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implement a PCI self-assessment program #214
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This should include:
Here are the PCI SAQ Instructions and Guidelines. |
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3.pdf |
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CDE = cardholder data environment |
Is my laptop part of the CDE? |
Re: AWS, Heroku, DO:
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I requested a quote for quarterly scanning from 403 Labs, whom I discovered from https://spreedly.com/files/asv-scan-aoc.pdf. |
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Oooooooh ... MaxCDN? 😞 |
Here we go:
And:
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6.3.2 |
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Aaaaaaaaaaand scope may have just creeped to include gratipay/gratipay.com#1052. 😩 |
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Guidance on 12.8.4, re: third-party providers (e.g., Heroku, AWS, etc.):
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Okay! Finished a first pass through the spec. 🏊 |
From: 403 Labs
To: 403 Labs
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From: 403 Labs
To: 403 Labs
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To: [email protected] (per)
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One of the major changes in PCI DSS 3.0 is that applications that host payment detail forms are subject to more stringent requirements, even if they never
Incidentally, while Braintree seems to be honoring these new rules, it turns out that Stripe is bending the rules to the point of breaking: they've convinced their qualified security assessor [QSA] "and others" to let them get away with simply building an iframe in JavaScript:
That's baloney-noodles. "To be eligible for PCI DSS v3 SAQ-A, the e-commerce environment must be fully outsourced such that: 'The entirety of all payment pages delivered to the consumer’s browser originates directly from a third-party PCI DSS validated service provider(s).'" Yet Stripe instructs their users to collect payment details on a form of their own construction:
Stripe clearly is advising their customers to violate PCI DSS v3, by using Stripe.js without submitting to SAQ A-EP. Now, on the other side, PCI SSC's reasoning for allowing iframes while disallowing direct
The implication for us is that, quite apart from our intention to start storing bank account numbers, it turns out that we're already responsible for SAQ A-EP, because we're hosting our own payments form. In fact, we never even discovered (and Balanced never emphasized) that we should have at least been self-assessing under SAQ A all along. |
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SAQ-D requires two penetration tests (internal and external), roughly $5,000 to $7,000 each. Third-party attestation is ~$50,000 and 6 months. |
See gratipay/gratipay.com#3870 (comment) for a security program description that is probably parallel to PCI DSS. |
https://summitroute.com/blog/2016/03/13/downclimb/#third-party-audits |
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With gratipay/gratipay.com#3504 (comment), I'm bumping this from the "Bring Back Payroll" milestone. |
We don't store credit card numbers, but we are planning to store bank account information as well as identity verification information. We should implement a PCI self-assessment program. We would have to do this in order to receive bank info from Balanced (gratipay/gratipay.com#3379), and we should do this anyway because, while not perfect, it's an industry best practice and a good starting point for us.
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