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Allow setting a minimum bid value to determine whether or not to use a block supplied by the builder API #273
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I took a stab at the PR, I have minimal GO experience but it seems to work fine. |
@metachris any thoughts on this? |
Thanks for the contribution! And sorry for being slow to respond on this. It was on the radar, but due to the merge there were so many other priorities. I wonder if there's an appetite for this feature from a wider audience. Could people please signify their interest by 👍 the initial comment above? |
@jumboshrimp100, responding here to keep the PR clean. The PR/issue is just for the absolute bid and this value is not exposed to the connected relays. There is ongoing work on exposing the local block value to the CL so that the CL can compare between builder blocks and the local block. If/when that functionality is implemented in the CLs/ELs it will make min-bid in MEV-Boost largely obsolete (unless there is desire to enable 2-way communication with the relays, which may or may not make sense given the complexity/game theory/additional latency concerns) |
for reference, this is the EL APIs issue: ethereum/execution-apis#307 about exposing the block value |
@allboxes thanks for your contribution! It's a great feature. |
My minimum bid is 0.05 does it will take effect less.. can you suggest me anything |
Currently users are required to make a binary choice between using a centralized block builder or forgoing MEV.
MEV-Boost should allow user's to set a fixed fee (e.g. 0.2 ETH) under which they will use a locally produced block.
In this way validators can gain exposure to large MEV opportunities while still contributing to decentralized block building when MEV is small/non existent.
Additionally, as the CL does not currently have a view into the value of a locally produced block, this provides some protection to user's from relay's producing very low value blocks.
In the future this can be enhanced by comparing the value of the locally built block vs. the remote builder's submission and using a fee delta instead of a fixed fee.
Originally submitted as an issue to a few CLs but it was suggested that it would be better to implement it in MEV-Boost.
Consensys/teku#6140
sigp/lighthouse#3517
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