From 11397da784e5db0bf809ac085a2966dcacb6e594 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "dependabot[bot]" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 12:30:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] build(deps): bump github.com/containers/image/v5 from 5.32.1 to 5.32.2 Bumps [github.com/containers/image/v5](https://github.com/containers/image) from 5.32.1 to 5.32.2. - [Release notes](https://github.com/containers/image/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/containers/image/compare/v5.32.1...v5.32.2) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: github.com/containers/image/v5 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-patch ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] --- go.mod | 2 +- go.sum | 4 +- .../image/v5/signature/fulcio_cert.go | 4 +- .../image/v5/signature/internal/rekor_set.go | 11 +- .../v5/signature/internal/sigstore_payload.go | 61 ++++-- .../v5/signature/policy_config_sigstore.go | 133 +++++++++++-- .../v5/signature/policy_eval_signedby.go | 38 ++-- .../v5/signature/policy_eval_sigstore.go | 184 ++++++++++++------ .../image/v5/signature/policy_types.go | 29 ++- .../containers/image/v5/version/version.go | 4 +- vendor/modules.txt | 2 +- 11 files changed, 341 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-) diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 1b88e6ee00..f2f1a1cd7f 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ require ( github.com/cavaliergopher/grab/v3 v3.0.1 github.com/cheggaaa/pb/v3 v3.1.5 github.com/containers/gvisor-tap-vsock v0.7.5 - github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.1 + github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.2 github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22 v22.5.0 github.com/crc-org/admin-helper v0.5.4 github.com/crc-org/machine v0.0.0-20240715101719-0c1bc9eb95f8 diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index fbba03469d..c9fdd51024 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ github.com/containerd/log v0.1.0 h1:TCJt7ioM2cr/tfR8GPbGf9/VRAX8D2B4PjzCpfX540I= github.com/containerd/log v0.1.0/go.mod h1:VRRf09a7mHDIRezVKTRCrOq78v577GXq3bSa3EhrzVo= github.com/containers/gvisor-tap-vsock v0.7.5 h1:bTy4u3DOmmUPwurL6me2rsgfypAFDhyeJleUcQmBR/E= github.com/containers/gvisor-tap-vsock v0.7.5/go.mod h1:GW9jOqAEEGdaS20XwTYdm6KCYDHIulOE/yEEOabkoE4= -github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.1 h1:fVa7GxRC4BCPGsfSRs4JY12WyeY26SUYQ0NuANaCFrI= -github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.1/go.mod h1:v1l73VeMugfj/QtKI+jhYbwnwFCFnNGckvbST3rQ5Hk= +github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.2 h1:SzNE2Y6sf9b1GJoC8qjCuMBXwQrACFp4p0RK15+4gmQ= +github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.2/go.mod h1:v1l73VeMugfj/QtKI+jhYbwnwFCFnNGckvbST3rQ5Hk= github.com/containers/libtrust v0.0.0-20230121012942-c1716e8a8d01 h1:Qzk5C6cYglewc+UyGf6lc8Mj2UaPTHy/iF2De0/77CA= github.com/containers/libtrust v0.0.0-20230121012942-c1716e8a8d01/go.mod h1:9rfv8iPl1ZP7aqh9YA68wnZv2NUDbXdcdPHVz0pFbPY= github.com/containers/ocicrypt v1.2.0 h1:X14EgRK3xNFvJEfI5O4Qn4T3E25ANudSOZz/sirVuPM= diff --git a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/fulcio_cert.go b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/fulcio_cert.go index 4e99864226..31dfdd3422 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/fulcio_cert.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/fulcio_cert.go @@ -195,10 +195,10 @@ func (f *fulcioTrustRoot) verifyFulcioCertificateAtTime(relevantTime time.Time, return untrustedCertificate.PublicKey, nil } -func verifyRekorFulcio(rekorPublicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, fulcioTrustRoot *fulcioTrustRoot, untrustedRekorSET []byte, +func verifyRekorFulcio(rekorPublicKeys []*ecdsa.PublicKey, fulcioTrustRoot *fulcioTrustRoot, untrustedRekorSET []byte, untrustedCertificateBytes []byte, untrustedIntermediateChainBytes []byte, untrustedBase64Signature string, untrustedPayloadBytes []byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error) { - rekorSETTime, err := internal.VerifyRekorSET(rekorPublicKey, untrustedRekorSET, untrustedCertificateBytes, + rekorSETTime, err := internal.VerifyRekorSET(rekorPublicKeys, untrustedRekorSET, untrustedCertificateBytes, untrustedBase64Signature, untrustedPayloadBytes) if err != nil { return nil, err diff --git a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/rekor_set.go b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/rekor_set.go index e79c91cf99..604c21c089 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/rekor_set.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/rekor_set.go @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func (p UntrustedRekorPayload) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) { // VerifyRekorSET verifies that unverifiedRekorSET is correctly signed by publicKey and matches the rest of the data. // Returns bundle upload time on success. -func VerifyRekorSET(publicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, unverifiedRekorSET []byte, unverifiedKeyOrCertBytes []byte, unverifiedBase64Signature string, unverifiedPayloadBytes []byte) (time.Time, error) { +func VerifyRekorSET(publicKeys []*ecdsa.PublicKey, unverifiedRekorSET []byte, unverifiedKeyOrCertBytes []byte, unverifiedBase64Signature string, unverifiedPayloadBytes []byte) (time.Time, error) { // FIXME: Should the publicKey parameter hard-code ecdsa? // == Parse SET bytes @@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ func VerifyRekorSET(publicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, unverifiedRekorSET []byte, unver return time.Time{}, NewInvalidSignatureError(fmt.Sprintf("canonicalizing Rekor SET JSON: %v", err)) } untrustedSETPayloadHash := sha256.Sum256(untrustedSETPayloadCanonicalBytes) - if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(publicKey, untrustedSETPayloadHash[:], untrustedSET.UntrustedSignedEntryTimestamp) { + publicKeymatched := false + for _, pk := range publicKeys { + if ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pk, untrustedSETPayloadHash[:], untrustedSET.UntrustedSignedEntryTimestamp) { + publicKeymatched = true + break + } + } + if !publicKeymatched { return time.Time{}, NewInvalidSignatureError("cryptographic signature verification of Rekor SET failed") } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/sigstore_payload.go b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/sigstore_payload.go index a2609c954b..8630b08e30 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/sigstore_payload.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/sigstore_payload.go @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import ( "encoding/json" "errors" "fmt" + "strings" "time" "github.com/containers/image/v5/version" @@ -171,24 +172,62 @@ type SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules struct { ValidateSignedDockerManifestDigest func(digest.Digest) error } -// VerifySigstorePayload verifies unverifiedBase64Signature of unverifiedPayload was correctly created by publicKey, and that its principal components +// verifySigstorePayloadBlobSignature verifies unverifiedSignature of unverifiedPayload was correctly created +// by any of the public keys in publicKeys. +// +// This is an internal implementation detail of VerifySigstorePayload and should have no other callers. +// It is INSUFFICIENT alone to consider the signature acceptable. +func verifySigstorePayloadBlobSignature(publicKeys []crypto.PublicKey, unverifiedPayload, unverifiedSignature []byte) error { + if len(publicKeys) == 0 { + return errors.New("Need at least one public key to verify the sigstore payload, but got 0") + } + + verifiers := make([]sigstoreSignature.Verifier, 0, len(publicKeys)) + for _, key := range publicKeys { + // Failing to load a verifier indicates that something is really, really + // invalid about the public key; prefer to fail even if the signature might be + // valid with other keys, so that users fix their fallback keys before they need them. + // For that reason, we even initialize all verifiers before trying to validate the signature + // with any key. + verifier, err := sigstoreSignature.LoadVerifier(key, sigstoreHarcodedHashAlgorithm) + if err != nil { + return err + } + verifiers = append(verifiers, verifier) + } + + var failures []string + for _, verifier := range verifiers { + // github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/cosign.verifyOCISignature uses signatureoptions.WithContext(), + // which seems to be not used by anything. So we don’t bother. + err := verifier.VerifySignature(bytes.NewReader(unverifiedSignature), bytes.NewReader(unverifiedPayload)) + if err == nil { + return nil + } + + failures = append(failures, err.Error()) + } + + if len(failures) == 0 { + // Coverage: We have checked there is at least one public key, any success causes an early return, + // and any failure adds an entry to failures => there must be at least one error. + return fmt.Errorf("Internal error: signature verification failed but no errors have been recorded") + } + return NewInvalidSignatureError("cryptographic signature verification failed: " + strings.Join(failures, ", ")) +} + +// VerifySigstorePayload verifies unverifiedBase64Signature of unverifiedPayload was correctly created by any of the public keys in publicKeys, and that its principal components // match expected values, both as specified by rules, and returns it. // We return an *UntrustedSigstorePayload, although nothing actually uses it, // just to double-check against stupid typos. -func VerifySigstorePayload(publicKey crypto.PublicKey, unverifiedPayload []byte, unverifiedBase64Signature string, rules SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules) (*UntrustedSigstorePayload, error) { - verifier, err := sigstoreSignature.LoadVerifier(publicKey, sigstoreHarcodedHashAlgorithm) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating verifier: %w", err) - } - +func VerifySigstorePayload(publicKeys []crypto.PublicKey, unverifiedPayload []byte, unverifiedBase64Signature string, rules SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules) (*UntrustedSigstorePayload, error) { unverifiedSignature, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(unverifiedBase64Signature) if err != nil { return nil, NewInvalidSignatureError(fmt.Sprintf("base64 decoding: %v", err)) } - // github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/cosign.verifyOCISignature uses signatureoptions.WithContext(), - // which seems to be not used by anything. So we don’t bother. - if err := verifier.VerifySignature(bytes.NewReader(unverifiedSignature), bytes.NewReader(unverifiedPayload)); err != nil { - return nil, NewInvalidSignatureError(fmt.Sprintf("cryptographic signature verification failed: %v", err)) + + if err := verifySigstorePayloadBlobSignature(publicKeys, unverifiedPayload, unverifiedSignature); err != nil { + return nil, err } var unmatchedPayload UntrustedSigstorePayload diff --git a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_config_sigstore.go b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_config_sigstore.go index beb5d0673e..965901e187 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_config_sigstore.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_config_sigstore.go @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package signature import ( "encoding/json" - "errors" "fmt" "github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal" @@ -15,29 +14,57 @@ type PRSigstoreSignedOption func(*prSigstoreSigned) error func PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPath(keyPath string) PRSigstoreSignedOption { return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { if pr.KeyPath != "" { - return errors.New(`"keyPath" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyPath" already specified`) } pr.KeyPath = keyPath return nil } } +// PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPaths specifies a value for the "keyPaths" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned. +func PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPaths(keyPaths []string) PRSigstoreSignedOption { + return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { + if pr.KeyPaths != nil { + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyPaths" already specified`) + } + if len(keyPaths) == 0 { + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyPaths" contains no entries`) + } + pr.KeyPaths = keyPaths + return nil + } +} + // PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyData specifies a value for the "keyData" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned. func PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyData(keyData []byte) PRSigstoreSignedOption { return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { if pr.KeyData != nil { - return errors.New(`"keyData" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyData" already specified`) } pr.KeyData = keyData return nil } } +// PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyDatas specifies a value for the "keyDatas" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned. +func PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyDatas(keyDatas [][]byte) PRSigstoreSignedOption { + return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { + if pr.KeyDatas != nil { + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyDatas" already specified`) + } + if len(keyDatas) == 0 { + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyDatas" contains no entries`) + } + pr.KeyDatas = keyDatas + return nil + } +} + // PRSigstoreSignedWithFulcio specifies a value for the "fulcio" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned. func PRSigstoreSignedWithFulcio(fulcio PRSigstoreSignedFulcio) PRSigstoreSignedOption { return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { if pr.Fulcio != nil { - return errors.New(`"fulcio" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"fulcio" already specified`) } pr.Fulcio = fulcio return nil @@ -48,29 +75,57 @@ func PRSigstoreSignedWithFulcio(fulcio PRSigstoreSignedFulcio) PRSigstoreSignedO func PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPath(rekorPublicKeyPath string) PRSigstoreSignedOption { return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { if pr.RekorPublicKeyPath != "" { - return errors.New(`"rekorPublicKeyPath" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublicKeyPath" already specified`) } pr.RekorPublicKeyPath = rekorPublicKeyPath return nil } } +// PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPaths specifies a value for the rRekorPublickeyPaths" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned. +func PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPaths(rekorPublickeyPaths []string) PRSigstoreSignedOption { + return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { + if pr.RekorPublicKeyPaths != nil { + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublickeyPaths" already specified`) + } + if len(rekorPublickeyPaths) == 0 { + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublickeyPaths" contains no entries`) + } + pr.RekorPublicKeyPaths = rekorPublickeyPaths + return nil + } +} + // PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyData specifies a value for the "rekorPublicKeyData" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned. func PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyData(rekorPublicKeyData []byte) PRSigstoreSignedOption { return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { if pr.RekorPublicKeyData != nil { - return errors.New(`"rekorPublicKeyData" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublicKeyData" already specified`) } pr.RekorPublicKeyData = rekorPublicKeyData return nil } } +// PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyDatas specifies a value for the "rekorPublickeyDatas" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned. +func PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyDatas(rekorPublickeyDatas [][]byte) PRSigstoreSignedOption { + return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { + if pr.RekorPublicKeyDatas != nil { + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublickeyDatas" already specified`) + } + if len(rekorPublickeyDatas) == 0 { + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublickeyDatas" contains no entries`) + } + pr.RekorPublicKeyDatas = rekorPublickeyDatas + return nil + } +} + // PRSigstoreSignedWithSignedIdentity specifies a value for the "signedIdentity" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned. func PRSigstoreSignedWithSignedIdentity(signedIdentity PolicyReferenceMatch) PRSigstoreSignedOption { return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error { if pr.SignedIdentity != nil { - return errors.New(`"signedIdentity" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"signedIdentity" already specified`) } pr.SignedIdentity = signedIdentity return nil @@ -92,21 +147,40 @@ func newPRSigstoreSigned(options ...PRSigstoreSignedOption) (*prSigstoreSigned, if res.KeyPath != "" { keySources++ } + if res.KeyPaths != nil { + keySources++ + } if res.KeyData != nil { keySources++ } + if res.KeyDatas != nil { + keySources++ + } if res.Fulcio != nil { keySources++ } if keySources != 1 { - return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("exactly one of keyPath, keyData and fulcio must be specified") + return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("exactly one of keyPath, keyPaths, keyData, keyDatas and fulcio must be specified") } - if res.RekorPublicKeyPath != "" && res.RekorPublicKeyData != nil { - return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("rekorPublickeyType and rekorPublickeyData cannot be used simultaneously") + rekorSources := 0 + if res.RekorPublicKeyPath != "" { + rekorSources++ + } + if res.RekorPublicKeyPaths != nil { + rekorSources++ + } + if res.RekorPublicKeyData != nil { + rekorSources++ + } + if res.RekorPublicKeyDatas != nil { + rekorSources++ } - if res.Fulcio != nil && res.RekorPublicKeyPath == "" && res.RekorPublicKeyData == nil { - return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("At least one of RekorPublickeyPath and RekorPublickeyData must be specified if fulcio is used") + if rekorSources > 1 { + return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("at most one of rekorPublickeyPath, rekorPublicKeyPaths, rekorPublickeyData and rekorPublicKeyDatas can be used simultaneously") + } + if res.Fulcio != nil && rekorSources == 0 { + return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("At least one of rekorPublickeyPath, rekorPublicKeyPaths, rekorPublickeyData and rekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified if fulcio is used") } if res.SignedIdentity == nil { @@ -144,7 +218,8 @@ var _ json.Unmarshaler = (*prSigstoreSigned)(nil) func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error { *pr = prSigstoreSigned{} var tmp prSigstoreSigned - var gotKeyPath, gotKeyData, gotFulcio, gotRekorPublicKeyPath, gotRekorPublicKeyData bool + var gotKeyPath, gotKeyPaths, gotKeyData, gotKeyDatas, gotFulcio bool + var gotRekorPublicKeyPath, gotRekorPublicKeyPaths, gotRekorPublicKeyData, gotRekorPublicKeyDatas bool var fulcio prSigstoreSignedFulcio var signedIdentity json.RawMessage if err := internal.ParanoidUnmarshalJSONObject(data, func(key string) any { @@ -154,18 +229,30 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error { case "keyPath": gotKeyPath = true return &tmp.KeyPath + case "keyPaths": + gotKeyPaths = true + return &tmp.KeyPaths case "keyData": gotKeyData = true return &tmp.KeyData + case "keyDatas": + gotKeyDatas = true + return &tmp.KeyDatas case "fulcio": gotFulcio = true return &fulcio case "rekorPublicKeyPath": gotRekorPublicKeyPath = true return &tmp.RekorPublicKeyPath + case "rekorPublicKeyPaths": + gotRekorPublicKeyPaths = true + return &tmp.RekorPublicKeyPaths case "rekorPublicKeyData": gotRekorPublicKeyData = true return &tmp.RekorPublicKeyData + case "rekorPublicKeyDatas": + gotRekorPublicKeyDatas = true + return &tmp.RekorPublicKeyDatas case "signedIdentity": return &signedIdentity default: @@ -192,18 +279,30 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error { if gotKeyPath { opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPath(tmp.KeyPath)) } + if gotKeyPaths { + opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPaths(tmp.KeyPaths)) + } if gotKeyData { opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyData(tmp.KeyData)) } + if gotKeyDatas { + opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyDatas(tmp.KeyDatas)) + } if gotFulcio { opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithFulcio(&fulcio)) } if gotRekorPublicKeyPath { opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPath(tmp.RekorPublicKeyPath)) } + if gotRekorPublicKeyPaths { + opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPaths(tmp.RekorPublicKeyPaths)) + } if gotRekorPublicKeyData { opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyData(tmp.RekorPublicKeyData)) } + if gotRekorPublicKeyDatas { + opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyDatas(tmp.RekorPublicKeyDatas)) + } opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithSignedIdentity(tmp.SignedIdentity)) res, err := newPRSigstoreSigned(opts...) @@ -221,7 +320,7 @@ type PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption func(*prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithCAPath(caPath string) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption { return func(f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error { if f.CAPath != "" { - return errors.New(`"caPath" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"caPath" already specified`) } f.CAPath = caPath return nil @@ -232,7 +331,7 @@ func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithCAPath(caPath string) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOptio func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithCAData(caData []byte) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption { return func(f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error { if f.CAData != nil { - return errors.New(`"caData" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"caData" already specified`) } f.CAData = caData return nil @@ -243,7 +342,7 @@ func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithCAData(caData []byte) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOptio func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithOIDCIssuer(oidcIssuer string) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption { return func(f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error { if f.OIDCIssuer != "" { - return errors.New(`"oidcIssuer" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"oidcIssuer" already specified`) } f.OIDCIssuer = oidcIssuer return nil @@ -254,7 +353,7 @@ func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithOIDCIssuer(oidcIssuer string) PRSigstoreSignedFul func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithSubjectEmail(subjectEmail string) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption { return func(f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error { if f.SubjectEmail != "" { - return errors.New(`"subjectEmail" already specified`) + return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"subjectEmail" already specified`) } f.SubjectEmail = subjectEmail return nil diff --git a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_signedby.go b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_signedby.go index 896ca5a60d..e5c9329185 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_signedby.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_signedby.go @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import ( "context" "errors" "fmt" - "os" "slices" "github.com/containers/image/v5/internal/multierr" @@ -27,33 +26,18 @@ func (pr *prSignedBy) isSignatureAuthorAccepted(ctx context.Context, image priva } // FIXME: move this to per-context initialization - var data [][]byte - keySources := 0 - if pr.KeyPath != "" { - keySources++ - d, err := os.ReadFile(pr.KeyPath) - if err != nil { - return sarRejected, nil, err - } - data = [][]byte{d} - } - if pr.KeyPaths != nil { - keySources++ - data = [][]byte{} - for _, path := range pr.KeyPaths { - d, err := os.ReadFile(path) - if err != nil { - return sarRejected, nil, err - } - data = append(data, d) - } - } - if pr.KeyData != nil { - keySources++ - data = [][]byte{pr.KeyData} + const notOneSourceErrorText = `Internal inconsistency: not exactly one of "keyPath", "keyPaths" and "keyData" specified` + data, err := loadBytesFromConfigSources(configBytesSources{ + inconsistencyErrorMessage: notOneSourceErrorText, + path: pr.KeyPath, + paths: pr.KeyPaths, + data: pr.KeyData, + }) + if err != nil { + return sarRejected, nil, err } - if keySources != 1 { - return sarRejected, nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: not exactly one of "keyPath", "keyPaths" and "keyData" specified`) + if data == nil { + return sarRejected, nil, errors.New(notOneSourceErrorText) } // FIXME: move this to per-context initialization diff --git a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_sigstore.go b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_sigstore.go index 4851650778..9c553771cb 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_sigstore.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_sigstore.go @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import ( "errors" "fmt" "os" + "strings" "github.com/containers/image/v5/internal/multierr" "github.com/containers/image/v5/internal/private" @@ -20,37 +21,69 @@ import ( "github.com/sigstore/sigstore/pkg/cryptoutils" ) -// loadBytesFromDataOrPath ensures there is at most one of ${prefix}Data and ${prefix}Path set, +// configBytesSources contains configuration fields which may result in one or more []byte values +type configBytesSources struct { + inconsistencyErrorMessage string // Error to return if more than one source is set + path string // …Path: a path to a file containing the data, or "" + paths []string // …Paths: paths to files containing the data, or nil + data []byte // …Data: a single instance ofhe raw data, or nil + datas [][]byte // …Datas: the raw data, or nil // codespell:ignore datas +} + +// loadBytesFromConfigSources ensures at most one of the sources in src is set, // and returns the referenced data, or nil if neither is set. -func loadBytesFromDataOrPath(prefix string, data []byte, path string) ([]byte, error) { - switch { - case data != nil && path != "": - return nil, fmt.Errorf(`Internal inconsistency: both "%sPath" and "%sData" specified`, prefix, prefix) - case path != "": - d, err := os.ReadFile(path) +func loadBytesFromConfigSources(src configBytesSources) ([][]byte, error) { + sources := 0 + var data [][]byte // = nil + if src.path != "" { + sources++ + d, err := os.ReadFile(src.path) if err != nil { return nil, err } - return d, nil - case data != nil: - return data, nil - default: // Nothing - return nil, nil + data = [][]byte{d} + } + if src.paths != nil { + sources++ + data = [][]byte{} + for _, path := range src.paths { + d, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + data = append(data, d) + } } + if src.data != nil { + sources++ + data = [][]byte{src.data} + } + if src.datas != nil { // codespell:ignore datas + sources++ + data = src.datas // codespell:ignore datas + } + if sources > 1 { + return nil, errors.New(src.inconsistencyErrorMessage) + } + return data, nil } // prepareTrustRoot creates a fulcioTrustRoot from the input data. // (This also prevents external implementations of this interface, ensuring that prSigstoreSignedFulcio is the only one.) func (f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) prepareTrustRoot() (*fulcioTrustRoot, error) { - caCertBytes, err := loadBytesFromDataOrPath("fulcioCA", f.CAData, f.CAPath) + caCertPEMs, err := loadBytesFromConfigSources(configBytesSources{ + inconsistencyErrorMessage: `Internal inconsistency: both "caPath" and "caData" specified`, + path: f.CAPath, + data: f.CAData, + }) if err != nil { return nil, err } - if caCertBytes == nil { - return nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: Fulcio specified with neither "caPath" nor "caData"`) + if len(caCertPEMs) != 1 { + return nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: Fulcio specified with not exactly one of "caPath" nor "caData"`) } certs := x509.NewCertPool() - if ok := certs.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCertBytes); !ok { + if ok := certs.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCertPEMs[0]); !ok { return nil, errors.New("error loading Fulcio CA certificates") } fulcio := fulcioTrustRoot{ @@ -66,24 +99,35 @@ func (f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) prepareTrustRoot() (*fulcioTrustRoot, error) { // sigstoreSignedTrustRoot contains an already parsed version of the prSigstoreSigned policy type sigstoreSignedTrustRoot struct { - publicKey crypto.PublicKey - fulcio *fulcioTrustRoot - rekorPublicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey + publicKeys []crypto.PublicKey + fulcio *fulcioTrustRoot + rekorPublicKeys []*ecdsa.PublicKey } func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) prepareTrustRoot() (*sigstoreSignedTrustRoot, error) { res := sigstoreSignedTrustRoot{} - publicKeyPEM, err := loadBytesFromDataOrPath("key", pr.KeyData, pr.KeyPath) + publicKeyPEMs, err := loadBytesFromConfigSources(configBytesSources{ + inconsistencyErrorMessage: `Internal inconsistency: more than one of "keyPath", "keyPaths", "keyData", "keyDatas" specified`, + path: pr.KeyPath, + paths: pr.KeyPaths, + data: pr.KeyData, + datas: pr.KeyDatas, // codespell:ignore datas + }) if err != nil { return nil, err } - if publicKeyPEM != nil { - pk, err := cryptoutils.UnmarshalPEMToPublicKey(publicKeyPEM) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing public key: %w", err) + if publicKeyPEMs != nil { + for index, keyData := range publicKeyPEMs { + pk, err := cryptoutils.UnmarshalPEMToPublicKey(keyData) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing public key %d: %w", index+1, err) + } + res.publicKeys = append(res.publicKeys, pk) + } + if len(res.publicKeys) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: "keyPath", "keyPaths", "keyData" and "keyDatas" produced no public keys`) } - res.publicKey = pk } if pr.Fulcio != nil { @@ -94,21 +138,32 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) prepareTrustRoot() (*sigstoreSignedTrustRoot, error) res.fulcio = f } - rekorPublicKeyPEM, err := loadBytesFromDataOrPath("rekorPublicKey", pr.RekorPublicKeyData, pr.RekorPublicKeyPath) + rekorPublicKeyPEMs, err := loadBytesFromConfigSources(configBytesSources{ + inconsistencyErrorMessage: `Internal inconsistency: both "rekorPublicKeyPath" and "rekorPublicKeyData" specified`, + path: pr.RekorPublicKeyPath, + paths: pr.RekorPublicKeyPaths, + data: pr.RekorPublicKeyData, + datas: pr.RekorPublicKeyDatas, // codespell:ignore datas + }) if err != nil { return nil, err } - if rekorPublicKeyPEM != nil { - pk, err := cryptoutils.UnmarshalPEMToPublicKey(rekorPublicKeyPEM) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing Rekor public key: %w", err) - } - pkECDSA, ok := pk.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) - if !ok { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("Rekor public key is not using ECDSA") + if rekorPublicKeyPEMs != nil { + for index, pem := range rekorPublicKeyPEMs { + pk, err := cryptoutils.UnmarshalPEMToPublicKey(pem) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing Rekor public key %d: %w", index+1, err) + } + pkECDSA, ok := pk.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("Rekor public key %d is not using ECDSA", index+1) + } + res.rekorPublicKeys = append(res.rekorPublicKeys, pkECDSA) + } + if len(res.rekorPublicKeys) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: "rekorPublicKeyPath", "rekorPublicKeyPaths", "rekorPublicKeyData" and "rekorPublicKeyDatas" produced no public keys`) } - res.rekorPublicKey = pkECDSA } return &res, nil @@ -134,37 +189,51 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) isSignatureAccepted(ctx context.Context, image priva } untrustedPayload := sig.UntrustedPayload() - var publicKey crypto.PublicKey + var publicKeys []crypto.PublicKey switch { - case trustRoot.publicKey != nil && trustRoot.fulcio != nil: // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations. + case trustRoot.publicKeys != nil && trustRoot.fulcio != nil: // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations. return sarRejected, errors.New("Internal inconsistency: Both a public key and Fulcio CA specified") - case trustRoot.publicKey == nil && trustRoot.fulcio == nil: // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations. + case trustRoot.publicKeys == nil && trustRoot.fulcio == nil: // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations. return sarRejected, errors.New("Internal inconsistency: Neither a public key nor a Fulcio CA specified") - case trustRoot.publicKey != nil: - if trustRoot.rekorPublicKey != nil { + case trustRoot.publicKeys != nil: + if trustRoot.rekorPublicKeys != nil { untrustedSET, ok := untrustedAnnotations[signature.SigstoreSETAnnotationKey] if !ok { // For user convenience; passing an empty []byte to VerifyRekorSet should work. return sarRejected, fmt.Errorf("missing %s annotation", signature.SigstoreSETAnnotationKey) } - // We could use publicKeyPEM directly, but let’s re-marshal to avoid inconsistencies. - // FIXME: We could just generate DER instead of the full PEM text - recreatedPublicKeyPEM, err := cryptoutils.MarshalPublicKeyToPEM(trustRoot.publicKey) - if err != nil { - // Coverage: The key was loaded from a PEM format, so it’s unclear how this could fail. - // (PEM is not essential, MarshalPublicKeyToPEM can only fail if marshaling to ASN1.DER fails.) - return sarRejected, fmt.Errorf("re-marshaling public key to PEM: %w", err) + var rekorFailures []string + for _, candidatePublicKey := range trustRoot.publicKeys { + // We could use publicKeyPEM directly, but let’s re-marshal to avoid inconsistencies. + // FIXME: We could just generate DER instead of the full PEM text + recreatedPublicKeyPEM, err := cryptoutils.MarshalPublicKeyToPEM(candidatePublicKey) + if err != nil { + // Coverage: The key was loaded from a PEM format, so it’s unclear how this could fail. + // (PEM is not essential, MarshalPublicKeyToPEM can only fail if marshaling to ASN1.DER fails.) + return sarRejected, fmt.Errorf("re-marshaling public key to PEM: %w", err) + } + // We don’t care about the Rekor timestamp, just about log presence. + _, err = internal.VerifyRekorSET(trustRoot.rekorPublicKeys, []byte(untrustedSET), recreatedPublicKeyPEM, untrustedBase64Signature, untrustedPayload) + if err == nil { + publicKeys = append(publicKeys, candidatePublicKey) + break // The SET can only accept one public key entry, so if we found one, the rest either doesn’t match or is a duplicate + } + rekorFailures = append(rekorFailures, err.Error()) } - // We don’t care about the Rekor timestamp, just about log presence. - if _, err := internal.VerifyRekorSET(trustRoot.rekorPublicKey, []byte(untrustedSET), recreatedPublicKeyPEM, untrustedBase64Signature, untrustedPayload); err != nil { - return sarRejected, err + if len(publicKeys) == 0 { + if len(rekorFailures) == 0 { + // Coverage: We have ensured that len(trustRoot.publicKeys) != 0, when nothing succeeds, there must be at least one failure. + return sarRejected, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: Rekor SET did not match any key but we have no failures.`) + } + return sarRejected, internal.NewInvalidSignatureError(fmt.Sprintf("No public key verified against the RekorSET: %s", strings.Join(rekorFailures, ", "))) } + } else { + publicKeys = trustRoot.publicKeys } - publicKey = trustRoot.publicKey case trustRoot.fulcio != nil: - if trustRoot.rekorPublicKey == nil { // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations. + if trustRoot.rekorPublicKeys == nil { // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations. return sarRejected, errors.New("Internal inconsistency: Fulcio CA specified without a Rekor public key") } untrustedSET, ok := untrustedAnnotations[signature.SigstoreSETAnnotationKey] @@ -179,19 +248,20 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) isSignatureAccepted(ctx context.Context, image priva if untrustedIntermediateChain, ok := untrustedAnnotations[signature.SigstoreIntermediateCertificateChainAnnotationKey]; ok { untrustedIntermediateChainBytes = []byte(untrustedIntermediateChain) } - pk, err := verifyRekorFulcio(trustRoot.rekorPublicKey, trustRoot.fulcio, + pk, err := verifyRekorFulcio(trustRoot.rekorPublicKeys, trustRoot.fulcio, []byte(untrustedSET), []byte(untrustedCert), untrustedIntermediateChainBytes, untrustedBase64Signature, untrustedPayload) if err != nil { return sarRejected, err } - publicKey = pk + publicKeys = []crypto.PublicKey{pk} } - if publicKey == nil { - // Coverage: This should never happen, we have already excluded the possibility in the switch above. + if len(publicKeys) == 0 { + // Coverage: This should never happen, we ensured that trustRoot.publicKeys is non-empty if set, + // and we have already excluded the possibility in the switch above. return sarRejected, fmt.Errorf("Internal inconsistency: publicKey not set before verifying sigstore payload") } - signature, err := internal.VerifySigstorePayload(publicKey, untrustedPayload, untrustedBase64Signature, internal.SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules{ + signature, err := internal.VerifySigstorePayload(publicKeys, untrustedPayload, untrustedBase64Signature, internal.SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules{ ValidateSignedDockerReference: func(ref string) error { if !pr.SignedIdentity.matchesDockerReference(image, ref) { return PolicyRequirementError(fmt.Sprintf("Signature for identity %q is not accepted", ref)) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_types.go b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_types.go index 96e91a0a9c..32aa1c0ad4 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_types.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_types.go @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ type prSignedBy struct { // KeyPath is a pathname to a local file containing the trusted key(s). Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths and KeyData must be specified. KeyPath string `json:"keyPath,omitempty"` - // KeyPaths if a set of pathnames to local files containing the trusted key(s). Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths and KeyData must be specified. + // KeyPaths is a set of pathnames to local files containing the trusted key(s). Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths and KeyData must be specified. KeyPaths []string `json:"keyPaths,omitempty"` // KeyData contains the trusted key(s), base64-encoded. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths and KeyData must be specified. KeyData []byte `json:"keyData,omitempty"` @@ -111,24 +111,35 @@ type prSignedBaseLayer struct { type prSigstoreSigned struct { prCommon - // KeyPath is a pathname to a local file containing the trusted key. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyData, Fulcio must be specified. + // KeyPath is a pathname to a local file containing the trusted key. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified. KeyPath string `json:"keyPath,omitempty"` - // KeyData contains the trusted key, base64-encoded. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyData, Fulcio must be specified. + // KeyPaths is a set of pathnames to local files containing the trusted key(s). Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified. + KeyPaths []string `json:"keyPaths,omitempty"` + // KeyData contains the trusted key, base64-encoded. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified. KeyData []byte `json:"keyData,omitempty"` - // FIXME: Multiple public keys? + // KeyDatas is a set of trusted keys, base64-encoded. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified. + KeyDatas [][]byte `json:"keyDatas,omitempty"` - // Fulcio specifies which Fulcio-generated certificates are accepted. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyData, Fulcio must be specified. + // Fulcio specifies which Fulcio-generated certificates are accepted. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified. // If Fulcio is specified, one of RekorPublicKeyPath or RekorPublicKeyData must be specified as well. Fulcio PRSigstoreSignedFulcio `json:"fulcio,omitempty"` // RekorPublicKeyPath is a pathname to local file containing a public key of a Rekor server which must record acceptable signatures. - // If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath or RekorPublicKeyData must be specified as well; otherwise it is optional - // (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified). + // If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath, RekorPublicKeyPaths, RekorPublicKeyData and RekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified as well; + // otherwise it is optional (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified). RekorPublicKeyPath string `json:"rekorPublicKeyPath,omitempty"` + // RekorPublicKeyPaths is a set of pathnames to local files, each containing a public key of a Rekor server. One of the keys must record acceptable signatures. + // If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath, RekorPublicKeyPaths, RekorPublicKeyData and RekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified as well; + // otherwise it is optional (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified). + RekorPublicKeyPaths []string `json:"rekorPublicKeyPaths,omitempty"` // RekorPublicKeyPath contain a base64-encoded public key of a Rekor server which must record acceptable signatures. - // If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath or RekorPublicKeyData must be specified as well; otherwise it is optional - // (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified). + // If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath, RekorPublicKeyPaths, RekorPublicKeyData and RekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified as well; + // otherwise it is optional (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified). RekorPublicKeyData []byte `json:"rekorPublicKeyData,omitempty"` + // RekorPublicKeyDatas each contain a base64-encoded public key of a Rekor server. One of the keys must record acceptable signatures. + // If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath, RekorPublicKeyPaths, RekorPublicKeyData and RekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified as well; + // otherwise it is optional (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified). + RekorPublicKeyDatas [][]byte `json:"rekorPublicKeyDatas,omitempty"` // SignedIdentity specifies what image identity the signature must be claiming about the image. // Defaults to "matchRepoDigestOrExact" if not specified. diff --git a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/version/version.go b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/version/version.go index 19f708adb9..64e4687259 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/version/version.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/version/version.go @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ const ( // VersionMajor is for an API incompatible changes VersionMajor = 5 // VersionMinor is for functionality in a backwards-compatible manner - VersionMinor = 33 + VersionMinor = 32 // VersionPatch is for backwards-compatible bug fixes - VersionPatch = 1 + VersionPatch = 2 // VersionDev indicates development branch. Releases will be empty string. VersionDev = "" diff --git a/vendor/modules.txt b/vendor/modules.txt index 69ef4930ce..e9d29a7b5b 100644 --- a/vendor/modules.txt +++ b/vendor/modules.txt @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ github.com/containers/gvisor-tap-vsock/pkg/tap github.com/containers/gvisor-tap-vsock/pkg/transport github.com/containers/gvisor-tap-vsock/pkg/types github.com/containers/gvisor-tap-vsock/pkg/virtualnetwork -# github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.1 +# github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.2 ## explicit; go 1.21.0 github.com/containers/image/v5/copy github.com/containers/image/v5/directory