EPIC: Remove VSCMaturedPacket

[insumity]

Problem

This ticket is created to track the work on whether we can remove VSCMaturedPackets from cross chain validation.
The problem behind the VSCMaturedPackets is that they pause unbonding on the provider chain. The provider chain can only unbond tokens after it has received VSCMaturedPackets from all the consumer chains. The use of VSCMaturedPacket complicates the protocol and can lead to unbonding delays (e.g., see here).

Tasks (to be updated)

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1. CCV's VSCMaturedPacket: What are the trust assumptions? #1011
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2. What are the safety/liveness properties CCV should satisfy?
3. Can we get real data on the currently relayed packets to have a more realistic view of what the model should capture? For example, are multi-day delays the norm, etc.?

Closing criteria

Reach to a conclusion on whether we can get rid of VSCMaturedPacket or not and under what assumptions.

[insumity]

Closing the whole EPIC because we reached to the conclusion that we cannot remove VSCMaturedPackets as is without potentially compromising the security of 3rd-party-chain light clients that track a consumer chain. This is shown in this document.