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In short: use Argon2id if you can, use Argon2d in almost every other case, consider Argon2i if you really do need memory side-channel attack resistance.
Part of the issue here is that we fell behind on upgrading passlib. The latest version of it uses Argon2id by default (our argon2-cffi version already defaults to id).
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
The is definitely low priority, as our passphrase scheme is safe enough anyway, however of course we better keep updated with the latest standard. Did we do any hash migration in the past? If not how do we want to handle that?
The last password migration we did added a new column and did the rehashing whenever the user logged in (freedomofpress/securedrop#3506)
I think can do roughly the same thing by just looking at the hash prefix, I wrote some pseudo-code at freedomofpress/securedrop#6631 (public ticket for dropping the passlib dependency). I think it makes sense to tackle both tickets at the same time.
Given that this is low priority, is it OK to disclose and patch publicly? Or keep it private until close-to-release time? (not 2.5.0 to be clear)
Originally filed as https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-security/issues/86
We currently use Argon2i to encrypt journalist passphrases:
However, Argon2id is what's recommended these days, this SO answer goes into depth and summarizes with:
Part of the issue here is that we fell behind on upgrading passlib. The latest version of it uses Argon2id by default (our argon2-cffi version already defaults to id).
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: