diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/prebuilt_rules/logic/diff/calculation/algorithms/multi_line_string_diff_algorithm.mock.ts b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/prebuilt_rules/logic/diff/calculation/algorithms/multi_line_string_diff_algorithm.mock.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..b237a9e3c0dcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/prebuilt_rules/logic/diff/calculation/algorithms/multi_line_string_diff_algorithm.mock.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright Elasticsearch B.V. and/or licensed to Elasticsearch B.V. under one
+ * or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License
+ * 2.0; you may not use this file except in compliance with the Elastic License
+ * 2.0.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Investigation guide, medium size, version A (original).
+ */
+export const TEXT_M_A =
+  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n';
+
+/**
+ * Investigation guide, medium size, version B (version A that was modified in one way).
+ * Modification: last line has been removed.
+ */
+export const TEXT_M_B =
+  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n';
+
+/**
+ * Investigation guide, medium size, version C (version A that was modified in another way).
+ * Modification: "Investigating High Number" -> "Investigating Low Number".
+ */
+export const TEXT_M_C =
+  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n';
+
+/**
+ * Investigation guide, medium size, expected result of the algorithm applied to versions A, B, and C.
+ * Changes compared to version A:
+ * - last line has been removed
+ * - "Investigating High Number" -> "Investigating Low Number"
+ */
+export const TEXT_M_MERGED =
+  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n';
+
+/**
+ * Investigation guide, extral large size, version A (original).
+ */
+export const TEXT_XL_A =
+  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n';
+
+/**
+ * Investigation guide, extral large size, version B (version A that was modified in one way).
+ * Modification: "Triage and analysis" -> "Triage or analysis".
+ */
+export const TEXT_XL_B =
+  '## Triage or analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n';
+
+/**
+ * Investigation guide, extral large size, version C (version A that was modified in another way).
+ * Modification: "Investigating High Number" -> "Investigating Low Number".
+ */
+export const TEXT_XL_C =
+  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n';
+
+/**
+ * Investigation guide, extral large size, expected result of the algorithm applied to versions A, B, and C.
+ * Changes compared to version A:
+ * - "Triage and analysis" -> "Triage or analysis"
+ * - "Investigating High Number" -> "Investigating Low Number"
+ */
+export const TEXT_XL_MERGED =
+  '## Triage or analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n';
diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/prebuilt_rules/logic/diff/calculation/algorithms/multi_line_string_diff_algorithm.test.ts b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/prebuilt_rules/logic/diff/calculation/algorithms/multi_line_string_diff_algorithm.test.ts
index ca1cba5af7044..72e87fde6ca2f 100644
--- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/prebuilt_rules/logic/diff/calculation/algorithms/multi_line_string_diff_algorithm.test.ts
+++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/prebuilt_rules/logic/diff/calculation/algorithms/multi_line_string_diff_algorithm.test.ts
@@ -13,22 +13,23 @@ import {
   ThreeWayDiffConflict,
 } from '../../../../../../../../common/api/detection_engine';
 import { multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm } from './multi_line_string_diff_algorithm';
-
-const MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD =
-  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n';
-
-const MODIFIED_MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD_1 =
-  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n';
-
-const MODIFIED_MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD_2 =
-  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n';
+import {
+  TEXT_M_A,
+  TEXT_M_B,
+  TEXT_M_C,
+  TEXT_M_MERGED,
+  TEXT_XL_A,
+  TEXT_XL_B,
+  TEXT_XL_C,
+  TEXT_XL_MERGED,
+} from './multi_line_string_diff_algorithm.mock';
 
 describe('multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm', () => {
   it('returns current_version as merged output if there is no update - scenario AAA', () => {
     const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
-      base_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
-      current_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
-      target_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
+      base_version: TEXT_M_A,
+      current_version: TEXT_M_A,
+      target_version: TEXT_M_A,
     };
 
     const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
@@ -45,9 +46,9 @@ describe('multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm', () => {
 
   it('returns current_version as merged output if current_version is different and there is no update - scenario ABA', () => {
     const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
-      base_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
-      current_version: MODIFIED_MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD_1,
-      target_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
+      base_version: TEXT_M_A,
+      current_version: TEXT_M_B,
+      target_version: TEXT_M_A,
     };
 
     const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
@@ -64,9 +65,9 @@ describe('multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm', () => {
 
   it('returns target_version as merged output if current_version is the same and there is an update - scenario AAB', () => {
     const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
-      base_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
-      current_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
-      target_version: MODIFIED_MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD_1,
+      base_version: TEXT_M_A,
+      current_version: TEXT_M_A,
+      target_version: TEXT_M_B,
     };
 
     const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
@@ -83,9 +84,9 @@ describe('multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm', () => {
 
   it('returns current_version as merged output if current version is different but it matches the update - scenario ABB', () => {
     const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
-      base_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
-      current_version: MODIFIED_MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD_1,
-      target_version: MODIFIED_MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD_1,
+      base_version: TEXT_M_A,
+      current_version: TEXT_M_B,
+      target_version: TEXT_M_B,
     };
 
     const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
@@ -101,21 +102,39 @@ describe('multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm', () => {
   });
 
   describe('if all three versions are different - scenario ABC', () => {
-    it('returns a computated merged version without a conflict if 3 way merge is possible', () => {
+    it('returns a computated merged version with a solvable conflict if 3 way merge is possible (real-world example)', () => {
       const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
-        base_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
-        current_version: MODIFIED_MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD_1,
-        target_version: MODIFIED_MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD_2,
+        base_version: TEXT_M_A,
+        current_version: TEXT_M_B,
+        target_version: TEXT_M_C,
       };
 
-      const expectedMergedVersion =
-        '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n';
+      const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
+
+      expect(result).toEqual(
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          merged_version: TEXT_M_MERGED,
+          diff_outcome: ThreeWayDiffOutcome.CustomizedValueCanUpdate,
+          conflict: ThreeWayDiffConflict.SOLVABLE,
+          merge_outcome: ThreeWayMergeOutcome.Merged,
+        })
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('returns a computated merged version with a solvable conflict if 3 way merge is possible (simplified example)', () => {
+      // 3 way merge is possible when changes are made to different lines of text
+      // (in other words, there are no different changes made to the same line of text).
+      const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
+        base_version: 'My description.\nThis is a second line.',
+        current_version: 'My MODIFIED description.\nThis is a second line.',
+        target_version: 'My description.\nThis is a MODIFIED second line.',
+      };
 
       const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
 
       expect(result).toEqual(
         expect.objectContaining({
-          merged_version: expectedMergedVersion,
+          merged_version: 'My MODIFIED description.\nThis is a MODIFIED second line.',
           diff_outcome: ThreeWayDiffOutcome.CustomizedValueCanUpdate,
           conflict: ThreeWayDiffConflict.SOLVABLE,
           merge_outcome: ThreeWayMergeOutcome.Merged,
@@ -123,11 +142,13 @@ describe('multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm', () => {
       );
     });
 
-    it('returns the current_version with a conflict if 3 way merge is not possible', () => {
+    it('returns the current_version with a non-solvable conflict if 3 way merge is not possible (simplified example)', () => {
+      // It's enough to have different changes made to the same line of text
+      // to trigger a NON_SOLVABLE conflict. This behavior is similar to how Git works.
       const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
         base_version: 'My description.\nThis is a second line.',
-        current_version: 'My GREAT description.\nThis is a third line.',
-        target_version: 'My EXCELLENT description.\nThis is a fourth.',
+        current_version: 'My GREAT description.\nThis is a second line.',
+        target_version: 'My EXCELLENT description.\nThis is a second line.',
       };
 
       const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
@@ -142,28 +163,24 @@ describe('multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm', () => {
       );
     });
 
-    it('should not exceed performance limits', () => {
+    it('does not exceed performance limits when diffing and merging extra large input texts', () => {
       const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
-        base_version:
-          '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
-        current_version:
-          '## Triage or analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
-        target_version:
-          '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
+        base_version: TEXT_XL_A,
+        current_version: TEXT_XL_B,
+        target_version: TEXT_XL_C,
       };
 
-      const expectedMergedVersion =
-        '## Triage or analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n';
-
       const startTime = performance.now();
       const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
       const endTime = performance.now();
 
-      expect(endTime - startTime).toBeLessThan(500); // If the regex merge in this function takes over 500ms, this test fails
+      // If the regex merge in this function takes over 500ms, this test fails
+      // Performance measurements: https://github.com/elastic/kibana/pull/199388
+      expect(endTime - startTime).toBeLessThan(500);
 
       expect(result).toEqual(
         expect.objectContaining({
-          merged_version: expectedMergedVersion,
+          merged_version: TEXT_XL_MERGED,
           diff_outcome: ThreeWayDiffOutcome.CustomizedValueCanUpdate,
           conflict: ThreeWayDiffConflict.SOLVABLE,
           merge_outcome: ThreeWayMergeOutcome.Merged,
@@ -176,8 +193,8 @@ describe('multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm', () => {
     it('returns current_version as merged output if current_version and target_version are the same - scenario -AA', () => {
       const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
         base_version: MissingVersion,
-        current_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
-        target_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
+        current_version: TEXT_M_A,
+        target_version: TEXT_M_A,
       };
 
       const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
@@ -197,8 +214,8 @@ describe('multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm', () => {
     it('returns target_version as merged output if current_version and target_version are different - scenario -AB', () => {
       const mockVersions: ThreeVersionsOf<string> = {
         base_version: MissingVersion,
-        current_version: MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD,
-        target_version: MODIFIED_MOCK_INVESTIGATION_GUIDE_FIELD_1,
+        current_version: TEXT_M_A,
+        target_version: TEXT_M_B,
       };
 
       const result = multiLineStringDiffAlgorithm(mockVersions);
diff --git a/x-pack/test/security_solution_api_integration/test_suites/detections_response/rules_management/prebuilt_rules/management/trial_license_complete_tier/upgrade_review_prebuilt_rules.multi_line_string_fields.ts b/x-pack/test/security_solution_api_integration/test_suites/detections_response/rules_management/prebuilt_rules/management/trial_license_complete_tier/upgrade_review_prebuilt_rules.multi_line_string_fields.ts
index a00cd90d02c03..d9c20fc28b43a 100644
--- a/x-pack/test/security_solution_api_integration/test_suites/detections_response/rules_management/prebuilt_rules/management/trial_license_complete_tier/upgrade_review_prebuilt_rules.multi_line_string_fields.ts
+++ b/x-pack/test/security_solution_api_integration/test_suites/detections_response/rules_management/prebuilt_rules/management/trial_license_complete_tier/upgrade_review_prebuilt_rules.multi_line_string_fields.ts
@@ -10,6 +10,12 @@ import {
   ThreeWayDiffOutcome,
   ThreeWayMergeOutcome,
 } from '@kbn/security-solution-plugin/common/api/detection_engine';
+import {
+  TEXT_XL_A,
+  TEXT_XL_B,
+  TEXT_XL_C,
+  TEXT_XL_MERGED,
+} from '@kbn/security-solution-plugin/server/lib/detection_engine/prebuilt_rules/logic/diff/calculation/algorithms/multi_line_string_diff_algorithm.mock';
 import { FtrProviderContext } from '../../../../../../ftr_provider_context';
 import {
   deleteAllTimelines,
@@ -250,14 +256,13 @@ export default ({ getService }: FtrProviderContext): void => {
             expect(reviewResponse.stats.num_rules_with_non_solvable_conflicts).toBe(0);
           });
 
-          it('should handle long strings without timing out', async () => {
+          it('should handle long multi-line strings without timing out', async () => {
             // Install base prebuilt detection rule
             await createHistoricalPrebuiltRuleAssetSavedObjects(es, [
               createRuleAssetSavedObject({
                 rule_id: 'rule-1',
                 version: 1,
-                description:
-                  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
+                description: TEXT_XL_A,
               }),
             ]);
             await installPrebuiltRules(es, supertest);
@@ -265,8 +270,7 @@ export default ({ getService }: FtrProviderContext): void => {
             // Customize a multi line string field on the installed rule
             await patchRule(supertest, log, {
               rule_id: 'rule-1',
-              description:
-                '## Triage or analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
+              description: TEXT_XL_B,
             });
 
             // Increment the version of the installed rule, update a multi line string field, and create the new rule assets
@@ -274,8 +278,7 @@ export default ({ getService }: FtrProviderContext): void => {
               createRuleAssetSavedObject({
                 rule_id: 'rule-1',
                 version: 2,
-                description:
-                  '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
+                description: TEXT_XL_C,
               }),
             ];
             await createHistoricalPrebuiltRuleAssetSavedObjects(es, updatedRuleAssetSavedObjects);
@@ -284,14 +287,10 @@ export default ({ getService }: FtrProviderContext): void => {
             // and multi line string field update has no conflict
             const reviewResponse = await reviewPrebuiltRulesToUpgrade(supertest);
             expect(reviewResponse.rules[0].diff.fields.description).toEqual({
-              base_version:
-                '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
-              current_version:
-                '## Triage or analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
-              target_version:
-                '## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
-              merged_version:
-                '## Triage or analysis\n\n### Investigating Low Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n',
+              base_version: TEXT_XL_A,
+              current_version: TEXT_XL_B,
+              target_version: TEXT_XL_C,
+              merged_version: TEXT_XL_MERGED,
               diff_outcome: ThreeWayDiffOutcome.CustomizedValueCanUpdate,
               merge_outcome: ThreeWayMergeOutcome.Merged,
               conflict: ThreeWayDiffConflict.SOLVABLE,