SATA problem on MeleA1000 #41
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dupe of #40 |
amery
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Nov 12, 2013
As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online. Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the system, like this: [ 0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 OK [ 1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK [ 1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK [ 2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node 4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK [ 3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node 5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK [ 3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node 6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK [ 4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node 7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK [ 4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs and this: [ 0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Libin <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
amery
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Nov 12, 2013
Turn it into (for example): [ 0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 0.074005] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 [ 0.603005] .... node #1, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 [ 1.200005] .... node #2, CPUs: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 [ 1.796005] .... node #3, CPUs: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 [ 2.393005] .... node #4, CPUs: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 [ 2.996005] .... node #5, CPUs: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 [ 3.600005] .... node #6, CPUs: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 [ 4.202005] .... node #7, CPUs: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 [ 4.811005] .... node #8, CPUs: #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 [ 5.421006] .... node #9, CPUs: #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 [ 6.032005] .... node #10, CPUs: #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 [ 6.648006] .... node #11, CPUs: #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 [ 7.262005] .... node #12, CPUs: #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 [ 7.865005] .... node #13, CPUs: #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 [ 8.466005] .... node #14, CPUs: #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 [ 9.073006] .... node #15, CPUs: #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 [ 9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs and drop useless elements. Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a Saturday evening. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
turl
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in allwinner-dev-team/linux-allwinner
Jan 28, 2014
when use dst_get_neighbour to get neighbour, we need rcu_read_lock to protect, since dst_get_neighbour uses rcu_dereference. The bug was reported by Ari Savolainen <[email protected]> [ 105.612095] [ 105.612096] =================================================== [ 105.612100] [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ] [ 105.612101] --------------------------------------------------- [ 105.612103] include/net/dst.h:91 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection! [ 105.612105] [ 105.612106] other info that might help us debug this: [ 105.612106] [ 105.612108] [ 105.612108] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 [ 105.612110] 1 lock held by dnsmasq/2618: [ 105.612111] #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff815df8c7>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 [ 105.612120] [ 105.612121] stack backtrace: [ 105.612123] Pid: 2618, comm: dnsmasq Not tainted 3.1.0-rc1 torvalds#41 [ 105.612125] Call Trace: [ 105.612129] [<ffffffff810ccdcb>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xbb/0xc0 [ 105.612132] [<ffffffff815dc5a9>] neigh_update+0x4f9/0x5f0 [ 105.612135] [<ffffffff815da001>] ? neigh_lookup+0xe1/0x220 [ 105.612139] [<ffffffff81639298>] arp_req_set+0xb8/0x230 [ 105.612142] [<ffffffff8163a59f>] arp_ioctl+0x1bf/0x310 [ 105.612146] [<ffffffff810baa40>] ? lock_hrtimer_base.isra.26+0x30/0x60 [ 105.612150] [<ffffffff8163fb75>] inet_ioctl+0x85/0x90 [ 105.612154] [<ffffffff815b5520>] sock_do_ioctl+0x30/0x70 [ 105.612157] [<ffffffff815b55d3>] sock_ioctl+0x73/0x280 [ 105.612162] [<ffffffff811b7698>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x98/0x570 [ 105.612165] [<ffffffff811a5c40>] ? fget_light+0x340/0x3a0 [ 105.612168] [<ffffffff811b7bbf>] sys_ioctl+0x4f/0x80 [ 105.612172] [<ffffffff816fdcab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Ari Savolainen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: RongQing <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
amery
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Mar 20, 2014
Starting with commit 3da5278 (of/irq: Rework of_irq_count()) the following warning is triggered on octeon cn3xxx: [ 0.887281] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at drivers/of/platform.c:171 of_device_alloc+0x228/0x230() [ 0.895642] Modules linked in: [ 0.898689] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.14.0-rc7-00012-g9ae51f2-dirty #41 [ 0.906860] Stack : c8b439581166d96e ffffffff816b0000 0000000040808000 ffffffff81185ddc [ 0.906860] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000000000000b [ 0.906860] 000000000000000a 000000000000000a 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 0.906860] ffffffff81740000 ffffffff81720000 ffffffff81615900 ffffffff816b0177 [ 0.906860] ffffffff81727d10 800000041f868fb0 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 [ 0.906860] 0000000000000000 0000000000000038 0000000000000001 ffffffff81568484 [ 0.906860] 800000041f86faa8 ffffffff81145ddc 0000000000000000 ffffffff811873f4 [ 0.906860] 800000041f868b88 800000041f86f9c0 0000000000000000 ffffffff81569c9c [ 0.906860] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 0.906860] 0000000000000000 ffffffff811205e0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 0.906860] ... [ 0.971695] Call Trace: [ 0.974139] [<ffffffff811205e0>] show_stack+0x68/0x80 [ 0.979183] [<ffffffff81569c9c>] dump_stack+0x8c/0xe0 [ 0.984196] [<ffffffff81145efc>] warn_slowpath_common+0x84/0xb8 [ 0.990110] [<ffffffff81436888>] of_device_alloc+0x228/0x230 [ 0.995726] [<ffffffff814368d8>] of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x48/0xd0 [ 1.002593] [<ffffffff81436a94>] of_platform_bus_create+0x134/0x1e8 [ 1.008837] [<ffffffff81436af8>] of_platform_bus_create+0x198/0x1e8 [ 1.015064] [<ffffffff81436cc4>] of_platform_bus_probe+0xa4/0x100 [ 1.021149] [<ffffffff81100570>] do_one_initcall+0xd8/0x128 [ 1.026701] [<ffffffff816e2a10>] kernel_init_freeable+0x144/0x210 [ 1.032753] [<ffffffff81564bc4>] kernel_init+0x14/0x110 [ 1.037973] [<ffffffff8111bb44>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c With this commit the kernel starts mapping the interrupts listed for gpio-controller node. irq_domain_ops for CIU (octeon_irq_ciu_map and octeon_irq_ciu_xlat) refuse to handle the GPIO lines (returning -EINVAL) and this is causing above warning in of_device_alloc(). Modify irq_domain_ops for CIU and CIU2 to "gracefully handle" GPIO lines (neither return error code nor call octeon_irq_set_ciu_mapping for it). This should avoid the warning. (As before the real setup for GPIO lines will happen using irq_domain_ops of gpio-controller.) This patch is based on Wei's patch v2 (see http://marc.info/?l=linux-mips&m=139511814813247). Signed-off-by: Andreas Herrmann <[email protected]> Reported-by: Yang Wei <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Daney <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6624/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
amery
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Jun 12, 2014
Code should be indented using tabs rather than spaces (see CodingStyle) and the canonical form to declare a constant static variable is using "static const" rather than "const static". Fixes the following warnings from checkpatch: $ scripts/checkpatch.pl -f drivers/gpu/drm/drm_plane_helper.c WARNING: storage class should be at the beginning of the declaration #40: FILE: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_plane_helper.c:40: +const static uint32_t safe_modeset_formats[] = { WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line #41: FILE: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_plane_helper.c:41: + DRM_FORMAT_XRGB8888,$ WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line #42: FILE: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_plane_helper.c:42: + DRM_FORMAT_ARGB8888,$ Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matt Roper <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
amery
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Oct 29, 2014
This patch wires up the new syscall sys_bpf() on powerpc.
Passes the tests in samples/bpf:
#0 add+sub+mul OK
#1 unreachable OK
#2 unreachable2 OK
#3 out of range jump OK
#4 out of range jump2 OK
#5 test1 ld_imm64 OK
#6 test2 ld_imm64 OK
#7 test3 ld_imm64 OK
#8 test4 ld_imm64 OK
#9 test5 ld_imm64 OK
#10 no bpf_exit OK
#11 loop (back-edge) OK
#12 loop2 (back-edge) OK
#13 conditional loop OK
#14 read uninitialized register OK
#15 read invalid register OK
#16 program doesn't init R0 before exit OK
#17 stack out of bounds OK
#18 invalid call insn1 OK
#19 invalid call insn2 OK
#20 invalid function call OK
#21 uninitialized stack1 OK
#22 uninitialized stack2 OK
#23 check valid spill/fill OK
#24 check corrupted spill/fill OK
#25 invalid src register in STX OK
#26 invalid dst register in STX OK
#27 invalid dst register in ST OK
#28 invalid src register in LDX OK
#29 invalid dst register in LDX OK
#30 junk insn OK
#31 junk insn2 OK
#32 junk insn3 OK
#33 junk insn4 OK
#34 junk insn5 OK
#35 misaligned read from stack OK
#36 invalid map_fd for function call OK
#37 don't check return value before access OK
#38 access memory with incorrect alignment OK
#39 sometimes access memory with incorrect alignment OK
#40 jump test 1 OK
#41 jump test 2 OK
#42 jump test 3 OK
#43 jump test 4 OK
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <[email protected]>
[mpe: test using samples/bpf]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
amery
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Dec 15, 2014
When using request_firmware_nowait() with FW_ACTION_NOHOTPLUG param to expose user helper interface, if the user do not react immediately, after 120 seconds there will be a hung task warning message dumped as below: [ 3000.784235] INFO: task kworker/0:0:8259 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 3000.791281] Tainted: G E 3.16.0-rc1-yocto-standard #41 [ 3000.798082] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 3000.806072] kworker/0:0 D cd0075c8 0 8259 2 0x00000000 [ 3000.812765] Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func [ 3000.818253] cd375e18 00000046 0000000e cd0075c8 000000f0 cd40ea00 cd375fec 1b883e89 [ 3000.826374] 0000026b cd40ea00 80000000 00000001 cd0075c8 00000000 cd375de4 c119917f [ 3000.834492] cd563360 cd375df4 c119a0ab cd563360 00000000 cd375e24 c119a1d6 00000000 [ 3000.842616] Call Trace: [ 3000.845252] [<c119917f>] ? kernfs_next_descendant_post+0x3f/0x50 [ 3000.851543] [<c119a0ab>] ? kernfs_activate+0x6b/0xc0 [ 3000.856790] [<c119a1d6>] ? kernfs_add_one+0xd6/0x130 [ 3000.862047] [<c15fdb02>] schedule+0x22/0x60 [ 3000.866548] [<c15fd195>] schedule_timeout+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3000.871887] [<c119b391>] ? __kernfs_create_file+0x71/0xa0 [ 3000.877574] [<c119bb9a>] ? sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0xaa/0x180 [ 3000.883533] [<c15fe84f>] wait_for_completion+0x6f/0xb0 [ 3000.888961] [<c1065200>] ? wake_up_process+0x40/0x40 [ 3000.894219] [<c13cb600>] _request_firmware+0x750/0x9f0 [ 3000.899666] [<c1382a7f>] ? n_tty_receive_buf2+0x1f/0x30 [ 3000.905200] [<c13cba02>] request_firmware_work_func+0x22/0x50 [ 3000.911235] [<c10550d2>] process_one_work+0x122/0x380 [ 3000.916571] [<c1055859>] worker_thread+0xf9/0x470 [ 3000.921555] [<c1055760>] ? create_and_start_worker+0x50/0x50 [ 3000.927497] [<c1055760>] ? create_and_start_worker+0x50/0x50 [ 3000.933448] [<c105a5ff>] kthread+0x9f/0xc0 [ 3000.937850] [<c15ffd40>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x20/0x30 [ 3000.943548] [<c105a560>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x100/0x100 This patch change the wait_for_completion() function call to wait_for_completion_interruptible() function call for solving the issue. Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kweh, Hock Leong <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jwrdegoede
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Feb 23, 2015
My previous patch "Btrfs: fix scrub race leading to use-after-free" introduced the possibility to sleep in an atomic context, which happens when the scrub_lock mutex is held at the time scrub_pending_bio_dec() is called - this function can be called under an atomic context. Chris ran into this in a debug kernel which gave the following trace: [ 1928.950319] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:621 [ 1928.967334] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 149670, name: fsstress [ 1928.981324] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 1928.989244] CPU: 24 PID: 149670 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 3.19.0-rc7-mason+ linux-sunxi#41 [ 1929.006418] Hardware name: ZTSYSTEMS Echo Ridge T4 /A9DRPF-10D, BIOS 1.07 05/10/2012 [ 1929.022207] ffffffff81a22cf8 ffff881076e03b78 ffffffff816b8dd9 ffff881076e03b78 [ 1929.037267] ffff880d8e828710 ffff881076e03ba8 ffffffff810856c4 ffff881076e03bc8 [ 1929.052315] 0000000000000000 000000000000026d ffffffff81a22cf8 ffff881076e03bd8 [ 1929.067381] Call Trace: [ 1929.072344] <IRQ> [<ffffffff816b8dd9>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x6e [ 1929.083968] [<ffffffff810856c4>] ___might_sleep+0x174/0x230 [ 1929.095352] [<ffffffff810857d2>] __might_sleep+0x52/0x90 [ 1929.106223] [<ffffffff816bb68f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2f/0x3b0 [ 1929.117951] [<ffffffff810ab37d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 1929.129708] [<ffffffffa05dc838>] scrub_pending_bio_dec+0x38/0x70 [btrfs] [ 1929.143370] [<ffffffffa05dd0e0>] scrub_parity_bio_endio+0x50/0x70 [btrfs] [ 1929.157191] [<ffffffff812fa603>] bio_endio+0x53/0xa0 [ 1929.167382] [<ffffffffa05f96bc>] rbio_orig_end_io+0x7c/0xa0 [btrfs] [ 1929.180161] [<ffffffffa05f97ba>] raid_write_parity_end_io+0x5a/0x80 [btrfs] [ 1929.194318] [<ffffffff812fa603>] bio_endio+0x53/0xa0 [ 1929.204496] [<ffffffff8130401b>] blk_update_request+0x1eb/0x450 [ 1929.216569] [<ffffffff81096e58>] ? trigger_load_balance+0x78/0x500 [ 1929.229176] [<ffffffff8144c74d>] scsi_end_request+0x3d/0x1f0 [ 1929.240740] [<ffffffff8144ccac>] scsi_io_completion+0xac/0x5b0 [ 1929.252654] [<ffffffff81441c50>] scsi_finish_command+0xf0/0x150 [ 1929.264725] [<ffffffff8144d317>] scsi_softirq_done+0x147/0x170 [ 1929.276635] [<ffffffff8130ace6>] blk_done_softirq+0x86/0xa0 [ 1929.288014] [<ffffffff8105d92e>] __do_softirq+0xde/0x600 [ 1929.298885] [<ffffffff8105df6d>] irq_exit+0xbd/0xd0 (...) Fix this by using a reference count on the scrub context structure instead of locking the scrub_lock mutex. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
mripard
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Sep 22, 2015
The use of get_domain() in copy_thread() results in an oops on ARMv7M/noMMU systems. The thread cpu_domain value is only used when CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS is enabled, so there's no need to save the value in copy_thread() except when this is enabled, and this option will never be enabled on these platforms. Unhandled exception: IPSR = 00000006 LR = fffffff1 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150909-00001-gb8ec5ad #41 Hardware name: NXP LPC18xx/43xx (Device Tree) task: 2823fbe0 ti: 2823c000 task.ti: 2823c000 PC is at copy_thread+0x18/0x92 LR is at copy_thread+0x19/0x92 pc : [<2800a46e>] lr : [<2800a46f>] psr: 4100000b sp : 2823df00 ip : 00000000 fp : 287c81c0 r10: 00000000 r9 : 00800300 r8 : 287c8000 r7 : 287c8000 r6 : 2818908d r5 : 00000000 r4 : 287ca000 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : fffffff0 r0 : 287ca048 xPSR: 4100000b Reported-by: Ariel D'Alessandro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
amery
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Jan 13, 2016
media_device_register_entity() is protected by a spin_lock. Calling ida_pre_get() with GFP_KERNEL may put it to sleep, with is a bad idea and causes this warning: [ 8812.397195] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:1287 [ 8812.397203] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 15179, name: modprobe [ 8812.397207] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 8812.397213] CPU: 2 PID: 15179 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B 4.4.0-rc2+ #41 [ 8812.397218] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015 [ 8812.397222] 0000000000000000 ffff880314c77268 ffffffff818f8ba7 ffff8803b17dde00 [ 8812.397232] ffff880314c77290 ffffffff811c2ee5 ffff8803b17dde00 ffffffff8284dbc9 [ 8812.397241] 0000000000000507 ffff880314c772d0 ffffffff811c30d5 0000000041b58ab3 [ 8812.397250] Call Trace: [ 8812.397258] [<ffffffff818f8ba7>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64 [ 8812.397265] [<ffffffff811c2ee5>] ___might_sleep+0x245/0x3a0 [ 8812.397270] [<ffffffff811c30d5>] __might_sleep+0x95/0x1a0 [ 8812.397276] [<ffffffff818fd083>] ? ida_pre_get+0x113/0x250 [ 8812.397282] [<ffffffff8153bb77>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x197/0x250 [ 8812.397288] [<ffffffff818fd083>] ida_pre_get+0x113/0x250 [ 8812.397293] [<ffffffff818fd265>] ida_simple_get+0xa5/0x170 [ 8812.397298] [<ffffffff818fd1c0>] ? ida_pre_get+0x250/0x250 [ 8812.397306] [<ffffffffa07382d1>] media_device_register_entity+0x171/0x420 [media] [ 8812.397318] [<ffffffffa129e76f>] v4l2_device_register_subdev+0x34f/0x640 [videodev] [ 8812.397324] [<ffffffffa0768dea>] v4l2_i2c_new_subdev_board+0x12a/0x250 [v4l2_common] [ 8812.397330] [<ffffffffa0768fe7>] v4l2_i2c_new_subdev+0xd7/0x110 [v4l2_common] [ 8812.397337] [<ffffffffa0768f10>] ? v4l2_i2c_new_subdev_board+0x250/0x250 [v4l2_common] [ 8812.397347] [<ffffffffa13d2f76>] au0828_card_analog_fe_setup+0x2e6/0x3f0 [au0828] [ 8812.397352] [<ffffffff814450cc>] ? power_down+0xc4/0xc4 [ 8812.397361] [<ffffffffa13d2c90>] ? au0828_tuner_callback+0x160/0x160 [au0828] [ 8812.397370] [<ffffffffa13d319f>] au0828_card_setup+0x11f/0x340 [au0828] [ 8812.397378] [<ffffffffa13d3080>] ? au0828_card_analog_fe_setup+0x3f0/0x3f0 [au0828] [ 8812.397384] [<ffffffff812a575b>] ? msleep+0x7b/0xc0 [ 8812.397393] [<ffffffffa13d0d79>] au0828_usb_probe+0x679/0xcf0 [au0828] [ 8812.397399] [<ffffffff81d7619d>] usb_probe_interface+0x45d/0x940 [ 8812.397406] [<ffffffff81ca7004>] driver_probe_device+0x454/0xd90 [ 8812.397411] [<ffffffff81ca7940>] ? driver_probe_device+0xd90/0xd90 [ 8812.397417] [<ffffffff81ca7940>] ? driver_probe_device+0xd90/0xd90 [ 8812.397422] [<ffffffff81ca7a61>] __driver_attach+0x121/0x160 [ 8812.397427] [<ffffffff81ca141f>] bus_for_each_dev+0x11f/0x1a0 [ 8812.397433] [<ffffffff81ca1300>] ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x10/0x10 [ 8812.397439] [<ffffffff822917d7>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40 [ 8812.397445] [<ffffffff81ca5d4d>] driver_attach+0x3d/0x50 [ 8812.397450] [<ffffffff81ca5039>] bus_add_driver+0x4c9/0x770 [ 8812.397456] [<ffffffff81ca944c>] driver_register+0x18c/0x3b0 [ 8812.397462] [<ffffffff8124c952>] ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x32/0x100 [ 8812.397468] [<ffffffff81d71e58>] usb_register_driver+0x1f8/0x440 [ 8812.397473] [<ffffffffa0208000>] ? 0xffffffffa0208000 [ 8812.397481] [<ffffffffa02080b7>] au0828_init+0xb7/0x1000 [au0828] [ 8812.397486] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [ 8812.397492] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40 [ 8812.397497] [<ffffffff8123bbf6>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590 [ 8812.397502] [<ffffffff815406e6>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [ 8812.397507] [<ffffffff815406e6>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [ 8812.397512] [<ffffffff815406e6>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [ 8812.397517] [<ffffffff815407f7>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0 [ 8812.397524] [<ffffffff814454e5>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5a4 [ 8812.397530] [<ffffffff812ed7e8>] load_module+0x6648/0x9d70 [ 8812.397535] [<ffffffff812e4b70>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50 [ 8812.397546] [<ffffffff812e71a0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20 [ 8812.397552] [<ffffffff8158e950>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50 [ 8812.397559] [<ffffffff811648db>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0 [ 8812.397565] [<ffffffff812f1208>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [ 8812.397571] [<ffffffff812f1100>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 8812.397576] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14 [ 8812.397582] [<ffffffff82292236>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
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Sep 14, 2016
The use of get_domain() in copy_thread() results in an oops on ARMv7M/noMMU systems. The thread cpu_domain value is only used when CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS is enabled, so there's no need to save the value in copy_thread() except when this is enabled, and this option will never be enabled on these platforms. Unhandled exception: IPSR = 00000006 LR = fffffff1 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150909-00001-gb8ec5ad #41 Hardware name: NXP LPC18xx/43xx (Device Tree) task: 2823fbe0 ti: 2823c000 task.ti: 2823c000 PC is at copy_thread+0x18/0x92 LR is at copy_thread+0x19/0x92 pc : [<2800a46e>] lr : [<2800a46f>] psr: 4100000b sp : 2823df00 ip : 00000000 fp : 287c81c0 r10: 00000000 r9 : 00800300 r8 : 287c8000 r7 : 287c8000 r6 : 2818908d r5 : 00000000 r4 : 287ca000 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : fffffff0 r0 : 287ca048 xPSR: 4100000b Reported-by: Ariel D'Alessandro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> Change-Id: I50753eae34431997b97529e8e68df87fe31bcfc6 (cherry picked from commit af4cb25) Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <[email protected]>
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Nov 25, 2016
The kernel WARNs and then crashes today if wm8994_device_init() fails after calling devm_regulator_bulk_get(). That happens because there are multiple devices involved here and the order in which managed resources are freed isn't correct. The regulators are added as children of wm8994->dev. Whereas, devm_regulator_bulk_get() receives wm8994->dev as the device, though it gets the same regulators which were added as children of wm8994->dev earlier. During failures, the children are removed first and the core eventually calls regulator_unregister() for them. As regulator_put() was never done for them (opposite of devm_regulator_bulk_get()), the kernel WARNs at WARN_ON(rdev->open_count); And eventually it crashes from debugfs_remove_recursive(). --------x------------------x---------------- wm8994 3-001a: Device is not a WM8994, ID is 0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at /mnt/ssd/all/work/repos/devel/linux/drivers/regulator/core.c:4072 regulator_unregister+0xc8/0xd0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc6-00154-g54fe84cbd50b #41 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) [<c010e24c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010af38>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c010af38>] (show_stack) from [<c032a1c4>] (dump_stack+0x88/0x9c) [<c032a1c4>] (dump_stack) from [<c011a98c>] (__warn+0xe8/0x100) [<c011a98c>] (__warn) from [<c011aa54>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x20/0x28) [<c011aa54>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<c0384a0c>] (regulator_unregister+0xc8/0xd0) [<c0384a0c>] (regulator_unregister) from [<c0406434>] (release_nodes+0x16c/0x1dc) [<c0406434>] (release_nodes) from [<c04039c4>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0x110) [<c04039c4>] (__device_release_driver) from [<c0403a64>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) [<c0403a64>] (device_release_driver) from [<c0402b24>] (bus_remove_device+0xd8/0x104) [<c0402b24>] (bus_remove_device) from [<c03ffcd8>] (device_del+0x10c/0x218) [<c03ffcd8>] (device_del) from [<c0404e4c>] (platform_device_del+0x1c/0x88) [<c0404e4c>] (platform_device_del) from [<c0404ec4>] (platform_device_unregister+0xc/0x20) [<c0404ec4>] (platform_device_unregister) from [<c0428bc0>] (mfd_remove_devices_fn+0x5c/0x64) [<c0428bc0>] (mfd_remove_devices_fn) from [<c03ff9d8>] (device_for_each_child_reverse+0x4c/0x78) [<c03ff9d8>] (device_for_each_child_reverse) from [<c04288c4>] (mfd_remove_devices+0x20/0x30) [<c04288c4>] (mfd_remove_devices) from [<c042758c>] (wm8994_device_init+0x2ac/0x7f0) [<c042758c>] (wm8994_device_init) from [<c04f14a8>] (i2c_device_probe+0x178/0x1fc) [<c04f14a8>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c04036fc>] (driver_probe_device+0x214/0x2c0) [<c04036fc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach+0xac/0xb0) [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0x9c) [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver+0x1a0/0x218) [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c040406c>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf8) [<c040406c>] (driver_register) from [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver+0x34/0x84) [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall+0x40/0x170) [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x15c/0x1fc) [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x114) [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init) from [<c0107978>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) ---[ end trace 0919d3d0bc998260 ]--- [snip..] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000078 pgd = c0004000 [00000078] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.8.0-rc6-00154-g54fe84cbd50b #41 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) task: ee874000 task.stack: ee878000 PC is at down_write+0x14/0x54 LR is at debugfs_remove_recursive+0x30/0x150 [snip..] [<c06e489c>] (down_write) from [<c02e9954>] (debugfs_remove_recursive+0x30/0x150) [<c02e9954>] (debugfs_remove_recursive) from [<c0382b78>] (_regulator_put+0x24/0xac) [<c0382b78>] (_regulator_put) from [<c0382c1c>] (regulator_put+0x1c/0x2c) [<c0382c1c>] (regulator_put) from [<c0406434>] (release_nodes+0x16c/0x1dc) [<c0406434>] (release_nodes) from [<c04035d4>] (driver_probe_device+0xec/0x2c0) [<c04035d4>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach+0xac/0xb0) [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0x9c) [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver+0x1a0/0x218) [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c040406c>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf8) [<c040406c>] (driver_register) from [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver+0x34/0x84) [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall+0x40/0x170) [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x15c/0x1fc) [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x114) [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init) from [<c0107978>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) Code: e1a04000 f590f000 e3a03001 e34f3fff (e1902f9f) ---[ end trace 0919d3d0bc998262 ]--- --------x------------------x---------------- Fix the kernel warnings and crashes by using regulator_bulk_get() instead of devm_regulator_bulk_get() and explicitly freeing the supplies in exit paths. Tested on Exynos 5250, dual core ARM A15 machine. Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> Acked-by: Charles Keepax <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
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Since commit: 4bcc595 ("printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines") printk() requires KERN_CONT to continue log messages. Lots of printk() in lockdep.c and print_ip_sym() don't have it. As the result lockdep reports are completely messed up. Add missing KERN_CONT and inline print_ip_sym() where necessary. Example of a messed up report: 0-rc5+ #41 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- syz-executor0/5036 is trying to acquire lock: ( rtnl_mutex ){+.+.+.} , at: [<ffffffff86b3d6ac>] rtnl_lock+0x1c/0x20 but task is already holding lock: ( &net->packet.sklist_lock ){+.+...} , at: [<ffffffff873541a6>] packet_diag_dump+0x1a6/0x1920 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 ( &net->packet.sklist_lock +.+...} ... Without this patch all scripts that parse kernel bug reports are broken. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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May 18, 2017
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Jun 7, 2017
[ Upstream commit 2423496 ] The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
repojohnray
pushed a commit
to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y
that referenced
this issue
Jun 7, 2017
[ Upstream commit 2423496 ] The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ linux-sunxi#41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
repojohnray
pushed a commit
to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y
that referenced
this issue
Jun 17, 2017
[ Upstream commit 2423496 ] The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ linux-sunxi#41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Nov 15, 2017
syzbot easily found a regression added in our latest patches [1] No longer set tp->highest_sack to the head of the send queue since this is not logical and error prone. Only sack processing should maintain the pointer to an skb from rtx queue. We might in the future only remember the sequence instead of a pointer to skb, since rb-tree should allow a fast lookup. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1706 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_ack+0x42bb/0x4fd0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3537 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801c154faa8 by task syz-executor4/12860 CPU: 0 PID: 12860 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.14.0-next-20171113+ #41 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:429 tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1706 [inline] tcp_ack+0x42bb/0x4fd0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3537 tcp_rcv_established+0x672/0x18a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5439 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2ab/0x7d0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1468 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:909 [inline] __release_sock+0x124/0x360 net/core/sock.c:2264 release_sock+0xa4/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2778 tcp_sendmsg+0x3a/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1462 inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:763 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:632 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:642 ___sys_sendmsg+0x75b/0x8a0 net/socket.c:2048 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2082 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2093 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2089 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 RIP: 0033:0x452879 RSP: 002b:00007fc9761bfbe8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000758020 RCX: 0000000000452879 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020917fc8 RDI: 0000000000000015 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00000000006ee3a0 R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 00007fc9761c06d4 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 12860: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:489 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x144/0x760 mm/slab.c:3638 __alloc_skb+0xf1/0x780 net/core/skbuff.c:193 alloc_skb_fclone include/linux/skbuff.h:1023 [inline] sk_stream_alloc_skb+0x11d/0x900 net/ipv4/tcp.c:870 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x1341/0x3b80 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1299 tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1461 inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:763 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:632 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:642 SYSC_sendto+0x358/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1749 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1717 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Freed by task 12860: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3492 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x77/0x280 mm/slab.c:3750 kfree_skbmem+0xdd/0x1d0 net/core/skbuff.c:603 __kfree_skb+0x1d/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:642 sk_wmem_free_skb include/net/sock.h:1419 [inline] tcp_rtx_queue_unlink_and_free include/net/tcp.h:1682 [inline] tcp_clean_rtx_queue net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3111 [inline] tcp_ack+0x1b17/0x4fd0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3593 tcp_rcv_established+0x672/0x18a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5439 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2ab/0x7d0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1468 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:909 [inline] __release_sock+0x124/0x360 net/core/sock.c:2264 release_sock+0xa4/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2778 tcp_sendmsg+0x3a/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1462 inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:763 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:632 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:642 ___sys_sendmsg+0x75b/0x8a0 net/socket.c:2048 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2082 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2093 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2089 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801c154fa80 which belongs to the cache skbuff_fclone_cache of size 456 The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of 456-byte region [ffff8801c154fa80, ffff8801c154fc48) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00070553c0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801c154f080 index:0x0 flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab) raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffff8801c154f080 0000000000000000 0000000100000006 raw: ffffea00070a5a20 ffffea0006a18360 ffff8801d9ca0500 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Fixes: 737ff31 ("tcp: use sequence distance to detect reordering") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
amery
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May 11, 2018
syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().
Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.
BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48 max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
#0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
__lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
__skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
__qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
__sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
repojohnray
pushed a commit
to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y
that referenced
this issue
May 21, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 jwrdegoede#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread linux-sunxi#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ linux-sunxi#26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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May 22, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 jwrdegoede#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 jwrdegoede#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] jwrdegoede#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread linux-sunxi#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 linux-sunxi#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] linux-sunxi#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ linux-sunxi#26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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During system reboot or halt, with lockdep enabled:
================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
4.18.0-rc1-salvator-x-00002-g9203dbec90a68103 #41 Tainted: G W
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage.
reboot/2779 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
0000000098ae4ad3 (&(&rchan->lock)->rlock){?.-.}, at: rcar_dmac_shutdown+0x58/0x6c
{IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at:
lock_acquire+0x208/0x238
_raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x54
rcar_dmac_isr_channel+0x28/0x200
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1c0/0x3c8
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x34/0x88
handle_irq_event+0x48/0x78
handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc4/0x12c
generic_handle_irq+0x18/0x2c
__handle_domain_irq+0xa8/0xac
gic_handle_irq+0x78/0xbc
el1_irq+0xec/0x1c0
arch_cpu_idle+0xe8/0x1bc
default_idle_call+0x2c/0x30
do_idle+0x144/0x234
cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x24
rest_init+0x27c/0x290
start_kernel+0x430/0x45c
irq event stamp: 12177
hardirqs last enabled at (12177): [<ffffff800881d804>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x4c
hardirqs last disabled at (12176): [<ffffff800881d638>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x1c/0x60
softirqs last enabled at (11948): [<ffffff8008081da8>] __do_softirq+0x160/0x4ec
softirqs last disabled at (11935): [<ffffff80080ec948>] irq_exit+0xa0/0xfc
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&(&rchan->lock)->rlock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&(&rchan->lock)->rlock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by reboot/2779:
#0: 00000000bfabfa74 (reboot_mutex){+.+.}, at: sys_reboot+0xdc/0x208
#1: 00000000c75d8c3a (&dev->mutex){....}, at: device_shutdown+0xc8/0x1c4
#2: 00000000ebec58ec (&dev->mutex){....}, at: device_shutdown+0xd8/0x1c4
stack backtrace:
CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: reboot Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc1-salvator-x-00002-g9203dbec90a68103 #41
Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a7795 ES2.0+ (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x148
show_stack+0x14/0x1c
dump_stack+0xb0/0xf0
print_usage_bug.part.26+0x1c4/0x27c
mark_lock+0x38c/0x610
__lock_acquire+0x3fc/0x14d4
lock_acquire+0x208/0x238
_raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x54
rcar_dmac_shutdown+0x58/0x6c
platform_drv_shutdown+0x20/0x2c
device_shutdown+0x160/0x1c4
kernel_restart_prepare+0x34/0x3c
kernel_restart+0x14/0x5c
sys_reboot+0x160/0x208
el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34
rcar_dmac_stop_all_chan() takes the channel lock while stopping a
channel, but does not disable interrupts, leading to a deadlock when a
DMAC interrupt comes in. Before, the same code block was called from an
interrupt handler, hence taking the spinlock was sufficient.
Fix this by disabling local interrupts while taking the spinlock.
Fixes: 9203dbe ("dmaengine: rcar-dmac: don't use DMAC error interrupt")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
amery
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Nov 7, 2018
Fix double-free that happens when thermal zone setup fails, see KASAN log below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in __hwmon_device_register+0x5dc/0xa7c CPU: 0 PID: 132 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G B 4.19.0-rc8-next-20181016-00042-gb52cd80401e9-dirty #41 Hardware name: NVIDIA Tegra SoC (Flattened Device Tree) Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func Backtrace: [<c0110540>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c0110944>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c0110924>] (show_stack) from [<c105cb08>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xb0) [<c105ca6c>] (dump_stack) from [<c02fdaec>] (print_address_description+0x68/0x250) [<c02fda84>] (print_address_description) from [<c02fd4ac>] (kasan_report_invalid_free+0x68/0x88) [<c02fd444>] (kasan_report_invalid_free) from [<c02fc85c>] (__kasan_slab_free+0x1f4/0x200) [<c02fc668>] (__kasan_slab_free) from [<c02fd0c0>] (kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x18) [<c02fd0ac>] (kasan_slab_free) from [<c02f9c6c>] (kfree+0x90/0x294) [<c02f9bdc>] (kfree) from [<c0b41bbc>] (__hwmon_device_register+0x5dc/0xa7c) [<c0b415e0>] (__hwmon_device_register) from [<c0b421e8>] (hwmon_device_register_with_info+0xa0/0xa8) [<c0b42148>] (hwmon_device_register_with_info) from [<c0b42324>] (devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info+0x74/0xb4) [<c0b422b0>] (devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info) from [<c0b4481c>] (lm90_probe+0x414/0x578) [<c0b44408>] (lm90_probe) from [<c0aeeff4>] (i2c_device_probe+0x35c/0x384) [<c0aeec98>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c08776cc>] (really_probe+0x290/0x3e4) [<c087743c>] (really_probe) from [<c0877a2c>] (driver_probe_device+0x80/0x1c4) [<c08779ac>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0877da8>] (__device_attach_driver+0x104/0x11c) [<c0877ca4>] (__device_attach_driver) from [<c0874dd8>] (bus_for_each_drv+0xa4/0xc8) [<c0874d34>] (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c08773b0>] (__device_attach+0xf0/0x15c) [<c08772c0>] (__device_attach) from [<c0877e24>] (device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x20) [<c0877e08>] (device_initial_probe) from [<c08762f4>] (bus_probe_device+0xdc/0xec) [<c0876218>] (bus_probe_device) from [<c0876a08>] (deferred_probe_work_func+0xa8/0xd4) [<c0876960>] (deferred_probe_work_func) from [<c01527c4>] (process_one_work+0x3dc/0x96c) [<c01523e8>] (process_one_work) from [<c01541e0>] (worker_thread+0x4ec/0x8bc) [<c0153cf4>] (worker_thread) from [<c015b238>] (kthread+0x230/0x240) [<c015b008>] (kthread) from [<c01010bc>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38) Exception stack(0xcf743fb0 to 0xcf743ff8) 3fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 Allocated by task 132: kasan_kmalloc.part.1+0x58/0xf4 kasan_kmalloc+0x90/0xa4 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x90/0x2a0 __hwmon_device_register+0xbc/0xa7c hwmon_device_register_with_info+0xa0/0xa8 devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info+0x74/0xb4 lm90_probe+0x414/0x578 i2c_device_probe+0x35c/0x384 really_probe+0x290/0x3e4 driver_probe_device+0x80/0x1c4 __device_attach_driver+0x104/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0xa4/0xc8 __device_attach+0xf0/0x15c device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x20 bus_probe_device+0xdc/0xec deferred_probe_work_func+0xa8/0xd4 process_one_work+0x3dc/0x96c worker_thread+0x4ec/0x8bc kthread+0x230/0x240 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38 (null) Freed by task 132: __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x200 kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x18 kfree+0x90/0x294 hwmon_dev_release+0x1c/0x20 device_release+0x4c/0xe8 kobject_put+0xac/0x11c device_unregister+0x2c/0x30 __hwmon_device_register+0xa58/0xa7c hwmon_device_register_with_info+0xa0/0xa8 devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info+0x74/0xb4 lm90_probe+0x414/0x578 i2c_device_probe+0x35c/0x384 really_probe+0x290/0x3e4 driver_probe_device+0x80/0x1c4 __device_attach_driver+0x104/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0xa4/0xc8 __device_attach+0xf0/0x15c device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x20 bus_probe_device+0xdc/0xec deferred_probe_work_func+0xa8/0xd4 process_one_work+0x3dc/0x96c worker_thread+0x4ec/0x8bc kthread+0x230/0x240 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38 (null) Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.15+ Fixes: 47c332d ("hwmon: Deal with errors from the thermal subsystem") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
amery
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Nov 9, 2018
Increase kasan instrumented kernel stack size from 32k to 64k. Other architectures seems to get away with just doubling kernel stack size under kasan, but on s390 this appears to be not enough due to bigger frame size. The particular pain point is kasan inlined checks (CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE vs CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE). With inlined checks one particular case hitting stack overflow is fs sync on xfs filesystem: #0 [9a0681e8] 704 bytes check_usage at 34b1fc #1 [9a0684a8] 432 bytes check_usage at 34c710 #2 [9a068658] 1048 bytes validate_chain at 35044a #3 [9a068a70] 312 bytes __lock_acquire at 3559fe #4 [9a068ba8] 440 bytes lock_acquire at 3576ee #5 [9a068d60] 104 bytes _raw_spin_lock at 21b44e0 #6 [9a068dc8] 1992 bytes enqueue_entity at 2dbf72 #7 [9a069590] 1496 bytes enqueue_task_fair at 2df5f0 #8 [9a069b68] 64 bytes ttwu_do_activate at 28f438 #9 [9a069ba8] 552 bytes try_to_wake_up at 298c4c #10 [9a069dd0] 168 bytes wake_up_worker at 23f97c #11 [9a069e78] 200 bytes insert_work at 23fc2e #12 [9a069f40] 648 bytes __queue_work at 2487c0 #13 [9a06a1c8] 200 bytes __queue_delayed_work at 24db28 #14 [9a06a290] 248 bytes mod_delayed_work_on at 24de84 #15 [9a06a388] 24 bytes kblockd_mod_delayed_work_on at 153e2a0 #16 [9a06a3a0] 288 bytes __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue at 158168c #17 [9a06a4c0] 192 bytes blk_mq_run_hw_queue at 1581a3c #18 [9a06a580] 184 bytes blk_mq_sched_insert_requests at 15a2192 #19 [9a06a638] 1024 bytes blk_mq_flush_plug_list at 1590f3a #20 [9a06aa38] 704 bytes blk_flush_plug_list at 1555028 #21 [9a06acf8] 320 bytes schedule at 219e476 #22 [9a06ae38] 760 bytes schedule_timeout at 21b0aac #23 [9a06b130] 408 bytes wait_for_common at 21a1706 #24 [9a06b2c8] 360 bytes xfs_buf_iowait at fa1540 #25 [9a06b430] 256 bytes __xfs_buf_submit at fadae6 #26 [9a06b530] 264 bytes xfs_buf_read_map at fae3f6 #27 [9a06b638] 656 bytes xfs_trans_read_buf_map at 10ac9a8 #28 [9a06b8c8] 304 bytes xfs_btree_kill_root at e72426 #29 [9a06b9f8] 288 bytes xfs_btree_lookup_get_block at e7bc5e #30 [9a06bb18] 624 bytes xfs_btree_lookup at e7e1a6 #31 [9a06bd88] 2664 bytes xfs_alloc_ag_vextent_near at dfa070 #32 [9a06c7f0] 144 bytes xfs_alloc_ag_vextent at dff3ca #33 [9a06c880] 1128 bytes xfs_alloc_vextent at e05fce #34 [9a06cce8] 584 bytes xfs_bmap_btalloc at e58342 #35 [9a06cf30] 1336 bytes xfs_bmapi_write at e618de #36 [9a06d468] 776 bytes xfs_iomap_write_allocate at ff678e #37 [9a06d770] 720 bytes xfs_map_blocks at f82af8 #38 [9a06da40] 928 bytes xfs_writepage_map at f83cd6 #39 [9a06dde0] 320 bytes xfs_do_writepage at f85872 #40 [9a06df20] 1320 bytes write_cache_pages at 73dfe8 #41 [9a06e448] 208 bytes xfs_vm_writepages at f7f892 #42 [9a06e518] 88 bytes do_writepages at 73fe6a #43 [9a06e570] 872 bytes __writeback_single_inode at a20cb6 #44 [9a06e8d8] 664 bytes writeback_sb_inodes at a23be2 #45 [9a06eb70] 296 bytes __writeback_inodes_wb at a242e0 #46 [9a06ec98] 928 bytes wb_writeback at a2500e #47 [9a06f038] 848 bytes wb_do_writeback at a260ae #48 [9a06f388] 536 bytes wb_workfn at a28228 #49 [9a06f5a0] 1088 bytes process_one_work at 24a234 #50 [9a06f9e0] 1120 bytes worker_thread at 24ba26 #51 [9a06fe40] 104 bytes kthread at 26545a #52 [9a06fea8] kernel_thread_starter at 21b6b62 To be able to increase the stack size to 64k reuse LLILL instruction in __switch_to function to load 64k - STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD - __PT_SIZE (65192) value as unsigned. Reported-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
amery
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Dec 20, 2018
Add napi_disable routine in gro_cells_destroy since starting from commit c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") gro_cell_poll and gro_cells_destroy can run concurrently on napi_skbs list producing a kernel Oops if the tunnel interface is removed while gro_cell_poll is running. The following Oops has been triggered removing a vxlan device while the interface is receiving traffic [ 5628.948853] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 [ 5628.949981] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 5628.950308] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [ 5628.950748] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #41 [ 5628.952940] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.955615] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.956250] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.957102] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.957940] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.958803] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.959661] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.960682] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.961616] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.962359] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.963188] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.964034] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.964871] Call Trace: [ 5628.965179] net_rx_action+0xf0/0x380 [ 5628.965637] __do_softirq+0xc7/0x431 [ 5628.966510] run_ksoftirqd+0x24/0x30 [ 5628.966957] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc5/0x160 [ 5628.967436] kthread+0x113/0x130 [ 5628.968283] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 5628.968721] Modules linked in: [ 5628.969099] CR2: 0000000000000008 [ 5628.969510] ---[ end trace 9d9dedc7181661fe ]--- [ 5628.970073] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.972965] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.973611] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.974504] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.975462] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.976413] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.977375] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.978296] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.979327] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.980044] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.980929] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.981736] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.982409] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 5628.983307] Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
repojohnray
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Jan 10, 2019
[ Upstream commit 8e1da73 ] Add napi_disable routine in gro_cells_destroy since starting from commit c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") gro_cell_poll and gro_cells_destroy can run concurrently on napi_skbs list producing a kernel Oops if the tunnel interface is removed while gro_cell_poll is running. The following Oops has been triggered removing a vxlan device while the interface is receiving traffic [ 5628.948853] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 [ 5628.949981] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 5628.950308] Oops: 0002 [jwrdegoede#1] SMP PTI [ 5628.950748] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ linux-sunxi#41 [ 5628.952940] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.955615] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.956250] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.957102] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.957940] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.958803] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.959661] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.960682] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.961616] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.962359] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.963188] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.964034] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.964871] Call Trace: [ 5628.965179] net_rx_action+0xf0/0x380 [ 5628.965637] __do_softirq+0xc7/0x431 [ 5628.966510] run_ksoftirqd+0x24/0x30 [ 5628.966957] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc5/0x160 [ 5628.967436] kthread+0x113/0x130 [ 5628.968283] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 5628.968721] Modules linked in: [ 5628.969099] CR2: 0000000000000008 [ 5628.969510] ---[ end trace 9d9dedc7181661fe ]--- [ 5628.970073] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.972965] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.973611] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.974504] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.975462] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.976413] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.977375] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.978296] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.979327] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.980044] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.980929] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.981736] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.982409] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 5628.983307] Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
repojohnray
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this issue
Jan 10, 2019
[ Upstream commit 8e1da73 ] Add napi_disable routine in gro_cells_destroy since starting from commit c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") gro_cell_poll and gro_cells_destroy can run concurrently on napi_skbs list producing a kernel Oops if the tunnel interface is removed while gro_cell_poll is running. The following Oops has been triggered removing a vxlan device while the interface is receiving traffic [ 5628.948853] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 [ 5628.949981] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 5628.950308] Oops: 0002 [jwrdegoede#1] SMP PTI [ 5628.950748] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ linux-sunxi#41 [ 5628.952940] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.955615] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.956250] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.957102] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.957940] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.958803] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.959661] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.960682] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.961616] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.962359] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.963188] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.964034] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.964871] Call Trace: [ 5628.965179] net_rx_action+0xf0/0x380 [ 5628.965637] __do_softirq+0xc7/0x431 [ 5628.966510] run_ksoftirqd+0x24/0x30 [ 5628.966957] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc5/0x160 [ 5628.967436] kthread+0x113/0x130 [ 5628.968283] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 5628.968721] Modules linked in: [ 5628.969099] CR2: 0000000000000008 [ 5628.969510] ---[ end trace 9d9dedc7181661fe ]--- [ 5628.970073] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.972965] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.973611] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.974504] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.975462] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.976413] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.977375] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.978296] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.979327] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.980044] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.980929] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.981736] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.982409] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 5628.983307] Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: c42858e ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jwrdegoede
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Aug 10, 2019
There is a potential deadlock in rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch() whereby rxrpc_put_peer() is called with the peer_hash_lock held, but if it reduces the peer's refcount to 0, rxrpc_put_peer() calls __rxrpc_put_peer() - which the tries to take the already held lock. Fix this by providing a version of rxrpc_put_peer() that can be called in situations where the lock is already held. The bug may produce the following lockdep report: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.2.0-next-20190718 linux-sunxi#41 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/0:3/21678 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock_bh /./include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: __rxrpc_put_peer /net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:415 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: rxrpc_put_peer+0x2d3/0x6a0 /net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:435 but task is already holding lock: 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock_bh /./include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch /net/rxrpc/peer_event.c:378 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x6b3/0xd02 /net/rxrpc/peer_event.c:430 Fixes: 330bdcf ("rxrpc: Fix the keepalive generator [ver #2]") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
repojohnray
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Sep 13, 2019
[ Upstream commit 60034d3 ] There is a potential deadlock in rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch() whereby rxrpc_put_peer() is called with the peer_hash_lock held, but if it reduces the peer's refcount to 0, rxrpc_put_peer() calls __rxrpc_put_peer() - which the tries to take the already held lock. Fix this by providing a version of rxrpc_put_peer() that can be called in situations where the lock is already held. The bug may produce the following lockdep report: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.2.0-next-20190718 linux-sunxi#41 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/0:3/21678 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock_bh /./include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: __rxrpc_put_peer /net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:415 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: rxrpc_put_peer+0x2d3/0x6a0 /net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:435 but task is already holding lock: 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock_bh /./include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch /net/rxrpc/peer_event.c:378 [inline] 00000000aa5eecdf (&(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x6b3/0xd02 /net/rxrpc/peer_event.c:430 Fixes: 330bdcf ("rxrpc: Fix the keepalive generator [ver jwrdegoede#2]") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jwrdegoede
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Dec 23, 2019
…A memory with different size" The TI CPSW(s) driver produces warning with DMA API debug options enabled: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1033 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1025 check_unmap+0x4a8/0x968 DMA-API: cpsw 48484000.ethernet: device driver frees DMA memory with different size [device address=0x00000000abc6aa02] [map size=64 bytes] [unmap size=42 bytes] CPU: 0 PID: 1033 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.3.0-dirty linux-sunxi#41 Hardware name: Generic DRA72X (Flattened Device Tree) [<c0112c60>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010d270>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c010d270>] (show_stack) from [<c09bc564>] (dump_stack+0xd8/0x110) [<c09bc564>] (dump_stack) from [<c013b93c>] (__warn+0xe0/0x10c) [<c013b93c>] (__warn) from [<c013b9ac>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x44/0x6c) [<c013b9ac>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c01e0368>] (check_unmap+0x4a8/0x968) [<c01e0368>] (check_unmap) from [<c01e08a8>] (debug_dma_unmap_page+0x80/0x90) [<c01e08a8>] (debug_dma_unmap_page) from [<c0752414>] (__cpdma_chan_free+0x114/0x16c) [<c0752414>] (__cpdma_chan_free) from [<c07525c4>] (__cpdma_chan_process+0x158/0x17c) [<c07525c4>] (__cpdma_chan_process) from [<c0753690>] (cpdma_chan_process+0x3c/0x5c) [<c0753690>] (cpdma_chan_process) from [<c0758660>] (cpsw_tx_mq_poll+0x48/0x94) [<c0758660>] (cpsw_tx_mq_poll) from [<c0803018>] (net_rx_action+0x108/0x4e4) [<c0803018>] (net_rx_action) from [<c010230c>] (__do_softirq+0xec/0x598) [<c010230c>] (__do_softirq) from [<c0143914>] (do_softirq.part.4+0x68/0x74) [<c0143914>] (do_softirq.part.4) from [<c0143a44>] (__local_bh_enable_ip+0x124/0x17c) [<c0143a44>] (__local_bh_enable_ip) from [<c0871590>] (ip_finish_output2+0x294/0xb7c) [<c0871590>] (ip_finish_output2) from [<c0875440>] (ip_output+0x210/0x364) [<c0875440>] (ip_output) from [<c0875e2c>] (ip_send_skb+0x1c/0xf8) [<c0875e2c>] (ip_send_skb) from [<c08a7fd4>] (raw_sendmsg+0x9a8/0xc74) [<c08a7fd4>] (raw_sendmsg) from [<c07d6b90>] (sock_sendmsg+0x14/0x24) [<c07d6b90>] (sock_sendmsg) from [<c07d8260>] (__sys_sendto+0xbc/0x100) [<c07d8260>] (__sys_sendto) from [<c01011ac>] (__sys_trace_return+0x0/0x14) Exception stack(0xea9a7fa8 to 0xea9a7ff0) ... The reason is that cpdma_chan_submit_si() now stores original buffer length (sw_len) in CPDMA descriptor instead of adjusted buffer length (hw_len) used to map the buffer. Hence, fix an issue by passing correct buffer length in CPDMA descriptor. Cc: Ivan Khoronzhuk <[email protected]> Fixes: 6670aca ("net: ethernet: ti: davinci_cpdma: add dma mapped submit") Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ivan Khoronzhuk <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Jul 13, 2020
ib_pd is accessed internally during destroy of the TIR/TIS, but PD can be not set yet. This leading to the following kernel panic. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000074 PGD 8000000079eaa067 P4D 8000000079eaa067 PUD 7ae81067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 709 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3 linux-sunxi#41 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:destroy_raw_packet_qp_tis drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c:1189 [inline] RIP: 0010:destroy_raw_packet_qp drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c:1527 [inline] RIP: 0010:destroy_qp_common+0x2ca/0x4f0 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c:2397 Code: 00 85 c0 74 2e e8 56 18 55 ff 48 8d b3 28 01 00 00 48 89 ef e8 d7 d3 ff ff 48 8b 43 08 8b b3 c0 01 00 00 48 8b bd a8 0a 00 00 <0f> b7 50 74 e8 0d 6a fe ff e8 28 18 55 ff 49 8d 55 50 4c 89 f1 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900007bbac8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88807949e800 RCX: 0000000000000998 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88807c180140 RBP: ffff88807b50c000 R08: 000000000002d379 R09: ffffc900007bba00 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000002d358 R12: ffff888076f37000 R13: ffff88807949e9c8 R14: ffffc900007bbe08 R15: ffff888076f37000 FS: 00000000019bf940(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000074 CR3: 0000000076d68004 CR4: 0000000000360ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: mlx5_ib_create_qp+0xf36/0xf90 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c:3014 _ib_create_qp drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h:333 [inline] create_qp+0x57f/0xd20 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1443 ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xcf/0x100 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1564 ib_uverbs_write+0x5fa/0x780 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:664 __vfs_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/read_write.c:495 vfs_write+0xc7/0x1f0 fs/read_write.c:559 ksys_write+0x5e/0x110 fs/read_write.c:612 do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:359 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x466479 Code: Bad RIP value. RSP: 002b:00007ffd057b62b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000466479 RDX: 0000000000000070 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000019bf8fc R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 0000000000000bf6 R14: 00000000004cb859 R15: 00000000006fefc0 Fixes: 6c41965 ("RDMA/mlx5: Don't access ib_qp fields in internal destroy QP path") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
repojohnray
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Aug 6, 2020
[ Upstream commit a2ec905 ] Fix kernel oops observed when an ext adv data is larger than 31 bytes. This can be reproduced by setting up an advertiser with advertisement larger than 31 bytes. The issue is not sensitive to the advertisement content. In particular, this was reproduced with an advertisement of 229 bytes filled with 'A'. See stack trace below. This is fixed by not catching ext_adv as legacy adv are only cached to be able to concatenate a scanable adv with its scan response before sending it up through mgmt. With ext_adv, this is no longer necessary. general protection fault: 0000 [jwrdegoede#1] SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 205 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-37-generic linux-sunxi#41-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 7590/0CF6RR, BIOS 1.7.0 05/11/2020 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth] RIP: 0010:hci_bdaddr_list_lookup+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth] Code: ff ff e9 26 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8b 07 48 89 e5 48 39 c7 75 0a eb 24 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 1c 44 8b 06 <44> 39 40 10 75 ef 44 0f b7 4e 04 66 44 39 48 14 75 e3 38 50 16 75 RSP: 0018:ffffbc6a40493c70 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 4141414141414141 RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9903e76c100f RDI: ffff9904289d4b28 RBP: ffffbc6a40493c70 R08: 0000000093570362 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9904344eae38 R12: ffff9904289d4000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffa3 R15: ffff9903e76c100f FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff990434580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007feed125a000 CR3: 00000001b860a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Call Trace: process_adv_report+0x12e/0x560 [bluetooth] hci_le_meta_evt+0x7b2/0xba0 [bluetooth] hci_event_packet+0x1c29/0x2a90 [bluetooth] hci_rx_work+0x19b/0x360 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x400 kthread+0x104/0x140 Fixes: c215e93 ("Bluetooth: Process extended ADV report event") Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <[email protected]> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Reported-by: Balakrishna Godavarthi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alain Michaud <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sonny Sasaka <[email protected]> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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May 31, 2021
Commit f5ce815 ("scsi: target: tcmu: Support DATA_BLOCK_SIZE = N * PAGE_SIZE") introduced xas_next() calls to iterate xarray elements. These calls triggered the WARNING "suspicious RCU usage" at tcmu device set up [1]. In the call stack of xas_next(), xas_load() was called. According to its comment, this function requires "the xa_lock or the RCU lock". To avoid the warning: - Guard the small loop calling xas_next() in tcmu_get_empty_block with RCU lock. - In the large loop in tcmu_copy_data using RCU lock would possibly disable preemtion for a long time (copy multi MBs). Therefore replace XA_STATE, xas_set and xas_next with a single xa_load. [1] [ 1899.867091] ============================= [ 1899.871199] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 1899.875310] 5.13.0-rc1+ linux-sunxi#41 Not tainted [ 1899.879222] ----------------------------- [ 1899.883299] include/linux/xarray.h:1182 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 1899.890940] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1899.899082] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 1899.905719] 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/1368: [ 1899.910161] #0: ffffa1f8c8b98738 ((wq_completion)target_submission){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ee/0x580 [ 1899.920732] #1: ffffbd7040cd7e78 ((work_completion)(&q->sq.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ee/0x580 [ 1899.931146] #2: ffffa1f8d1c99768 (&udev->cmdr_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: tcmu_queue_cmd+0xea/0x160 [target_core_user] [ 1899.941678] stack backtrace: [ 1899.946093] CPU: 0 PID: 1368 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1+ linux-sunxi#41 [ 1899.953070] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME Z270-A, BIOS 1302 03/15/2018 [ 1899.962459] Workqueue: target_submission target_queued_submit_work [target_core_mod] [ 1899.970337] Call Trace: [ 1899.972839] dump_stack+0x6d/0x89 [ 1899.976222] xas_descend+0x10e/0x120 [ 1899.979875] xas_load+0x39/0x50 [ 1899.983077] tcmu_get_empty_blocks+0x115/0x1c0 [target_core_user] [ 1899.989318] queue_cmd_ring+0x1da/0x630 [target_core_user] [ 1899.994897] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1899.999695] ? trace_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0 [ 1900.003501] ? __kmalloc+0x205/0x380 [ 1900.007167] tcmu_queue_cmd+0x12f/0x160 [target_core_user] [ 1900.012746] __target_execute_cmd+0x23/0xa0 [target_core_mod] [ 1900.018589] transport_generic_new_cmd+0x1f3/0x370 [target_core_mod] [ 1900.025046] transport_handle_cdb_direct+0x34/0x50 [target_core_mod] [ 1900.031517] target_queued_submit_work+0x43/0xe0 [target_core_mod] [ 1900.037837] process_one_work+0x268/0x580 [ 1900.041952] ? process_one_work+0x580/0x580 [ 1900.046195] worker_thread+0x55/0x3b0 [ 1900.049921] ? process_one_work+0x580/0x580 [ 1900.054192] kthread+0x143/0x160 [ 1900.057499] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 [ 1900.062661] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f5ce815 ("scsi: target: tcmu: Support DATA_BLOCK_SIZE = N * PAGE_SIZE") Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bodo Stroesser <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
jwrdegoede
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Oct 5, 2022
NULL pointer dereference is triggered when calling thp split via debugfs on the system with offlined memory blocks. With debug option enabled, the following kernel messages are printed out: page:00000000467f4890 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x121c000 flags: 0x17fffc00000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) raw: 0017fffc00000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: unmovable page page:000000007d7ab72e is uninitialized and poisoned page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(p)) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1248! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 16 PID: 20964 Comm: bash Tainted: G I 6.0.0-rc3-foll-numa+ linux-sunxi#41 ... RIP: 0010:split_huge_pages_write+0xcf4/0xe30 This shows that page_to_nid() in page_zone() is unexpectedly called for an offlined memmap. Use pfn_to_online_page() to get struct page in PFN walker. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") [visible after d0dc12e] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [5.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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Nov 2, 2023
…>cur_tx KCSAN reported the following data-race: ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rtl8169_poll [r8169] / rtl8169_start_xmit [r8169] write (marked) to 0xffff888102474b74 of 4 bytes by task 5358 on cpu 29: rtl8169_start_xmit (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4254) r8169 dev_hard_start_xmit (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4889 ./include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 net/core/dev.c:3544 net/core/dev.c:3560) sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:342) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3817 net/core/dev.c:4306) ip_finish_output2 (./include/linux/netdevice.h:3082 ./include/net/neighbour.h:526 ./include/net/neighbour.h:540 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:233) __ip_finish_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:311 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:293) ip_finish_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:328) ip_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:435) ip_send_skb (./include/net/dst.h:458 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:127 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1486) udp_send_skb (net/ipv4/udp.c:963) udp_sendmsg (net/ipv4/udp.c:1246) inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:840 (discriminator 4)) sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:730 net/socket.c:753) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2177) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2185) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) read to 0xffff888102474b74 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 21: rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4397 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4581) r8169 __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6527) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6596 net/core/dev.c:6727) __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:553) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:632) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:647) common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 (discriminator 14)) asm_common_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:636) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:291) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:390) call_cpuidle (kernel/sched/idle.c:135) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:219 kernel/sched/idle.c:282) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:378 (discriminator 1)) start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:210 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:294) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:433) value changed: 0x002f4815 -> 0x002f4816 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 21 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/21 Tainted: G L 6.6.0-rc2-kcsan-00143-gb5cbe7c00aa0 linux-sunxi#41 Hardware name: ASRock X670E PG Lightning/X670E PG Lightning, BIOS 1.21 04/26/2023 ================================================================== The write side of drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c is: ================== 4251 /* rtl_tx needs to see descriptor changes before updated tp->cur_tx */ 4252 smp_wmb(); 4253 → 4254 WRITE_ONCE(tp->cur_tx, tp->cur_tx + frags + 1); 4255 4256 stop_queue = !netif_subqueue_maybe_stop(dev, 0, rtl_tx_slots_avail(tp), 4257 R8169_TX_STOP_THRS, 4258 R8169_TX_START_THRS); The read side is the function rtl_tx(): 4355 static void rtl_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct rtl8169_private *tp, 4356 int budget) 4357 { 4358 unsigned int dirty_tx, bytes_compl = 0, pkts_compl = 0; 4359 struct sk_buff *skb; 4360 4361 dirty_tx = tp->dirty_tx; 4362 4363 while (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx) { 4364 unsigned int entry = dirty_tx % NUM_TX_DESC; 4365 u32 status; 4366 4367 status = le32_to_cpu(tp->TxDescArray[entry].opts1); 4368 if (status & DescOwn) 4369 break; 4370 4371 skb = tp->tx_skb[entry].skb; 4372 rtl8169_unmap_tx_skb(tp, entry); 4373 4374 if (skb) { 4375 pkts_compl++; 4376 bytes_compl += skb->len; 4377 napi_consume_skb(skb, budget); 4378 } 4379 dirty_tx++; 4380 } 4381 4382 if (tp->dirty_tx != dirty_tx) { 4383 dev_sw_netstats_tx_add(dev, pkts_compl, bytes_compl); 4384 WRITE_ONCE(tp->dirty_tx, dirty_tx); 4385 4386 netif_subqueue_completed_wake(dev, 0, pkts_compl, bytes_compl, 4387 rtl_tx_slots_avail(tp), 4388 R8169_TX_START_THRS); 4389 /* 4390 * 8168 hack: TxPoll requests are lost when the Tx packets are 4391 * too close. Let's kick an extra TxPoll request when a burst 4392 * of start_xmit activity is detected (if it is not detected, 4393 * it is slow enough). -- FR 4394 * If skb is NULL then we come here again once a tx irq is 4395 * triggered after the last fragment is marked transmitted. 4396 */ → 4397 if (tp->cur_tx != dirty_tx && skb) 4398 rtl8169_doorbell(tp); 4399 } 4400 } Obviously from the code, an earlier detected data-race for tp->cur_tx was fixed in the line 4363: 4363 while (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx) { but the same solution is required for protecting the other access to tp->cur_tx: → 4397 if (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx && skb) 4398 rtl8169_doorbell(tp); The write in the line 4254 is protected with WRITE_ONCE(), but the read in the line 4397 might have suffered read tearing under some compiler optimisations. The fix eliminated the KCSAN data-race report for this bug. It is yet to be evaluated what happens if tp->cur_tx changes between the test in line 4363 and line 4397. This test should certainly not be cached by the compiler in some register for such a long time, while asynchronous writes to tp->cur_tx might have occurred in line 4254 in the meantime. Fixes: 94d8a98 ("r8169: reduce number of workaround doorbell rings") Cc: Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <[email protected]> Acked-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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this issue
Nov 2, 2023
…cArray[entry].opts1 KCSAN reported the following data-race: ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4368 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4581) r8169 race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff888140d37570 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 21: rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4368 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4581) r8169 __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6527) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6596 net/core/dev.c:6727) __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:553) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:632) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:647) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1074 (discriminator 14)) asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:645) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:291) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:390) call_cpuidle (kernel/sched/idle.c:135) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:219 kernel/sched/idle.c:282) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:378 (discriminator 1)) start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:210 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:294) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:433) value changed: 0xb0000042 -> 0x00000000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 21 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/21 Tainted: G L 6.6.0-rc2-kcsan-00143-gb5cbe7c00aa0 linux-sunxi#41 Hardware name: ASRock X670E PG Lightning/X670E PG Lightning, BIOS 1.21 04/26/2023 ================================================================== The read side is in drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c ========================================= 4355 static void rtl_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct rtl8169_private *tp, 4356 int budget) 4357 { 4358 unsigned int dirty_tx, bytes_compl = 0, pkts_compl = 0; 4359 struct sk_buff *skb; 4360 4361 dirty_tx = tp->dirty_tx; 4362 4363 while (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx) { 4364 unsigned int entry = dirty_tx % NUM_TX_DESC; 4365 u32 status; 4366 → 4367 status = le32_to_cpu(tp->TxDescArray[entry].opts1); 4368 if (status & DescOwn) 4369 break; 4370 4371 skb = tp->tx_skb[entry].skb; 4372 rtl8169_unmap_tx_skb(tp, entry); 4373 4374 if (skb) { 4375 pkts_compl++; 4376 bytes_compl += skb->len; 4377 napi_consume_skb(skb, budget); 4378 } 4379 dirty_tx++; 4380 } 4381 4382 if (tp->dirty_tx != dirty_tx) { 4383 dev_sw_netstats_tx_add(dev, pkts_compl, bytes_compl); 4384 WRITE_ONCE(tp->dirty_tx, dirty_tx); 4385 4386 netif_subqueue_completed_wake(dev, 0, pkts_compl, bytes_compl, 4387 rtl_tx_slots_avail(tp), 4388 R8169_TX_START_THRS); 4389 /* 4390 * 8168 hack: TxPoll requests are lost when the Tx packets are 4391 * too close. Let's kick an extra TxPoll request when a burst 4392 * of start_xmit activity is detected (if it is not detected, 4393 * it is slow enough). -- FR 4394 * If skb is NULL then we come here again once a tx irq is 4395 * triggered after the last fragment is marked transmitted. 4396 */ 4397 if (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx && skb) 4398 rtl8169_doorbell(tp); 4399 } 4400 } tp->TxDescArray[entry].opts1 is reported to have a data-race and READ_ONCE() fixes this KCSAN warning. 4366 → 4367 status = le32_to_cpu(READ_ONCE(tp->TxDescArray[entry].opts1)); 4368 if (status & DescOwn) 4369 break; 4370 Cc: Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <[email protected]> Acked-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Nov 2, 2023
…>opts1 KCSAN reported the following data-race bug: ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4430 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4583) r8169 race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff888117e43510 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 21: rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4430 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4583) r8169 __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6527) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6596 net/core/dev.c:6727) __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:553) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:632) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:647) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1074 (discriminator 14)) asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:645) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:291) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:390) call_cpuidle (kernel/sched/idle.c:135) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:219 kernel/sched/idle.c:282) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:378 (discriminator 1)) start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:210 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:294) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:433) value changed: 0x80003fff -> 0x3402805f Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 21 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/21 Tainted: G L 6.6.0-rc2-kcsan-00143-gb5cbe7c00aa0 linux-sunxi#41 Hardware name: ASRock X670E PG Lightning/X670E PG Lightning, BIOS 1.21 04/26/2023 ================================================================== drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c: ========================================== 4429 → 4430 status = le32_to_cpu(desc->opts1); 4431 if (status & DescOwn) 4432 break; 4433 4434 /* This barrier is needed to keep us from reading 4435 * any other fields out of the Rx descriptor until 4436 * we know the status of DescOwn 4437 */ 4438 dma_rmb(); 4439 4440 if (unlikely(status & RxRES)) { 4441 if (net_ratelimit()) 4442 netdev_warn(dev, "Rx ERROR. status = %08x\n", Marco Elver explained that dma_rmb() doesn't prevent the compiler to tear up the access to desc->opts1 which can be written to concurrently. READ_ONCE() should prevent that from happening: 4429 → 4430 status = le32_to_cpu(READ_ONCE(desc->opts1)); 4431 if (status & DescOwn) 4432 break; 4433 As the consequence of this fix, this KCSAN warning was eliminated. Fixes: 6202806 ("r8169: drop member opts1_mask from struct rtl8169_private") Suggested-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <[email protected]> Acked-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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I succeeded to compile and start my own kernel, using the branch allwinner-v3.0-
android-v2 ...
But when I install the sata module (sw_ahci_platform) I have this error:
<6>ata1: EH complete
<3>ata1: exception Emask 0x10 SAct 0x0 SErr 0x4000000 action 0xe frozen
ata1: exception Emask 0x10 SAct 0x0 SErr 0x4000000 action 0xe frozen
<3>ata1: irq_stat 0x00000040, connection status changed
<3>ata1: SError: { DevExch }
<4>ata1: limiting SATA link speed to 1.5 Gbps
<6>ata1: hard resetting link
<6>ata1: SATA link down (SStatus 1 SControl 310)
<6>ata1: EH complete
<3>ata1: exception Emask 0x10 SAct 0x0 SErr 0x4000000 action 0xe frozen
<3>ata1: irq_stat 0x00000040, connection status changed
<3>ata1: SError: { DevExch }
I checked the internet, some guys report a cable error, but when I boot on
Android I get this:
sw_ahci sw_ahci.0: controller can't do PMP, turning off CAP_PMP
sw_ahci sw_ahci.0: forcing PORTS_IMPL to 0x1
sw_ahci sw_ahci.0: AHCI 0001.0100 32 slots 1 ports 3 Gbps 0x1 impl platform mode
sw_ahci sw_ahci.0: flags: ncq sntf pm led clo only pio slum part ccc
scsi0 : sw_ahci_platform
ata1: SATA max UDMA/133 irq_stat 0x00400040, connection status changed irq 56
ata1: SATA link up 3.0 Gbps (SStatus 123 SControl 300)
ata1.00: native sectors (2) is smaller than sectors (1953525168)
ata1.00: ATA-8: ST1000LM024 HN-M101MBB, 2AR10002, max UDMA/133
ata1.00: 1953525168 sectors, multi 0: LBA48 NCQ (depth 31/32)
ata1.00: configured for UDMA/133
Any suggestions ?
thanks and regards,
Nik0
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