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decode_response.go
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decode_response.go
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// Copyright 2016 Russell Haering et al.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package saml2
import (
"bytes"
"compress/flate"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"encoding/xml"
"github.com/beevik/etree"
"github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/types"
dsig "github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig"
"github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig/etreeutils"
rtvalidator "github.com/mattermost/xml-roundtrip-validator"
)
func (sp *SAMLServiceProvider) validationContext() *dsig.ValidationContext {
ctx := dsig.NewDefaultValidationContext(sp.IDPCertificateStore)
ctx.Clock = sp.Clock
return ctx
}
// validateResponseAttributes validates a SAML Response's tag and attributes. It does
// not inspect child elements of the Response at all.
func (sp *SAMLServiceProvider) validateResponseAttributes(response *types.Response) error {
if response.Destination != "" && response.Destination != sp.AssertionConsumerServiceURL {
return ErrInvalidValue{
Key: DestinationAttr,
Expected: sp.AssertionConsumerServiceURL,
Actual: response.Destination,
}
}
if response.Version != "2.0" {
return ErrInvalidValue{
Reason: ReasonUnsupported,
Key: "SAML version",
Expected: "2.0",
Actual: response.Version,
}
}
return nil
}
// validateLogoutResponseAttributes validates a SAML Response's tag and attributes. It does
// not inspect child elements of the Response at all.
func (sp *SAMLServiceProvider) validateLogoutResponseAttributes(response *types.LogoutResponse) error {
if response.Destination != "" && response.Destination != sp.ServiceProviderSLOURL {
return ErrInvalidValue{
Key: DestinationAttr,
Expected: sp.ServiceProviderSLOURL,
Actual: response.Destination,
}
}
if response.Version != "2.0" {
return ErrInvalidValue{
Reason: ReasonUnsupported,
Key: "SAML version",
Expected: "2.0",
Actual: response.Version,
}
}
return nil
}
func xmlUnmarshalElement(el *etree.Element, obj interface{}) error {
doc := etree.NewDocument()
doc.SetRoot(el)
data, err := doc.WriteToBytes()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = xml.Unmarshal(data, obj)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (sp *SAMLServiceProvider) getDecryptCert() (*tls.Certificate, error) {
if sp.SPKeyStore == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no decryption certs available")
}
//This is the tls.Certificate we'll use to decrypt any encrypted assertions
var decryptCert tls.Certificate
switch crt := sp.SPKeyStore.(type) {
case dsig.TLSCertKeyStore:
// Get the tls.Certificate directly if possible
decryptCert = tls.Certificate(crt)
default:
//Otherwise, construct one from the results of GetKeyPair
pk, cert, err := sp.SPKeyStore.GetKeyPair()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error getting keypair: %v", err)
}
decryptCert = tls.Certificate{
Certificate: [][]byte{cert},
PrivateKey: pk,
}
}
if sp.ValidateEncryptionCert {
// Check Validity period of certificate
if len(decryptCert.Certificate) < 1 || len(decryptCert.Certificate[0]) < 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty decryption cert")
} else if cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(decryptCert.Certificate[0]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid x509 decryption cert: %v", err)
} else {
now := sp.Clock.Now()
if now.Before(cert.NotBefore) || now.After(cert.NotAfter) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decryption cert is not valid at this time")
}
}
}
return &decryptCert, nil
}
func (sp *SAMLServiceProvider) decryptAssertions(el *etree.Element) error {
var decryptCert *tls.Certificate
decryptAssertion := func(ctx etreeutils.NSContext, encryptedElement *etree.Element) error {
if encryptedElement.Parent() != el {
return fmt.Errorf("found encrypted assertion with unexpected parent element: %s", encryptedElement.Parent().Tag)
}
detached, err := etreeutils.NSDetatch(ctx, encryptedElement) // make a detached copy
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to detach encrypted assertion: %v", err)
}
encryptedAssertion := &types.EncryptedAssertion{}
err = xmlUnmarshalElement(detached, encryptedAssertion)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to unmarshal encrypted assertion: %v", err)
}
if decryptCert == nil {
decryptCert, err = sp.getDecryptCert()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to get decryption certificate: %v", err)
}
}
raw, derr := encryptedAssertion.DecryptBytes(decryptCert)
if derr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to decrypt encrypted assertion: %v", derr)
}
doc, _, err := parseResponse(raw)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to create element from decrypted assertion bytes: %v", derr)
}
// Replace the original encrypted assertion with the decrypted one.
if el.RemoveChild(encryptedElement) == nil {
// Out of an abundance of caution, make sure removed worked
panic("unable to remove encrypted assertion")
}
el.AddChild(doc.Root())
return nil
}
if err := etreeutils.NSFindIterate(el, SAMLAssertionNamespace, EncryptedAssertionTag, decryptAssertion); err != nil {
return err
} else {
return nil
}
}
func (sp *SAMLServiceProvider) validateElementSignature(el *etree.Element) (*etree.Element, error) {
return sp.validationContext().Validate(el)
}
func (sp *SAMLServiceProvider) validateAssertionSignatures(el *etree.Element) error {
signedAssertions := 0
unsignedAssertions := 0
validateAssertion := func(ctx etreeutils.NSContext, unverifiedAssertion *etree.Element) error {
if unverifiedAssertion.Parent() != el {
return fmt.Errorf("found assertion with unexpected parent element: %s", unverifiedAssertion.Parent().Tag)
}
detached, err := etreeutils.NSDetatch(ctx, unverifiedAssertion) // make a detached copy
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to detach unverified assertion: %v", err)
}
assertion, err := sp.validationContext().Validate(detached)
if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
unsignedAssertions++
return nil
} else if err != nil {
return err
}
// Replace the original unverified Assertion with the verified one. Note that
// if the Response is not signed, only signed Assertions (and not the parent Response) can be trusted.
if el.RemoveChild(unverifiedAssertion) == nil {
// Out of an abundance of caution, check to make sure an Assertion was actually
// removed. If it wasn't a programming error has occurred.
panic("unable to remove assertion")
}
el.AddChild(assertion)
signedAssertions++
return nil
}
if err := etreeutils.NSFindIterate(el, SAMLAssertionNamespace, AssertionTag, validateAssertion); err != nil {
return err
} else if signedAssertions > 0 && unsignedAssertions > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid to have both signed and unsigned assertions")
} else if signedAssertions < 1 {
return dsig.ErrMissingSignature
} else {
return nil
}
}
//ValidateEncodedResponse both decodes and validates, based on SP
//configuration, an encoded, signed response. It will also appropriately
//decrypt a response if the assertion was encrypted
func (sp *SAMLServiceProvider) ValidateEncodedResponse(encodedResponse string) (*types.Response, error) {
raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encodedResponse)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Parse the raw response
doc, el, err := parseResponse(raw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var responseSignatureValidated bool
if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation {
el, err = sp.validateElementSignature(el)
if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
// Unfortunately we just blew away our Response
el = doc.Root()
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if el == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing transformed response")
} else {
responseSignatureValidated = true
}
}
err = sp.decryptAssertions(el)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var assertionSignaturesValidated bool
if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation {
err = sp.validateAssertionSignatures(el)
if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
if !responseSignatureValidated {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("response and/or assertions must be signed")
}
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else {
assertionSignaturesValidated = true
}
}
decodedResponse := &types.Response{}
err = xmlUnmarshalElement(el, decodedResponse)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to unmarshal response: %v", err)
}
decodedResponse.SignatureValidated = responseSignatureValidated
if assertionSignaturesValidated {
for idx := 0; idx < len(decodedResponse.Assertions); idx++ {
decodedResponse.Assertions[idx].SignatureValidated = true
}
}
err = sp.Validate(decodedResponse)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return decodedResponse, nil
}
// DecodeUnverifiedBaseResponse decodes several attributes from a SAML response for the purpose
// of determining how to validate the response. This is useful for Service Providers which
// expose a single Assertion Consumer Service URL but consume Responses from many IdPs.
func DecodeUnverifiedBaseResponse(encodedResponse string) (*types.UnverifiedBaseResponse, error) {
raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encodedResponse)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var response *types.UnverifiedBaseResponse
err = maybeDeflate(raw, func(maybeXML []byte) error {
response = &types.UnverifiedBaseResponse{}
return xml.Unmarshal(maybeXML, response)
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return response, nil
}
// maybeDeflate invokes the passed decoder over the passed data. If an error is
// returned, it then attempts to deflate the passed data before re-invoking
// the decoder over the deflated data.
func maybeDeflate(data []byte, decoder func([]byte) error) error {
err := decoder(data)
if err == nil {
return nil
}
deflated, err := ioutil.ReadAll(flate.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data)))
if err != nil {
return err
}
return decoder(deflated)
}
// parseResponse is a helper function that was refactored out so that the XML parsing behavior can be isolated and unit tested
func parseResponse(xml []byte) (*etree.Document, *etree.Element, error) {
var doc *etree.Document
var rawXML []byte
err := maybeDeflate(xml, func(xml []byte) error {
doc = etree.NewDocument()
rawXML = xml
return doc.ReadFromBytes(xml)
})
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
el := doc.Root()
if el == nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to parse response")
}
// Examine the response for attempts to exploit weaknesses in Go's encoding/xml
err = rtvalidator.Validate(bytes.NewReader(rawXML))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return doc, el, nil
}
// DecodeUnverifiedLogoutResponse decodes several attributes from a SAML Logout response, without doing any verifications.
func DecodeUnverifiedLogoutResponse(encodedResponse string) (*types.LogoutResponse, error) {
raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encodedResponse)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var response *types.LogoutResponse
err = maybeDeflate(raw, func(maybeXML []byte) error {
response = &types.LogoutResponse{}
return xml.Unmarshal(maybeXML, response)
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return response, nil
}
func (sp *SAMLServiceProvider) ValidateEncodedLogoutResponsePOST(encodedResponse string) (*types.LogoutResponse, error) {
raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encodedResponse)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Parse the raw response
doc, el, err := parseResponse(raw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var responseSignatureValidated bool
if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation {
el, err = sp.validateElementSignature(el)
if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
// Unfortunately we just blew away our Response
el = doc.Root()
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if el == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing transformed logout response")
} else {
responseSignatureValidated = true
}
}
decodedResponse := &types.LogoutResponse{}
err = xmlUnmarshalElement(el, decodedResponse)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to unmarshal logout response: %v", err)
}
decodedResponse.SignatureValidated = responseSignatureValidated
err = sp.ValidateDecodedLogoutResponse(decodedResponse)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return decodedResponse, nil
}