diff --git a/examples/ecdsa.c b/examples/ecdsa.c index 7e4f1b13ac86d..01088e31035af 100644 --- a/examples/ecdsa.c +++ b/examples/ecdsa.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ int main(void) { unsigned char compressed_pubkey[33]; unsigned char serialized_signature[64]; size_t len; - int is_signature_valid; + int is_signature_valid, is_signature_valid2; int return_val; secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; @@ -116,10 +116,18 @@ int main(void) { printf("Signature: "); print_hex(serialized_signature, sizeof(serialized_signature)); - /* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */ secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); + /* Bonus example: if all we need is signature verification (and no key + generation or signing), we don't need to use a context created via + secp256k1_context_create(). We can simply use the static (i.e., global) + context secp256k1_context_static. See its description in + include/secp256k1.h for details. */ + is_signature_valid2 = secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(secp256k1_context_static, + &sig, msg_hash, &pubkey); + assert(is_signature_valid2 == is_signature_valid); + /* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them. * This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for * example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), Or the OS diff --git a/examples/schnorr.c b/examples/schnorr.c index 207c45c42226e..535b59a177132 100644 --- a/examples/schnorr.c +++ b/examples/schnorr.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int main(void) { unsigned char auxiliary_rand[32]; unsigned char serialized_pubkey[32]; unsigned char signature[64]; - int is_signature_valid; + int is_signature_valid, is_signature_valid2; int return_val; secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pubkey; secp256k1_keypair keypair; @@ -135,6 +135,15 @@ int main(void) { /* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */ secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); + /* Bonus example: if all we need is signature verification (and no key + generation or signing), we don't need to use a context created via + secp256k1_context_create(). We can simply use the static (i.e., global) + context secp256k1_context_static. See its description in + include/secp256k1.h for details. */ + is_signature_valid2 = secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(secp256k1_context_static, + signature, msg_hash, 32, &pubkey); + assert(is_signature_valid2 == is_signature_valid); + /* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them. * This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for * example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), Or the OS