The code comments for PreChecks give a clear description of what the PreChecks are for:
// Run the policy checks on a given transaction, excluding any script checks.
// Looks up inputs, calculates feerate, considers replacement, evaluates
// package limits, etc. As this function can be invoked for "free" by a peer,
// only tests that are fast should be done here (to avoid CPU DoS).The PreChecks function is very long but is worth examining to understand better which checks are undertaken as part of this first stage.
During PreChecks the m_rbf bool will have been set to true if it is determined that this transaction would have to replace an existing transaction from our mempool.
If this bool is set, then ReplacementChecks will be run.
These checks are designed to check that BIP125 RBF rules are being adhered to.
Following ReplacementChecks we initialise a PrecomputedTransactionData struct in the Workspace which will hold expensive-to-compute data that we might want to use again in subsequent validation steps.
Click to show the PrecomputedTransactionData struct
struct PrecomputedTransactionData
{
// BIP341 precomputed data.
// These are single-SHA256, see https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#cite_note-15.
uint256 m_prevouts_single_hash;
uint256 m_sequences_single_hash;
uint256 m_outputs_single_hash;
uint256 m_spent_amounts_single_hash;
uint256 m_spent_scripts_single_hash;
//! Whether the 5 fields above are initialized.
bool m_bip341_taproot_ready = false;
// BIP143 precomputed data (double-SHA256).
uint256 hashPrevouts, hashSequence, hashOutputs;
//! Whether the 3 fields above are initialized.
bool m_bip143_segwit_ready = false;
std::vector<CTxOut> m_spent_outputs;
//! Whether m_spent_outputs is initialized.
bool m_spent_outputs_ready = false;
PrecomputedTransactionData() = default;
template <class T>
void Init(const T& tx, std::vector<CTxOut>&& spent_outputs);
template <class T>
explicit PrecomputedTransactionData(const T& tx);
};Next we call PolicyScriptChecks() passing in the same ATMPArgs and Workspace that we used with PreChecks.
This is going to check the transaction against our individual node’s policies.
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Tip
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Note that local node policies are not necessarily consensus-binding, but are designed to help prevent resource exhaustion (e.g. DoS) on our node. See the transaction validation and consensus in bitcoin core sections for more information on the differences between policy and consensus. |
PolicyScriptChecks() starts with initialisation of the transaction into a CTransaction, before beginning to check the input scripts against the script flags.
bool MemPoolAccept::PolicyScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata)
{
const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state;
constexpr unsigned int scriptVerifyFlags = STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS;
// Check input scripts and signatures.
// This is done last to help prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
if (!CheckInputScripts(tx, state, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags, true, false, txdata)) { (1)
// SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK requires SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS, so we
// need to turn both off, and compare against just turning off CLEANSTACK
// to see if the failure is specifically due to witness validation.
TxValidationState state_dummy; // Want reported failures to be from first CheckInputScripts
if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputScripts(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) &&
!CheckInputScripts(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) {
// Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED,
state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
}
return false; // state filled in by CheckInputScripts
}
return true;
}-
Calling
CheckInputScripts()involves ECDSA signature verification and is therefore computationally expensive.
If the script type is SegWit an additional round of checking is performed, this time including the CLEANSTACK rule.
The call(s) flag cacheSigStore as true, and cacheFullScriptStore as false, which means that matched signatures will be persisted in the cache, but matched full scripts will be removed.
If the PolicyScriptChecks return true we will move on to consensus script checks, again passing in the same ATMPArgs, Workspace and now PrecomputedTransactionData that we used previously with PolicyScriptChecks.
The main check in here is CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache() which is going to compare all the transaction inputs to our mempool, checking that they have not already been marked as spent.
If the coin is not already spent, we reference it from either the UTXO set or our mempool, and finally submit it through CheckInputScripts() once more, this time caching both the signatures and the full scripts.
Click to show CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache()
/**
* Checks to avoid mempool polluting consensus critical paths since cached
* signature and script validity results will be reused if we validate this
* transaction again during block validation.
* */
static bool CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state,
const CCoinsViewCache& view, const CTxMemPool& pool,
unsigned int flags, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, CCoinsViewCache& coins_tip)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, pool.cs)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
AssertLockHeld(pool.cs);
assert(!tx.IsCoinBase());
for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
const Coin& coin = view.AccessCoin(txin.prevout);
// This coin was checked in PreChecks and MemPoolAccept
// has been holding cs_main since then.
Assume(!coin.IsSpent());
if (coin.IsSpent()) return false;
// If the Coin is available, there are 2 possibilities:
// it is available in our current ChainstateActive UTXO set,
// or it's a UTXO provided by a transaction in our mempool.
// Ensure the scriptPubKeys in Coins from CoinsView are correct.
const CTransactionRef& txFrom = pool.get(txin.prevout.hash);
if (txFrom) {
assert(txFrom->GetHash() == txin.prevout.hash);
assert(txFrom->vout.size() > txin.prevout.n);
assert(txFrom->vout[txin.prevout.n] == coin.out);
} else {
assert(std::addressof(::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip()) == std::addressof(coins_tip));
const Coin& coinFromUTXOSet = coins_tip.AccessCoin(txin.prevout);
assert(!coinFromUTXOSet.IsSpent());
assert(coinFromUTXOSet.out == coin.out);
}
}
// Call CheckInputScripts() to cache signature and script validity against current tip consensus rules.
return CheckInputScripts(tx, state, view, flags, /* cacheSigStore = */ true, /* cacheFullSciptStore = */ true, txdata);
}PackageMempoolChecks are designed to "Enforce package mempool ancestor/descendant limits (distinct from individual ancestor/descendant limits done in PreChecks)".
They take a vector of CTransactionRefs and a PackageValidationState.
Again we take two locks before checking that the transactions are not in the mempool.
Any transactions which are part of the package and were in the mempool will have already been removed by MemPoolAccept::AcceptPackage().
Finally we check the package limits, which consists of checking the {ancestor|descendant} {count|size}. This check is unique to packages because we can now add descendants whose ancestors would not otherwise qualify for entry into our mempool with their low effective fee rate.
Provided that consensus script checks pass and this was not a test ATMP call, we will call Finalize() on the transaction.
This will remove any conflicting (lower fee) transactions from the mempool before adding this one, finishing by trimming the mempool to the configured size (default: static const unsigned int DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE = 300; MB).
In the event that this transaction got trimmed, we ensure that we return a TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full" result.