diff --git a/src/backend/commands/variable.c b/src/backend/commands/variable.c index f0f2e076552..071bef63754 100644 --- a/src/backend/commands/variable.c +++ b/src/backend/commands/variable.c @@ -821,14 +821,16 @@ check_session_authorization(char **newval, void **extra, GucSource source) return false; } + /* + * When source == PGC_S_TEST, we don't throw a hard error for a + * nonexistent user name or insufficient privileges, only a NOTICE. See + * comments in guc.h. + */ + /* Look up the username */ roleTup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(*newval)); if (!HeapTupleIsValid(roleTup)) { - /* - * When source == PGC_S_TEST, we don't throw a hard error for a - * nonexistent user name, only a NOTICE. See comments in guc.h. - */ if (source == PGC_S_TEST) { ereport(NOTICE, @@ -846,6 +848,28 @@ check_session_authorization(char **newval, void **extra, GucSource source) ReleaseSysCache(roleTup); + /* + * Only superusers may SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION a role other than itself. + * Note that in case of multiple SETs in a single session, the original + * authenticated user's superuserness is what matters. + */ + if (roleid != GetAuthenticatedUserId() && + !GetAuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser()) + { + if (source == PGC_S_TEST) + { + ereport(NOTICE, + (errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), + errmsg("permission will be denied to set session authorization \"%s\"", + *newval))); + return true; + } + GUC_check_errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE); + GUC_check_errmsg("permission denied to set session authorization \"%s\"", + *newval); + return false; + } + /* Set up "extra" struct for assign_session_authorization to use */ myextra = (role_auth_extra *) guc_malloc(LOG, sizeof(role_auth_extra)); if (!myextra) diff --git a/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c b/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c index a604432126c..64545bc3738 100644 --- a/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c +++ b/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c @@ -582,6 +582,16 @@ GetAuthenticatedUserId(void) return AuthenticatedUserId; } +/* + * Return whether the authenticated user was superuser at connection start. + */ +bool +GetAuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser(void) +{ + Assert(OidIsValid(AuthenticatedUserId)); + return AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser; +} + /* * GetUserIdAndSecContext/SetUserIdAndSecContext - get/set the current user ID @@ -889,28 +899,12 @@ system_user(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) /* * Change session auth ID while running * - * Only a superuser may set auth ID to something other than himself. Note - * that in case of multiple SETs in a single session, the original userid's - * superuserness is what matters. But we set the GUC variable is_superuser - * to indicate whether the *current* session userid is a superuser. - * - * Note: this is not an especially clean place to do the permission check. - * It's OK because the check does not require catalog access and can't - * fail during an end-of-transaction GUC reversion, but we may someday - * have to push it up into assign_session_authorization. + * Note that we set the GUC variable is_superuser to indicate whether the + * current role is a superuser. */ void SetSessionAuthorization(Oid userid, bool is_superuser) { - /* Must have authenticated already, else can't make permission check */ - Assert(OidIsValid(AuthenticatedUserId)); - - if (userid != AuthenticatedUserId && - !AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser) - ereport(ERROR, - (errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), - errmsg("permission denied to set session authorization"))); - SetSessionUserId(userid, is_superuser); SetConfigOption("is_superuser", diff --git a/src/include/miscadmin.h b/src/include/miscadmin.h index 14bd574fc24..11d6e6869de 100644 --- a/src/include/miscadmin.h +++ b/src/include/miscadmin.h @@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ extern Oid GetUserId(void); extern Oid GetOuterUserId(void); extern Oid GetSessionUserId(void); extern Oid GetAuthenticatedUserId(void); +extern bool GetAuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser(void); extern void GetUserIdAndSecContext(Oid *userid, int *sec_context); extern void SetUserIdAndSecContext(Oid userid, int sec_context); extern bool InLocalUserIdChange(void);