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P2P Encryption #170
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This is now #240. |
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Graceful Shutdown on SIGINT and Non-Blocking Services
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Add ether transfer log
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adding sort to masternode list
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…reshold-flag install immutability threshold flags
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Use ArbOS version 8 for Arbitrum testing
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…reum#170) * Replace `utesting/blocktraces` with git-submodule `test-traces`. * Fix to package utesting. * Update git-submodile `blocktraces` and update path in test code.
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…ployment (ethereum#170) * Remove chainID check from create2deployer pre-compile deployment * Also remove GetCodeSize check
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Nodes that already know a prior node's ID (by way of either a past session or a trusted intermediary), should be guaranteed that a connection to the same network endpoint is indeed this node. i.e. Make impossible a MitM attack.
Simple *DH key exchange cannot do this.
Following Hello, initial period of handshake involves either ECDH key exchange (if the connecting endpoint doesn't know the node ID) or ECIES encrypted key delivery (if the connecting endpoint knows the node ID). Either way, the connecting node begins the post-Hello handshake.
A. New packets:
B. Following the key delivery/exchange, ALL information, including message size and magic number runs through an (AES?) encrypted filter.
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