are the same as the Linux default `mount` flags. If you do not specify any options, the systems uses the following options: + `rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=65536k`. + +**--uid**=UID + Sets the UID used within the container. + +**--uidmappings** + Add UIDMappings e.g HostUID:ContainerID:Size for use with User Namespace + +**--uts** + Use the uts namespace + +# EXAMPLES + +## Generating container in read-only mode + +During container image development, containers often need to write to the image +content. Installing packages into /usr, for example. In production, +applications seldom need to write to the image. Container applications write +to volumes if they need to write to file systems at all. Applications can be +made more secure by generating them in read-only mode using the --read-only switch. +This protects the containers image from modification. Read only containers may +still need to write temporary data. The best way to handle this is to mount +tmpfs directories on /generate and /tmp. + + # ocitools generate --read-only --tmpfs /generate --tmpfs /tmp --tmpfs /run --rootfs /var/lib/containers/fedora /bin/bash + +## Exposing log messages from the container to the host's log + +If you want messages that are logged in your container to show up in the host's +syslog/journal then you should bind mount the /dev/log directory as follows. + + # ocitools generate --bind /dev/log:/dev/log --rootfs /var/lib/containers/fedora /bin/bash + +From inside the container you can test this by sending a message to the log. + + (bash)# logger "Hello from my container" + +Then exit and check the journal. + + # exit + + # journalctl -b | grep Hello + +This should list the message sent to logger. + +## Bind Mounting External Volumes + +To mount a host directory as a container volume, specify the absolute path to +the directory and the absolute path for the container directory separated by a +colon: + + # ocitools generate --bind /var/db:/data1 --rootfs /var/lib/containers/fedora --args bash + +## Using SELinux + +You can use SELinux to add security to the container. You must specify the process label to run the init process inside of the container using the --selinux-label. + + # ocitools generate --bind /var/db:/data1 --selinux-label system_u:system_r:svirt_lxc_net_t:s0:c1,c2 --rootfs /var/lib/containers/fedora --args bash + +Not in the above example we used a type of svirt_lxc_net_t and an MCS Label of s0:c1,c2. If you want to guarantee separation between containers, you need to make sure that each container gets launched with a different MCS Label pair. + +Also the underlying rootfs must be labeled with a matching label. For the example above, you would execute a command like: + + # chcon -R system_u:object_r:svirt_sandbox_file_t:s0:c1,c2 /var/lib/containers/fedora + +This will set up the labeling of the rootfs so that the process launched would be able to write to the container. If you wanted to only allow it to read/execute the content in rootfs, you could execute: + + # chcon -R system_u:object_r:usr_t:s0 /var/lib/containers/fedora + +When using SELinux, be aware that the host has no knowledge of container SELinux +policy. Therefore, in the above example, if SELinux policy is enforced, the +`/var/db` directory is not writable to the container. A "Permission Denied" +message will occur and an avc: message in the host's syslog. + +To work around this, the following command needs to be generate in order for the proper SELinux policy type label to be attached to the host directory: + + # chcon -Rt svirt_sandbox_file_t -l s0:c1,c2 /var/db + +Now, writing to the /data1 volume in the container will be allowed and the +changes will also be reflected on the host in /var/db. + +# SEE ALSO +**runc**(1), **ocitools**(1) + +# HISTORY +April 2016, Originally compiled by Dan Walsh (dwalsh at redhat dot com) diff --git a/man/ocitools-validate.1.md b/man/ocitools-validate.1.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f5c1c9676 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/ocitools-validate.1.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +% OCI(1) OCI User Manuals +% OCI Community +% APRIL 2016 +# NAME +ocitools-validate - Validate a OCI bundle + +# SYNOPSIS +**ocitools validate** +[**--path**[=*PATH*] + +# DESCRIPTION + +Validate an OCI bundle + +# OPTIONS +**--path="PATH" + Path to bundle + +# SEE ALSO +**ocitools**(1) + +# HISTORY +April 2016, Originally compiled by Dan Walsh (dwalsh at redhat dot com) diff --git a/man/ocitools.1.md b/man/ocitools.1.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..02e9d71b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/ocitools.1.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +% OCI(1) OCITOOLS User Manuals +% Dan Walsh +% APRIL 2016 +# NAME +ocitools \- OCI (Open Container Initiative) tools + +# SYNOPSIS +**ocitools** [OPTIONS] COMMAND [arg...] + +**ocitools** [--help|-v|--version] + +# DESCRIPTION +ocitools is a collection of tools for working with the [OCI runtime specification](https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec). + + +# OPTIONS +**--help** + Print usage statement + +**-v**, **--version** + Print version information. + +# COMMANDS +**validate** + Validating OCI bundle + See **ocitools-validate(1)** for full documentation on the **validate** command. + +**generate** + Generating OCI runtime spec configuration files + See **ocitools-generate(1)** for full documentation on the **generate** command. + +# SEE ALSO +**ocitools-validate**(1), **ocitools-run**(1) + +# HISTORY +April 2016, Originally compiled by Daniel Walsh (dwalsh at redhat dot com)